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巻頭言

人間主義の追求

創価大学平和問題研究所 所長 玉井秀樹

2016年、創価大学平和問題研究所は設立40周年を迎えた。創価大学は、建学の精神に「人類の平和を守るフォートレス（要塞）たれ」と掲げた通り、開学当初より平和創造の拠点たることを期していたが、平和学に関する具体的な取り組みは、1976年の平和問題研究所の設立に始まると言えるであろう。

研究所の最初の具体的な成果は開設から3年を経て1979年に創刊した研究紀要『創大平和研究』として結実する。この創刊号には創立者・池田大作先生から「21世紀への平和路線」を特別に寄稿していただいたが、この論稿に展開された、いわば「人間主義的平和観」とでもいうべき思考、そして、この立場からする政策研究という当研究所の活動方針が確定したとあってよいであろう。

平和問題研究所設立から「21世紀への平和路線」発表に至る1970年代の国際社会もまた大きな変動の10年間であった。70年代当初は、いわゆる米ソ緊張緩和（デタント）がすすみ、戦略兵器制限交渉が進展、1972年にはSALT Iが調印される。しかし、それは平和の到来を意味していたわけではなく、米ソの核爆弾製造数は急速に増加し、アジア・アフリカでの地域紛争なども断続的に勃発。また、1973年の第4次中東戦争を契機にアラブ産油国は石油戦略を発動し、いわゆる「石油危機」によって世界経済は大きなダメージを受けることになった。

当時の平和研究者は、「デタント」といわれながら核軍拡が進み、また、第三世界における貧困が深刻化し、地域紛争が頻発するという、「平和ではない」

状況が拡大する原因の究明に取り組み、国際社会の構造そのものに、平和を妨げる「暴力」を生み出す問題が生じているのだという批判的研究が発展した。この時期、1973年に日本平和学会が発足し、1975年に日本の大学初の平和研究所として広島大学平和科学研究センターが設立された。創価大学平和問題研究所は、このように日本における平和研究の制度化が進むなかで誕生したものである。

ところで、1977年になると米ソ関係は再び悪化の兆しを見せ始める。急速に進んだ核軍拡の結果、ソ連が新型の中距離核ミサイルを配備し、一方で米国は命中精度を上げた核ミサイル技術をもとにソ連の軍事目標を破壊する核配備をするという方針を打ち出す。そして、1979年はエポックメイキングとなった。中越紛争という社会主義世界の対立、イラン革命政権樹立という反米イスラム勢力の登場、そして、ソ連のアフガニスタン侵攻によって米ソ関係の悪化が決定的になった。SALT IIは批准されないままに終わり、いわゆる、「新・冷戦」が始まった。

『創大平和研究』創刊号、そして、「21世紀への平和路線」はこうした時代背景で生まれたものであった。

「21世紀への平和路線」ではその冒頭で、戦争がもたらす破壊と殺戮が、これまでの戦争正当化の理由を全く無意味にするほどに甚大な規模になっており、戦争を廃絶し、平和を追求しなければならないと主張する。そして、このような戦争の変質は、「人間が兵器を使うというよりも兵器に人間が使われる傾向が増大し、人間そのものが、兵器や戦争の全き支配下に置かれるようになってきた」ために生じたもので、このような人間支配をする戦争文明の行きつく先が核戦争の脅威であることを指摘し、核の脅威をこう説明する。

核戦争の脅威というものは、ヨーロッパ主導型の近代文明総体が直面している、一つのカタストロフィー（破局）であることが分かる。それは、近代史を通じて徐々に進行してきた、機械や政治機構による人間支配の完結ともいえる。したがって21世紀への平和路線を模索するには、そうした史的視野に立って、文明総体を問い直すという、広はんな分析、パースペク

ティブ（展望）が要請される。機械や巨大機構による人間支配から人間を救い出し、どう主役の座を回復せしむるかという、明確な目標を浮かび上がらせるために――

池田先生は、1978年の国連軍縮特別総会への軍縮提言を期に1983年からは毎年平和提言を発表されているが、これまで一貫して「国際社会に人間性を復権させることこそが、人類的課題解決への鍵となること」をさまざまな観点から提示されてきた。池田先生が言われる「人間性」、「ヒューマニティー」、「人間主義」とは、エゴイスティックな人間中心主義ではない。利他と創造性にあふれる働きをさして本来の「人間らしさ」といわれている。核戦争の脅威を高め、人々を殺戮してかえりみない残虐な人間の存在を冷徹に見据えたうえで、そのような人間を見放すのではなく、利他と創造の善なる存在へ変革するという道を提示されてきた。

この志向性は、「人間の生にとってかけがいのない中枢部分を守り、すべての人の自由と可能性を実現する」という人間の安全保障概念と深く共鳴するものであり、当研究所としても微力ながらこの課題に取り組んできたところである。

このほど発刊の運びとなった『創大平和研究』では、こうした当研究所の地道な取り組みのひとつの成果として開催したシンポジウムの内容を発表させていただくことができた。たいへんに有意義な知見を与えてくださった各シンポジウムのパネリストの先生方にあらためて御礼申し上げます。そして、このシンポジウムを可能にした、朴総長をはじめ韓国・慶南大学の諸先生、人間の安全保障学会の先生方、戸田記念国際平和研究所の皆様にも心より感謝申し上げます次第である。

慶南大学との研究協力は、朴総長の積極的な提案もあり、今後、台湾の中国文化大学を加えた3大学の共同事業として取り組む発展を見せた。2017年9月には、本学がホストとなって沖縄の地で国際会議を開催する予定となっている。誰もかけがえのない存在であるという人間主義の立場から、対立と分断を協和と連帯へ転換する創造に挑戦していきたい。

創価大学平和問題研究所設立40周年
グローバル・コア・センター設立記念シンポジウム
Symposium Commemorating the 40th Anniversary of SUPRI
and the Establishment of the Global Core Center

アジアにおける人間の安全保障の促進
— 韓・朝鮮半島の平和と安全保障共同体の形成 —

Human Security in Asia: Peace in the Korean Peninsula and
Peacebuilding in Northeast Asia

2016年5月21日

創価大学国際会議場

13:00-13:10 OPENING REMARK

Our Challenge to Peacebuilding through Education for Global
Citizens

Professor Dr. Yoshihisa Baba, the President of Soka University

PRESENTATION

13:15-13:35 “DPRK Nuclear Issue after the 4th Test”

Dr. Su-Hoon Lee (Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam
University)

13:40-14:00 “Domestic Politics and National Identity: Disentangling
Japan-South Korea Relations”

Dr. Kim Jung (Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University)

14:05-14:25 “Building a Security Community in the North-East Asia: Problems and Prospects”

Professor Dr. Kevin Clements (University of Otago, NCPCS, SUPRI)

15:15-16:45 Panel Discussion

【Moderator】 Professor Hideki Tamai (Director of SUPRI)

PANELISTS

Dr. Su-Hoon Lee

Professor, Kyungnam University

The former Director of Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)

Professor Su-hoon Lee received his Ph.D. in Comparative International Development and Sociology from Johns Hopkins University in 1986. In 1986, Dr. Lee joined Kyungnam University in Korea and simultaneously assumed the position of the Associate Director at its Institute for Far East Asian Studies (IFES) in Seoul. During 2009-2014, he served as the Director of IFES. He was a Visiting Professor at Keio University, Tokyo in 2015.

His academic activities include the President of the Korean Association of Comparative Sociology, Editor of Asian Perspective, Vice President of Korea Sociological Association, and Executive Member of International Sociological Association (2002-2006).

His monographs include State-Building in the Contemporary Third World (Westview Press, 1989), World-System Analysis (in Korean, 1993), For a Humane World-System (in Korean, 1999), Crisis and Capitalism of East Asia (in Korean, 2001), World-System. Northeast Asia. Korean Peninsula (in Korean, 2004), and In Search of a Common Future in Northeast Asia (in Korean, 2013). He has

also published numerous articles and book chapters on the world order, Northeast Asia, and the Korean peninsula.

He has served on various advisory committees of the ROK government. Since August 2005, he has assumed the Chair (Ministerial level position) of the 'Presidential Committee on Northeast Asian Initiative'. He accompanied President Roh Moo-hyun for the 2007 inter-Korean summit held in Pyongyang as one of the special delegation.

Dr. Kim Jung

Professor, University of North Korean Studies (UNKS)

Director for planning of Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES)

Jung Kim is an assistant professor of political science at University of North Korean Studies (UNKS) and director for planning at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies (IFES) of Kyungnam University in Seoul. He is also a lecturer at Graduate School of International Studies and Underwood International College of Yonsei University and an editorial committee member of Review of North Korean Studies. Prior to joining UNKS, he worked at East Asia Institute (2009-2013) and IFES (1996-2002) as a senior research fellow and held a visiting research position in Advanced Social and International Studies at University of Tokyo as a Fox International Fellow (2004-2005). He earned his undergraduate degree in political science from Korea University and graduated from Yale University with his doctoral degree in political science. He has published numerous articles in academic journals, including Asian Perspective and Asian Survey, and edited volumes, including Adapt, Fragment, Transform: Corporate Restructuring and System Reform in South Korea and Routledge

Dr. Kevin Clements

Professor, Otago University

Director of the New Zealand National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies (NCPACS)

Visiting Professor, Soka University Peace Research Institute (SUPRI)

Professor Clements is the Foundation Chair of Peace and Conflict Studies and Director of the New Zealand National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies (NCPACS) at the University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand, and Secretary General of the International Peace Research Association.

Prior to taking up these positions he was the Professor of Peace and Conflict Studies and Foundation Director of the Australian Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Queensland, Brisbane, Australia.

His career has been a combination of academic analysis and practice in the areas of peacebuilding and conflict transformation. Professor Clements has been a regular consultant to a variety of non-governmental and intergovernmental organisations on disarmament, arms control, conflict resolution, development and regional security issues.

He has written or edited 7 books and over 150 chapters/articles on conflict transformation, peacebuilding, preventive diplomacy and development with a specific focus on the Asia Pacific region.

主催者挨拶

地球市民育成による 平和構築への貢献をめざして

創価大学学長 馬場善久

本日は、創価大学平和問題研究所設立40周年、そして、グローバル・コア・センター設立を記念するシンポジウムをこのように盛大に開催することができました。週末のお忙しいところ、このように多くの皆様に御参加いただき、心より感謝申し上げます。たいへんにありがとうございました。

創価大学平和問題研究所は、建学の三精神の一つである「人類の平和を守るフォートレス（要塞）たれ」との理念に基づき、平和の達成に関する諸問題の調査・研究を行い、平和社会の建設と人類の福祉の向上に貢献することを目的として、1976年4月1日に設置されました。

1979年に創刊した研究所紀要『創大平和研究』に寄せられた創立者・池田大作先生の論稿「21世紀への平和路線」では、核兵器は人間を手段化し、ないがしろにする西欧近代文明の負の側面の象徴であると指摘し、核兵器の廃絶に挑むことは、現代文明に人間主義を復興させるという挑戦に他ならないと主張されました。研究所では、1981年に学術シンポジウム「核戦争の危機と人類生存の条件」を開催するなど、核兵器廃絶を重要なテーマとして取り組んできました。

また、1984年には環太平洋研究プロジェクトを立ち上げ『環太平洋諸国における安全保障問題と日本の課題』を出版し、以降、10年以上にわたり環太平洋シンポジウムを開催するなど、アジア・太平洋地域の平和と発展を探索する取り組みを続けてまいりました。

本学はもとより、関係諸国、団体などが、アジアの平和と発展のために様々に取り組んできましたが、変動し続ける国際社会の中で、いまだに安定した平和共同体をアジアに作り出すには至っておりません。それどころか、近年、関係諸国の利害対立が以前よりも先鋭化して現れ、軍事的な衝突の可能性さえ懸念される状況が生まれるようになっていきます。

今回のシンポジウムで焦点をあてる北東アジアとは、日本、韓国、北朝鮮、中国等によって構成されるエリアですが、日・韓・中三カ国の人口、GDP、工業生産力、軍事力はあまりにも巨大です。これほど強大な「パワー」が対立的関係であることは、地域だけでなく世界の安定と平和にとって最重要な課題であることは明白であります。

最重要な課題であることはその解決の道が簡単なものではないということでもあります。しかし、本学がこれまで取り組んできた経験、そして広く結んできた知的ネットワークという貴重な財産をもって、この難題解決にわずかながらでも貢献したいという思いで今回のシンポジウムを開催させていただきました。そして、本日はこの難しい問題を論じていただくのに相応しい研究者をお招きすることができたと考えています。

国際平和研究学会の事務局長などを歴任された世界的な平和学者であるケヴィン・クレメンツ教授、そして、世界トップレベルの韓半島問題研究拠点として知られている韓国・慶南大学の極東問題研究所からキム・ジュン教授とリ・スホン教授をお迎えすることができました。

クレメンツ教授は創立者・池田先生とも長年の親交があり、本学の研究・教育活動に大きな協力をしていただきました。今回は、本学平和問題研究所の客員教授として参加いただいております。

慶南大学との交流は、2015年に北韓大学院から創立者・池田大作先生への名誉講座教授として招聘いただき、そして、同年、慶南大学からは名誉博士号が授与されるなど、急速に発展してまいりました。本学と慶南大学との間では学生交流に加えて、朴総長の積極的な御提案もあり、極東問題研究所と平和問題研究所を中心に平和研究発展のために協力をすすめているところです。

昨年は朴総長の卓越したリーダーシップによって開催された「韓国グローバルフォーラム2015：分断から70年：朝鮮半島の過去・現在・未来」に招待をいただきました。今回、本学にとっては研究体制発展の画期となる記念シンポジウムに、極東問題研究所の気鋭の研究者をお招きすることができました。両大学の研究交流がいよいよ本格的に進展していることの証左であると心から嬉しく思いますし、関係各位に深く感謝申し上げます。

創価大学は建学の精神を現実世界にどのように具現化するのか、創立50周年が近づくなかグランドデザインを構想してまいりました。そして、「平和と持続可能なグローバル社会の構築を担う地球市民を育成する」ことこそ、人間教育の最高学府をめざす本学の使命であるとの結論に至り、「地球市民」育成の教育体制整備を本格化しました。こうした取り組みが文部科学省のスーパーグローバル大学創成支援事業にも採択され、教育体制の強化を進めているところでもあります。

「平和と持続可能な繁栄を先導する世界市民教育プログラム」を推進する中核組織が、このほど開設する運びとなったグローバル・コア・センターです。同センターは、今後、「平和」「開発」「環境」「人権」の分野での研究と交流事業を推進していくこととなりますが、その基底にあるのはあらゆる人々の尊厳ある生存を追求する普遍的な人間主義です。この志向性は、「人間の生にとってかけがいのない中枢部分を守り、すべての人の自由と可能性を実現する」という人間の安全保障概念と深く共鳴するものであり、本日のシンポジウムの統一テーマに人間の安全保障をとりいれたのもそうした理由からであります。

現実の北東アジア地域では、様々なレベルで対立的な生存競争が戦われているわけですが、本日のシンポジウムは、その困難を乗り越えて「すべての人の自由と可能性を実現する」方途を見出す、有意義なものとなることは間違いないと確信しております。

パネリストの諸先生をはじめ、本日御参加の皆様重ねて感謝申し上げます、挨拶に代えさせていただきます。本日はたいへんにありがとうございました。

OPENING REMARK

Contributing to peacebuilding through the training of global citizens

Yoshihisa Baba

President
Soka University

Today, we are able to hold this great symposium commemorating the 40th anniversary of the establishment of the Soka University Peace Research Institute and the establishment of the Global Core Center. I would like to express my gratitude to all of you for taking time from your busy weekend schedule to participate in this symposium. Thank you.

The Soka University Peace Research Institute was established on April 1, 1976, based on the concept of “Be a fortress for the peace of humankind,” which is one of the three founding principles, for the purpose of contributing to the establishment of a peaceful society and the improvement of human welfare by conducting surveys and research on the various problems related to the achievement of peace.

In an article by Dr. Daisaku Ikeda (the founder of the university), titled *Peace Guidelines toward the 21st Century*, which appeared in *Soka University Peace Research* (created by the institute in 1979), Dr.

Ikeda pointed out that nuclear weapons are symbolic of the negative aspects of modern Western civilization. Dr. Ikeda also wrote that Western civilization makes people into “a means” and neglects their intrinsic value, and he argued that the drive to eliminate nuclear weapons is equivalent to revitalizing humanism toward present-day civilization. The institute has thus been working on the elimination of nuclear weapons as an important topic, and held an academic symposium in 1981, titled “Crisis of Nuclear War and the Conditions for Human Survival.”

In addition, the Pacific Basin Research Project was launched in 1984, and *The Security of the Pacific Basin Countries and the Role of Japan* was published in the same year. Since then, the institute has worked on initiatives aimed at striving for the peace and development of the Asia Pacific region, such as by holding Pacific Basin Symposiums for over 10 years.

In addition to our university, other involved countries and organizations have been working in various ways toward peace and development in Asia. However, in the midst of an ever-changing international society, we have yet to succeed in creating a stable and peaceful community in Asia. Rather, in recent years, the conflicts of interests among concerned countries have become more pronounced, and furthermore, situations are arising in which even military incidents may occur.

Northeast Asia, which is the focus of this symposium, is an area consisting of Japan, South Korea, North Korea, China, and other countries, but the populations, GDPs, industrial capacities, and military capacities of the three countries of Japan, South Korea, and China are all too big. It is obvious that such big “powers” being in an adversarial relationship is the most critical issue not only for the

region but also for stability and peace around the world.

Also, the fact that it is the most critical issue means that it is not easy to solve. However, we decided to hold this symposium because we wanted to contribute to solving this difficult issue, if only just a little, by using the valuable assets of the experience gained through the initiatives that our university has been working on over the years along with the wide intellectual network that we have created. Moreover, I believe that today we have been able to invite researchers who are capable of discussing this difficult issue.

Today, we are able to welcome Professor Kevin Clements, an international scholar of Peace Studies who holds the position of Secretary General of the International Peace Research Association and other positions, along with Professor Jung Kim and Professor Su-Hoon Lee from the Institute for Far East Studies (IFES) at Kyungnam University in Korea, which is regarded as one of the top institutes around the world for studies regarding the Korean Peninsula.

Professor Clements is a long-time friend of university founder Dr. Ikeda, and he has kindly provided a great deal of cooperation for our research and educational activities. Professor Clements participated in this symposium as a visiting professor at the Soka University Peace Research Institute.

The exchanges with Kyungnam University have increased rapidly since 2015, when the University of North Korean Studies invited Dr. Ikeda to be a distinguished professor, and the same year, Kyungnam University granted an honorary doctorate to Dr. Ikeda. Thanks in part to a proposal by Kyungnam University President Jae-kyu Park, in addition to student exchanges, Soka University and Kyungnam University are currently promoting cooperation for the development of peace studies mainly at the Institute for Far East Studies and at the

Peace Research Institute.

Last year, we were invited to “Korea Global Forum 2015: 70 Years of Division: Past, Present, and Future on the Korean Peninsula,” held under the excellent leadership exercised by President Park. Furthermore, this year, we were able to invite to this symposium up-and-coming researchers from the Institute for Far East Studies, which will be a milestone for the development of the Soka University's research system. I am very happy to see that the exchanges between the two universities are now truly developing, and I would like to express my sincere gratitude to all parties involved.

Soka University has been forming its Grand Design as we approach the 50th anniversary of the founding of the university, including how we can realize the spirit of the founding principles in the real world. We have reached the conclusion that “training global citizens that can establish peace and a sustainable international society” is the mission of our university, which aims to become the top educational institution in human education, and we have started to lay the groundwork for an educational system that will train “global citizens.” These initiatives were selected into the Top Global University Project of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, and we are currently enhancing our educational system.

The central organization that will promote the “Program to educate global citizens that can lead the way to peace and sustainable prosperity” is the Global Core Center, which will open later this year. Going forward, the center will promote research and exchange programs in the fields of “peace,” “development,” “the environment” and “human rights,” all of which are based on universal humanism that pursues dignity for the lives of all people. This direction strongly resonates with the concept of Human Security “to protect the vital

core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment,” and this is why Human Security was incorporated into the overall theme of this symposium.

In the Northeast Asia region, actual battles for survival between opposing groups are occurring on various levels. However, I believe that this symposium will definitely help overcome such difficulties and find ways to “enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment for all people.”

Once again, I would like to express my gratitude to all of you here today, including the guest panelists, for attending this symposium. Thank you.

PRESENTATION

THE DPRK NUCLEAR ISSUE¹ AFTER THE FOURTH TEST

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The DPRK Nuclear Issue

This past January 2016 North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test. Undoubtedly, Pyongyang's continued pursuit of nuclear weapons development poses critical problems on multiple fronts.

First of all, it represents a major threat to the peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and in Northeast Asia at large. All of North Korea's regional neighbors have expressed that they cannot accept a nuclear-armed DPRK. Their support of the latest round of UN sanctions is a clear message to North Korea that its adherence to the nuclear program is not a viable option. They all call for a nuclear

1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Symposium Commemorating the 40th Anniversary of SUPRI, Soka University, Japan on May 21, 2016. This work was supported by Kyungnam University Foundation Grant, 2015.

free Korean Peninsula; anything less is unacceptable. Ultimately, a nuclear North Korea threatens the global nonproliferation regime and regional security.

North Korea's nuclear capability is a potential factor for a regional arms buildup. For instance, we have seen that North Korea's nuclear weapons development has emboldened South Korean hardliners to raise the once taboo question of whether South Korea should build its own nuclear arsenal.² North Korea's fourth nuclear test has rekindled the debate.³ North Korea's growing capability, coupled with uncertainty about the strength of US extended deterrence in Asia, has evoked similar sentiments in Japan.⁴

The most recent nuclear test also led Seoul and Washington to launch formal talks in March and later officially agree in July to deploy THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) missile defense system on South Korean soil, citing North Korea's growing nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities as the reason and shrugging off the strong protest of China and Russia, who view the deployment as aimed at them.⁵ Furthermore, the US and ROK held their largest

2 Barbara Demick, "More South Koreans Support Developing Nuclear Weapons," *LA Times*, March 18, 2013.

3 Robert Kelly, "South Korea's Nuclear Temptation," *The Diplomat*, March 1, 2016; Gordon G. Chang, "Will South Korea Rethink Its Nuke Policy?" *World Affairs Journal*, January 12, 2016.

4 Danielle Demetriou, "Japan 'Should Develop Nuclear Weapons' to Counter North Korea Threat," *Telegraph*, April 20, 2009; Eric Johnson, "Osaka Governor Says Japan Should Debate Need for Nuclear Weapons," *Japan Times*, March 30, 2016; Admiral Dennis Blair and General Masayuki Hironaka, "The North Korean Nuclear Test and the US-Japan Alliance," *The Diplomat*, January 24, 2016.

5 Choe Sang-Hun, "South Korea and U.S. Agree to Deploy Missile Defense System," *New York Times*, July 7, 2016; Jack Kim, "South Korea, U.S. to Deploy THAAD Missile Defense, Drawing China Rebuke," *Reuters*, July 8,

ever annual joint military exercises this past spring—an operation that Pyongyang interpreted as “nuclear war moves.”⁶ Indeed, recent reports question whether the nuclear great powers themselves—that is, China, Russia, and the US—are already in a “Cold War-like spiral” toward a “second nuclear age” as they race to develop more sophisticated nuclear arms.⁷ North Korea’s own nuclear-weapons pursuit will only serve to increase hardline attitudes, exacerbate regional tensions, heighten fears in Seoul and Tokyo, and fuel Cold War tendencies.

Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons ambitions serve as a structural barrier to improvement in inter-Korean relations. South Korea has condemned North Korea’s nuclear tests since the first one was conducted in October 2006. For the incumbent administration in Seoul, North Korea’s willingness toward denuclearization has been made a precondition to improved inter-Korean relations that have already been severely damaged during the previous Lee Myung-bak administration. Seoul’s current policy toward the North, its so-called “trust-building process,” has promised improvement in relations between the two Koreas; but the policy is said to be “built on a solid

2016. Despite the public outcry in South Korea—as approximately half the population is opposed to the deployment—the South Korean government later announced that the anti-missile battery system would be staged in the vicinity of the southeastern county of Seongju and be operational by the end of 2017. See Jack Kim and Ju-min Park, “South Korea chooses site of THAAD U.S. missile system amid protests,” *Reuters*, July 13, 2016; Charlie Campbell, “Backlash Over THAAD Shows Why the Kim Clan Have Terrorized North Korea for So Long,” *Time*, July 15, 2016.

6 Reuters, “South Korea, U.S. begin exercises as North Korea Threatens Attack,” March 7, 2016.

7 William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, “Race for the Latest Class of Nuclear Arms Threatens to Revise Cold War,” *New York Times*, April 16, 2016.

foundation of security” to “deter North Korea provocations based on strong deterrence,” with Seoul encouraging Pyongyang to “scrap its nuclear program and abide by international norms and obligations.”⁸ It is predicated on the position that Pyongyang first must show its sincerity for denuclearization. Intrinsically, that means halting all nuclear testing—as such is seen as a grave provocation and threat to peace on the peninsula—and return to the Six-Party Talks, the multilateral forum established to negotiate a peaceful solution to the nuclear issue.

North Korea’s continued nuclear pursuit stands as an impediment to the country’s economic development. Its nuclear testing has only served to increase the severity of international and bilateral sanctions against the country, thus negatively impacting its trade, and furthering Pyongyang’s diplomatic and economic isolation. The latest round of UN sanctions—that is, UN Security Council Resolution 2270—is illustrative of this. Indeed, North Korea’s ability to attract significant foreign investment and earn hard currency for its economic development will prove illusive unless provocations cease and genuine progress is made in negotiating a solution to the nuclear issue.

Where Do We Stand?

To understand the nuclear issue, we must go back to early 1990s—the advent of “the first nuclear crisis” on the Korean peninsula. In the wake of the collapse of the communist bloc in the early 1990s, loss

8 Ministry of Unification, “Trust Building Process on the Korean Peninsula,” September 2013, <http://eng.unikorea.go.kr/content.do?cmsid=1920&mode=view&page=&cid=32799>.

of North Korea's system of preferential barter trade, and uncertainty of security support from its traditional allies, North Korea's threat perception peaked. Seoul had normalized relations with its Cold War adversaries, China and Russia; but Pyongyang failed to do the same with its enemies, the US and Japan. Isolated and growing more insecure, North Korea decided to 'go-it-alone'. Overwhelmed by the "hostile policy" of a military super-power, it has adopted a kind of balancing strategy of its own against the United States by posing asymmetrical challenges and threats.⁹

After IAEA inspectors found "discrepancies" in North Korea's 1992 nuclear materials declaration, special inspections of DPRK facilities were demanded in February 1993. North Korea refused. Pyongyang announced its intent to withdraw from the NPT—which it had only officially ascended to a year earlier. Over the next year and a half, the situation would spiral downward to the point where President Bill Clinton entertained the idea of a surgical strike on the North Korean nuclear facilities in the spring of 1994. Former President Jimmy Carter's trip to Pyongyang in June that year stopped the attack and instead his discussions with Kim Il Sung helped to confirm a "freeze" of North Korea's nuclear programs—and in the process prevent UN sanctions and avert a war. Despite Kim Il Sung's sudden death in July, four months of bilateral US-DPRK negotiations would lead to the "Geneva Agreed Framework" of October 1994, a bilateral agreement to halt North Korea's nuclear programs. The agreement also called for movement toward full normalization of US-DPRK political and economic relations.

Improvements in the security environment would follow for the

9 Kyung-Ae Park, "North Korean Strategies in the Asymmetric Nuclear Conflict with the United States," *Asian Perspective* 34:1 (2010), pp. 11-47.

next eight years primarily because of the engagement policy taken by two liberal administrations of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun in Seoul. Most significant would be the improvement in inter-Korean relations, highlighted by the first ever inter-Korean summit held in June 2000. The Geneva Agreement has been, slow and rocky it may be, implemented with collective support by the US, South Korea and even Japan.

But after the advent of the George Bush administration in 2001, lack of commitment and bad faith on both sides—that is, between Pyongyang and Washington—would lead to the collapse of the Agreed Framework. The collapse has turned out to be a major blow to denuclearization of North Korea.

In October 2002, the nuclear issue resurfaced after allegations and controversy over North Korea's possession of a clandestine uranium enrichment program. US/IAEA accusations and Pyongyang's refusals—over not only its nuclear but also missile programs—would subsequently lead to North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT in January 2003.

Turbulence in the NEA security environment would ensue. Eventually, in August 2003, a six-party negotiation framework, the Six-Party Talks(6PT), was formed to specifically deal with the security concerns created by the nuclear issue. This included all relevant parties: the two Koreas, the United States, China, Japan, and Russia.

Over the following two years, despite hiatuses and diverging interests, the 6PT would make progress, most notably during the fourth round of talks and signing of the “September 19 joint statement” in 2005.

But this, too, came to a critical juncture in October 2006 when North Korea conducted its first nuclear test. International sanctions

ensued. But the parties committed to diplomacy to resolve the impasse, generating positive momentum to resume talks. Talks in February 2007 culminated in the signing of a detailed “action plan” for all parties to move the peninsular denuclearization efforts forward, including by means of five issue-specific Working Groups. The subsequent constructive bilateral consultations and coordination helped build confidence among the actors, and in particular helped repair bones of contention (that is, the Banco Delta Asia issue) that obstructed further progress from being made.

A second inter-Korean summit was held in October 2007, which coincided with 6PT negotiations. The contents and outcomes of the summit suggested Pyongyang’s awareness that expanding inter-Korean economic relations, as well as putting an enduring peace framework in place, is based on North Korea’s own commitment to resolving the nuclear issue.

But eventually unsatisfactory North Korean declarations, delays in agreed upon energy assistance, and failure to reach an agreement on verification, *inter alia*, would bring the 6PT to a stalemate. The 6PT has not convened since December 2008 and has been suspended since April 2009.

Since then, North Korea has conducted tests of nuclear explosive devices in May 2009, February 2013, and January 2016. Its nuclear-bomb making capability has increased. Notably its uranium enrichment facilities—as revealed in November 2010¹⁰—and ability to produce weapons-grade plutonium has been augmented. Pyongyang claims to have tested a thermonuclear device this past January. The

10 Siegfried S. Hecker, “A Return Trip to North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Complex,” NAPSNet Special Report, Nautilus Institute, November 22, 2010.

North Korean leader reportedly seeks to boost the country's nuclear arsenal for deterrent purposes.¹¹ North Korea has stated it intends to improve the “quality and quantity” of its nuclear stockpile—assessed to be between 10 to 16 bombs, and estimated to be capable of producing 100 by 2020.¹² Likewise, its missile programs—also a grave threat to regional security—have seen significant upgrading and expansion over these years.¹³ This includes technical advancements to mount nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles.¹⁴ One can only speculate that the North Korean regime will continue to strengthen the country's nuclear weapons capabilities.

Predictably, the fourth nuclear test brought about condemnation from the international community. As a consequence we have seen active diplomacy by South Korea and the members of the UN Security Council. The outcome has been the UNSC's adoption of Resolution 2270 on March 2, which brings down the most stringent sanctions to date against the DPRK.¹⁵

Even North Korea's lone ally, China, has shown active diplomacy in this regard. Beijing helped to negotiate with Washington the latest UNSC resolution. And on the sideline of the recent nuclear security summit in Washington, US president Barack Obama and Chinese president Xi Jinping expressed a “commitment to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and full implementation of U.N. sanctions,”

11 “Kim Jong Un Guides Work for Increasing Nuclear Arsenal,” KCNA, March 9, 2016.

12 Joel S. Wit and Sun Young Ahn, “North Korea's Nuclear Futures: Technology and Strategy,” US-Korea Institute at SAIS, 2015.

13 *Ibid.*

14 “Kim Jong Un Guides Work for Mounting Nuclear Warheads on Ballistic Rockets,” KCNA, March 9, 2016.

15 For the UNSC members' statements and contents of UNSC Resolution 2270, see <http://www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12267.doc.htm>.

and that they will “enhance communication and coordination on the Korea nuclear issue.”¹⁶

Will Sanctions Work?

The big question is, will the latest round of sanctions work?

Over the years we have seen numerous UN sanctions adopted following North Korea’s nuclear and missile provocations.

Yet there are no signs that the sanctions policy has been effective. Many analysts argued that sanctions don’t work. Due to North Korea’s economic isolation, stiffer sanctions are unlikely to have the desired effect. In fact, even under sanctions, the North Korean economy has shown improvement and plus growth rates. Obviously, there are many ways that North Korea evades sanctions.

UN Security Council Resolutions (2006 ~ 2016)

S/RES/1695 (July 15, 2006) Condemned North Korea’s 2006 launch of ballistic missiles and imposed sanctions.

S/RES/1718 (October 14, 2006) Expressed concern over North Korea’s 2006 nuclear test, imposed sanctions and set up the Sanctions Committee.

S/RES/1874 (June 12, 2009) Expressed concern over North Korea’s 2009 nuclear test. Extended sanctions to concern all arms material and related financial transactions, technical training, advice, services or assistance, manufacture and maintenance. Set up the Panel of Experts to assist the Sanctions Committee.

¹⁶ “Remarks by President Obama and President Xi of the People’s Republic of China before Bilateral Meeting,” The White House, March 31, 2016.

S/RES/1887 (September 24, 2009) Called for implementing the UNSC Resolution 1540 for nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament.

S/RES/1928 (June 7, 2010) Extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 12 June 2011.

S/RES/1985 (June 10, 2011) Extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 12 June 2012 and asked it to submit its midterm and final reports to the Sanctions Committee for discussion one month before they are submitted to the Security Council.

S/RES/2050 (June 12, 2012) Extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 12 June 2013.

S/RES/2087 (January 22, 2013) Condemned North Korea's 2012 satellite launch and added to sanctions.

S/RES/2094 (March 7, 2013) Imposed sanctions after North Korea's 2013 nuclear test. 7 March 2013

S/RES/2141 (March 5, 2014) Extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 5 April 2015.

S/RES/2207 (March 4, 2015) Extended the mandate of the Panel of Experts until 5 April 2016.

S/RES/2270 (March 2, 2016) Imposed sanctions after North Korea's 2016 nuclear and missile tests. Sanctions include inspection of all passing cargo to and from North Korea, prohibition of all weapons trade with the country, additional restrictions on North Korean imports of luxury goods, and expulsion of certain North Korean diplomats suspected of illicit activities.

The most recent UN sanctions, brought down in March 2016 via adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2270, are supposedly more stringent than ever. It expands the scope of existing sanctions. However, as always, UN member-states' compliance with the sanctions

will determine the effectiveness of the expanded scope.

Many countries also have implemented bilateral sanctions against the DPRK, including the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, the EU, and South Korea, among others, as they view North Korea's nuclear programs as a global security and proliferation threat.¹⁷ But North Korea has been under unilaterally-imposed US embargos and various sanctions since the Korean War (1950). They have dealt with sanctions for decades.

Recently, the ROK government has demonstrated an “all-in” approach to sanctions. In February Seoul shut down the last remaining major inter-Korean cooperation project, the Kaesong Industrial Complex. Obviously, the aim is to stop inflow of hard currency into Pyongyang and to force North Korea to capitulate or face economic collapse.

China's position—that is, “sanction is not the goal”, but rather “an instrument for non-nuclearization”—diverges from the US and South Korean sanctions only position. China has been reluctant to use trade leverage against North Korea, for various reasons, but partly because Beijing fears such might set off the collapse of the regime in the DPRK and cause regional instability. China has over these years taken the position of “stability first” on the Korean peninsula. Indeed, Article 49 and 50 of UNSC Resolution 2270 emphasize the “importance of maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia at large, and expresses its commitment to a peaceful, diplomatic and political solution to the situation,” while reaffirming

17 For example, see the US Office of Foreign Assets Control's current sanctions against the DPRK. OFAC, “North Korea Sanctions Program,” June 3, 2015. <https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/nkorea.pdf>

support of the 6PT and “the commitments set forth in the Joint Statement of 19 September 2005 issued by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, and the United States, including that the goal of the 6PT is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner, that the United States and the DPRK undertook to respect each other’s sovereignty and exist peacefully together, and that the Six Parties undertook to promote economic cooperation, and all other relevant commitments.” China’s strong support for the 6PT and for the implementation of ‘September 19 joint statement’ are reflected in the newest UNSC resolution.

The big picture suggests that a heavy sanctions policy has failed in the past to bring about the desired change in North Korea’s behavior. This time, once again there are noticeable limitations to sanctions, especially in terms of implementation.¹⁸ What is more, sanctions tend to lead to adaptation and further provocative actions by North Korea, trapping us in a vicious cycle: that is, North Korea’s provocative action, followed by international sanctions, followed by Pyongyang’s opposition and further provocations, more sanctions, etc. Sanctions alone do not seem to be the answer.

How to Resume Six Party Talks

To resolve the nuclear issue, North Korea must be brought back to the dialogue table—specifically, the Six-Party Talks. Indeed Article 50 of the Resolution 2270 reassures support of the 6PT. Then how to resume the 6PT is the real question that faces all concerned parties in Northeast Asia.

18 Andrea Berger, “The 2016 UN Panel of Experts Report: An Eye-Opening Account of Persistent Blindness,” *38 North*, April 19, 2016.

Criticized in the past as a “crisis management mechanism,” the 6PT process, like other multilateral efforts, has its flaws and vulnerabilities. It isn’t perfect.

But up to this point in time, the 6PT is the only venue to deal with the DPRK nuclear issue. It has shown value and utility. Critics may ask, “How so?” Well, while the six-party process was working, we did not see repeated provocations from North Korea. Also, the September 2005 Joint Statement is the most comprehensive security cooperation charter that the parties to the talks have agreed upon, establishing a foundation in which to resume dialogue.

Following North Korea’s fourth nuclear test, there has been a renewed consensus on the value of the 6PT. But to get North Korea to the talks, preconditions of “denuclearization first”—however desirable—are not likely to move the North Koreans toward dialogue. Pyongyang’s security concerns will have to be addressed, as the Chinese government repeatedly emphasized.

In this context, China put forth a new proposal that we start a simultaneous dialogue process that discusses ‘non-nuclearization’ of the Korean Peninsula and a ‘peace agreement’ to end the Korean War. In particular, progress needs to be made on a peace agreement. Offering to commence dialogue on the issue could be put forward as an incentive to bring North Korea back to the 6PT process.

Unquestionably, however, getting North Korea back to the 6PT will

be a herculean challenge, as Pyongyang views the talks as “dead.”¹⁹ At this stage, it might be premature to resume this forum. Unless certain preconditions are met by the DPRK, the 6PT is unlikely to be resumed.

Under the current long stalemate, the 6PT will need to take a minimalist approach, that is, to set its goal lower. DPRK’s moratorium on the nuclear and missile firing tests in return for a nominal US humanitarian aid that the United States and North Korea have formulated and agreed in 2012 may be a useful reference. The urgent task may be to stop leaving North Korean nuclear programs free-floating. The DPRK nuclear program needs to be put under some kind of international control in order to end the current negligence of the problem. If not, and we continue on the current course, North Korea will carry on with its nuclear ambitions and tests.

19 Reportedly, Choe Son Hui, the North Korean delegate to the 26th Northeast Asian Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) held June 22-23, 2016, said during the closed-door session that “six party talks are dead” and also reiterated Pyongyang’s position that North Korea will never give up its nuclear deterrent unless the “entire world abandons nuclear weapons.” Since the suspension of the 6PT in December 2008, the NEACD—a Track II gathering—is the only mechanism that brings nuclear envoys from the 6PT countries to one table. North Korea did not participate in the dialogue in 2014 and 2015. Elizabeth Shim, “North Korea says six-party talks on denuclearization are ‘dead’,” UPI, June 22, 2016.

PRESENTATION

Unraveling Japan-South Korea Relations: An Empirical Analysis

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Introduction

Scholars have produced a substantial number of studies on Japan-South Korea relations. Among others, Glosserman and Snyder (2015), Lee and Kimiya (2015), Kim and Abe (2015), Lee and Isozaki (2015), Kimura (2014), Dudden (2008), and Lind (2008) represent a subset of the most recent notable contributions to the literature that have a wide audience in the field. To complement these decent research outputs, in this article, I attempt to appraise the evolution of Japan-South Korea relations, placing the case in cross-national and time-

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serial context with comparable empirical data. Specifically, I trace the evolution of Japan-South Korea relations, focusing on two interconnected questions: (1) whether Japan-South Korea relations are going through the worst stage; and (2) why Japan-South Korea relations have evolved as they have.

In the next section, I attempt to assess Japan-South Korea relations with emphasis on descriptive inference. I conduct a comparative empirical study to examine the validity of the claim that we are going through the worst period of Japan-South Korea relations. I close this section, showing that Japan-South Korea relations are uniquely deteriorating compared to other Asia-Pacific bilateral relations and unprecedentedly worsening compared to other temporal periods of both nations.

The penultimate section deals with what best accounts for the worst Japan-South Korea relations. Decomposing the factors that shape Japan-South Korea relations into international and domestic ones, I uncover the uneven development in the distribution of material and ideational powers surrounding Japan and South Korea. On the balance of material powers, structural symmetry that characterizes Japan-South Korea relations perplexes Japanese and elevate South Korean in terms of national pride. On the balance of ideational powers, structural asymmetry that characterizes Japan-South Korea relations makes the two nations diverge in dealing with the rise of China and historical reconciliation issues. On top of this, I find that strategic situations that shape the policy choices of political elites differ between the two countries. In Japan where conservatization of political elites has continued, it is hard for political leaders to send sincere apologetic remembrance to South Koreans due to the lack of political pressure from progressives. In South Korea

where polarization of political elites has proceeded, it is difficult for conservative (progressive) political leaders to receive strategic apologetic remembrance from Japanese due to anticipated backlash from progressive (conservative) oppositions. I conclude this article with the finding that this worst period of Japan-South Korea relations is attributable to international factors that make the two nations diverge in dealing with the critical issues and domestic factors that make it difficult to send and receive apologetic remembrance each other.

Are we going through the worst period of Japan–South Korea relations?

Following Katzenstein and Keohane (2007: 12), I view anti-Japanese (or anti-South Korean) sentiment as a “psychological tendency to hold negative views of Japan (or South Korea) and of Japanese (or South Korean) society in general.” The simplest way to view anti-Japanese (or anti-South Korean) sentiment is as measured by results of public opinion polls that express negative views toward Japan (or South Korea) or toward Japanese (or South Koreans).

Table 1 How Asia-Pacific Publics See Japan and South Korea

	<i>Japan</i>		<i>South Korea</i>	
	2008	2015	2008	2015
Australia	17	10	19	25
China	69	81	29	41
India	-	16	-	19
Indonesia	14	13	30	27
Japan	30	15	40	75

Malaysia	-	9	-	21
Pakistan	19	15	28	20
Philippines	-	12	-	23
South Korea	51	73	<u>7</u>	17
United States	11	18	25	31
Vietnam	-	8	-	8
Median	19	15	28	23
Lower Quartile	15.5	12.25	22	20.25
Upper Quartile	40.5	17	29.5	29
Lower Boundary of Outlier Range	-22	5.125	10.75	7.125
Upper Boundary of Outlier Range	78	24.125	40.75	42.125
Lower Boundary of Far Out Range	-59.5	-2	-0.5	-6
Upper Boundary of Far Out Range	115.5	31.25	52	55.25

Source: Pew Research Center (2015).

Notes: Underlined bold font indicates outliers and shaded bold font indicates far-outs.

Let us first consider whether we are going through the worst Japan-South Korea relations with a cross-national perspective. The question is: are current Japan-South Korea relations unique in their sourness in the region compared to other bilateral relations? To answer this query, I conduct an empirical exploration with cross-national public opinion data.

Table 1 compares negative views on Japan and South Korea by respondents of eleven Asia-Pacific nations to the Pew Research Center's polls in 2008 and 2015. Columns *Japan* and *South Korea* show the percentage of respondents who have somewhat unfavorable and very unfavorable opinion of Japan and South Korea, respectively.

For starters, in 2008, most of the neighbors send relatively low levels of negative signals toward Japan and South Korea with the median

values of 19 and 28, respectively. No countries can be classified as “outlier” or “far out” nations with regard to anti-Japanese (or anti-South Korean) sentiment.¹ For Japan, while the responses of South Korea and China are outside of the interquartile range, they are still not outside of the outlier range. For South Korea, whereas the responses of Japan and Indonesia get out of the interquartile range, they are still far from being outliers. In other words, in 2008, both nations live in the comfort zone in terms of anti-Japanese (or anti-South Korean) sentiment among the Asia-Pacific publics.

Second, in 2015, while most Asia-Pacific countries show even lower levels of unfavorable attitudes toward Japan and South Korea as indicated in the values of median that drop to 15 and 23, respectively, there emerge clear “far out” nations in regard to anti-Japanese (or anti-South Korean) sentiment. For Japan, China with the score of 81 and South Korea with the score of 73 go beyond the upper boundary of “far out” range. For South Korea, Japan with the score of 75 breaks the upper boundary of “far out” range. It is notable that the proportion of respondents who say “unfavorable” toward Japan (or South Korea) among other neighbors never exceeds 50 percent. To put it differently, in 2015, the attitudes of Japanese (or South Koreans) toward South Korea (or Japan) is leaning exceptionally to the negative side compared to those of other neighboring countries.

In sum, from Table 1 that shows cross-national comparison of unfavorability of Japan and South Korea among Asia-Pacific publics

1 If Q_1 and Q_3 are the lower and upper quartiles respectively, then one could define an outlier to be any observation outside the range:

$$[Q_1 - k(Q_3 - Q_1), Q_3 + k(Q_3 - Q_1)]$$

for some nonnegative constant k , where $k = 1.5$ indicates an “outlier,” and $k = 3$ indicates data that is “far out.” See Gailmard (2014: 21-32).

in 2008 and 2015, it is clear that Japan-South Korea relations are getting worse and worse in the hearts and minds of the people in both nations and their bitterness are exceptional in the Asia-Pacific region.

Next, consider whether we are going through the worst period of Japan-South Korea relations longitudinally. The question is: are current Japan-South Korea relations distinctive in their bitterness in the bilateral history? For answering the inquiry, I conduct an empirical exploration with time-series public opinion data.


Figure 1 illustrates the longitudinal percentage changes of respondents of Japanese (or South Korean) who show “unfavorable” attitudes to South Korea (or Japan) from 1991 until 2015 in alternate years. I use public opinion data produced by Japan’s Cabinet Office for Japanese responses and those by Asahi Shimbun-Donga Ilbo, Gallup Korea, and Pew Research Center for South Korean responses.²

First, in the side of Japan, it seems that there are three distinctive temporal orders with regard to anti-South Korean sentiment. During the 1990s, a majority of Japanese send negative signals to South Korea with the highest unfavorability score of 57.5 in 1997. Since 1999 when the score falls below 50, anti-South Korean sentiment among the Japanese public steadily fades away during the 2000s and takes the lowest unfavorability score of 34.2 in 2009. After 2011 with the score of 35.3, anti-South Korean sentiment of the Japanese people suddenly surges in 2013 with the score of 58 and reaches all time high in 2015 with the score of 64.7. It might not be a coincidence that President Lee Myung-bak visited Dokdo (Takeshima) in 2012 and anti-South Korean sentiment of Japanese swelled in 2013. In a nutshell, while

² For details of the data, see Appendix.

up until 2011 there had been a solid downturn in anti-South Korean sentiment among the Japanese public, the trend is overturned making Japan-South Korea relations the worst over the recent twenty-five years on the Japanese Archipelago.

Figure 1 How Japanese and South Korea Publics See Each Other



Sources: Japan's Cabinet Office (2016) for Japanese unfavorability toward South Korea; for South Korean unfavorability toward Japan, Isozaki (2015) for the 1995 and 1999 data; Pew Research Center (2015) for the 2013 data; and Gallup Korea (2015) for the 1991, 1993, 1997, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2007, 2009, 2011, and 2015 data.

Second, in the side of South Korea, the patterns of anti-Japanese sentiment are more volatile and unstable. During the recent twenty-five years, there are only two times that respondents who say “unfavorable” to Japan fall short of a majority: the score of 43 in 1999 and 44 in 2011. These exceptions might have something to do with the facts that the South Korean government officially opened the markets for Japanese entertainment industries in 1999 and the Great East

Japan earthquake occurred in 2011. Before the 2010s, anti-Japanese sentiment moves in series of zigzags, going beyond the score of 70 in 1997, 2005, and 2009 and then falling below 70 each time. What makes the 2010s distinctive in the history of anti-Japanese sentiment of South Koreans is that the unfavorability scores pass 70 and stays there. In sum, among the South Korean public, while anti-Japanese sentiment had bobbed up and down up until 2011, it resolutely gathers momentum to an unprecedented extent, making Japan-South Korean relations poorest in the last two decades on the Korean Peninsula.


In sum, are we going through the worst period of Japan-South Korea relations? With an eye on cross-national comparison, the answer would be the affirmative: According to a 2015 international poll, 73 percent of South Koreans view Japan unfavorably, making South Korea, after China, the country with the second most negative perception of Japan in the Asia-Pacific region. Likewise, 75 percent of Japanese show disapproving attitude toward South Korea, making Japan the nation with the most negative perception of South Korea in Asia-Pacific neighboring countries.

With a view from historical perspective, the answer appears affirmative: According to 2015 domestic polls, 64.7 percent of Japanese look unfavorably at South Korea, making 2015 the year that records the highest anti-South Korean sentiment in the last two decades of its history. Likewise, 74 percent of South Korean reveal their unfavorability toward Japan, making 2015 the year that marks one of the highest anti-Japanese sentiment during the recent twenty-five years of its history.

Why have Japan–South Korea relations been getting worse?

As it is confirmed that we are going through the worst period of Japan-South Korea relations, it seems natural to raise a question: Why have Japan-South Korea relations been getting worse?

Figure 2 GDP of Japan and South Korea, 1980–2015



Source: OECD (2016).

To answer the question, I propose an explanation that contains international and domestic factors in shaping the relations between Japan and South Korea. Let us first consider international factors that contribute to worsening Japan-South Korea relations. There are two structural factors: (1) the distribution of material powers that is characterized by convergence to a balance and symmetry between the two countries; and (2) the distribution of ideational powers that is characterized by divergence from a balance and asymmetry between


the two nations.

For starters, disparity in hard powers between Japan and South Korea has dwindled. Three indicators of hard powers are introduced: (1) Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as a measure of economic powers; (2) Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) as a measure of military powers; and (3) GDP per capita as a measure of social powers.

Figure 2 displays the longitudinal changes of GDP of both nations from 1980 until 2015. In 1980, the size of Japanese economy was larger than that of South Korea by a factor of eleven. At that time, while Japan's GDP was about a trillion US dollars, South Korea's GDP is about 90 billion US dollars. The gap of economic powers between the two countries fell to a factor of five in 1995 when Japan's GDP was 2.9 trillion US dollars while South Korea's GDP was 600 billion US dollars. Since 2009 when the gap declined to a factor of less than three, the economic power disparity continues to shrink up until 2015 when Japan's GDP with 4.7 trillion US dollars is larger than South Korea's GDP with 1.7 trillion US dollars by a factor of 2.7. During the recent twenty-five years, while Japan has developed its economy by a factor of 4.7, South Korea has grown its economy by a factor of nineteen. The economic-power gap between the two countries has certainly decreased.

Military power disparity between Japan and South Korea from 1980 until 2007 is illustrated in Figure 3. As a composite index of six indicators including iron and steel production, military expenditures, military personnel, primary energy consumption, total population, and urban population, CINC measures the percentage proportion

Figure 3 Military Capabilities of Japan and South Korea, 1980–2007




Source: Correlates of War Project (2016).

of a nation's military powers to a world total military powers.³ In 1980, Japan's military capability was greater than South Korea's by a factor of 3.8. The former secured about 5.3 percent of world military powers while the latter had about 1.4 percent. The gap declined to a factor of less than three in 1990 when Japan contained 5.6 percent and South Korea 1.9 percent and to a factor of less than two in 2004 when the former had 4.7 percent and the latter 2.4 percent. In 2007, the gap is about a factor of 1.8 in which Japan holds 4.3 percent and South Korea 2.4 percent. During the recent two decades, the disparity between the two countries in terms of military powers has evidently declined as Japan has expanded its military capability by a factor of 0.8 and South Korea by a factor of 1.7.

³ For more details, see Correlates of War Project (2016).

Figure 4 GDP per capita of Japan and South Korea, 1980–2015




Source: OECD (2016).

Figure 4 shows time-serial changes in GDP per capita of the two countries from 1980 and 2015. In 1980, Japanese were richer than South Koreans by a factor of 3.6. GDP per capita of Japan was more than 8,500 US dollars while that of South Korea was about 2,400 US dollars. The gap dwindled to a factor of less than two in 1993 when Japan's GDP per capita was more than 210,000 US dollars and South Korea's about 110,000. In 2015, GDP per capita of both nations is virtually the same: 37,121 US dollars for Japan and 34,502 US dollars for South Korea. There is only 7.5 percent differential between the two. For the recent twenty-five years, Japanese have raised their income by a factor of 4.3 and South Koreans by a factor of 14.4. In terms of social powers, South Koreans have nearly caught up to the Japanese.

In a nutshell, as shown in changes in economic, military, and social balance of powers between the two countries, power asymmetry that

had characterized Japan-South Korea relations is being replaced by power symmetry that could make Japanese disturbed and South Koreans exalted.

Figure 5 How Japan and South Korea See the United States and China, 2002–2015



Source: Pew Research Center (2016).

Unlike the distribution of material powers that converge to a balance, the distribution of ideational powers diverges from a balance between Japan and South Korea. Among others, this is clear in the threat perception of China’s rise and America’s decline between the two nations.

Figure 5 illustrates how Japanese and South Koreans see the United States and China from 2002 until 2015. The unfavorability of Japanese toward the United States was upward up until 2008 and then declined and slightly surged until 2015. In particular, since 2012 it has stably stayed around a score of 30 percent. The unfavorability of South Koreans toward the United States steadily decreased from 2002 and

never went beyond a score of 20 percent since 2009. In both nations, anti-Americanism seems out of the question in the public sphere. That is to say, they converge on the solid foundation with the United States as an alliance partner.

The unfavorability of both nations toward China diverges, however. In both Japan and South Korea, it increased around 2010 when the negative perception of the publics of the two nations converged around the score of 60 percent. Since then, the two countries started to diverge: Anti-Chinese sentiment in Japan has dramatically increased from 61 percent in 2011 to 89 percent in 2015 whereas anti-Chinese sentiment in South Korea has vividly dwindled from 56 percent in 2010 to 37 percent in 2015. In other words, today a majority of Japanese are highly suspicious while a majority of South Koreans are fairly comfortable with the rise of China. This asymmetric perception of the Chinese threat between the two countries is surely an alarming ideational factor in shaping Japan-South Korea relations. In a situation where most Japanese see China as a near-enemy and most South Koreans see China as a near-friend, it is highly unlikely to have a healthy relationship between the two nations.

The asymmetric perception of China's threat between Japan and South Korea reflects the asymmetric perception of Japan's apology between them. Table 2 shows how Chinese, Japanese, and South Koreans think about Japan's apology for its military actions during the 1930s and 1940s. In 2008, 76 percent of Chinese and 96 percent of South Koreans believed that Japan did not apologize sufficiently while 41 percent of Japanese agreed with them. In 2013, 78 percent of Chinese and 98 percent of South Koreans think that Japan did not apologize sufficiently whereas 28 percent of Japanese share that opinion. To put it another way, virtually all South Koreans and

four-fifths of the Chinese see that Japan's apology is not sufficient while three-fifths of the Japanese people ponder that its apology is sufficient. This huge chasm in historical remembrance is another crucial factor that shapes Japan-South Korea relations in a negative direction.

Table 2 How China, Japan, and South Korea Think about Japan's Apology

	2008			2013		
	Apologized sufficiently	Not apologized sufficiently	No apology necessary	Apologized sufficiently	Not apologized sufficiently	No apology necessary
China	8	76	2	4	78	2
Japan	42	41	10	48	28	15
South Korea	1	96	1	1	98	1

Source: Pew Research Center (2013).

Table 3 How Japanese and South Korean Publics and Experts See Each Other

	Japanese Public	South Korean Public	Japanese Experts	South Korean Experts
2013	37.3	76.6	27.5	28.8
2014	54.4	70.9	44.2	36.8
2015	52.4	72.5	43.2	36.4


Source: Genron NPO and East Asia Institute (2015).

The marked divergence in how to perceive China's rise and historical remembrance between the two countries affects divergence in opinions between the publics and the experts of both nations (see Table 3). It is notable that anti-Japanese sentiment of South Koreans is higher than anti-South Korean sentiment of Japanese among the publics while anti-South Korean sentiment of Japanese is higher than anti-Japanese sentiment of South Korean among the

experts. For instance, between the two publics, 72 percent of South Koreans reveal unfavorable attitude toward Japan while 52 percent of Japanese disclose the same attitude toward South Korea. Among the experts, however, 36 percent of South Koreans show negative perception of Japan whereas 43 percent of Japanese express the same perception of South Korea in 2015. It appears that Japanese experts are more sensitive to divergence in the rise of China and historical remembrance issues than South Korean ones.

The reason that we observe differences in responses to ideational distribution of powers between Japanese and South Korean experts seems to originate from the broad transformation of political elites in both nations. This leads to domestic factors that shape Japan-South Korean relations.

Figure 6 Ideological Distributions of Japanese National Diet Members in 2003 and 2014




Source: Taniguchi and Asahi Shimbun (2016).

Figure 6 displays the ideological distribution of the House of

Representatives members of Japan's National Diet in 2003 and 2014. On one-dimensional policy space, 0 represent the most progressive and 10 represents the most conservative. In 2003, among 456 members, the value of mean is 5.23 and the value of standard deviation is 2.38. In 2014, among 427 members, the value of mean is 5.78 and the value of standard deviation is 1.45. Between 2003 and 2014, the center of gravity among political elites assuredly moves in the conservative direction as progressives thin out and conservatives thicken. This change implies that dominant political elites in Japan have little incentive to send apologetic remembrance toward South Korea since there is little capability for progressives to provoke backlash against conservatives' unapologetic remembrance. Due to conservatization of Japanese political elites, it will be difficult to receive apologetic remembrance from the Japanese government.

Figure 7 Ideological Distributions of South Korean National Assembly Members in 2002 and 2012



Source: Korean Association of Party Studies and Joongang Ilbo (2016).

Figure 7 exhibits ideological distribution of the South Korean National Assembly members in 2002 and 2012. On one-dimensional policy space, 0 represent the most progressive and 10 represents the most conservative. In 2002, among 238 members, the value of mean is 4.90 and the value of standard deviation is 1.56. In 2012, among 223 members, the value of mean is 5.00 and the value of standard deviation is 1.80. Between 2002 and 2012, the center of gravity among political elites stays around 5 constantly and both progressives and conservatives thicken. This change implies that dominant political elites in South Korea have little capacity to accept signals from Japan since there are plenty of incentives for progressives as well as conservatives to incite backlash against Japan's remembrance. Due to polarization of South Korean political elites, it will be hard to accept any sort of remembrance signal, be it apologetic or unapologetic, for the South Korean government.

In sum, the distribution of material powers between Japan and South Korea is characterized by convergence and symmetry while the distribution of ideational powers between them is described by divergence and asymmetry. These international changes mirror domestic transformations in which conservatization of Japanese political elites and polarization of South Korean political elites raise the bar for historical reconciliation between the two nations.

Conclusion

This article has discussed whether we are going through the worst period of Japan-South Korea relations. It found that Japan-South Korea relations are uniquely flagging cross-nationally and unprecedentedly waning historically. The reduction in gaps in terms

of economic, military, and social powers between the two countries is a set of international factors that confuse Japanese and elevate South Koreans. The increasing dissimilarity in dealing with the rise of China and historical reconciliation issues is another set of international factors that make Japan-South Korea relations complicated. The conservatization of Japanese political elites lessens the incentives to send sincere apologetic remembrance to South Koreans. The polarization of South Korean political elites diminishes the capability to accept strategic apologetic remembrance from Japanese. It seems that Japan-South Korea relations is at a stalemate.

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Appendix How Japanese and South Korean Publics See Each Other

	Asahi Shimbun-Donga Ilbo		Japan's Cabinet Office	Gallup Korea	Pew Research Center	
	Japan	South Korea	Japan	South Korea	Japan	South Korea
1984	19	39	47.1	-	-	-
1988	21	51	42.9	-	-	-
1990	23	66	50.8	-	-	-
1991	-	-	51.4	58	-	-
1993	-	-	51.8	63	-	-
1995	21	69	54	-	-	-
1997	17	65	57.5	75	-	-
1999	12	43	46.9	-	-	-
2001	15	57	45.5	69	-	-
2003	-	-	41	62	-	-
2005	22	63	44.3	79	-	-
2006	-	-	47.1	-	43	-
2007	-	-	42.6	68	-	72
2008	-	-	40.9	-	40	51
2009	-	-	34.2	73	-	-
2011	-	-	35.3	44	-	-
2012	17	50	59	-	-	-
2013	-	-	58	-	-	77
2014	-	-	66.4	-	-	77
2015	-	-	64.7	74	75	73

Sources: Isozaki (2015) for Asahi Shimbun-Donga Ilbo surveys; Japan's Cabinet Office (2016) for Japan's Cabinet Office surveys; Gallup Korea (2015) for Gallup Korea surveys; Pew Research Center (2015) for Pew Research Center surveys.

PRESENTATION

Building a Security Community in
Northeast Asia:
Dealing with Painful History to Build a
Peaceful Present

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University of Otago
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There is absolutely no doubt that the Northeast Asian region—China, Japan and Korea—is going to prove absolutely critical to global peace and stability in the 21st century. Northeast Asia is the center of global economic development. It has a land mass fifteen percent bigger than all of Europe and a combined population of 1.5 billion people or over one-fifth of all the people of the world. What happens in Northeast Asia (economically, socially and politically) is going to have a major impact on levels of prosperity, well-being and political stability in South East Asia and elsewhere.

It is vital, therefore, to ensure that the social, political and military relationships between all three countries are as positive as the economic links so that each country can contribute what it can to regional and, by extension, global peace and security.

There certainly is no space for competitive or, worse, destructive

nationalism, in Northeast Asia. If these countries were to revert to pre-Second World War and post war conflict patterns it would have major negative implications for regional and global peace and stability. The challenge, therefore, is how to deepen and expand strong and robust bilateral and trilateral socio-economic and political relationships within the region so that a genuine cooperative security regime might be developed capable of developing and guaranteeing stable peace.

If trilateral relationships flourish, Northeast Asia's claims to global economic and political leadership in the 21st century will be secure. If there are tensions in any one of these relationships then Northeast Asian global leadership will be less secure and once again Northeast Asia could become a region of instability rather than stability. The Northeast Asian region does not have any regional security architecture equivalent to that in South East Asia or Europe. It has maintained reasonable levels of political stability for the past 25 years mainly because of extensive economic relationships and a range of formal and informal relationships between policy makers and politicians in all three countries. These are beginning to get a little frayed in the 21st century. Emerging incompatibilities means that instead of focusing on ways in which security issues can be addressed collaboratively and cooperatively there has been a resurgence of neo-nationalism; expanded militarization and securitization of relationships and a willingness to project power and coercive diplomacy in Northeast Asia. There have been very few efforts, for example, to develop a shared vision on how to promote peace and security.

The election or (in China's case) selection of conservative nationalist leaders in Japan, South Korea and China has generated

additional instability as each country tries to make sense of the shifting dynamics and power transitions taking place in the region. All three countries are in transition. Despite a slowdown in its economic growth, China is the world's fastest rising economic power. Japan's economy is stagnant but it is still the third largest economy in the world and the Republic of Korea is emerging as a very robust middle power both economically and diplomatically.

Insofar as Chinese, Japanese and Korean national trajectories are convergent there is a reasonable likelihood of peace and stability. When they start to diverge the probability of political and/or economic stability diminishes. While China, Japan and Korea have relatively robust economic systems all three political systems often seem precarious and lack deep popular legitimacy. This sense of political fragility has contributed towards an upsurge of identity politics in North East Asia which means that Northeast Asian foreign policies are being driven by a complex combination of domestic as well as external dynamics. Nationalist identity politics have been driven by ruling elites in China, Japan and Korea wanting to consolidate their power and authority in order to boost popular support, grapple with corruption and political fragility and maintain domestic integration.

The major geo-political result of these domestic and triangular dynamics is that China is moving closer to South Korea while Japan is going in the opposite direction. The very successful summit between President's Xi Jinping and Park Geun-hye in Beijing in June 2013, for example, was not reflected in a similar summit between Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President Xi Jin Ping. In fact, Japanese Foreign Ministry Officials continue to experience difficulties organizing summit meetings between the leaders of China and Japan

because Shinzo Abe remains unwilling to meet China's preconditions of: (i) no reinterpretation of war history and; (ii) an end to Japanese leadership visits to the Yasukuni shrine. The brief encounter between both political leaders at the Peking APEC meeting in November 2014, for example, did not amount to a summit meeting and was followed up by a range of parliamentary delegations to try and thaw frosty relations between both countries. The upshot of all these different processes is that China-Japan-Korean relationships have become more incompatible and tense.

While there have been many diplomatic efforts to address the tensions in the trilateral relationships they remain remarkably persistent and intractable. There was enormous anxiety, in China, for example, about how Japan would commemorate the 70th anniversary of the end of the Second World War. As it turned out Prime Minister Abe's comments were less fulsome than those made by Prime Minister Murayama on the occasion of the 50th anniversary and did not satisfy the Chinese or Korean governments.

These incidents demonstrate that the past continues to impose itself on the present in ways which confound diplomats and political leaders who would like to move on from Second World War history and the painful traumatic memories afflicting all three countries.

This paper is interested, therefore, in how China, Japan and Korea can maintain and guarantee negative peace in Northeast Asia but more optimally what conditions and institutions are necessary to generate a more positive peace and the development of regional economic, social and political regimes capable of maintaining both.

Many of the issues that have been addressed in the Symposium, for example, such as North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile programme; China's maritime assertiveness; Japan's reinterpretation

of its Pacifist Constitution and desire to become a “normal” nation, are all presenting rather than underlying problems. What I want to argue in this paper is that these presenting problems are symptoms of deeper tensions which are perhaps better explained in terms of domestic dynamics rather than geo-political big power competitive dynamics.

There has been negative peace in the region for the past 25 years largely because of a joint commitment to economic growth and development, a willingness to placate US strategic interests and a desire to coexist without raising uncomfortable questions about past painful history. In the past 10 years, however, as the leaderships of China, Japan and Korea have advocated strong nationalist sentiments; and xenophobic feelings about each other there has been an increase in state to state rivalry, military competition and a surprising re-activation of painful and unresolved issues from the Second World War.

While ASEAN, for example, developed strong norms of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states and a commitment to the peaceful resolution of state conflicts through such bodies as the ASEAN Regional Forum and in all the diverse Ministerial and other meetings no such development has occurred in Northeast Asia. There was considerable co-operation on economic growth and development issues but a strange neuralgia about developing regional security architecture. I was actively involved with Canadian colleagues, for example, in a range of Northeast Asian conversations on confidence building, arms control and disarmament and the peaceful resolution of conflicts in the 1990s but we made little progress. There was a willingness on the part of China, Japan and Korea, to deepen

economic interdependence and explore ways in which inter state cooperation could be advanced on a bilateral and trilateral basis but there was no willingness to develop regional institutional machinery to boost peace and stability in any systematic way.

In the 1990s to the early 2000s, for example, the ROK reached out economically to the DPRK and China joined the World Trade Organisation arguing that its primary purpose was a “a peaceful rise” in Asia and the rest of the world. There was sustained economic cooperation between Japan and the ROK and China, Japan and Korea all met and participated in different institutions of ASEAN. Within the region, the East Asia Summit; the Six Party Talks; and the creation of a Trilateral Secretariat linking China, Japan and South Korea also took place in this immediate post war period. The most important outcome of all these economic initiatives was that China became the number one destination for foreign direct investment and exports from both Japan and South Korea.

None of this cooperation eliminated conflict however, North Korea conducted its first missile and nuclear tests; China and Taiwan periodically clashed over sovereignty issues and independence claims and here was growing tension between Japan and the DPRK. But overall there was a sense that economic ties were driving peace within the region.¹

1 Stephan Haggard, “The Liberal View of the International Relations of Asia,” in Saadia Pekkanen, John Ravenhill and Rosemary Foot (eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) pp. 45-63 Robert. O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1984); John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, “Clear and Clean: The Fixed Effects of the Liberal Peace.” *International Organization* (Spring, 2001)

The last 10 years, however, have seen a very rapid rise in interstate competition and rivalry. This has manifested itself in expensive military modernization and conflicts over a variety of maritime sovereignty claims. China's 2015 declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in areas under ROK and Japanese administrative control and its recent development of several reefs in the South China Seas to advance its 9 Dash line claim have not boosted regional cooperation and confidence. Similarly the DPRK's sinking of the South Korean corvette, the Cheonan, along with its shelling of Yeonpyeong Island plus renewed nuclear and missile tests have generated alarm throughout the region. America's pivot toward East Asia and Japan's identification of China and the DPRK as major security threats have all generated tension within the region. The Six Party Talks on North Korea, ground to a halt in 2007 and trilateral meetings among the leaders of China, Japan and Korea were frozen for three and a half years. There have also been a growing number of economic differences over things like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank developed by China and the TPP developed by the US and its allies. But what makes all of these "events" and incidents toxic is that they have increasingly been linked to contested and competing interpretations of painful history (particularly in Korea and China) and the re-emergence of xenophobic nationalism.

Northeast Asia is a complex security system which has developed some norms /conventions/ and economic arrangements which have governed relationships between the different states over the past thirty years. These cordial relations are under threat at the moment because political leaders in China, Japan, the ROK, DPRK, Russia

and the United States are all trying to satisfy large and growing numbers of citizens who feel economically, social and politically excluded from the benefits of their particular political and economic systems. Nationalism is an easy way of responding to generalized social, economic and political fears, anxieties and insecurities and as integrated threat theory suggests it can and does boost internal integration over the short term.

I want to argue, however, that nationalism is one of the most significant challenges to the development of an intentional cooperative security community in Northeast Asia and unless it is addressed as an impediment there will be no evolution of a robust security community in Northeast Asia. The absence of a security community does not mean that Northeast Asia will erupt into armed conflict any time soon but it does signal that there are conflictual relationships that are capable of undermining the collaborative and cooperative relationships.

China, Japan and the two Koreas have grappled with questions of national identity for many years but these have grown more acute since the end of the Cold War. All four countries have not hesitated to promote officially sanctioned nationalism when and as domestic politics demands it. The Chinese administration of Jiang Zemin, for example, launched “patriotic education” in the 1990s. This activated

2 Suisheng Chao, “A State-led Nationalism: The Patriotic Education Campaign in Post-Tiananmen China,” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, (March, 1998) Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 287-302; Chung-In Moon and Seung-Won Suh, “Identity Politics, Nationalism, and the Future of Northeast Asian Order,” in G. John Ikenberry and Chung-In Moon, eds., *The United States and Northeast Asia: Debates, Issues, and New Order* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), pp. 193-229. Elena Atanassova-Cornelis, “The Political and Security Dimension of Japan—China Relations: Strategic Mistrust and Fragile Stability*,” *Pacific Focus* Vol.; 26. No. 2 (August, 2011): 165-187.

a particular set of Second World War Narratives centering on Chinese resistance to the Japanese invasion but it also succeeded in generating very negative views of Japan among the Chinese people.³ Patriotic fervour was promoted by the CCP to generate national unity and strengthen its ruling power.⁴ China's official encouragement of anti-Japanese sentiment stimulated anti Chinese feeling within Japan. Both have fuelled competitive nationalism in the region for the last decade.

The reactivation of Japanese nationalist sentiment since Shinzo Abe returned to power stimulated official ROK criticisms of Japan as well. Both China and the ROK, for example jointly developed a statue and memorial hall at Harbin railway station to commemorate the anti -Japanese Korean nationalist, An Jung-geun. This stoked anti Japanese nationalism in both Korea and China.⁵

Prime Minister Koizumi's, creation of a National Defence Agency with Ministerial status, for example, coupled with his desire that Japanese Textbooks erase reference to Japan's war time atrocities all "officially" nudged Japanese politics in a more right wing direction. His visit to the Yasakuni Shrine created a permissive environment for Shinzo Abe to promote a "Normal" Japan, by which he means a militarily powerful Japan, that would revise the Pacifist Constitution and decide for itself when and where it would utilize coercive

3 Minxin Pei and Michael Swaine, "Simmering Fire in Asia: Averting Sino-Japanese Strategic Conflict," *Policy Brief*, 44 (November 2005). Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, at <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=17720>.

4 Chung-In Moon and Seung-Won Suh, *op. cit.*, p. 208. As cited in Atanassova-Cornelia, *op. cit.* p. 173.

5 Asahi Shimbun, "China sets up memorial for Korean anti-Japanese activist," January 20, 2014 available at <http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/china/AJ201401200074>.

diplomacy. This was also based on a strong reassertion of the US-Japan Security alliance even if this somewhat contradicts the nationalist impulses of many of his supporters.

“Abenomics” and Abe’s foreign policy have precipitated widespread civil society opposition in Japan but the political opposition to the LDP/Komeito coalition remains weak and so far incapable of resisting these new militarizing trends. When Japan reasserts its territorial claims to the Dokdo/Takeshima islands and the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands they activate painful memories and generate deep anxiety in the ROK and in China. This has meant that when there have been incidents that would normally be managed with quiet diplomacy e.g conflicts over fishing rights, arrests of Japanese businessmen in China, they have generated megaphonic responses and both organised and spontaneous nationalist protests in Japan and China.

Shinzo Abe’s decisions to challenge the post war political agreement including the verdicts of the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal; plus his continuation of Koizumi’s desire to sanitise the history books; and retreat from the war apologies of predecessors like Kono and Murayama have further fuelled Chinese and Korean anxiety about Japan’s political and military intentions. Imposing new Secrecy Laws, clamping down on internal political dissent and promoting the invigoration of Japanese defence industries have also generated alarm.

There have been parallel nationalist processes in the two Koreas as well. The election of President Lee Myung-Bak in 2008, for example, generated a more hardline Korean and Japanese response to the DPRK. President Lee was in favour of regional dialogues between Russia, China, Japan and Korea he was ambivalent and antagonistic to North Korea.

This hardline approach in Korea also resulted in a desire to change school texts promoted under the Kim-Roh regimes which President Lee claimed had denigrated the democratic and economic achievements of earlier leaders by adopting “an anti-market, anti-liberal democracy, anti-American, and pro-North Korean stance.” See Chung-in Moon (2009: 125)

This hardening of approach towards North Korea, undoubtedly fuelled nervousness in Pyongyang and provided external justification for its nuclear weapon and missile development. In particular President Lee’s insistence that continued economic support to the North was dependent on denuclearization and respect for human rights accelerated divisions between both countries.⁶ Despite relatively smooth bilateral relations between Japan and the ROK, Lee’s visit to the Dokdo/Takeshima island (contested by Japan) again reactivated painful memories about Japan-Korea relations.

When President Park Guen-hye, took power in 2012 she softened some of Lee’s approaches to the DPRK but joined China in criticism of Abe’s desire to move Japan in a more nationalist direction. She was particularly concerned about Shinzo Abe’s desire to reinterpret history in order to absolve the Japanese government for any responsibility for its employment of “comfort women.” during the Second World War. When Abe visited the Yasakuni shrine, Korean public opinion of him shifted in a very negative direction and fell to a level equal to that of Kim Jong-un.⁷

6 Haggard and Noland, “North Korea in 2008,” *Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid and Reform* p. 99.

7 Asan Institute, “Challenges and opportunities for Korea-Japan Relations in 2014,” available at <http://en.asaninst.org/contents/challenges-and-opportunities-for-korea-japan-relations-in-2014>.

The hardening of nationalist positions in China, Japan and the ROK, played neatly into the hands of the DPRK leadership. Kim Jong Il and Kim Jong-Un, for example, both hardened their desire for an autarkic nation state capable of repelling all invaders. Confronted by famines and a spluttering economy, however, neither leader has been able to balance the DPRK nuclear programme and expanding militarization (both conventional and nuclear) with economic development and growth. The only way in which the North can maintain internal control is by asserting that the DPRK is locked in threatening relationships with the ROK, the US, and Japan. Promoting these nationalist positions promotes an action-reaction dynamic that fuels vicious rather than virtuous cycles.


When the 6 party talks hit an impasse in 2008, for example, the military hardliners took over in the DPRK just as they did in China and the ROK. This resulted in the North reactivating its nuclear program, and expanding its conventional forces as well. This militarization could only be sustained by arguing for real and imagined national security threats from the US, Japan and the ROK. Kim Jong-Un made sure that these threats were not only imaginary but real by initiating military actions against the South and by his purge of roughly 40 percent of his top military leaders.⁸

If all the countries of Northeast Asia are interested in the denuclearization of North Korea, and the prevention of Japan and South Korea from going nuclear all four countries have got to start thinking of ways in which they can diminish nationalist rivalry; deal with painful history effectively and develop a join vision of a security

8 Alexandre Mansourov, "North Korea: Leadership Schisms and Consolidation During Kim Jong Un's Second Year in Power," *38 North* available at <http://38north.org/2014/01/amansourov012214>

community that will guarantee stable peace. This is an imperative because the tenuous security order that emerged during the cold war “stalemate” has disappeared and been replaced by national political rivalries that threaten to subvert the fragile peace gained by economic integration.


In order to clear the way for this to happen leaders in all four countries bilaterally and trilaterally have to initiate processes to change popular perceptions of the other. To illustrate what this might mean and how complicated the process is I want to focus on China-Japan, relations to demonstrate the ways in which personal opinion is driving national antagonism. The popular perceptions of each other are negative and high. The Genron Public Opinion Poll, for example, shows just how negative.⁹



The reasons for this unfavourable opinion are as follows.

As can be seen from these tables Painful History is the primary


9 See <http://www.genron-npo.net/en/pp/archives/5217.html>




driver of Chinese antagonism and Japanese Defensiveness. Japanese lack of a proper apology and remorse over the history of the invasion of China accounts for 70.5% of Chinese unfavorable views of Japan. On the other side 55.1% of Japanese unfavorable views of China are driven by irritation at the perceived sense of constant criticism for Second World War atrocities. The Japanese people and its current leadership- want China and Korea to forget the war and move on. To do this they are cultivating historical amnesia, wanting to renegotiate

the post war political settlement and “Normalise” Japan’s role in the world. They also feel that they have apologised enough!

In terms of divisive issues, Japanese concerns about China focus mainly on air pollution,(36.8%) and territorial disputes (20%) Although the territorial dispute is diminishing in importance from last year. For the Chinese, however, the territorial dispute over the Senkaku-Diaoyu Islands was most important at 50.6%. But the Nanjing Massacre came second at 47.9%. The interesting thing is that the percentage of people for whom this is important has grown from 35.5% in 2014 to nearly 48% last year. As the years recede and the direct participants die the painful memories in China are intensifying. But the public in both countries are deeply suspicious of the other and pessimistic about the future.



It is history Issues, a lack of trust and indifference to the identity needs of the other that are driving the antagonism between China and Japan. 60% of Japanese people mistrust the Chinese >40% of Chinese mistrust the Japanese. This mistrust is driven in part by territorial disputes but mainly unresolved history issues. It is the



unwillingness of either side to acknowledge the identity needs of the other that is fuelling the fundamental divisions between both countries.

10

Social identity theories argue that the more important group identity is to self, then identification with that group or nation becomes a source of individual pride and self-esteem. Taken to extreme this often results in the xenophobic nationalism that we see in Northeast Asia. Individuals who identify highly with the nation are likely to collectively “forget” the nation’s past injustices and focus instead on past glories. The need for positive self-esteem and reputation on both sides has driven China and Japan in opposite directions. Japan’s nationalist elites elevate their “Chosen Glory” (narratives and myths about the nation’s glorious past and visions of a glorious future) and would rather not focus on any negative dimensions of their past.

China on the other hand has chosen to focus on past humiliations and “chosen trauma” while building a glorious future. In response

10 (Tajfel & Turner, 1986)

Japan introduces its own “Chosen Traumas”. Hiroshima, Nagasaki and the Tokyo incendiary raids . These are useful reminders of the inhumanity of such weapons and such tactics but they are also used to diminish Japanese guilt for its past aggression. This results in “Competitive Victimhood” narratives which also work to impede the development of peaceful co-existence or better still reconciliation in North East Asia.

These competing narratives of “Chosen Glory” and “Chosen Trauma” serve very particular political purposes in both countries. Unless these narratives are addressed directly, however, it will not be possible to deal with their painful divisive history and relationships will always be fraught. The competitive victimhood dynamic, for example, gets translated into a competition for number one status. Prime Minister Abe asserts that “Japan is not and will never be a tier two country. That is the core message I’m here to make, and I should repeat it by saying I am back and so shall Japan be.” Abe and Hyakuta together have said “Japan! Be proud of yourself in the Center of the World.. And in August 2014, Abe asserted that those executed by the Allied Powers are “the foundation of the nation” and should be hailed for having “staked their souls to become the foundation of their nation so that Japan could achieve the peace and prosperity of today”

This is countered in China by President Xi Jin Ping stating that China has a dream too. This is his Chinese Dream. “This dream can be said to be the dream of a strong nation. And for the military, it is a dream of a strong military,” ... “To achieve the great revival of the Chinese nation, we must ensure there is unison between a prosperous country and strong military” He also wants recognition and an apology from Japan for the way in which it humiliated China

in the 1930s and 1940s. This is viewed as a pre-requisite for Chinese strength in the 21st century.

For Abe the political is deeply personal. He wishes to revisit Japanese war history and revoke the post war settlement which he sees as victor's justice. He also wants to change Article 9 of the Constitution, Remilitarise Japan so that it is seen as a "normal" nation and promote 21st century Japanese nationalism to exonerate his grandfather Nobosuke Kishi who was judged a Class A War Criminal.

There is no cordiality between Xi Jinping and Shinzo Abe. Both are "princelings" from old political dynasties. Both have histories to reinterpret and both are utterly convinced of their own moral rectitude. Xi Jinping wants personal acknowledgement from Abe of Japanese responsibility for the war. Abe wants Chinese acknowledgement of Japanese wartime suffering and an end to repeated requests for apology. 74.1% of the Chinese polled were dissatisfied with Abe's statement on the 70th anniversary of the End of the Second World War. They felt that it was a watering down of the 1995 Murayama statement made on the 50th anniversary where Murayama made a very moving personal apology for the damage and suffering caused by Japan to its Asian neighbors. The statement was based on a Cabinet decision, requiring unanimous approval from the Cabinet members.

The fact is that there are divergent views on how to deal with painful history. 47% of Chinese (Up from 31.4% in 2014) believe that "China Japan relations will not develop unless the historical issues are resolved. 35.5% of Japanese polled think it will be impossible to resolve the history issues until there is an improvement in the relationships between both countries. So there is an impasse. My argument , based on a series of problem solving workshops that I

facilitated in Northeast Asia is that there will be no improvement in relationships until there is a recognition of the deeper identity needs of both sides and an effective apology from Japan acceptable to the Chinese.

According to Blatz, C. W., K. Schumann, and M. Ross.¹¹ effective apologies require the following 1) the perpetrator's acceptance of responsibility; 2) acknowledgement of harm and/or victim's suffering 3) expression of sorrow and remorse; 4) admission of injustice or wrongdoing; 5) forbearance, or promises to behave better and never repeat the mistake again and; 6) offers of reparations/to repair the damages . I would also want to add the following . (7) Sincerity. This is difficult to pin down but if it looks as though an apology is insincere or made for instrumental purposes it is unlikely to be effective. (8) Representation. If states wish to apologise then it's important that the victim knows how representative the apology is and finally Specificity and clear acknowledgement of the offence.

China and Korea feel aggrieved because of specific atrocities like the "rape of Nanjing," inhumane treatment of prisoners of war, the forced sexual services of "comfort women" for Japanese soldiers, medical experimentation in Manchuria and on a more general level, Japanese aggression, annexation and colonial rule in Asia during the 19th and 20th centuries. Japan, for its part has issued over 50 apologies since the Second World War and the Japanese government and people feel that this should be enough to resolve the unresolved history. So why haven't they been accepted and why hasn't there been some reconciliation between the victims and perpetrators? One of the major reasons has been the vagueness and non specificity

11 Blatz, C. W., K. Schumann, and M. Ross. 2009. "Government Apologies for Historical Injustices." *Political Psychology* 30 (2); 219-241

of the apology. For example the Japanese Foreign Ministry issued this statement in 2005.¹²

“During a certain period of the past, Japan followed a *mistaken national policy and caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those Asian nations, through its colonial rule and aggression*. Japan squarely *faces these facts of history in a spirit of humility*. With feelings of deep remorse and heartfelt apology always engraved in mind, Japan, underpinned by its solid democracy, has resolutely and consistently strived for peace by adhering to a strictly defensive security policy, preventing the escalation of international conflict, and dedicating itself to international peace and stability by mobilizing all its resources...After the end of World War II, Japan renounced all rights, titles and claims to Korea, Taiwan, the Kurile islands, a portion of Sakhalin, and other territories, and accepted the judgments of the International Military Tribunal of the Far East (Tokyo Trial), in which 25 Japanese leaders had been convicted of war crimes. Many other Japanese were convicted in other war crimes courts. *Japan has dealt with the issues of reparations, property and claims, in accordance with the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the bilateral peace treaties, agreements and instruments. Japan paid reparations to Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam, while others waived them*. After the normalization of its relations with the Republic of Korea, China and other countries, *Japan extended a substantial amount of economic cooperation. With the parties to these documents, the issues of reparations, property and claims, including the claims by individuals, have been settled legally* (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2005, cited in Seaton 2007, 66).

12 (Seaton, 2007)

The apologies which China and Korea have felt more comfortable with have been personal and heart felt. Hosokawa Morihiro, for example made more than four official apologies for Japan's "aggressive acts" and "colonial rule" causing "intolerable pain and suffering" to the people of Asia and around the world. Hosokawa's statements were hailed as having shifted the apology discourse of the Japanese government. They were also perceived as sincere.

Similarly Murayama Tomiichi's, 1995 statement, could not get Diet support for an apology but with cabinet approval he said "In the hope that no such mistake be made in the future, I regard, in a spirit of humility, these irrefutable facts of history, and express here once again my feelings of deep remorse (*tsuuzetsu na hansei*) and state my heartfelt apology (*kokoro kara no owabi*)" Yohei Kono's apology in Korea for Comfort women in 1993 was of a similar order.

The problems with these specific apologies is they were considered personal rather than political-from the Left rather than the mainstream Right-Instrumental rather than heartfelt-but they were nevertheless accepted in Seoul and Beijing in the spirit within which they were given. Over the past 15 years (apart from the brief SDP interregnum) there has been a dramatic right wing shift in Japanese politics. From the 1980s to now. Apologies, expressions of remorse have been undercut by multiple Prime Ministerial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and by a desire that Japan revisit its war history, the post war settlement and become a "normal nation" again.

Japan can only persuade its neighbours about its sincerity and address this painful history if it can establish its harmlessness to them. It cannot do this when it is intent on "normalising" and when it continues to celebrate those who were responsible for terrible acts of aggression. It cannot make an effective apology with non

specific expressions of remorse or by engaging in the dynamics of competitive victimhood and the promotion of collective amnesia. And it cannot do this by literally rewriting history.

There will be no trusting harmonious relationships in NorthEast Asia until the painful traumatic history is put to rest by effective and acceptable apologies and more empathetic, altruistic relationships . This is challenging because of unmet identity needs in all three countries. China feels that its victimisation and humiliation has never been adequately acknowledged by Japan. Japan feels that it has apologised enough and that its moral reputation is constantly being impugned. Apologies that do not pay explicit attention to each other's deeper identity needs are unlikely to be successful.

Moral Imagination is critical to transforming Sino-Japanese relations. Both China and Japan have to imagine themselves in an inclusive and expandable web of relationships with each other so that they might do no harm and deal with each other's deepest fears. They need to cultivate and sustain a problem solving curiosity that embraces the diverse complexities of their past and current relationships. Both China and Japan need to nurture each other's creative potential and both need courage to build confidence and trust between each other for the future. Unfortunately these are in short supply in Northeast Asia-but have to be discovered quickly if a security community is to be envisioned. This will require the reconvening of all the bilateral and trilateral summits, as well as the development of regional institutions to facilitate all of this. To move in this direction will also require a positive collective vision of how all four Northeast Asian countries might relate to each other over the rest of the 20th century.

Of one thing we can be sure. It is only after this painful history

has been put to rest that each country will be able to trust the other enough to boost confidence between their respective militaries; generate higher levels of political cooperation and create the transparent communications necessary to generating awareness of the others benign intentions. There will be no prospect of much movement on arms control and disarmament issues until these historic issues have been put to rest.

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The 6th Annual Conference of the Japan Association
for Human Security Studies
Symposium
Global Governance for Human Security

Plenary Session: December 10, from 14:30 to 17:30

Venue: Soka University, Global Square 6F, AW608

The idea of Human Security has evolved and has been advocated by some governments and civil society organizations since its articulation by UNDP in 1994. We can see the development of this idea in international community through a significant volume of reports and resolutions, e.g., the HSC report in 2003, the Reports of the Secretary-General and the General Assembly Resolutions in 2010 and 2012 among many others. Taking such development into account, it can be said that Human Security “has been prioritized as a foreign policy goal”* in international community.

Our question is, in this context, whether international community implements policies for Human Security appropriately or not, in other words, whether a form of global governance for Human Security is actually being carried out and to what extent. It is to this end that we have invited experts from UN organizations with the aim of examining the implementation and implications of Human Security by the organizations. We would like to explore the agenda for improving global governance for Human Security.

*Gerad Oberleitner, ‘Human Security: Idea, Policy and Law’,
in *Routledge Handbook of Human Security*, 2014, p. 319

1. Opening remarks

Global Governance for Human Security

Professor Hideki Tamai, Soka University Peace Research
Institute

2. Presentation

Human Security in Development Practice

Mr. Tetsuo Kondo, Director of the UNDP Representation
Office in Tokyo

Human Security – Application and its Added Value at the
United Nations

Ms. Mehrnaz Mostafavi, Chief of Human Security Unit,
United Nations

Human Security and UNHCR's Strategy to Tackle the Global
Displacement Crisis:

The perspective of protecting displaced people

Mr. Dirk Hebecker, Representative of the UNHCR
Representation in Japan

Discussant

Professor Kiyoko Ikegami, Nihon University Graduate School
of Social and Cultural Studies

3. Panel Discussion

Opening Remark

Global Governance for Human Security

Hideki Tamai

Director
Soka University Peace Research Institute

Good afternoon, everyone. I am the director of the Soka University Peace Research Institute and the chair of this year's JAHSS conference - the Japan Association of Human Security Studies. It is our great honor and pleasure to host this year's conference here at Soka University.

I am deeply grateful to the many people who have contributed to make the conference possible. I would like to especially express my gratitude to the Toda Institute for Global Peace and Policy Research for their sponsorship.

I also wish to thank our distinguished panelists for their cooperation and support in making this year's conference a reality. I thank all of you from the bottom of my heart for taking time from your busy schedules to participate. Thank you very much.

Allow me to say a few words about this year's conference venue, Soka University. When Soka University was established in 1971, the

founder, Dr. Daisaku Ikeda, articulated the three founding principles as follows;

Be the highest seat of learning for humanistic education

Be the cradle of a new culture

Be a fortress of peace for humankind

The Peace Research Institute was then opened in 1976, our institute celebrated 40th anniversary this year, based on the principle of becoming a fortress for the peace of humankind, for the purpose of contributing to the establishment of a peaceful society and the improvement of human welfare by conducting surveys and research on the various problems related to the achievement of peace.

Dr. Ikeda has written a Peace Proposal every year since 1983. He often refers to the importance of efforts toward Human Security in his proposals. He has emphasized the importance of Human Security values, including survival, livelihood and dignity - and related initiatives in the area of peacebuilding. In this connection, this year's proposal quotes the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development: "As we embark on this collective journey, we pledge that no one will be left behind".

All of us gathered here today have been contributing to research and educational projects to promote a broader understanding of Human Security and its implementation. With these aims, it is our great pleasure as this year's host to play an active role in JAHSS and its future development.

A focus of this year's conference, the 6th one to date, we would like to assess our capacity to put the values of Human Security into action. As you know, it has been over 20 years now since UNDP announced the concept of Human Security. Since then, the idea has evolved and has been advocated by various governments and civil

society organizations. We can see the development of the idea in the international community through a significant volume of reports and resolutions, for example, the HSC report in 2003, the Reports of the Secretary-General and the General Assembly Resolutions in 2010 and 2012 among many others. Taking such developments into account, it can be said that Human Security has indeed been “prioritized as a foreign policy goal” in the international community.

We chose “Global Governance for Human Security” as the title of this symposium. Our question is whether the international community is implementing policies for Human Security as effectively as it could, in other words, whether a form of global governance for Human Security is actually being carried out and to what extent.

We are most fortunate this year to have with us experts from UN organizations to help us assess issues related to the implementation and implications of Human Security.

Mr. Tetsuo Kondo, Director of the UNDP Representation Office in Tokyo

Ms. Mehrnaz Mostafavi, Chief of Human Security Unit, United Nations

Mr. Dirk Hebecker, Representative of the UNHCR Representation in Japan

Needless to say, these experts represent the core organizations for the implementation of Human Security. Learning from their experience, we hope to better understand some of the challenges of putting the values of Human Security into practice.

We are also pleased to receive Professor Kiyoko Ikegami of Nihon University Graduate School of Social and Cultural Studies as a discussant. We can benefit greatly from Professor Ikegami’s broad perspective and deep experience from her work both at the UN with

UNHCR and civil society organizations such as JOICFP.

In the first session, we will hear presentations from the three panelist's presentation and comments from the discussant. We will take a break after the presentation session. We will then have the second session, the panel discussion. In that session, the panelists will respond to questions and comments from audience.

I would like to express my gratitude again, and hope that everyone can enjoy this symposium. Thank you very much.

PRESENTATION

Human Security in Development Practice

Tetsuo Kondo

Director
UNDP Representation Office in Tokyo

The world agreed on the SDGs at last year's UN General Assembly, namely, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The 17 goals and 169 targets always matter; however, GA resolution 70/1 of Agenda 2030 has its core message in its preamble, referring to the notion of freedom from fear and freedom from want, with human dignity. Overall, the approach of SDGs is characterized as human-centered development.

I aim to align these SDG principles with the notion of human security, considering my field experiences of UN missions and UNDP field offices for peace consolidation, livelihood recovery, and sustainable human development. These are the core competencies of the UN operational activities.

Most of my UNDP field duty stations were in conflict-affected areas, such as Iraq, Timor-Leste, Kosovo, and Chad. I served in these missions during a particular planning phase called "transition."

The communities affected by conflict have common problems of institutional disorder that deprives people of public services: education, health and safety, and security.

For me, having served in the United Nations, our responsibility is to restore a community's functions rather than to just provide humanitarian supplies. I regret to say that the UN's intervention is not an ideal solution because it will always be needed when the national administration capacity is lowered and requires help in order to support the people affected.

Threats and Risks

In many cases, people affected by conflict find themselves in the best position to define human security needs because they know exactly what kind of threats and wants affect them, and also what is specifically needed to ensure a sustainable livelihood. We, from the UN, help to identify the threats and risks that they are facing and to plan solutions.

Last year, on this same occasion of the Japan Association for Human Security Studies, Professor Kinhide Mushanokoji gave keynote remarks that were very enlightening. He explained the meaning of the word "security" with the verb "secure," which is composed of the prefix "se- (without)" and the stem "-cure (care)," saying that security is a condition under which people do not need to be cared for. Therefore, to establish or ensure human security is an action to eliminate threats and mitigate risks that disable people from living without worrying about danger to their lives.

Opportunities

The UNDP Human Development Report in 1994 presented an approach to providing sustainable solutions to people with need of international care. A new way of thinking after the Cold War when massive military expenditure was no longer required provided such an opportunity. The idea of human security opened this opportunity for people to use the savings from the “dividend of peace.”

Twenty years later, this idea is still valid because a global goal of Agenda 2030, SDGs, has its bedrock in human security and sustainable development. The preparation process for SDGs was guided by local experiences and global debates recalling the concept “Act locally and think globally.”

Tools

In the history of human beings, the world agreed to establish the League of Nations after WWI, and the United Nations after WWII. These international institutional collaborations were a response to the need for global governance. Their aims have been to maintain peace and uphold human rights.

The UN’s role has been evolving over time. Now, the UN places greater focus on sustainable development. The key issue here is the best way to connect peace, human rights, and sustainable development. In my observation, this is “human security.”

Conflict and Violent Extremism

The UNDP HDR 1994 indicates that, without peace, there may be

no development but that, without development, peace is threatened. It points to the idea that a war deprives people of human rights and all types of security: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security, and political security.

Moreover, international security has been becoming increasingly fragile as globalization advances. A clear and present danger for the sustainability of the world at this point of time is violent extremism.

There has been no effective solution that directly addresses the root causes of extremists' hostility towards human beings, which on earth is never acceptable. The UNDP report in 1994 already clearly stated that the causes of violence lie in poverty and inequality.

Environment

Japan went through an environmental crisis after WWII when it showed miraculous economic performance. A book written in 1975 by Dr. Michael Reich *Island of Dreams* illustrated this crisis with such diseases as marine water pollution diseases known as *Minamata*, mercury-polluted fishermen's plight, or Yokkaichi air pollution that caused asthma syndromes or other ailments. Japan has not been engaged in any military conflicts after WWII, but this crisis arose. And this is not considering countries affected by war.

The important point here is that Japan is a learned country that has overcome the environmental crisis by the strong initiatives of local communities of their own, by local governments, and by the private sector. Now, Japan supports many developing countries with its experiences and know-how in order to eliminate pollution. The media and civil society also played an essential role. I think this experience

of self-recovery from environmental crisis pushed Japan to become one of the most vocal advocates for environmental sustainability.

Health

Health sector support requires scientific, evidence-based planning to find solutions. Human security assistance programming, in which I have been involved, is always based on analysis, mapping, and planning. Therefore, the global health initiatives implemented as part of the MDGs in the last 15 years are, by definition, human security goals. Dr. Peter Piot, a role model for me as an international civil servant, wrote in his memoir *No Time to Lose* that when he was engaged in HIV retroviral treatment with President Mbeki, his approach was exactly a human security approach. At that time, South Africa was facing a serious crisis of HIV infection and the situation was out of control. There was a tendency for African political leaders to deny the Western approach to finding solutions to African problems. Dr. Piot, through his face-to-face dialogue with the president, strongly emphasized the point that scientific data must be considered essential in policy planning.

This year, year one of the SDGs, Japan took strong initiatives to address the global health agenda, namely health emergency response, antimicrobial resistance, and universal health coverage, by assuming the G7 Ise-Shima Summit presidency and co-organizing TICAD VI. In the past, it was in 2000 that Japan chaired the G7 Kyushu-Okinawa Summit on the eve of the Millennium Summit at the UNGA, which addressed the eradication of infectious diseases such as HIV, malaria, and tuberculosis. This initiated the process of establishing the Global Fund for ATM. Overall, MDG Goal 6 on HIV has made substantive

progress in most affected areas.

Experiences in a UN Country Team

The role of the United Nations in the field as a UN country team is to help member states tackle humanitarian and development challenges. It then has to identify opportunities to obtain international support to address the remedies, without damaging the environment and national identity but delivering noticeable impact. I worked on cases in Kosovo and Chad to provide multi-sectoral solutions in these post-conflict situations.

During the relief phase, the UN country team forms a humanitarian coordination team and works using a cluster approach. As the crisis phase evolves, a recovery and normalization program is applied with the UNDP as the lead agency. When the government recovers its normal capacity, policies under the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) shall be formulated. The value of human security is an overarching guideline in operating the entire process.

Kosovo in 2008

In 1999, the Kosovo conflict disrupted essential social services, stifled economic development, and exacerbated the growing hardships faced by an already vulnerable and distressed population after the demise of the former Yugoslavia. After NATO military intervention, the Serbian government and Kosovo-Albanian Liberation Army ceased fire.

But, when I arrived in 2007 as deputy resident representative of the UNDP, there was an absence of effective administration in Northern

Kosovo where the Kosovo-Serbian population was a majority due to a vacuum of sovereign institutions. The UN agencies on the ground collectively programmed a human security project and applied to the UN Trust Fund for Human Security for funding.

The approach was to form a local action group consisting of three parties, Kosovo-Serbian, Kosovo-Albanian, and the UN, to identify local needs in healthcare, education, and employment creation. The program was a full success and nearly 1,000 victim populations gained access to long-time-missing public services.

Chad in 2014

My subsequent assignment as country director of the UNDP was in Chad in the Sahel African region. Despite its abundant natural resources, Chad remains one of the poorest countries in the world. Thirty years of constant violence and conflict have resulted in massive international displacement that has spurred tensions between host communities and internally displaced persons (IDPs)

One of the most conflict-affected areas was the eastern region vulnerable to drought, water scarcity, climate change, competition over scarce resources, and growing tension among communities. Lack of local administration aggravated the living conditions of the population with frequent violence against women.

The program funded by the UN Trust Fund focused on three areas: access to drinking water and food with little infrastructure; job training for IDPs, especially women, to achieve a sustainable income; and protection of women from gender-based violence.

The national association of women's empowerment partnered with the UNDP, UNICEF, and UNFPA to provide technical support to

the beneficiaries. Approximately 12,000 of the local population were given the opportunity to keep hunger and insecurity away from their communities.

Conclusions

Such projects as formulated and implemented jointly by UN agencies in different development contexts show examples of concrete actions to address human security. The threats faced by people in Northern Kosovo and Sahelian Chad were quite different in appearance and are again quite different from the environmental crisis in Japan in the 1960-70s and the HIV fatal health hazards in 1990.

We do not talk about force or coercion as a solution to the problem but instead employ a human-centered approach with sustainable and preventive solutions globally supported and understood. This means the affected population recovering access to freedom from fear and freedom from want with human dignity.

Thank you for your attention.

PRESENTATION

Human Security – Application and its Added Value at the United Nations

Mehrnaz Mostafavi

Chief

Human Security Unit, United Nations

It is my sincere pleasure to be with you today and to share this panel with my esteemed colleagues, Professor Tamai, Mr. Kondo and Mr. Hebecker. I am enormously grateful to Soka University for inviting me to this very timely conference on Global Governance for Human Security. Events like this provide a wonderful opportunity for us to reflect on progress made and to consider how to strengthen our common resolve to improve the lives of those most vulnerable. It is also befitting that this conference is held in Tokyo as the Government of Japan has and continue to be instrumental in the advancement of human security.

Colleagues,

I believe it is not an overestimation to say that we meet at a time of considerable crisis. Whether it is the scourge of conflict, the outbreak of pandemics, the devastation of natural disasters, or the indignity

of abject poverty, today's world is an intolerably insecure place for many. And, while progress has been made, recent trends test the efficacy of our international system and examine our efforts to prevent human suffering.

Today, the rising number of people affected by conflict, notably in Syria, Yemen, the Central African Republic and South Sudan, among others, has contributed to the largest number of displaced individuals in search of greater peace and brighter future for themselves and their families since World War II.

Meanwhile, as witnessed in West Africa, the Ebola virus and other pandemics not only threaten people's lives, but place considerable stress on the fragile social, political and economic systems of those countries least capable of responding.

In addition, across the globe, the devastating impact of climate change and natural disasters threaten the lives and livelihoods of millions of people. And while majority of climate-related deaths and economic losses occur in poor regions, the March 11 Japan Earthquake reminds us of the indiscriminate threat of natural disasters to those most vulnerable in all parts of the world.

Lastly, persistent poverty and inequality continue to limit the choices and opportunities of marginalized individuals and undermine their efforts to participate and contribute to their societies.

In one way or another, each of these scenarios result in grave human insecurities - specifically, the breakdown in the survival, livelihood and dignity of individuals and their communities. Moreover, these challenges, if not addressed in a comprehensive and inclusive manner, can lead to more intractable crisis that often spillover into broader national, regional and international insecurities.

Indeed, it is safe to say that to adequately and sustainably address

today's multidimensional and complex challenges requires a renewed consensus on the added value of the human security approach and its systematic application in international, regional, national and local governance mechanisms.

Such an approach recognizes that today's constellation of threats, if not confronted by a framework that emphasizes the interconnected aspirations of people to be free from fear, want and indignity, can lead to further insecurities and provide the space in which, in some instances, criminal networks and terrorist organizations can make inroads and rally marginalized and disgruntled communities into their ranks.

But more importantly, the application of human security provides an invaluable methodology for developing people-centred and comprehensive responses based on multi-stakeholder partnerships to reduce the likelihoods of conflict; overcome the obstacles to inclusive and sustainable development; and promote a life of dignity for all. And while much work remains, a focus on human security can undoubtedly enrich and strengthen our actions towards greater progress and stability within and across our borders.

As a result, recent global policy reviews, and subsequent agendas, have all underlined the added value of such an approach.

From the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, to the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, the United Nations Peace Operations and Peacebuilding Reviews, the World Humanitarian Summit, and the UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants, all these reviews and global policy developments have acknowledged the indispensable truth that silo-driven approaches, most commonly adopted by the international community, are not keeping pace with the challenges of a more complex and interconnected world.

Subsequently, they have called for people-centered, comprehensive, context-specific and prevention-oriented approaches that protect and empower people, and that can more effectively prevent and address today's complex challenges.

Colleagues,

As you are all aware, in September of last year, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development was adopted. This transformative agenda was the result of a two-year consultative process in which an unprecedented number of civil society actors and academic institutions participated and played a critical role in our collective efforts to eradicate poverty in all its forms by 2030.

But 15 years to achieve a world free of poverty, hunger, disease and violence, with no one left behind, will not be an easy endeavor.

Reaching this goal will require the concerted efforts of all of us. It will require new and innovative solutions that match the scale and ambition of the SDGs. As I'm sure you can imagine – along with its many opportunities, implementing this broad yet integrated agenda also presents a number of challenges which the human security approach can help address.

Specifically, to meet the goals of Agenda 2030, a context-specific analysis at the local level – a hallmark of the human security approach – is needed in order to further extend the benefits of economic growth across and within countries. Whereas national measurements may not adequately address disparities at the community level, the identification of bottlenecks at the local level can foster an inclusive economic growth with significant gains across societies.

The application of human security, moreover, addresses not only

developmental challenges but also challenges stemming from other factors that impede economic growth and poverty reduction.

Based on its core vision to achieve freedom from fear, want and indignity, a focus on human security helps clarify how diverse issues ranging from deprivation in all its forms (food, health, education, employment, etc.) to violence and environmental degradation interact and require comprehensive and context-specific solutions.

That is, by emphasizing the triangular relationship between peace and security, development and human rights, a focus on human security can ensure that poverty reduction strategies are attentive to the root causes and the remedial solutions needed in order to stem the persistence of insecurities and stop their impact on the achievement of inclusive and sustainable development and the promotion of peaceful societies.

Today we can confidently say that the application of human security will complement and significantly enrich the mechanisms that will be needed in order to attain the SDGs.

In addition to supporting the SDGs, the application of human security also contributes to ongoing efforts in a number of important areas which I would like to share with you, notably, a more inclusive and sustainable peacebuilding architecture; a stronger transition from humanitarian relief to longer-term development; and, more effective mechanisms to prevent, prepare for, manage and recover from natural disasters, particularly at the local level.

Friends,

After two decades of steady decline, conflicts are once again on the rise. As noted in the review of the UN peacebuilding architecture in 2015, the success for sustaining peace “relies on uniting the ‘peace

and security’, ‘human rights’ and ‘development’ pillars of the United Nations.”

In this regard, the human security approach is an invaluable tool for building multi-stakeholder partnerships for conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

Despite daunting challenges, post-conflict situations do provide significant opportunities to address the root causes of conflicts, to heal fragmentation, and to strengthen state-society relations.

The success of peacebuilding strategies, however rest on the ability to deliver the dividends of peace to all people and communities in a manner that is transparent, participatory and fair.

To this end, the application of human security underlines the inclusion of protection efforts – such as providing public safety, essential basic services and the rule of law with empowerment measures that promote partnerships with local stakeholders.

Local partners can play a significant role in reinforcing ownership in the future of their country; in nurturing reconciliation; and in restoring trust in the institutions that return stability to post-conflict situations. Together, this dual approach can help minimize the space in which societies may relapse into conflicts.

At the same time, by promoting a comprehensive and context-specific approach, the application of human security can ensure that support from across the international community is based on the actual realities on the ground. This results in a response framework in which the needs, vulnerabilities and capacity gaps of conflict-affected countries are continually assessed, and actions that address these gaps are supported by a peacebuilding architecture that strengthens local and national capacities.

Colleagues,

The transition from humanitarian relief to long-term development is another complex and rarely linear experience. Far too often, environmental crises or violent conflicts devastate the same vulnerable communities time and time again.

Without addressing the underlying causes of these crises, I'm afraid our best efforts to build back better will remain unfulfilled.

As a multi-stakeholder, comprehensive and integrated approach, the application of human security can contribute significantly to our ongoing efforts in this area. Human security underscores the need for joint analysis, planning and implementation among humanitarian and development actors, and provides the rationale and evidence by which to transcend this divide.

At its core, human security is rooted in the notion that threats to people's survival, livelihood and dignity are seldom singular in nature. Rather, a mix of factors come together to generate situations that are often complex and multidimensional. Therefore, human security advocates for comprehensive solutions that encompass all key stakeholders including those responsible for emergency relief, rehabilitation and longer-term development.

Moreover, human security is premised on the recognition that long-term sustainable results are more likely to be generated by activities that go beyond responding to an immediate crisis. By looking at the root causes of a particular threat, the human security approach identifies the structural and behavioural changes needed in order to mitigate negative impacts and help prevent the re-occurrence of current and future crises.

Lastly, climate change and its interactions with other insecurities remains one of the most pressing issues of our time.

Climatic fluctuations, environmental degradation and extreme weather patterns disrupt harvests, deplete fisheries, erode livelihoods and increase the spread of infectious diseases. Vulnerable groups are particularly at risk, not only from the immediate impacts of natural disasters, but also from knock-on risk factors such as, displacement and migration.

Since 2008, an average of 26 million people have been displaced each year as a result of natural disasters.

Climate change is also a “threat multiplier”... particularly in situations where the loss of land, together with persistent poverty, displacement and other insecurities, trigger competition over increasingly scarce natural resources that often intensify into societal tensions.

Well-suited to the multifaceted challenges of natural disasters, the human security approach highlights the interconnectedness and the cross-sectoral consequences of climate change and its impact on different facets of people’s lives. Such an analysis helps to identify the differentiated impact as well as the compounding magnitude of climate-related threats on people and their communities.

The Sendai Conference in particular, highlighted many of the core principles of human security. It advocated for a broader and more people-centred, preventative approach. It underscored the importance of comprehensive and multi-sectoral solutions that engage all stakeholders. And it emphasized the need to strengthen cooperation to build local and national resilience and to facilitate the transfer of technology and financial assistance.

For close to two decades, the UN Trust Fund for Human Security has provided resources and guided programmes that aim to reduce the risks of vulnerabilities; seek to build the resilience of fragile

communities; and strive to protect those most vulnerable.

The human security approach recognises that insecurities must be tackled together in terms of UN support. Accordingly, all programmes under the Trust Fund require an integrated response, often including several UN entities, in partnership with Government and non-governmental actors - thereby, combining expertise, accelerating delivery, limiting duplication, and maximising the reach of scarce resources.

With over \$440 million distributed to more than 220 projects and programmes since 1999, the UN Trust Fund for Human Security, established by the Government of Japan, has produced a substantial catalogue of lessons learned in how we conceptualize, plan and respond to current and emerging challenges. It has provided the rationale and methodology for why different entities must come together to support a more inclusive and shared prosperity in greater peace and resilience.

Colleagues,

I am pleased to say that in recent years we have made significant progress in expanding the practice of human security across the United Nations and beyond.

Today, more and more university programmes are training the next generation of human security experts. In addition, an increasing number of civil society organizations have integrated the human security approach into their work with Governments and communities.

At the Human Security Unit, we continue to partner with a wide range of UN and non-UN entities. Among these, the UN Trust for Human Security remains an important instrument in expanding the

contribution of human security to the priorities of the international community.

Through seed money provided by the Trust Fund, combined with co-funding commitments from other sources, particularly at the national level, contributions to the Trust Fund have resulted in greater multi-stakeholder partnerships on a wide range of issues that aim to reduce vulnerability, strengthen resilience, prevent conflicts, and foster social harmony.

And while the Trust Fund remains critical in our efforts to promote human security, we continue to undertake additional steps to mainstream the application of human security in the work of the United Nations. This work is guided by the “Framework for Cooperation on the System-wide Application of Human Security”.

The Framework, endorsed by the Interagency Working Group on Human Security, highlights the added value of the human security approach and its contribution to the priority areas of the UN -such as, the fulfillment of the SDGs, the One UN reform agenda, transition from humanitarian to long-term development, and disaster risk reduction. It documents how the application of human security can enable the United Nations system to utilize its resources and comparative advantages in a more integrated, effective and efficient manner.

In addition to our support to the UN system, our partnerships with member States and others on a wide range of issues and activities remains a priority for us.

Among these, in May of this year, we co-organized an event titled “Health, Resilience, and the Added Value of the Human Security Approach to Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals” in collaboration with the Pan American Health Organization and the

Japan Center for International Exchange, co-sponsored by the Permanent Missions of Costa Rica, Japan and Thailand.

Later in the month, the Advisory Board on Human Security and the Human Security Unit participated in the Asia-Pacific Regional Human Security Conference, organized by the Government of Thailand, as the Chair of the Human Security Network. The event brought together policy-makers and practitioners to share experiences on how the application of human security contributes to the achievement of the SDGs.

Most recently, the HSU in partnership with the Human Security Network and the Aspen Ministers Forum organized a high-level event on “Human Security for Refugees, Migrants and Host Communities: Tools and Approaches for Collective Action.” Bringing together present and former Foreign Ministers, Permanent Representatives, and senior UN officials, the event reinforced the value of the human security approach to the implementation of the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants.

These collaborations are further complemented by our ongoing engagement with academics and non-governmental organizations, across regions and continents, including today’s timely conference at Soka University.

Looking to the future, we will focus our efforts to ensure that the lessons learned from the past 17 years continue to be translated into institutional, policy and programmatic shifts that enable us to better manage risks, prevent instabilities, save lives, and promote greater peace and prosperity for all.

And, through all of our work, we will continue to place ‘people’ at the heart of our actions so that, at this critical juncture, our international system has the policies and practices to advance human

security.

Therefore, allow me to underscore my sincere hope for the success of this conference and our joint efforts to further strengthen the “Global Governance for Human Security.” Let us, through the human security approach, connect the dots that will enable us to better respond to current and emerging challenges. Let us uphold the United Nations Charter and its focus on “we the peoples”. And let us strive to achieve international cooperation in promoting peace, prosperity and dignity for all.

I thank you for your attention.

PRESENTATION

Human Security and UNHCR's Strategy to Tackle the Global Displacement Crisis: The perspective of protecting displaced people

Dirk Hebecker

Representative
UNHCR Representation in Japan

Dear Participants, Colleagues and Friends,

I am glad to speak on this topic on 'Human Rights Day' as human security, not just for me but also from a human rights perspective, is very much about 'securing' people's access to basic rights, first and foremost the right to life but also the whole range of rights listed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted 68 years ago in Paris. You may know that 10 December is usually celebrated under a unique theme every year - in 2016 it is:



**STAND UP
FOR SOMEONE'S
RIGHTS TODAY**

Human Rights Day 2016

Being on a panel with distinguished experts puts myself - a layman on human security - in a very stressful position. I would like to skip any generic statements about human security and talk about the perspective of UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency which is mandated to protect, assist and find durable solutions for refugees and also acts as the protection lead in the inter-agency response to situations of internal displacement.

UNHCR's mandate kicks in when governments are unable or unwilling to protect and assist refugees. Refugees are non-citizens. They flee from their homes when they are afraid (war, human rights violations, discrimination etc.) - i.e. when they cannot enjoy the protection of their government anymore; that also means their 'human security'. Protection and human security are often interchangeable in displacement situations. Any refugee crisis is always also a crisis of human security (Ogata).

Running away from home only gives refugees 'safety' - human security requires life-saving assistance from the first days of their exile and investment into their education, skills development and individual and collective capacities.

The very initial 'human security' for refugees, and internally displaced people for that matter, however, - and this is my first point - probably comes from their own communities and often from the communities that host them, sometimes even before any aid arrives.

The challenge for any aid organization is to provide assistance in such a way that it doesn't create dependencies (which too often develop into hard-to-cure 'syndroms') but emphasizes community mobilization and self-reliance over hand-outs (assistance).

In reality, when refugees arrive in neighboring countries, the initial response (esp. provision of shelter, food and nutrition, water, health

services, etc.) does not always, or almost never, take into account the capabilities of the refugee community from Day 1. Refugees then quickly get used to being provided everything they need instead of organizing themselves as a community, as a family but also as individuals.

Of course, at the beginning of a refugee crisis, refugees often think of their situation as a very temporary one and there is nothing wrong with provision of assistance when refugees are weak, exhausted, traumatized, or malnourished.

The problem is that most refugee situations can't be resolved within a short time; on average, refugees now stay in exile for more than 10 years (Kenya/Somalia, Bangladesh/Myanmar, Pakistan/Afghanistan etc. are just a few examples of what we call 'protracted situations').

In Bangladesh, even to this day, some of the basic services for Rohingya refugees in the camps are provided by aid organizations or the government - doctors, nurses, engineers, teachers etc. Had the international community invested in education (incl. higher) for young refugees 20-25 years ago at the beginning of this situation, the refugee community could have its own refugee doctors, refugee nurses, refugee engineers, etc. by now...

This brings me to my second point - I believe that governance of human security is very important. The issue I just described - the failed opportunity to tackle 'human security' based on self-help and self-reliance development - comes from weak governance of 'human security'.

We talk about mainstreaming human security - but it has not been mainstreamed to a satisfactory level. Key documents during the recent New York high level GA meeting on refugees and migration (Sept 2016) did not mention 'human security'. But I don't want to

jump to conclusions. That could be an indicator for very good mainstreaming. (More likely it isn't.) - [By the way, one important exception is Japan's Prime Minister Abe's speech at the New York summit: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000189243.pdf>.]

Good governance of human security is manifested through the Human Security Trust Fund. Regular calls for funding are going out to agencies and partners, and the project selection ensures that funded projects indeed meet the criteria and that tangible improvements to the human security of beneficiaries can be expected. (I believe a sizeable number of projects are indeed implemented by UNHCR.)

In UNHCR, I would say, human security is understood to be mainstreamed through our protection and assistance work. We don't actively use the term as such (which could be an indicator for how deeply human security has already been mainstreamed already in UNHCR) but everyone understands that efforts to strengthen empowerment, community mobilization, education, self-reliance, addressing the specific needs of women and girls, elderly, children and adolescents etc. and the promotion of rights, in particular freedom of movement, access to the labor market, health and education all add up to define 'human security' in practice and reality.

My third and last point is about the particular challenges of today's global displacement crisis and how UNHCR tries to tackle them strategically.

What are the latest developments?

2016 was a crucial year and, in a way, turning point not just for UNHCR but the entire international community, in particular since the 2015 massive arrival of refugees in Europe. Also, we had the WHS in Istanbul, the G7 summit in Ise-Shima which, for the first time in

great detail, discussed and deliberated on refugees and migrants. Then finally, in September 2016, the GA held a summit meeting to address large movements of refugees and migrants, followed by Obama's Leaders' summit on refugees.

At the end of 2015, we had 65 million refugees and other displaced people on our books. By the end of 2016, this number will have reached 68-69 million people. Some 34,000 people are forced from their homes every day!

The New York Declaration - unanimously adopted at the GA, contains bold commitments both to address the issues we face now and to prepare the world for future challenges. These include commitments to:

- ❖ Protect the human rights of all refugees and migrants, regardless of status. This includes the rights of women and girls and promoting their full, equal and meaningful participation in finding solutions.
- ❖ Ensure that all refugee and migrant children are receiving education within a few months of arrival.
- ❖ Prevent and respond to sexual and gender-based violence.
- ❖ Support those countries rescuing, receiving and hosting large numbers of refugees and migrants.
- ❖ Work towards ending the practice of detaining children for the purposes of determining their migration status.
- ❖ Strongly condemn xenophobia against refugees and migrants and support a global campaign to counter it.
- ❖ Strengthen the positive contributions made by migrants incl. refugees to economic and social development in their host countries.
- ❖ Improve the delivery of humanitarian and development

assistance to those countries most affected, including through innovative multilateral financial solutions, with the goal of closing all funding gaps.

- ❖ Implement a comprehensive refugee response, based on a new framework that sets out the responsibility of Member States, civil society partners and the UN system, whenever there is a large movement of refugees or a protracted refugee situation.
- ❖ Find new homes for all refugees identified by UNHCR as needing resettlement; and expand the opportunities for refugees to relocate to other countries through, for example, labour mobility or education schemes.
- ❖ Strengthen the global governance of migration by bringing the International Organization for Migration into the UN system.

All this - without explicit references to 'human security' - is about human security.

What will happen next?

The New York Declaration contains concrete plans for how to build on these commitments: -

- ❖ Start negotiations leading to an international conference and the adoption of a global compact for safe, orderly and regular migration in 2018. The agreement to move toward this comprehensive framework is a momentous one. It means that migration, like other areas of international relations, will be guided by a set of common principles and approaches.
- ❖ Develop guidelines on the treatment of migrants in vulnerable situations. These guidelines will be particularly important for the increasing number of unaccompanied children on the move.

- ❖ Achieve a more equitable sharing of the burden and responsibility for hosting and supporting the world's refugees by adopting a global compact on refugees in 2018.

UNHCR's strategy – in relation to human security

High Commissioner F. Grandi started in January 2016. Since then he has been having broad consultations to formulate a strategy for the next five to ten years. It does not explicitly include the term 'human security' yet the strategy (still in draft) refers to many of its important elements. Let me give a few key examples:

Mobilizing for Solutions

Under this heading, UNHCR recognizes that the prospects of large-scale return and reintegration at an early stage are limited by the recurrent and protracted nature of today's conflicts. Precisely because of this, we will enhance and deepen our 'solutions reflex', mobilizing a range of partners and robustly pursuing an expansion of solutions opportunities for refugees and the internally displaced.

We will:

- ❖ actively pursue voluntary repatriation opportunities for refugees, and in-country solutions for IDPs, upholding the right to return and identifying and nurturing openings that may emerge, including through localized solutions, with appropriately designed and targeted support aimed at fostering conditions conducive to safe, dignified, sustainable return;
- ❖ mobilize political, security, human rights and development actors to address root causes of displacement and statelessness, and the

drivers of displacement, including through information-sharing, protection analysis and early warning;

- ❖ significantly expand access to third country solutions for refugees, including resettlement opportunities and complementary pathways for admission of refugees such as medical evacuation and humanitarian admission programmes, family reunification, and opportunities for skilled migration, labour mobility and education;
- ❖ pursue family reunification as a key aspect of all forms of solution;
- ❖ equip refugees with relevant skills and capacities in locations of displacement and countries of asylum, with a solutions orientation;
- ❖ identify and leverage potential opportunities for local integration or local settlement where appropriate;
- ❖ pursue alternative solutions mechanisms, such as bilateral or regional migration arrangements, which may correspond to the range of ways in which refugees themselves pursue more secure and forward looking lives; and
- ❖ foster opportunities for the gradual, voluntary reacquisition of national protection while still in exile, including through refugee participation in elections, or in peace processes.

Connecting to National Systems and Communities

At a time of growing inequality and exclusion, and in which increasing numbers of people have lost the protection of their own governments and communities, we will help connect refugees, internally displaced and stateless people to local systems and

communities, expanding opportunities and enabling the progressive realization of rights, including through their inclusion in development plans.

We will:

- ❖ promote the early inclusion of forcibly displaced and stateless populations, pending a solution, in national health, education, financial and other social services, and protection mechanisms available to the local population, working with states to avoid parallel systems which locate people in camps or settlements and/or leave them out of the mainstream in other ways;
- ❖ align with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), including through development of a strong evidence base, to ensure that displaced and stateless people are fully incorporated in national development frameworks, and that the SDGs that address root causes are fully implemented;
- ❖ engage key international development actors, including international financial institutions, in addressing the root causes of displacement and statelessness as key components of improved development outcomes; and
- ❖ empower forcibly displaced and stateless people to effectively contribute to the communities in which they live and pursue a vision of a future, including through freedom of movement, education (including enhanced access to tertiary education) and connections to economic opportunities.

In concluding, I would like to highlight the positive role Japan has been and is playing to promote human security (for refugees, internally displaced and the world's poor). Japan has been a predictable and generous supporter of UNHCR's work on behalf

and for the well-being of refugees, displaced people and their host communities.

Again, I am grateful for today's opportunity to highlight UNHCR's human security work and wish this symposium further rich discussions.

Thanks to Soka University for hosting and the Japan Association for Human Security Studies for organizing today's event!

Thank you very much!

人間の安全保障学会 第6回研究大会
開催校企画 公開シンポジウム

ヒューマニズムの世紀へ

— 人間の安全保障の追求と核廃絶の取り組み —

【日 時】 2016年12月11日（日） 14:30～17:30

【会 場】 創価大学グローバル・スクエア AB103

【主 催】 人間の安全保障学会第6回研究大会実行委員会

【共 催】 創価大学平和問題研究所 戸田記念国際平和研究所

【ねらい】

核兵器は安全保障上の理由から必要であるといわれる。しかしその安全保障の内容は、必ずしも一義的ではない。たとえば、「人間の安全保障」という観点からは、核兵器はむしろ脅威であると捉える議論もある。いわゆる核兵器の非人道性をめぐる議論であるが、そこから核兵器の廃絶の第一歩として法的に禁止すべきだとの声も高まっている。

本シンポジウムでは、安全保障に資するとされる核兵器が実際にいかなる兵器であるかを明らかにし、その脅威を解消していくためにいかなる方途を取るべきかに関する知見を深める。

- ①核兵器が人間の安全保障上の脅威、すなわち、「人間の生にとってかけがえのない中枢部分」（生存、生活、尊厳）を脅かすものであるという観点から、核兵器を廃絶すべきとする理由を論じる。
- ②核兵器を廃絶する具体的な手段として核兵器条約による法的規制の意義と課題を論じる。

【タイムテーブル】

I. 主催者挨拶

玉井秀樹教授（創価大学平和問題研究所所長）

II. 基調講演

「核兵器のない世界をめざして：核兵器の非人道性とその克服」

講演者 朝長万左男博士（長崎原爆病院名誉院長）

III. パネリスト報告

①「核兵器禁止条約交渉：将来の締結も念頭において」

報告者 福井康人准教授 広島市立大学平和研究所

②「核廃絶に向けて、軍縮不拡散教育の重要性」

報告者 土岐雅子女史 ジェームズ・マーティン不拡散研究センター

IV. パネル・ディスカッション（60分）

司会：石井秀明教授（創価大学平和問題研究所）

主催者挨拶

人間の安全保障の追求と核廃絶の取り組み

創価大学平和問題研究所 所長 玉井秀樹

本日は人間の安全保障学会第6回研究大会の公開シンポジウムに御参加いただき、たいへんありがとうございました。

人間の安全保障という概念がUNDPによって発表されて以来、20年以上を経て、今日の国際社会において、様々な政策や問題解決にあたって「人間を中心にすえて」考えるべきであるという、人間の安全保障的なアプローチが浸透してきました。

皆様ご存知のように大きな契機となったのが2003年の人間の安全保障委員会報告であり、ここで提示された人間の安全保障概念や価値観が今日の言説のベースとなっているといえます。そして2010年代に入りまして、国連事務総長報告や国連総会決議において、国連活動の機軸となるべきものが人間の安全保障の考え方であると表明されるようになりました。このように人間の安全保障という考え方が国際社会における規範概念、政策概念として浸透していくために力を尽くしてきたのが日本政府・外務省でした。

人間の安全保障学会は、このような人間の安全保障概念普及と政策実現の取り組みの中核となってきた研究者、実務家によって発足したものであり、まだ歴史は浅いものの日本のみならず、世界的にも人間の安全保障概念の深化と政策実現をめざす貴重なまた重要な学会であると自負しております。また、そうした意義ある学会の研究大会をこの創価大学で開催できますことは、大変に光栄なことで大きな喜びとするところであります。創価大学での大会開催をお認

めいただきました、梅垣会長をはじめ理事の皆様、会員の皆様に深く感謝申し上げます。また、共催機関として開催にあたって多大なるご支援をいただきました戸田記念国際平和研究所の皆様にも厚く御礼申し上げます。さらに、今回の研究大会開催にあたって、本学教職員、学生の皆様にも大変な御協力をいただいておりますことに感謝申し上げます。まことにありがとうございます。

さて、創価大学は1971年に設立されたわけですが、その際に創立者池田大作先生が示されたのが、

人間教育の最高学府たれ
大文化建設の揺籃たれ
人類の平和を守るフォートレスたれ
との建学の三指針です。

平和問題研究所は、「人類の平和を守るフォートレスたれ」との指針の実現化をめざして1976年に設立されました。

私たちの大学名、創価とは価値創造ということです。価値創造への限りない可能性に満ちた存在が生命であり、我々人間であると捉えるのが、私たちの人間主義の考え方です。こうした我々の思考は当然のことながら、「人間の安全保障」というアイデアと深く共鳴するものでした。

平和問題研究所では、小規模ながら多年にわたり、人間の安全保障の追求をテーマとしてセミナーやシンポジウム、また、平和講座などを開催してきたところであります。

このような取り組みをしてきました当研究所は本年、設立40周年を向かえたわけですが、その意義ある本年に、人間の安全保障学会をお招きできたことに大きな喜びを感じております。

平和問題研究所が長年取り組んできたテーマのひとつが核兵器廃絶への方途でありました。生命の尊厳に基づく人間主義という私たちの立場からすれば、非人道の極みとも言うべき核兵器の問題に取り組まざるを得ないところであります。

これまでは核兵器の問題は、主に軍事、国際政治、外交、といった視点からアプローチされることがほとんどでした。しかしながら、NPT体制の矛盾が

拡大する昨今、核兵器の全面禁止条約の成立をめざす運動が活発化する中で、再び、人道上の課題として核兵器の問題が論じられるようになっていきます。

そのような中で、人間の安全保障上の価値、恐怖からの自由、欠乏からの自由、尊厳を持って生きる自由を脅かすものとしての核兵器の問題が浮上しています。

本日のシンポジウムでは、日本赤十字社・長崎原爆病院名誉院長、長崎大学医学部原研内科名誉教授の朝長万左男先生に基調講演をしていただきます。

朝長先生は、1943年長崎市の御出身で、1968年に長崎大学医学部卒業後、長崎大学医学部附属原爆後障害医療研究施設長、長崎大学大学院医歯薬学総合研究科長、日本赤十字社・長崎原爆病院院長などを歴任。この間、核戦争防止国際医師会議（IPPNW）国際副会長、長崎市長平和推進専門会議委員、長崎平和推進協会副理事長、核廃絶ナガサキ市民集会副委員長など、数多くの重責を担われ、被爆者治療と核兵器廃絶に尽力されてきました。

また、本日は、広島市立大学平和研究所の福井康人先生、ミドルベリー国際大学院モントレイ校・ジェームズ・マーティン不拡散研究センター不拡散教育プロジェクトマネージャーの土岐雅子先生のお二人にも御報告をいただくことになっています。

福井先生は、1964年兵庫県の御出身で、同志社大学法学部卒業後、外務省に入省され、安全保障政策、軍備管理軍縮、難民支援などに取り組んでこられ、ルーマニア大使館、軍縮会議日本政府代表部等に勤務されてきました。その後、パリ第1大学法科大学院で博士号（法学）を取得され、2015年より現職につかれています。

また、土岐先生はモントレイ国際大学院で国際政策学修士を取得され、その後、軍縮・不拡散教育の推進、主に高校生を対象としたプロジェクトを担当されてきました。軍縮不拡散教育、日本の核軍縮、不拡散政策、原子力政策についての専門家であります。

本日は、このような素晴らしいパネリストお招きして、シンポジウムを開催できますことは、主催者として大きな喜びであり、感謝に堪えません。人道上の問題として核兵器を考えるための得がたいお話をしっかりと拝聴し、また、

議論を深めていくことができれば幸いです。

本日は、御多忙のなかおいいただきましたパネリストの先生方に重ねて感謝申し上げますとともに、週末の御多用のなか、御参加いただきました皆様に感謝申し上げます、ご挨拶とさせていただきます。たいへんにありがとうございました。

基調講演

核兵器のない世界をめざして —— 核兵器の非人道性の克服 ——

日本赤十字社 長崎原爆病院名誉院長 朝 長 万左男

はじめに

近年、核兵器の非人道性が世界的コンセンサスとなってきた。非人道性に基づき、核兵器を法的に禁止する多国間交渉がいよいよ国連の場において2017年に実現する勢いである。この動きは150カ国に上る非核保有国と市民社会を代表する多数の NGO によって主導されている。一方、安全保障を核抑止政策（拡大抑止政策を含め）に依存する核保有国とその同盟国の日本・NATO 諸国などは、法的禁止が時期尚早であり、拙速な条約成立は安全保障上、リスクを伴うことを主張し、両グループ間の対立が先鋭化している。この基調講演では、核兵器の非人道性の認識が切り拓きつつある核廃絶への道にはだかる障碍を明らかにし、その克服について考える。

1. 非人道性の世界的コンセンサスと国際政治

核兵器の非人道性に関する認識の高まりは、1970年に発効した核不拡散（NPT）条約が、その第6条で「各締約国は核競争の早期停止と、核軍縮を誠実に行う約束」を核兵器国及び非核兵器国すべてに求めているにもかかわらず、遅々として進展しない核廃絶プロセスの現状に対する不満が、特に核兵器国に向けて、非核兵器国と市民社会に鬱積していることを背景としている。

2009年には就任間もないオバマ米大統領は、ブラハ演説において「米国は、核兵器を使用した唯一の国として道義的に責任があり、核兵器のない世界の平和と安全を追求すること」を約束し、ノーベル平和賞を受賞した。

1863年の設立以来、自然災害・戦争・紛争において中立的機関としての救援活動と国際人道法の確立に貢献してきた国際赤十字委員会（ICRC、本部ジュネーブ）は、2010年のケレンベルガー ICRC 会長の声明以来、核兵器の非人道性をあらためて指摘し、核爆発の被害を予防することは事実上不可能であり、根本的には核廃絶以外に方策がないことを主張してきた。この動きはただちに2010年の NPT 運用会議に反映され、「核爆発のもたらす結末についての深刻な憂慮」が最終文書に表明された。

国際的には、このような流れにのって世界で初めての「核兵器の非人道性に関する国際会議（International Conference on Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons）」が2013年2月オスロで開催され、その後2014年の第2回（メキシコ）と第3回（ウイーン）が続いた。非人道性に関する科学的知見から倫理的知見まで網羅して、多くの発表と討議が行われた。その集大成とも言うべき「オーストリアの誓約」と呼ばれる文書が120カ国の賛同を得て、2015年 NPT 再検討会議に提出された。これは後に「人道の誓約（Humanitarian Pledge）」と改称されている。

その後、オーストリア、メキシコ、エジプトなどの非核兵器国が中心となり、これに ICAN（International Campaign for Abolition of Nuclear Weapons）などの国際 NGO が加わり、国連の場で議論を牽引し、非人道性に基づき核兵器を法的に禁止する方向性を目指す多国間交渉を2017年に開始する提案が、本年10月に第1委員会において多数決で可決されている（賛成123、反対38、棄権16）。日本政府はこの種の決議で初めての反対票を投じた。この決議は、いよいよこの12月中に国連総会に付され、間違いなく決議されると思われる。

しかし、この流れは核兵器国側の受け入れるところとはならず、核軍縮・核廃絶の運動は、分断の危機を生じつつある。唯一の核兵器の戦争使用の被害国となり、核廃絶を主導することを国策としてきた日本政府が、同様の危惧を表

明して、反対にまわったことは国内外を驚かせた。核兵器条約の法的禁止に多数決論理で突き進む非核兵器国側にとって、核兵器国側のこの態度は、今や人類にとって最大級の難しい政治課題を突きつけている。

本年5月27日、オバマ大統領は広島をはじめて公式に訪問し、原爆犠牲者の冥福を祈った。しかし米国による非人道兵器使用について謝罪はなく、人類（米国）が1945年に核時代の幕を拓き、冷戦時代の核兵器競争を招来したことを、科学と軍事の結合による人類の英知のよるものとし、人類の生存をも支配するに至った核兵器の廃絶を実現する英知の創造には未だ至っていないことを吐露するにとどまった。核なき世界の唱道者のオバマの退任も間近となり、次期大統領に決定したトランプ氏の核政策はまだ予見できてない。近未来における核廃絶の動向には不透明感が漂っている。

2. 非人道性をめぐる日本と世界の歴史

1) 広島・長崎（1945年）以前

米国政府および軍部内において原爆に非人道兵器の懸念が存在したことが米国の歴史学者の研究から明らかにされている。例えば当時欧州戦線の最高司令官であったアイゼンハワー将軍は戦争使用に反対している。しかしトルーマンの最終的な投下の決定には影響しなかった。

2) 広島・長崎（1945）直後

鈴木（終戦）内閣はスイス政府を介して非人道兵器の指摘をして、米国に抗議している。広島に早期に入市し救援活動をしたICRC派遣のマルセル・ジュノー博士の報告には、非人道性の指摘が含まれており、ICRCの本部は直ちに世界の支部に通知した。長崎では、原爆被爆者780名を収容した大村海軍病院長の泰山弘道少将は彼らの惨状に驚愕し、原爆の被害が毒ガスなど国際人道法で禁止されている兵器のそれをはるかに上回る非人道性を示していることを長崎県知事を通してICRCへ電報で知らせている。

3) 下田判決（1963年）

原爆裁判と呼ばれる日本政府を相手とする被爆者の賠償訴訟において、広島

と長崎への原爆投下の違法性を認定した判決である。現在唯一の核兵器の非人道性に関する裁判所の判断である。賠償請求は退けられている。原告の下田氏の名前で下田判決と呼ぶ。

4) 国際司法裁判所 (ICJ) の勧告的意見 (1996年)

国連総会の発議に基づく裁判所の勧告的意見として「核兵器の使用は一般的には国際人道法に反するが、一国の危急存亡の場合にその使用が禁止されるかどうかは判断できない」という付帯条項が付けられた。この点で核兵器の使用に例外規定があり得る曖昧さが残ることとなり、現在においてもこの論点は、核兵器禁止条約についての議論において核抑止論に立つ核保有国などの主張に一定の根拠を与えることになった。

5) 播基文国連事務総長の5項目提案 (2008年)

相互に補強し合うような複数条約により核兵器の法的制約を目指すという第1項のほか高度の検証をとまなう禁止条約の考え方を示し、すでにプエルトリコなどから国連に対して提案されているモデル禁止条約が参考になるとした。

6) 2010年の ICRC ケレンベルガー会長の声明

7) 2010年 NPT 再検討会議における非人道的結末の憂慮表明

8) 2013～2014年 核兵器の非人道性に関する国際会議 (第1回オスロ、第2回メキシコ、第3回ウイーン)

3回の人道会議の結論として、オーストリアは以下のような総括を行っている。核爆発の影響は国境を越え、人体影響を含め長期に持続し、都市に対して壊滅的であり、ひいては国境を越えて地球環境を損ない、飢餓などにより人類の生存を脅かす。核実験の爆発も同様である。核兵器が存在する限り、事故や誤算による核爆発のリスクはつきまとい、これを完全に防ぐための唯一の保証は核兵器の完全廃絶である。核爆発がいったん起これば、人道的な対応や医療救援活動は不可能となり、根本的には爆発の予防しかない。現時点では核兵器の保有を始め、移送、製造、使用を禁止する包括的な法的規範がなく、ここに法的ギャップが存在する。核兵器の爆発がもたらすこのような壊滅的結末は、法的にもまた倫理上も問題である。

9) 2015年 NPT 運用会議における非人道性をめぐる議論

オーストリアが主導し159カ国ステートメントが提出され議題となった。その骨子は核兵器の爆発の壊滅的結末、爆発の即時の人道的緊急事態への対応が不可能、二度と使用されないことが人類の利益に直結、核兵器が決して使用されない保証は核兵器の全廃であることなどである。この内容はすでに触れた「オーストリアの誓約」とほぼ同じである。

これに対してオーストラリアの主導により米国との同盟国を多く含む26カ国（日本も含まれる）共同ステートメントも提案された。これは核兵器の非人道性を強調すると同時に、核兵器国が実質的に参加する取り組みが必要であり、核兵器の大幅な削減の実現のためには、世界レベルで核兵器の安全保障の側面も、人道的側面と同じ比重で重要視する必要性を説いている。このオーストラリア案は核兵器国の参加による建設的な取り組みが必須であり、非核兵器国のみでの取り組みでは実現性に乏しいことを主張している。

この NPT 運用会議の最終文書は不成立に終わったが、いくつかの重要な事項が国連総会に提案される運びとなった。

10) 2015年12月国連総会における核兵器の法的禁止の枠組み協議を促進する 公開作業部会 Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) の2016年開催 決定

総会の多数決によって2016年に3回の OEWG がジュネーブにおいて開催されることが決定した。

11) 2016年3回にわたる OEWG 会議

核兵器の禁止の法的枠組み協議を国連において2017年に開始すべきとする最終決議が多数決で採択され、国連総会第1委員会に提案された。この決議に日本は棄権した。

12) 2016年10月国連第1委員会決議

OEWG の決議を受けて討議が激しく行われ、多国間交渉会議を2017年に2回行う決定が多数決で賛成多数で決定した。賛成123、反対38、棄権16。日本は核兵器国に同調して反対に回った。中国、オランダ（NATO 国）は棄権、北朝鮮は賛成した。

日本の反対の理由は、禁止条約は時期尚早であり、国際安全保障の阻害要因となり、危険でもあるというものであった。また核兵器国の参加しない協議は無意味であることなどである。多くの非核兵器国が賛成する中、唯一の被爆国日本が自国の核抑止政策の理論を越える政策変更（パラダイムシフト）を決断できなかったことになる。しかしその後、日本政府は2017年の会議自体へは参加することを表明し、岸田外務大臣は核兵器国への働きかけなどの橋渡しの役割を積極的に担うと述べた。

以上が経時的に追った核兵器の非人道性をめぐる国内外、特に国連を中心とした議論と決議の概要である。国連の多数決原理でここまで非核兵器国が主導して来たが、いよいよ2017年に2回の核兵器禁止条約の法的枠組みを巡る多国間協議が開始される。

3. 広島・長崎にみる非人道性のエビデンス

ここで唯一の被爆国日本が体験した核爆発がもたらした被害を人道的な観点から振り返ってみる。これらは日本政府の代表団の一員として出席した著者が、核兵器の国際人道会議の第1回オスロおよび第2回メキシコで、開催国のノルウェーおよびメキシコ政府の依頼で長崎・広島の悲惨な体験を講演したものである。

1) 無警告

広島・長崎の原爆投下の直前に米軍は大量の宣伝ビラを日本全国に撒いている。都市名を挙げて日本政府の降伏がない場合、どれかを爆撃するので退去するよう促している。しかしこれらの都市の名前には広島も長崎も含まれておらず、事実上の無警告投下となった。

2) 無差別

兵士と市民、成人と高齢者・子供、軍事施設と民間施設などいわゆる戦争法で禁じられている標的が含まれることを当然の前提として、市民活動のピーク時に原爆は投下されている。

3) 大量殺戮（虐殺）と都市壊滅（通信・インフラ・医療機関の壊滅）

その結果、死傷者数は両市併せて20万人を越え、未曾有の都市破壊となった。インフラ、特に病院等の医療施設と医療スタッフの死傷により救護活動は不可能となった。

4) 爆風・放射線・熱線による毒ガスを上回る苦痛（急性障害）

原爆の物理力の3要素が複合して多くの被爆者を早期に死に至らしめた。

5) 生涯持続性の放射線後遺症（後障害）

かろうじて生き延びた人々は長期に持続する白血病・癌・多重癌・心筋梗塞などの後障害に苦しむこととなった。特に白血病と癌は70年後の現在も持続しており、1945年の瞬間的な放射線被曝の人体影響が生涯持続性であることを証明している。その根本原因は、人体を構成する臓器の細胞が被曝することによって細胞の遺伝子を担うDNAの二重鎖切断が生じ、その修復過程で遺伝子にエラーが起こることが解明されている。

6) 生涯持続性の精神的影響

原爆で悲惨な体験をした人々が70年後の現在もうつ病・鬱状態などの精神症状に悩まされ続けていることが明らかにされている。外傷後ストレス障害（PTSD）も見られる。

7) 100万人都市に対する16キロトン原爆及び1メガトン水爆の攻撃を受けた場合の都市インフラ被害および人的被害のシミュレーション

現代都市がかなりの強靱な建築物やインフラで建設されているにもかかわらず、原爆と水爆の被害は今日でも許容できる範囲を超えており、特に水爆の場合の人的被害の規模は死傷者が80万人に達することが推計された。また救援活動はインフラの破壊によりほとんど実質的な効果を上げることはできないことも推定された。

4. 非人道性の倫理哲学面におけるジレンマ

ここで、個々の市民レベルにおいて恐怖と欠乏をもたらし人間の安全保障を破壊する核爆発の恐るべき非人道結末の認識をもってしても、それが直ちに核

抑止論に立つ核兵器国や日本などの同盟国の核政策にパラダイムシフトをもたらすことができない現実に触れておきたい。これは日本が抱える大きなジレンマでもある。

一国の安全保障の根幹には国民の安全保障、すなわち生命と安全に対する国家の責任と義務を果たす場合、「一種の人道観念」が核兵器国と核兵器依存国に潜在することを指摘しなければならない。1996年のICJの勧告的意見が特に付帯意見として言及した、国家が危急存亡に直面し、国民の生命を保証できない危機が迫った状況においては、これを回避する究極の手段として核兵器の使用を不可欠と国家が考えることについては違法かどうか判断ができないとした箇所に係わることである。

人間の安全保障を中心においた核兵器の非人道性のコンセンサスに対して、国家の核抑止政策を基礎とする安全保障をその上位に置く考え方が持続していると言わざるを得ない。冷戦期にやむにやまれぬ敵対関係が戦争まで広がることを、相互確証破壊の理論に基づく核抑止論で克服しようとした米ソの指導者の思考が、冷戦後20年を経てもなお現実の国際政治の場で生き続けている現状を直視すると、非人道性認識から核なき世界に到るプロセスにおいて克服しなければならない壁は厚いと言わざるを得ない。

ICANなど市民社会の代表的NGOは「人間の安全保障主義」に立ち、核兵器禁止条約を成立させることによって、規範を先行させることがその解決策の一つになると考える。条約が大多数の非核兵器国によって成立すれば、自ずから規範となって核兵器国にも次第に浸透していき、その規範に従わざるを得なくなるという、やや楽観主義的な考え方である。核なき世界の実現を目指すことを表明している核兵器国の米国や日本のような一部の核依存国は規範に従い、条約に署名するかもしれないが、すべての核保有国がそうなるとは楽観視できない。

米国や日本はこれまでも人道会議の場に参加し、すでに核兵器の非人道性を認めている。特に日本は唯一の被曝国としてその認識の度合はきわめて高い。国家の安全保障を現実的には優先政策とせざるを得ない世界政治の現状に鑑みて、当面は核抑止政策を維持するが、やがて核による抑止が不要な世

界を実現できるとこれらの核依存国は考えており、現在唯一存在する法的枠組みのNPT条約に依拠しつつ、CTBT批准の貫徹、核分裂物質生産禁止条約(FMCT)の成立などを目指し、ステップ・バイ・ステップ(あるいはブロック積み上げ方式)でそのような世界を実現し行くことが、核なき世界を安全に確実にもたらす近道であるとする考え方である。

人間の安全保障を優先しすぎると国を危うくし、この状況は翻って国民の生存のリスクを高め、危険であるとするこの考えかたに対し、現在多数派を形成するに至った核兵器禁止条約推進派が、上述したように規範の成立で乗り越えようとすることはやや理想論に傾き、前者の理論を覆すほどの強靱さに欠けていることがたびたび指摘されている。

オバマ大統領が広島演説で指摘したように、人類は「科学の力により生み出した核時代を終焉に導くための英知をまだ創出できていない」状況にある。これは、自らが作りだした軍事力によって人類は身動きがとれなくなっている姿でもある。この点では人類は病んでいるとの認識が必要である。私が所属する核戦争防止国際医師会議(International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear Wars [IPPNW] 1985年ノーベル平和賞)では、核抑止論の蔓延を疫病(Pandemic)の流行として擬人化している。

人間あつての国家(国民国家)であり、核抑止により都市(すなわち人間)を標的とする核兵器の照準は、すなわち人間にも照準が合わされていると認識すべきである。その即時(Alert)体制がいかに人類の生存のリスクを高めているか、今や全人類が自覚すべき時である。そこでは市民社会の一員である科学者の責任も問われる。核兵器は科学者が作り出し、科学者が協力しなければその維持はできない兵器である。科学者の目覚めが必須であり、科学者が一般市民と連帯することが重要である。ノーベル賞受賞の物理学者(アインシュタインや日本の湯川秀樹博士)が立ち上げたパグウォッシュ会議(1995年ノーベル平和賞)は科学者の責任をこれまで強く訴えてきた。

最後に市民社会の責任も考えなければならない。世界の指導者であるそれぞれの国の政治家を選ぶのは最終的には市民である。米国のような核兵器国において核抑止論を市民の過半数が承認または黙認する状況からは、核抑止論を超

越し人間の安全保障の観点を上位に置いて、政治決断をする政治指導者は生まれにくい。日本の現状もこれに当てはまる可能性がある。米国の拡大抑止力に対中国および対北朝鮮の核攻撃抑止を期待する国民が過半数を越えている可能性がある。

5. 非人道（非核兵器国）側と核抑止政策（核兵器依存国）側の共同作業こそ人類の英知

状況は切迫している。この12月国連総会で決議されると、核兵器禁止条約を目指す法的枠組みの多国間協議が2017年に2回行われる。したがって、非核兵器国が多数決で押し切ると、一定の形の核兵器禁止条約が成立する可能が出てくる。反対派である核兵器国・拡大抑止依存国（日本・NATO諸国）およびオーストラリアなどの非人道性と核抑止政策両立派がどの程度会議に出席するかは未だ予見できないが、少なくとも日本政府は出席を公表している。

両派の亀裂を緩和させなければならない。そのために歩み寄りが必須である（妥協）。核兵器国の出席と核兵器禁止条約へのプロセスに対する一定の理解を引き出す必要がある。この場合、核なき世界を目指すという究極の目標は両派とも共有している事実のあることが重要である。

核兵器国側が主張しているステップ・バイ・ステップで核抑止政策の必要度を低減していくプロセスに人道派も理解を示す必要がある。核兵器禁止条約成立に向かう政治力学の中で、両派の協議に交渉のコアを置く必要がある。米国などが主張してきた、ステップ・バイ・ステップの各段階（CTBT、FMCT、核拡散など諸課題の解決）の最も有効かつ迅速な方策をとともに追究する。ここで核兵器国派にも非人道派にもNPT条約の第6条の真摯な実行が求められる。

また核抑止政策における核兵器の役割の低減も具体的に話し合うべき大きなステップとなる。ここでは非人道性を深く理解する被爆国日本が核の先制不使用などの低減策を提案していくなど、いくつもの交渉アイテムが考えられる。また米口間で滞っている核弾頭の相互削減交渉の再開なども核兵器国に外圧として有効かもしれない。核兵器国が世界に拡がった紛争の解決に真剣に取り組

み、国際安全保障の好転を目指すとともに、信頼醸成の確立を共通目標におけば、核兵器禁止条約の成立に向かう動きを対立ではなく、協調にギアチェンジできるかもしれない。核兵器国には非人道性のより一層の深い認識を迫り、彼らが唱える核軍縮の履行、CTBT 批准の貫徹、FMCT 条約の実現などをタイムテーブルに載せていくことは、市民社会が考える、まずは規範の確立を先行させる考え方に一見対立をもたらすかに見えるが、規範の確立後に核兵器国を取り込み、さらに種々のプロセスを協議することの困難さを考えれば、大きな視点からは、両派の考えは同じ方向性に収斂していくのではないだろうか？

その交渉のプロセスにこそ人類の英知の発揮のしどころがあるのではないか？

このような観点からは、新アジェンダ連合 (NAC) が発表している核兵器禁止条約のタイプ分けが重要な意味を持つ。それらは、1. 検証制度まで含む完全な核廃絶を一気に目指す包括的核兵器禁止条約 (Comprehensive Nuclear Convention)、2. 開発から使用、威嚇までを先行禁止する核兵器禁止先行条約 (Nuclear Weapon Ban Treaty)、3. NPT を中心に、CTBT、FMCT など核兵器の諸禁止事項を包括したフレキシビリティのある枠組み合意、4. 1～3の混合型である。このうち3の枠組み合意が最も核兵器側との交渉において力を発揮すると思われる。フレキシブルに種々の取り決めをタイムテーブルを協議しながら設定するやり方を採用できる。これは核兵器国側のいうステップ・バイ・ステップとほとんど変わらないような時間差をもうけつつ段階的に禁止条約の実現をもたらすのではないだろうか？ 日豪両政府によってまとめられた核不拡散・核軍縮に関する国際委員会 (ICNND) の報告書には短期、中期、最終段階の長期的タイムテーブルが示されている。そこに緩やかな形で核兵器禁止条約の成立を核兵器国側が承認するというぎりぎりの交渉が行われることが、交渉の最大の山場となるであろう。

まとめ

2017年は人類にとってきわめて重要な核兵器廃絶をめぐる最大の分岐点にな

ることが予想される。人間の安全保障の完全確立の前提として、核兵器禁止条約の成立をいかにして核兵器国と非核兵器国が信頼を醸成しながら、人類的英知を傾けて共同作業によって実現するかが問われている。唯一の戦争被爆国の日本が果たすべき役割は限りなく大きくかつ重要である。

Keynote Lecture

Toward a World Without Nuclear Weapons: Overcoming the Inhumanity of Nuclear Weapons

Masao Tomonaga

Director Emeritus
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Introduction

In recent years, a global consensus has emerged regarding the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. With multi-partisan cognizance of this inhumanity, momentum for multilateral negotiations to legally prohibit nuclear weapons is finally, in 2017, coalescing at the United Nations. This move is being led by more than 150 nonnuclear powers as well as numerous nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) as representatives of civil society. Conversely, the world's nuclear powers, who rely on policies of nuclear deterrence (including those regarding expansion deterrence), as well as allies such as Japan and the NATO member countries, claim that a legal ban is premature and that the rapid conclusion of a such a treaty is fraught with security risks, and opposition between these two camps is becoming more pointed. In this keynote lecture, I would like

to reflect on how we can clarify and overcome the obstacles standing in the way of the gradual clearance for abolishing nuclear weapons by our recognition of the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons.

1. International Politics and the Global Consensus on Inhumanity

Behind the growing recognition of the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, dissatisfaction with the state of the process of abolishing nuclear weapons, which has made little, if any, progress to date, has been accumulating, particularly on the part of civil society and the nonnuclear powers vis-à-vis the world's nuclear powers despite the demand imposed on all nuclear powers and nonnuclear powers by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which came into force in 1970 and Article 6 of which mandates that "each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament."

In 2009, shortly after his inauguration, the then U.S. President Barack Obama, in a speech delivered in the Czech Republic's capital, Prague, promised that "as the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon, the United States has a moral responsibility ... to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons" for which he was later awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

After a statement issued in 2010 by its chairman, Jakob Kellenberger, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC, based in Geneva, Switzerland), an institution that has contributed to relief activities and the establishment of international humanitarian law as a neutral organization in the context of natural disasters,

wars, and conflict since its establishment in 1863, has once again been highlighting the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons and insisting on the practical impossibility of preventing damage from nuclear explosions and on the fact that fundamentally, abolishing nuclear weapons is our only possible option. This move was immediately reflected in the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (2010 NPT Review), and an expression of “deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons” was included in the final document adopted by the conference.

Internationally, in line with the same ideological current, the first International Conference on Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons was held in Oslo, Norway, in February 2013, which was soon followed by second and third conferences held in Nayarit (Mexico) and Vienna (Austria), respectively, in 2014, which included many presentations and discussions that ran the gamut from ethical to scientific findings concerning inhumanity. A document known as the “Austrian Pledge” that could be called the culmination of this process was agreed upon by 120 countries for submission to the subsequent NPT Review Conference in 2015. This was later renamed the “Humanitarian Pledge.”

Thereafter, discussions at the UN began to be driven primarily by nonnuclear powers such as Austria, Mexico, and Egypt, along with international NGOs such as International Campaign for Abolition of Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), and a proposal for multilateral negotiations slated to begin in 2017 and aimed at the legal prohibition of nuclear weapons based on their inhumanity was passed by a majority vote in the First Committee in October 2016 (123 in favor, 38 opposed, 16 abstaining). The government of Japan voted for the first time to

oppose this type of resolution. This resolution was finally forwarded to the UN General Assembly in the middle of December, and at the time of writing, a decision is expected to be imminent.

However, this growing consensus has not been readily accepted by the world's nuclear powers, and the movement for nuclear disarmament and abolition is facing a crisis of division. The government of Japan, as the only country ever to have been subjected to the wartime use of atomic weapons and that has until now regarded leading the charge for abolishing nuclear weapons as a national policy by expressing similar concerns, sparked astonishment at home and abroad by turning against the resolution. For the nonnuclear powers pressing forward on the logic of the majority to a legal prohibition of nuclear weapons treaties, the attitude of the nuclear powers poses one of the most difficult political challenges of today for all of humanity.

On May 27, 2016, President Obama made his first official visit to Hiroshima to pray for the victims of the atomic bombings. However, no apology has been forthcoming for the non-humanitarian use of weapons by the U.S., and when humanity (i.e., the U.S.) raised the curtain on the nuclear age in 1945, it ushered in a nuclear arms race during the Cold War era as the product of the wisdom that humanity derived by combining science and military affairs and only revealed that it has failed to achieve the wisdom necessary to abolish the nuclear weapons that now dictate the very survival of our species. In contrast to President Obama's advocacy of a world without nuclear weapons, the nuclear policy that will be followed by his successor, President Trump, remains to be seen. The immediate future of the move for abolishing nuclear weapons has grown cloudy.

2. A Legacy of Inhumanity for Japan and the World

1) *Prior to the Bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (1945)*

Studies by American historians have revealed concerns within the U.S. government and military regarding the use of weapons of mass destruction. For example, General Eisenhower, who, at the time, served as the Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force in the European theatre, was opposed to their use in war. However, this did not affect President Truman's ultimate decision to drop the bombs.

2) *In the Immediate Wake of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (1945)*

At the end of the war, the Suzuki Cabinet drew attention to the non-humanitarian character of the atomic bombs and protested America's actions through an intermediary, the Swiss government. The report by Dr. Marcel Juneau, one of the first physicians dispatched to Hiroshima by the ICRC to provide relief activities, highlighted this inhumanity, and the central office of the ICRC quickly notified its branch chapters around the world. In Nagasaki, Major General Yasuyama Kōdō, the director of the Ōmura Naval Hospital, which housed 780 atomic bomb survivors, was astonished at the severity of their injuries. He sent a telegram via the Governor of Nagasaki to notify the ICRC that the damage caused by the atomic bombs demonstrated an inhumanity that far surpassed that of weapons such as poison gas that were prohibited by international humanitarian law.

3) *The Shimoda Ruling (1963)*

This was a ruling in a suit, known as the A-bomb Trial, for reparations by several victims of the atomic bombings against the Japanese government that recognized the illegality of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As of now, it is the only court case to have issued a ruling on the humanitarian impact of nuclear

weapons. However, the claim for reparations was dismissed. It is known as the Shimoda ruling after the leader of the group of plaintiffs, Mr. Ryuichi Shimoda.

4) International Court of Justice (ICJ) Advisory Opinion (1996)

As an advisory opinion issued by the court on the basis of an initiative of the UN General Assembly, an incidental provision was attached stating that the “use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the … rules of humanitarian law … the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the … use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in which the very survival of a State would be at stake.” In this respect, some ambiguity continues to exist in that exceptional provisions may conceivably exist regarding the use of nuclear weapons. Even now, this issue provides certain grounds for assertions, such as those by nuclear powers who argue the need for nuclear deterrence, being made in the context of discussions of a possible nuclear weapons convention (NWC).

5) UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon's Five Point Proposal (2008)

In addition to the first paragraph, which aims at imposing legal restraints on the use of nuclear weapons by multiple mutually reinforcing treaties, this proposal is a proof of concept for a prohibition treaty accompanied by advanced inspections and draws heavily on model ban treaties that have been proposed to the UN by, among others, Puerto Rico.

6) Declaration by Jakob Kellenberger, Chairman of the ICRC (2010)

7) Expression of Concern regarding “Catastrophic Humanitarian Consequences” by the 2010 NPT Review Conference

8) Three International Conferences on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons (2013 and 2014) in Oslo (Norway), Nayarit (Mexico), and Vienna

(Austria)

As the conclusion of the third Humanitarian Conference, Austria issued a summary, which is as follows: “The impact of nuclear weapons ... would not be constrained by national borders and could have regional and even global consequences, causing destruction, death and displacement as well as profound and long-term damage to the environment, climate, human health and well-being, socioeconomic development, social order and could even threaten the survival of humankind. ... The use and testing of nuclear weapons have [also] demonstrated their devastating immediate, mid- and long-term effects. ... As long as nuclear weapons exist ... the risks of accidental, mistaken, unauthorized, or intentional use of nuclear weapons are evident [and] ... the only assurance against the risk of a nuclear weapon detonation is the total elimination of nuclear weapons. ... The imperative of prevention as the only guarantee against the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use was highlighted. Looking at nuclear weapons from a number of different legal angles, it is clear that there is no comprehensive legal norm universally prohibiting possession, transfer, production, and use... [The] suffering caused by nuclear weapon use is not only a legal matter, it necessitates moral appraisal. The catastrophic consequences of a nuclear weapon detonation event ... raise profound ethical and moral questions on a level transcending legal discussions and interpretations.”

9) Discussions of Inhumanity at the 2015 NPT Review Conference

The Austrian-led statement by 159 countries was submitted as the agenda for discussion. Its central issues included the catastrophic consequences of the detonation of nuclear weapons, the impossibility of immediate humanitarian response to such explosions, the direct

benefit to mankind of such weapons never being used again, and the fact that the only guarantee of nuclear weapons never being used again is their complete elimination. The content of this statement is substantively similar to that of the Austrian Pledge mentioned earlier.

In response, a second joint statement by the U.S. and 26 other countries that included many of its allies (including Japan) was also submitted with sponsorship by Australia. This statement, while emphasizing the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, also stated the necessity of efforts involving the substantial participation of the world's nuclear powers. In order to realize a broad-based reduction of nuclear weapon arsenals, it advocated the need for emphasizing the global security aspects of nuclear weapons at the same level as their humanitarian aspects. This Australian proposal insisted that constructive efforts with the participation of nuclear powers would be indispensable and that efforts involving only nonnuclear powers would lack feasibility.

Even though this NPT Review Conference was concluded without successfully arriving at a final document, it did result in several important matters being proposed to the UN's General Assembly.

10) Official Initiatives to Promote a Consultative Framework to Address the Legal Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons by the UN General Assembly (December 2015)

A majority vote of the Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) on nuclear disarmament convened in 2016 passed a resolution that three sessions of the OEWG would be held in Geneva in 2017.

11) Three Sessions of the OEWG in 2016

A final resolution to launch discussions of a legal framework to prohibit nuclear weapons at the UN was adopted in 2017 by a majority vote and proposed to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly. Japan abstained from this resolution.

12) October 2016 Resolution by the UN General Assembly's First Committee

After vigorous discussion in response to the resolution by the OEWG, a decision to hold two conferences on multilateral negotiations in 2017 was taken by a majority vote, with 123 in favor, 38 opposed, and 16 abstaining. In line with the nuclear powers, Japan voted to oppose the resolution. China and the Netherlands (a NATO country) voted to abstain, and North Korea voted in favor of the resolution.

The reasons for Japan's opposition were that a NWC would be premature, as well as being dangerous and impeding national security. Another reason was that consultations conducted without the participation of the world's nuclear powers would be meaningless. Thus, as many nonnuclear powers voted in favor of the resolution, Japan, as the only country to have been subjected to the use of atomic weapons, was nevertheless unable to accomplish a paradigm shift to transcend its own policies, which had their basis in the theory of nuclear deterrence. However, the government of Japan later expressed its willingness to participate in the 2017 meetings, with Foreign Minister Kishida stating that he would play an active role as a mediator in lobbying nuclear powers.

The foregoing discussion offers a chronological outline of discussions and resolutions in Japan and around the world concerning the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, with particular reference to the UN. Even though these discussions have until now been driven by the world's nonnuclear powers under the UN principle of majority rule, multilateral talks over the legal framework of an NWC are finally slated to begin over two occasions in 2017.

3. Evidence of Inhumanity Apparent in Hiroshima and Nagasaki

Let's reflect here from a humanitarian perspective on the damage caused by the nuclear detonation experienced by Japan as the only country to fall victim to atomic bombing. These authors, who attended the first and second International Conferences on Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons in Norway and Mexico, respectively, as representatives of the Japanese government, at the request of the governments of the host countries, delivered lectures on the tragic experience of Nagasaki and Hiroshima.

1) No Warning

Immediately prior to the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the U.S. military scattered a large volume of leaflets throughout Japan. Naming the cities that would be attacked, these leaflets urged citizens to flee, indicating that they would be bombed unless the government of Japan chose to surrender. However, neither Hiroshima nor Nagasaki was included among the cities so named; the bombing was in effect conducted with no warning.

2) Indiscriminate

On the natural assumption that the areas targeted included not only soldiers and military facilities but also targets prohibited by the so-called rules of war, such as civilian adults, the elderly, and children, as well as private facilities, the atomic bombs were dropped during the peak hours of civic activity.

3) Extensive Slaughter (Massacre) and Urban Destruction (including that of Communications Infrastructure and Medical Institutions)

The resulting casualties and injuries exceeded a combined total of 200,000 people for both cities and were accompanied by an unprecedented level of urban devastation. Relief activities became

impossible because of the deaths and injuries of medical staff and the destruction of infrastructure, including that of hospitals and other medical facilities.

4) Blast, Radiation, and Heat Damage Causing Pain (Acute Damage) Exceeding Those Caused by Poison Gas

The three elements of the physical force of the atomic bomb worked in combination to trigger the quick elimination of the bombing victims.

5) Lifelong Persistence of the After Effects of Radiation (Subsequent Complications)

Those who managed to survive have suffered over the long term from chronic conditions such as leukemia, cancer, multiple cancer, and myocardial infarction. Leukemia and cancer, in particular, remain persistent even 70 years later, proving that the human impact of sudden radiation exposure can persist over a lifetime. The root cause has been identified to be genetic errors that occur during the repair process after the cells of organs that make up the human body are exposed, resulting in the double-strand breakage of DNA carrying the genes of the affected cells.

6) Sustained Lifetime Psychological Impact

It is now clear that those who underwent the horrific experience of the atomic bombing have continued to suffer from psychiatric symptoms such as depression even now, 70 years later. Cases of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) are also in evidence.

7) Attacks Using 16-Kiloton Atomic Bombs and 1-megaton Hydrogen Bombs on Cities with Populations of 1 Million People Simulations of Infrastructural and Human Damage

Despite the fact that the construction of buildings and infrastructure in contemporary cities is now conducted to ensure considerable resilience, the scope of the damage caused by an atomic or hydrogen

bomb surpasses any acceptable range even today, and the scale of human injuries in the case of a hydrogen explosion, in particular, has been estimated at upward of 800,000 dead and injured. It is also assumed that relief activities will be largely ineffective because of the consequent infrastructural devastation.

4. The Ethical and Philosophical Dilemma of Inhumanity

In this section, I would like to touch upon the reality that even while recognizing the horrifying humanitarian consequences of nuclear detonations, which cause terror and privation for individual citizens and destabilize human security, it has remained impossible to accomplish a rapid paradigm shift in the nuclear policies of the world's nuclear powers and their allies, such as Japan, which are based on the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. This is also a major dilemma facing Japan.

The security of a country is the security — in other words the lives and safety — of its citizens. When fulfilling the state's responsibility and duty to ensure this security, it must be noted that a latent notion of humanitarianism underlies the world's nuclear powers and nations that rely on nuclear weapons. This is related to a point singled out for special mention in an incidental provision in the advisory opinion issued in 1996 by the ICJ. In other words, in crises where states face emergency life-and-death situations such as being unable to safeguard the lives of their citizens, it is not possible to determine whether states that consider the use of nuclear weapons to be indispensable as the ultimate deterrent are acting illegally or not.

Against the consensus regarding the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons that is focused on human security, the sustained

idea of prioritizing security founded in states' policies of nuclear deterrence is inevitable. During the Cold War, the leaders of the U.S. and the erstwhile USSR sought to overcome the threat that their inevitable antagonism would lead to war with a theory of nuclear deterrence grounded in the doctrine of mutually assured destruction. Directly examining how this idea remains current in the actual sites of international politics even now, 20 years after the end of the Cold War, it must be acknowledged that the barriers that must be overcome in the process leading from a recognition of the inherent inhumanity of nuclear weapons to the realization of a world without them are considerable.

As representatives of civil society, NGOs such as ICAN advocate the principle of human security in the belief that focusing first on norms by establishing an NWC offers a possible solution. Following this somewhat optimistic line of thought, if a treaty were to be established by a majority of nonnuclear powers, it would naturally come to be a norm, gradually filtering through to the nuclear powers, which would then be compelled to obey the norm. While the U.S., which is a nuclear power, and several countries such as Japan that are dependent on nuclear deterrence have announced that while they may sign a treaty in accordance with norms, they are not optimistic regarding all nuclear powers being so inclined.

The U.S. and Japan have attended previous humanitarian conferences and have previously acknowledged the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. Japan, in particular, has been extremely cognizant of this fact given its experience as the only country ever to have been subjected to the wartime use of atomic weapons. Given the current state of world politics, in which state security must, in practice, take precedence as a policy concern, the policy of nuclear

deterrence will be sustained for the time being. However, nuclear-dependent countries believe that a world without nuclear deterrence could become a reality in due course. While relying on the presently existing legal framework of the NPT, they seek to achieve intermediate ends such as the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the establishment of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT), revealing a school of thought that considers this step-by-step (or building-block) approach to the actualization of such a world as an accelerated way of realizing a world without nuclear weapons in a secure and reliable manner.

As President Obama noted in his Hiroshima speech, humanity has not yet achieved the wisdom necessary for closing out the nuclear era that was brought into being by the power of science. This also echoes how humanity has become ensnared by its own military cunning and strength. In this respect, it is necessary to recognize that humanity is ill. In the group to which I belong, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear Wars (IPPNW, recipient of the 1985 Nobel Peace Prize), we liken the spread of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence to a pestilential pandemic.

States (nation states) are human institutions, and we must recognize that the pursuit of nuclear deterrence by targeting cities (and thus, human beings) with nuclear weapons also puts human beings in the crosshairs. It is about time that all of humanity realized just how much the alert system increases the risk to humanity's survival. To this end, we must also ask after the responsibility of scientists, who are also members of civil society. Nuclear weapons are produced by scientists, without whose cooperation they cannot be maintained. It is essential for scientists to awaken to this fact, and it is important for scientists to stand hand in hand with the public.

The Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs (recipient of the 1995 Nobel Peace Prize), established with the participation of Nobel Prize-winning physicists (such as Albert Einstein and Japan's Hideki Yugawa), have in the past made strong appeals to scientists' sense of responsibility.

Finally, we must also consider the responsibilities of civil society. Ultimately, citizens select the politicians who, by wielding power in their respective countries, become world leaders. The current state of affairs is one in which a majority of citizens approve of, or at least tolerate, the doctrine of nuclear deterrence in countries such as the U.S., which are positioned as nuclear powers. Such a situation is not conducive to the emergence of political leaders that make political decisions transcending nuclear deterrence and prioritize the perspective of human security. There is a possibility of this also applying to the current situation in Japan. In other words, a majority of citizens may expect the extended deterrence of the U.S. to protect against nuclear strikes by China or North Korea.

5. Collaboration between the Non-Humanitarian Order (the Nuclear Powers) and the Policy of Nuclear Deterrence (Countries Relying on Nuclear Deterrence) Is Itself the Wisdom of Humanity

The situation is dire. It was resolved in December 2016 that a multilateral "United Nations conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons" would be convened over two sessions in 2017. Accordingly, if the nonnuclear powers can push through a majority, the possibility of establishing some form of NWC would emerge. While the degree to which participation can be expected from the opposing faction comprising nuclear powers

and countries that rely on extended deterrence (such as Japan and the NATO countries) and those such as Australia that prefer to balance the existence of weapons of mass destruction with nuclear deterrence, the Japanese government, at least, has announced its intention to attend.

We must work to assuage this split between the two factions. For this, compromise is essential. It is necessary to secure the attendance of the nuclear powers and their understanding, to some degree, of the process leading toward an NWC. In this sense, it will be important for both parties to share the ultimate aim of a world without nuclear weapons.

It is also necessary for the humanitarian faction to demonstrate its understanding of the step-by-step process of undermining the doctrine of nuclear deterrence that the nuclear powers are insistent upon. Amid the political dynamics involved in the lead-up to the establishment of an NWC, it is necessary to place bilateral (meaning both factions) consultation at the core of negotiations. The most effective and rapid measures required to realize each stage of the step-by-step approach insisted upon by countries such as the U.S. (e.g., CTBT, FMCT, and the solutions to various problems such as nuclear proliferation) should be pursued in collaboration. Here, the serious execution of the NPT's Article 6 will be required of the nuclear power faction and the one that considers nuclear weapons to be non-humanitarian.

Reducing the role of nuclear weapons in nuclear deterrence policies is another major step requiring concrete discussion. Here, several possible negotiation items are conceivable, including for Japan, a victim of atomic bombing that deeply understands the inhumanity of such weapons, to suggest measures for their reduction,

such as the prohibition of their preemptive use. This may also be effective as external pressure on the nuclear powers, such as by resuming negotiations for the mutual reduction of nuclear warheads that have been stalled between the U.S. and Russia. If the world's nuclear powers, besides seriously addressing solutions to conflicts that have spread through the world and seeking an improvement in international security, were to agree on the establishment of confidence-building as a common goal, it might be possible to shift gears from opposition to collaboration in the move toward establishing an NWC. For the nuclear powers to acquire a deeper recognition of the inhumanity of their position, they need to agree on a timetable to accomplish goals such as the fulfillment of the nuclear disarmament that they advocate, thorough ratification of the CTBT, and realization of the FMCT — these seem at first glance to conflict with civil society's idea of focusing first on the establishment of norms. However, despite the difficulty of engaging the nuclear powers after the establishment of norms and that of consulting with them on various processes, from a wider perspective, perhaps, the ideas of the two factions might converge in the same direction. Perhaps, we will find an ideal opportunity to demonstrate our wisdom as human beings in this negotiation process itself.

From such a perspective, the typology of the NWC announced by the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) assumes greater significance. In other words, this consists of 1) a comprehensive nuclear convention that includes a system for inspections and aims at the complete abolition of nuclear weapons; 2) a nuclear weapon ban treaty that preemptively prohibits the development and use of nuclear weapons — even as a threat; 3) a flexible framework agreement that incorporates various nuclear weapon prohibitions focusing on the

NPT and including the CTBT and the FMCT; and 4) an amalgam of 1), 2), and 3). Of these, the third option of a framework agreement seems to be the one that is most likely to wield influence in negotiations with the nuclear powers. It should be possible to adopt a method in which various arrangements can be established in a flexible manner while the timetable is discussed. However, won't this lead to the realization of an NWC in a staged manner with a time lag that it is essentially identical to the step-by-step approach preferred by the nuclear powers? A report by the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament (ICNND) prepared by the governments of Japan and Australia shows a short-term, medium-term, and final-stage long-term timetable. In this, undertaking precarious negotiations to get the nuclear powers to approve the establishment of a moderate version of an NWC is likely to be the biggest hurdle for the negotiations.

Conclusion

The year 2017 is expected to be the most significant crossroads for the abolition of nuclear weapons — a matter of the gravest human urgency. As a prerequisite for the complete establishment of human security, we must reflect on ways to heed the wisdom of humanity to jointly realize the establishment of an NWC while fostering trust between the world's nuclear and nonnuclear powers. The role to be played by Japan, as the only country ever to have been subjected to the wartime use of atomic weapons, will be incalculably immense and important.

*This translated version was revised on June 10, 2017.

報 告

核兵器禁止条約交渉 —— 将来の締結も念頭において ——

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1. はじめに

本報告では人間の安全保障の追求と核廃絶の取組とのテーマの下で、来年にもニューヨーク国連本部において開催される見込みの核兵器禁止条約交渉について、将来の条約締結も念頭において話させて頂こうと思います。本日の登壇者の中では唯一の実務系出身ということもあり、日本の立ち位置及び現下の核軍縮を取り巻く現状を直視した上で、将来この交渉が成就して条約が出来た暁に、唯一の被爆国である日本が条約締結のための国会のご承認を頂けないような状況になっては困るとの強い思いがあります。このため、若干技術的な話になりますが、先ず日本の立場表明を検証した上で、交渉の前提となる手続事項、更には主要な実質事項として想定される基本的義務及び条約締結時の国内法担保の要請について、これまでの軍縮条約での若干の事例を紹介する形でお話しさせていただきます。

本日の公開シンポジウムは一般の方を対象としたものですので、条約についての基本的な点についても予め説明させていただきます。軍縮措置は国家の主権に属する兵器・軍隊等の削減を求めるものですから、自主的乃至は一方向的に軍備縮小が行われることもあります。そこには常に安全保障上の考慮が働き、法的拘束力を有する条約によりその国に義務を課す形で実施されることが多いことについてはご案内のとおりです。最も直近に行われた軍縮条約の事例として

武器貿易条約（ATT）交渉があげられますが、核兵器と比較すると軍縮交渉の優先度が高くないとされる通常兵器の移転を規制するもののものであっても例外ではありません。ちなみに、こうした条約そのものについては「国の間において文書の形式により締結され、国際法によって規律される国際的な合意（単一の文書によるものであるか関連する二以上の文書によるものであるかを問わず、また、名称の如何を問わない）」とウィーン条約法条約は定義しております。

まず、議論の前提となる条約に関連する規則についてはこのウィーン条約法条約が重要であり、いわば「条約の基本法」とも言えるもので、条約について慣習法化された基本的規則の多くはこの条約により成文化されており、例えば、米国はこの条約法条約を締結していませんが、新STARTにおいても暫定適用の規則等で条約法条約を遵守しております。別の例をあげると、日本が核兵器禁止条約交渉決議には反対したものの条約交渉に参加すると岸田外務大臣が記者会見で述べておりますが、条約法条約は「交渉国（第2条1（d）」については「条約文の作成及び採択に参加した国」と定義されており、条約交渉に正式に参加する際の具体的な手続について代表が全権委任状を示す等も定められており、このような規則に従って条約交渉が行われることになります。

ご存知の方には釈迦に説法ではありますが、念のため条約文の採択と確定の手続について、簡単に触れさせていただきます。条約文の採択は、多数国間での交渉では全ての国が合意することは現実には困難な実情も反映して、「国際会議においては、条約文や、出席しかつ投票する国の三分の二以上の多数による議決で採択される。ただし、出席しかつ投票する国が三分の二以上の多数による議決で異なる規則を適用することを決定した場合は、この限りではない（第9条2）」と定められております。また、条約文の確定については、「条約文に定められている手続又は条約文の作成に参加した国が合意する手続（条約第10条（a）」や「（a）の手続がない場合には、条約文の作成に参加した国」によるものと規定され、随所で「条約文の作成に参加した国」であることが重要な位置を占めていることにお気づきになるものと思っておりますが、少なくとも条約交渉に参加する意義はこうした点にもあります。

更に条約交渉が終了してから、条約に拘束されることについての同意の表明（即ち、署名（署名のみで効力を生ずるものもあります）、批准、受諾、承諾）がなされることになります。多数国間条約は、コンセンサス合意でなく表決により採択されるものも少なくないことから、その条約を一部または全て受け入れられないとする国が出て来ることもあります。最終的に採択された条約について部分的に受け入れられないとする国は、条約が禁止していない場合には留保を付した上で締結することになります。

もともと、留保を禁止している場合であっても「留保」でない「解釈宣言」を行うことにより、利害関係の調整を行った上で条約に同意する手続に入ることも可能ですが、例えば、イスラム諸国による大幅な人権条約への留保が条約を骨抜きにしかねないといった問題についても耳にされたことがあると思います。他方で、条約に同意しない国は非締約国のままとなることを選択することになります。

以上、核兵器禁止条約交渉を考える上で最低限度関連しうる条約法条約の規則について説明させて頂きましたが、これらの点は将来の核兵器禁止条約のあるべき姿を検討する上で不可欠な点ですので、後で再度触れることになると思います。

2. 核兵器禁止条約と日本の立場

ここから日本の核兵器禁止条約に関連して公式に表明されている日本の立場について検証してみたいと思います。日本政府の立場は、国際会議での日本代表による発言のみならず、国内においても国会での政府答弁、質問主意書への答弁書等から知ることが出来ます。特に質問主意書への答弁書については国会法第74条に定める内閣への質問権の行使に対する正式な回答として閣議決定されますので、予め内閣法制局による審査等も経て厳格な手続の下でセットされ、憲法の定める三権分立の下で国会に対する行政府としての公式回答と位置付けられるものです。他方で、国会答弁の場合は事務方が用意した答弁案を基に主務官庁の政務レベル幹部等が答弁を行うものですので、（ご自分の言葉で

と意図的なもの、間違えての双方がありうるものと思いますが) 事前に用意された答弁案のとおり答弁されない議員もいらっしゃるようですように、ある意味裁量の幅が残されております。

核兵器禁止条約決議案が国連総会第一委員会で採択されてから、既に衆参両院議員から複数の関連する質問主意書がでており、これまでの核兵器の使用(又はその禁止)を巡るものも併せますと、核兵器禁止条約に臨む日本の立場が外務省等事務方にとり容易ならざるものであることが見えて参ります。日本外交を担う外務省には、軍縮を担当する部署のみならず、安全保障政策や日米安全保障条約を担当する部署等、この核兵器禁止条約に関連する部局があり、それらの組織間で決裁書等が所掌事務に応じて調整された結果として政策決定が行われます。このため、核兵器禁止条約を巡っても核兵器不拡散条約(NPT)を基礎とする核軍縮・核不拡散体制の中での位置付け、拡大抑止の確保といった安全保障関連部署からの要請等を踏まえて、総合的に調整された結果として、例えば国連総会第一委員会での一般討論演説、投票態度といった形で我々の目に触れることになります。

また、近年は各省庁を束ねる内閣官房に日本の安全保障政策の司令塔として国家安全保障局も設置されており、このような部署にもお伺いを立てることになるので、核兵器禁止条約のように国益に直結する案件であればあるほど重層的な意思決定メカニズムを経て決定されることになります。このため、軍縮不拡散外交を担う外務省の軍備管理科学部といった一部局のレベルでは、根本的な事情の変更が生じる場合ですとか、政治的なイニシアティブがない限りにおいて、政策変更は極めて困難なものであることは皆さまも容易に想像できるものと思います。そういったことも念頭において、最近の質問主意書から核兵器禁止条約交渉に関係しうるものを参照してみたいと思います。

まず、核兵器使用禁止条約については、例えば、参議院小西博之議員からの質問に対し、

- 核軍縮に関する我が国の基本的立場は、核兵器のない世界の実現のためには、核兵器の非人道性に対する正確な認識及び厳しい安全保障環境に

対する冷静な認識に基づき、核兵器国と非核兵器国との間の協力による現実的かつ実践的な措置を積み重ねていくことが不可欠であるというものである。

- ご指摘の決議案は、北朝鮮の核・弾道ミサイル開発が我が国の安全に対する重大かつ差し迫った脅威となっている中で、このような我が国の基本的立場に合致せず、また、核兵器国と非核兵器国との間の対立を一層助長し亀裂を深めるものであるとの理由から、慎重な検討を重ねた結果反対したもの。
- (TPP 特別委員会で岸田外相が答弁しているように、) 交渉が開始されることとなる以上は、交渉に参加し、唯一の戦争被爆国として、核兵器国と非核兵器国との間の協力が不可欠であるとの立場から、主張すべきことはしっかりと主張していくことも念頭に置いているが、いずれにせよ、交渉の在り方の詳細に関する今後の議論等も踏まえ検討していく考え。

とする答弁書の事例があります。

更に、「多国間核軍縮交渉の前進」決議案について詳細に回答を求めたものもあり、重複部分を除くと、参議院福島瑞穂議員からの質問に対しては、

- 御指摘の本決議案は、二千十七年にいわゆる核兵器禁止条約の交渉を開始することを決定するものであり、一般的な形で核兵器の法的禁止を目指すことに言及したこれまでの決議とは異なるものである。
- 御指摘の交渉に参加するか否かについては、外務省のホームページにおいてその会見記録を公開しているご指摘の記者会見において、岸田外務大臣が「交渉への参加・不参加を含め、今後の対応ぶりについては、交渉のあり方の詳細に関する今後の議論も踏まえ、また、これまで連携してきた豪、独など中道諸国の動向も見極めつつ、政府全体で検討していくこととなりますが、私（大臣）としては、現段階では、交渉に積極的に参加をし、唯一の被爆国として、そして核兵器国、非核兵器国の協力

を重視する立場から主張すべきことはしっかりと主張していきたいと考えております」と述べたとおりである。

- 政府としてはかねてから明らかにしてきたとおり、核兵器の使用は、その絶大な破壊力、殺傷力の故に国際法の思想的基盤にある人道主義の精神に合致しないと考えており、人類に多大な惨禍をもたらしうる核兵器が将来二度と使用されるようなことがあってはならず、核兵器のない世界で安全な世界を目指した現実的かつ着実な核軍縮努力を重ねていくことが重要であると考えている。
- 国際司法裁判所が千九百九十六年七月八日に発表した勧告的意見は、核兵器による威嚇又はその使用は、武力紛争時に適用される国際法の規則、特に人道法の原則と規則に一般的には反するが、国家の存続自体が問題となるような自衛の究極的状況における核兵器による威嚇又はその使用が合法か違法かについて最終的な結論をだすことはできない等述べているところであり、政府としては、国際連合の主要な司法機関である国際司法裁判所が同意見で示した見解について、厳粛に受け止めるべきものと考えている。
- 御指摘の「国家の存亡そのもののかかった自衛の極端な状況」については、個別具体的に判断されるものであり、一概にお答えすることは困難である。
- 御指摘の多国間核軍縮交渉の前進に関するオープン・エンド作業部会の報告書の附属文書二の内容は、同作業部会において必ずしも議論が行われたものではなく、同作業部会に参加した国際連合加盟国、国際機関及び市民社会の提案を一覧にしたものであると理解しており、また、我が国の提案はないことから、御指摘の「核兵器の使用の威嚇」、「核戦争の計画への参加」、「核兵器の標的設定への参加」、「核兵器を搭載した艦船の寄港ならびに領海通過」、「核兵器の領土内通過」及び「援助、奨励、誘導」の意味するところが必ずしも明らかでなく、お答えすることは困難である。

とする答弁書の事例があります。

更に、核兵器の使用禁止については衆議院鈴木貴子議員より質問が出ており、

- 我が国は、いわゆる非核三原則により、憲法上は保有することを禁ぜられていないものも含めて政策上の方針として一切の核兵器を保有しないという原則を堅持している。また、原子力基本法（昭和三十年法律第百八十六号）において、原子力利用は平和の目的に限り行う旨が規定され、さらに、我が国は、核兵器の不拡散に関する条約（昭和五十一年条約第六号）上の非核兵器国として、核兵器等の受領、製造等を行っていない義務を負っており、我が国は一切の核兵器を保有しえないこととしているところである。
- その上で、従来から、政府は、憲法第九条と核兵器の関係についての純法理的な問題として、我が国には固有の自衛権があり、自衛のための必要最小限度の実力を保持することは、憲法第九条二項によっても禁止されているわけではなく、したがって、核兵器であっても、仮にそのような限度に留まるものがあるとするれば、それを保有することは、必ずしも憲法の禁止するところではないが、他方、右の限度を超える核兵器の保有は、憲法上許されないものであり、このことは核兵器の使用についても妥当すると解しているところであり、平成二十八年三月十八日の参議院予算委員会における横畠内閣法制局長官の答弁もこの趣旨を述べたものである。
- 純法理的な問題として、憲法第9条は、一切の核兵器の保有及び使用をおよそ禁止しているわけではないと解されるが、その保有及び使用を義務付けているというものではないことは当然であることから、核兵器を保有及び使用しないこととする政策的選択を行うことは憲法上何ら否定されていないのであり、現に我が国は、そうした政策的選択の下に、非核三原則を堅持し、更に原子力基本法及び核兵器の不拡散に関する条約により一切の核兵器を保有しえないとしているところであって、憲法と

核兵器不拡散条約との間に、お尋ねのような効力の優劣関係を論ずるべき抵触の問題は存在しない。

とする答弁書の事例があります。

以上から、我が国の基本的立場及び決議に賛同できないとするこれまでと同様の説明理由に加えて、一般的な形で核兵器の法的禁止を目指すことに言及したこれまでの決議とは異なるといった点を強調して反対したものとされています。先ほど、述べましたように国会答弁等と異なり裁量の幅が殆どないという質問主意書・答弁書の本来的な性格もあり、今後条約交渉が開始されても、国際場裏での今後の日本政府の立場表明でもこうした質問主意書への答弁書のラインを基本にした対応しかできないことになり、私が危惧しているのは、国際場裏での核兵器国と非核兵器国の亀裂の解決は外交実務に携わる方々に託するとしても、日本国内においても、外務省軍備管理科学部と核軍縮に強い関心を有する市民団体の方々との間でのかい離が更に大きくなることです。

日本が好むと好まざるとにかかわらず、いずれにせよ核兵器禁止条約交渉が始まる見通しとなったことを考えると、一見曖昧に見えても担当部局の裁量の余地を残す形で答弁書をセットすべきだったと感じており、これではハイレベルの政治的決断がなされない限り、議論の後追いに終始することしかできなくなると思います。日本は唯一の被爆国として軍縮不拡散外交政策の一貫性を保持すべきであり、また、国家安全保障上の考慮との両立が容易でないことは殆どの人が理解しているものと思います。

条約には反対するので無難な意見表明しかないとするのではなく、本来は条約が作成される暁には日本条項（Japan clause）と称されうるような形で最後まで残りうる具体的な条文の提案を始め、様々な法的・政治的制約がある中でも、日本は条約交渉には目に見える形で積極的に参加すべきであると考えております。

次に手続事項からコンセンサス方式及び NGO 参加条件について、核兵器の使用を禁止する条約がどのような点での考慮を必要とするのか代表的な点について、取り上げてみたいと思います。

3. 手続事項（意思決定と NGO 参加条件）

まず手続事項についてですが、条約交渉マンデート決議の文言から現時点で想定される点について、私の理解を述べさせていただきます。国連総会第一委員会決議（L.41）本文パラ10には以下のような表現があります。

10. Decides that the conference shall convene in New York, under the rules of procedure of the General Assembly unless otherwise agreed by the conference, from 27 to 31 March and from 15 June to 7 July 2017, with the participation and contribution of international organizations and civil society representatives;

従って、特段の決定がない限りは国連総会手続規則が適用されることが明示されており、新規加盟国の承認といった重要事項に該当しない案件は「出席しかつ投票する国の過半数」により決定が行われます。作業部会での日本の主張を始め核軍縮についてはコンセンサス方式で行われていることが慣行となっているとする見解も見られます。

しかしながら、NPT 会議で使われている手続規則も（これまで適用されたことはないものの）表決による意思決定を許容する規則が書かれています。自分の記憶をたどってみると、約10年前に IAEA 総会で伝統的にコンセンサス採択されていた中東決議がいきなり表決により採択されたこともありましたが、手続規則が本来的に許容する場合は表決の可能性は排除されず、今回の作業部会での報告書採択が表決で採択されたことは国連総会手続規則の想定する範囲内のことです。

今後、核兵器国と非核兵器国の対立が更に先鋭化する可能性もあり、その場合には NPT 関連会議においても、そのような状況下で一定の結論を求めようとすると必然的にコンセンサスの追求は交渉者の心理的障壁にはなりえても、最終的に手続規則上は許容されている表決に付されることになる可能性は排除されないものと理解しております。

もっとも軍縮会議の手續規則には明示的にコンセンサス方式が規定されておりますし、特定通常兵器使用制限禁止条約（CCW）運用検討会議の手續規則では「8条」に言及することによりコンセンサス方式が間接的に規定されておりますので、2016年12月12日からジュネーブで開催される CCW 運用検討会議により自律型致死兵器システム（いわゆる自律型ロボット兵器）の政府専門家会合が2017年に開催されるかについてはコンセンサス方式で決定される必要があります。

従って、条約交渉会議により別途の手續規則が合意されない限りは、交渉会議での意思決定は表決により採択されることとなります。また、NGO の参加条件についても手續規則交渉の際には主要な論点となることが多いですが、これも決議には国連総会手續規則の下で明確に参加が許容される形で書かれている点は留意すべきものと思われま

4. 想定される基本的義務と国内法担保の要請

国連で採択された条約の中には国連海洋法条約のように320条にわたる大部のものから武器貿易条約（ATT）のように30条にも満たない簡潔なものまで様々な条約があります。また、最初にウィーン条約法条約による条約の定義について述べましたように、名称も色々あり、複数の文書からなるものもあります。核兵器禁止条約については、化学兵器禁止条約をベースに検討されたコスタリカの提唱するモデル条約や国際反核市民団体連合 ICAN が提唱する核兵器の使用禁止を軸に条約を考える先行禁止条約等の提案がなされていますが、条約交渉に臨むにあたり最低限度、何時（即ち、時間的管轄）、何処で（即ち、場所的管轄）、誰による核兵器の使用をどのように禁止するのかについて頭の体操をしておく必要があるように思われます。

もっとも質問主意書への答弁書に示されたアプローチのように、そもそも条約交渉には反対するがゆえに議論の中には入らないとする立場も理論上ありうるのかもしれませんが。私が強調したいのは、米国は核兵器禁止条約に反対して作業部会にも出席しませんでした。他方で NATO 諸国向けに発出された決

議案反対を要請する文書を見ると、核兵器の通過の問題をはじめ核兵器使用禁止の義務が課された場合にはどのような法的措置が国内法上必要とされるかも含めて、入念に検討していることが窺われます。

勿論、日本も条約を締結する際には国内法担保をしっかりとする国ですが、仮に今後核兵器禁止条約交渉が進捗して最終的に条約が作成された時に、唯一の被爆国として核軍縮・不拡散に資する条約であるにもかかわらず、条約交渉時に十分に日本の意向が反映されなかった結果として条約締結のための国会承認が得られない事態になるようなことは避けるべきだと思います。

今後の条約交渉の結果、核兵器禁止条約が作成された際には、国内法上も核兵器の使用禁止は担保される必要があります、先ほど紹介させて頂いた質問主意書の答弁書にもあるように、「その保有及び使用を義務付けているというものではないことは当然」としても、非核三原則を前提とした上で核兵器の使用はあり得ないこととして、日本の現行法上は核兵器の使用禁止は刑罰で担保されていないのではないかと思います。

例えば、包括的核実験禁止条約の国内実施のためには、「核原料物質、核燃料物質及び原子炉の規制に関する法律」（原子炉等規制法）の法改正により「第七十六条の三核爆発を生じさせた者は、七年以下の懲役に処する。2前項の未遂罪は、罰する。」として、核爆発禁止を刑罰で担保しております。このような条文で、自然人のみならず法人が同じようなことをした場合も処罰する両罰規定方式にするのか、海外で日本人が核兵器を使用した場合をどうカバーするのかとの観点から刑法の国外犯規定の対象犯罪に含めるのかといった点も、検討される必要があります。

もともとこの法律の目的は、

原子力基本法（昭和三十年法律第百八十六号）の精神に則り、核原料物質、核燃料物質及び原子炉の利用が平和の目的に限られることを確保するとともに、原子力施設において重大な事故が生じた場合に放射性物質が異常な水準で当該原子力施設を設置する工場又は事業所の外へ放出されることその他の核原料物質、核燃料物質及び原子炉による災害を防止し、及び核燃料物質を防護して、公共の安全を図るために、製錬、加

工、貯蔵、再処理及び廃棄の事業並びに原子炉の設置及び運転等に関し、大規模な自然災害及びテロリズムその他の犯罪行為の発生も想定した必要な規制を行うほか、原子力の研究、開発及び利用に関する条約その他の国際約束を実施するために、国際規制物資の使用等に関する必要な規制を行い、もつて国民の生命、健康及び財産の保護、環境の保全並びに我が国の安全保障に資することを目的とする。

と原子炉等規制法第1条は規定しておりますので、核兵器の使用禁止については原子力の平和的利用というこの目的に合致しないとして、原子炉等規制法により規定されるのが適切でないと思われる場合は、別途の単独立法により核兵器の使用禁止が国内法上規定される必要があります。

更に悩ましいのが、憲法第9条2の範囲内の自衛のための場合については、「我が国には固有の自衛権があり、自衛のための必要最小限度の実力を保持することは、憲法第九条二項によっても禁止されているわけではなく、したがって、核兵器であっても、仮にそのような限度に留まるものがあるとすれば、それを保有することは、必ずしも憲法の禁止するところではない」としており、この考え方をどのように捉えるかです。

これは核兵器の使用威嚇に関する ICJ 勧告的意見の主文 E2 が「国家の存続自体が問題となるような自衛の究極的状況における核兵器による威嚇又はその使用が合法か違法かについて最終的な結論をだすことはできない」とする結論と類似しております。このように自衛権の範囲内であれば核兵器の使用の禁止は法的なものではなく政策的選択に過ぎないとも解釈しうるもので、核兵器の使用の結果がどれだけ悲惨なものか皆知っており、核兵器の使用禁止については安全保障上の考慮との比較衡量が十分に行われた上で、禁止の除外範囲を可能な限り極小化する必要があります。

殆どの多数国間条約には関係国の利害関係を調整した上で普遍化を進めるための工夫が施されており、時には「抜け穴」と非難されることも少なくないですが、冒頭に述べました留保や除外規定の範囲をどこまで許容するのか、禁止規制の実効性を確保しつつ可能な限り多くの国が締結するように条約が作られる必要があります。

現実の問題として、日本の領域には日本政府の管轄下及び管理下でない場所が存在し、具体的には在日米軍基地等ですが、このような場所での日本が締結した条約の実施の担保は困難なのが実態です。例えば、対人地雷禁止条約やクラスター弾条約の締約国でない国の管理する在日米軍の施設・区域で起きる基本的義務の違反には対応が容易でなく、そもそも厳密には条約への同意を表明してない非締約国には法的義務、更にその違反も生じない訳です。

このように、拡大抑止といった抽象的な概念レベルでの議論もさることながら、実務レベルでは日米安全保障条約や地位協定の関連規定との整合性の確保という非常に困難な課題が待っています。

最近の軍縮条約の事例ですと、例えばクラスター弾条約第21条はこの条約の締約国でない国との関係（具体的には米国等ですが）については、参加を奨励する一方で、「国際法の規定に従い、締約国又はその軍事上の要員若しくは国民は、この条約の締約国でない国であって締約国に対して禁止されている活動を行うことのあるものとの間で軍事的な協力及び軍事行動を行うことができる。」と規定する形で矛盾の解消に努めています。勿論このような除外規定による例外化をどこまで認めるかということについては、市民団体関係者からは抜け穴を作るものであり受け入れがたいとする見方も当然あります。

5. おわりに

私は『なぜ核はなくならないのかⅡ』という本に核兵器禁止条約を巡る議論を深化させるためには、核兵器の使用禁止による保護法益を明確にする必要があると書きました。これは条約交渉のみならず将来の日本による条約締結をも念頭に置いたもので、日本において国内実施を確実にするためには刑罰により担保する必要があり、罪刑法定主義の要請からも「核兵器の使用禁止」の定義及び意味するところの明確な範囲、更にはその必要性を明らかにすることが要請されているからです。この保護法益について、例えば保護法益主義及び刑法理論という法益（侵害・危殆化）という概念を基に4つの保護法益の形態を提示することを試みている先行研究があります。

即ち、具体例として、①人格の中核部分を構成する法益であり、生命や身体の枢要部分等を保護するもの、②同じく個人的法益ではあっても、そうした方が望ましいという観点からのもの、③個人に帰属するものとして法により保護されているに過ぎない利益（財産権等）、社会公共のものと構成されるもの（環境保護等）、④国家的保護法益をあげております。

これは刑法という核兵器禁止条約交渉が関係する国際法とは異なった分野における学説の一つに過ぎないものの、核兵器の使用禁止を巡る議論にも参考になるもので、核兵器は非人道的なものであり使用禁止は当然の帰結とすることに終始せず、こうした法的側面を含めた理論的裏付けを確保する必要があるものと考えております。

以上、大雑把な切り口で恐縮ですが、条約交渉の際に論点となるのは定義問題、基本的義務、国連憲章を含む他の国際条約との関係、国内実施、締約国会議等の意思決定機関、紛争解決条項、発効要件等最終条項であり、このような条約として必ず具備すべき典型的な条項がどのように書かれるべきか、先ず検討される必要があります。

更に、日本が橋渡し役を果たしたいのであれば、各国の動向を見極めた上で議論をリードする必要があり、今後詳細に検討した上で日本の国益を害さないように、日本が得意なところのみでも構わないので、作業文書により具体的な文言の提案を行う等の形の貢献が期待されております。

また、核兵器禁止条約は軍縮を含む国際安全保障分野全体に係わる条約構想であり、外務省を見ても、軍備管理科学部だけでなく総合外交政策局、なかならず国際法局等の知見も借りつつ、まさに「現実的かつ実践的な」対応が求められているものと理解しております。国際法（International law, Law of Nations）は基本的に国家間関係を規律するものなので、先ずは国、即ち政府に頑張ってもらわなければなりません。もともと、条約交渉マンデート決議が国際機関や市民社会の参加及び貢献を前提としていることもあり、我々大学関係者も、市民社会の一員として政府との適当な緊張感・距離を保ちつつ、知恵出しといった形により、いい意味で協力をする必要があると考えております。以上、ご清聴ありがとうございました。

Report

Negotiating the Nuclear Weapons Convention: With a Mind to Its Future Conclusion

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1. Introduction

In this lecture, I would like to talk about negotiations toward a nuclear weapons convention (hereinafter referred to as “NWC”), which is expected to be held in 2017 at the headquarters of the United Nations in New York, in terms of the themes of human security and efforts toward nuclear abolition, while bearing in mind the future conclusion of such a treaty. Among the Panelists who make presentations today, I am the only one who has practitioners’ background as a former Foreign Service officer, I would like to touch upon the analysis on Japan’s position and the current circumstances surrounding the current discussion on nuclear disarmament. Sooner or later, these negotiations will be concluded and a treaty will be then opened for signature, I have a strong sense that it would be problematic if Japan, as the only nation to have suffered from atomic

bombing, were not able to obtain approval from the Diet to ratify the treaty which will be useful for total elimination of nuclear weapons. For this reason, even though this may be a little technical, after first of all reviewing Japan's position statement by presenting some cases relating to disarmament treaties to date, I would like to begin with some procedural matters that serve as the prerequisite for such negotiations and then substantial matters such as basic obligations and national application clause which demand for municipal law enactment in view of the conclusion of such a treaty, referring to the similar precedent cases in the field of disarmament treaty that may be supposed to be the principal issue of these matters.

Since today's symposium is aimed at the general public, I first lay out some fundamentals of international law making for NWC negotiations. Because disarmament measures seek to reduce weapons and the military, which fall within the realm of states' sovereignty, disarmament measures are sometimes undertaken voluntarily or unilaterally. Thus, these are always subject to security considerations and as we have seen, are largely undertaken in forms of a legally binding treaty which obliges States Parties to comply with them. Taking the case of negotiations of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) as the most recent example of a disarmament treaty, we can see that disarmament negotiations are not exceptional even where they are intended to regulate the transfer of ordinary weapons that are not considered to be high-priority when compared with nuclear weapons. Incidentally, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (hereinafter referred to as "VCLT") defines a treaty in this sense to mean "an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and

whatever its particular designation.”

To begin with, the VCLT, which we could regard as the “basic law of treaties”, is important in terms of fundamental rules related to the treaty being discussed here. Accordingly, many of these rules that have become customary for treaties are codified by this VCLT. For example, even though the U.S. is not a signatory to the VCLT, it has complied with its state practice even under the provisional application rules of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). To cite another example, the VCTL defines a “negotiating State” to mean “a State which took part in the drawing up and adoption of the text of the treaty” (Article 2.1[e]). It also sets out various provisions for specific procedures for formal participation in treaty negotiations, including that delegates should have full powers to represent the state in question. Treaty negotiations are held according to these rules. For some of you, this will be akin to “preaching to the Buddha”; however, just in case, I touch lightly on the procedures for adopting a treaty and endowing the legally-binding power. The adoption of the text of a treaty, reflecting the fact that it is difficult in practice for all participating states to agree in case of multilateral negotiations, as is provided for in Article 9.2 of the VCLT, which stipulates that “the adoption of the text of a treaty at an international conference takes place by the vote of two thirds of the States present and voting, unless by the same majority they shall decide to apply a different rule.” Moreover, the way that the treaty is to be established as authentic and definitive is set out in Article 10 (a) as being “by such procedure as may be provided for in the text or agreed upon by the States participating in its drawing up” or “Failing such procedure, by the signature, signature ad referendum or initialing by the representatives of those States of the text of the treaty or of the

Final Act of a conference incorporating the text.” While you would notice that being a “State participating in the drawing up of the text treaty” occupies an important position in the treaty negotiations, the significance of at least *participating in treaty negotiations* is also evident.

Furthermore, once treaty negotiations are concluded, an expression of consent to be bound by a treaty will be given (that is, signature *ad referendum*, signature — in some cases this is all that is necessary — followed by ratification, acceptance, and approval). Since there are quite a few cases of the adoption of multilateral treaties by voting instead of consensus agreement, countries that regard the final form of the adopted treaty to be unacceptable, where not prohibited by the treaty itself, enter it with reservations.

Even where reservations are prohibited, it is still possible for a country to begin the process of consent to the treaty in question after making adjustments according to its interests with an “interpretive declaration” rather than a “reservation.” However, you may be familiar with the problem of how the abuse of substantial reservations in the area of human rights in some countries tend to dilute the effects of treaties. Conversely, states that do not agree to the treaty chose to remain as non-contracting parties.

I have explained the basic rules set out in the VCLT as a potential minimum standard for thinking regarding negotiating an NWC. However, since these points are indispensable for considering the future form of an NWC, I would like to return to them later in my lecture.

2. Japan’s Position on a Nuclear Weapons Convention

From here, I would like to examine Japan’s official position

as announced in relation to an NWC. Not only from remarks by Japanese representatives at international conferences but also in official statements made in the national Diet, such as those in official government replies and written answers to official questions enable us to know positions taken by the Government of Japan. Written answers to official questions, in particular, are decided upon by the Cabinet as formal answers to those who exercise the right to question the Cabinet as set out in Article 74 of the Diet Act. Accordingly, these are formulated under strict procedures after prior consideration by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau and thus are positioned as the government's official replies to the Diet — the executive branch under the tripartite separation of powers set out by the Constitution. Conversely, since oral responses in the Diet are delivered by the executive political officers of the competent government agency, these are accorded some latitude of discretion in that there are some lawmakers who do not answer in accordance with the prepared answer as much as they can in improvised ones.

Since the resolution on NWC negotiations was adopted by of the UN General Assembly, several relevant official questions have already been raised by members of the House of Representatives. Taking these in combination with previous questions related to the use (or prohibition) of nuclear weapons, we may observe that staking Japan's position vis-à-vis an NWC will not be easy for the Government such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). MOFA, which bears responsibility for Japanese diplomacy, has various sections related to the NWC, including not only a department in charge of disarmament but also bureaus in charge of the security policies and so on. It is between these organizations that policy decisions are made consequent to adjustments being made to approvals and matters

related to the affairs under their jurisdiction. For this reason, I would like to draw your attention, for example, to Japan's addresses and voting attitudes at the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, which are consequent to comprehensive adjustments made in light of requests from security-related bureaus to position even the NWC within nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation systems based on the NPT so as to secure extended deterrence.

In addition, in the past few years, a National Security Secretariat has also been set up within the Cabinet Secretariat to coordinate Japan's security policies. Thus, initiatives such as the NWC are decided through a multilayered decision-making mechanism to the extent that they are directly linked to national interest. Accordingly, at the departmental level of the MOFA that is responsible for diplomacy pertaining to disarmament and nonproliferation, policy change is bound to be fraught with difficulties without fundamental change in the circumstances or political initiative as I am sure, we can well imagine. With that in mind, I would like to see what might relate to the NWC negotiations from recent official questions.

First, with regard to an NWC to ban the use of nuclear weapons, we have the example of a written answer to a question submitted by Hiroyuki Konishi, a member of the House of Councilors:

- * Japan's basic position on nuclear disarmament is that in order to realize a world without nuclear weapons that is based on the accurate recognition of the inhumanity of nuclear weapons and a calm awareness of the harsh security environment, it is essential to take realistic and practical measures through cooperation between the world's Nuclear-Weapon-States (NWS) and Non-nuclear-Weapon States (NNWS).

- * Japan opposed the proposed resolution after repeated careful examination because of the fact that given that the nuclear and ballistic missile development by the DPRK (Democratic people's republic of Korea) constitutes a serious and imminent threat to Japan's security, it was not consistent with Japan's basic position, as described above, and that it served to deepen schisms and promote antagonism between the NWS and NWS.
- * As Foreign Minister Kishida responded at the Special Committee on the TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership), while bearing in mind the need to firmly argue our position from the standpoint that in addition to the commencement of negotiations, as the only country to have been suffered from the wartime use of atomic bombs, it is also essential for Japan to participate in the negotiations working for cooperation between the NWS and NNWS. In any case, we wish to consider this further on the basis of future discussions on the details regarding how the negotiations will take place.

In addition, some lawmakers asked for detailed answers regarding the resolution on “the advancement of multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations.” Leaving out portions overlapping with the above, the following example is a written answer given in response to questions by Mizuho Fukushima, a member of the House of Councilors:

- * The resolution in question concerns the decision to enter into negotiations on the so-called Nuclear Weapons Convention in 2017 and completely differs from the resolution mentioned previously, which aimed at the legal prohibition of nuclear

weapons in a general form.

- * As to whether to participate in the negotiations in question, as stated by Foreign Minister Kishida at the press briefing in question, for which the transcript is publicly available on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, “our future activities, including participation as well as non-participation, will be decided on the basis of future discussions on the details about how the negotiations will take place. In addition, while such consideration will take place at the level of the entire government while also looking carefully at trends among middle-powers countries such as Australia and Germany with whom we have been collaborating thus far, for myself [as minister], at this stage I believe that I would like to participate actively in the negotiations, to firmly argue our position as the only country which suffered from the use of atomic bombs from the standpoint of emphasizing cooperation between the NWS and NNWS.”
- * As this government has made clear since long, we believe that the use of nuclear weapons, owing to their extraordinarily destructive and murderous power, is not consistent with the spirit of humanitarianism that serves as the ideological foundation of international law. We also believe that such nuclear weapons, which could have catastrophic consequences for humankind, must never be used again and that it is important to persevere in realistic and steady efforts at nuclear disarmament with the aim of realizing a safer world without nuclear weapons.
- * The advisory opinion rendered by the International Court of Justice on July 8, 1996, has stated that the “threat or

use of nuclear weapons should also be compatible with the requirements of the international law applicable in armed conflict, particularly those of the principles and rules of international humanitarian law” but “that it cannot reach a definitive conclusion as to the legality or illegality of the use of nuclear weapons by a State in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in which its very survival would be at stake” despite this being generally at odds with the same principles and rules. As a government, we believe that we should take this opinion rendered by the International Court of Justice, the main judicial body of the United Nations, very seriously.

- * The phrase in question, “an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in which its very survival would be at stake,” is one that must be determined according to individual and specific circumstances and is thus difficult to address in a categorical manner.
- * It is our understanding that the contents of Annex 2 of the “Report of the Open-ended Working Group taking forward multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiations” in question were not necessarily discussed at the working group itself but represent a list of proposals by Member States of the United Nations, international organizations, and civil society actors participating in the working group. In addition, since there are no proposals by Japan, providing an answer is difficult given that the precise meanings of phrases such as “the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons,” “participating in nuclear war planning,” “participating in the targeting of nuclear weapons,” “permitting vessels with nuclear weapons in ports and territorial seas,” “permitting nuclear weapons from being transited

through national territory,” and “assistance, encouragement, and inducement” are not necessarily clear.

Furthermore, the following is an example of a written answer to questions regarding a prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons submitted by Takako Suzuki, a member of the House of Representatives.

- * On the basis of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, as a matter of public policy, Japan adheres to the principle of not possessing any nuclear weapons, including even the ones whose possession is not constitutionally prohibited. In addition, the Atomic Energy Basic Act. (Act No. 186 of December 19, 1955) stipulates that the utilization of nuclear energy will be limited to peaceful purposes. Furthermore, as a NNWS to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Japan regards itself as being under an obligation not to receive the transfer from any transfer or whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices[u8] and considers itself not to be allowed to possess any nuclear weapons.
- * On this basis, as a purely legal issue concerning the relationship between nuclear weapons and Article 9 of the Constitution, the government has traditionally taken the following view: Since Japan has an inherent right to self-defense, retaining the necessary minimum level of self-defense capability is not necessarily prohibited by Article 9.2 of the Constitution.

Accordingly, even if this were to involve nuclear weapons, as long as this remained within the bounds of such a limit, possessing such arms would not necessarily be prohibited by the Constitution. Conversely, the possession of nuclear weapons exceeding such a limit is unacceptable under the constitution. The same understanding is also held to be valid for the use of nuclear weapons. This was also the substance of the reply by Director-General Yokobatake of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau to the House of Councilors Budget Committee on the 18th of August[Author10], 2016.

- * As a purely legal issue, it is understood that Article 9 of the Constitution does not necessarily prohibit the possession or use of nuclear weapons and that it obviously does not mandate their possession or use. Accordingly, the policy decision whether to possess or use nuclear weapon is not denied by the Constitution. Rather, it is on the basis of such a policy decision that Japan firmly adheres to the Three Non-Nuclear Principles and regards itself as being unable to possess any nuclear weapons under the terms of the Atomic Energy Basic Act and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. There is no problem of conflict to be discussed between the Constitution and the NPT as implied by the question.

From the above, in addition to the oft-repeated conventional explanation of Japan's stance and why it is unable to agree to the resolution, it is regarded as having been opposed by the emphasis of this resolution's difference from previous resolutions that cite its aim as being the legal prohibition of nuclear weapons in a general form. Partly due to the inherent character of official questions and written

answers, which, as I mentioned earlier, are unlike oral replies in the Diet insofar as they allow little scope for discretion, even if treaty negotiations were to be launched in the future, the future position statements by the Japanese government in the international arena can only respond on the basis of the line taken in written answers to official questions such as these. My concern is that even if we were to leave the search for a way of resolving the schism between nuclear powers and nonnuclear states in the international arena to other diplomatic actors, the gulf inside Japan between the Government of Japan and the civil society groups strongly interested in nuclear disarmament will grow even wider.

Given that the negotiation of an NWC is slated to begin whether Japan likes it or not, Japan should maintain a consistent foreign policy that is focused on disarmament and nonproliferation. Moreover, I think that most people understand that balancing this with national security considerations is bound to be difficult.

I do not consider that we are only asserting a safe opinion because we oppose the treaty. Rather, when the treaty is drafted as normal, I believe that Japan, even while facing various legal and political constraints, should begin to propose specific clauses that could stay the course in such a way that they could be called “Japan clauses” for Japan’s active participation in treaty negotiations in a visible way.

3. Procedural Issues (Decision-Making and Conditions for NGO Participation)

Now I would like to discuss a few representative points concerning what is required from a procedural perspective in terms of a

consensus method and conditions for NGO participation in the consideration of a treaty prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. Firstly, concerning procedural issues, I would like to offer my understanding of what is currently assumed from the wording of the treaty negotiation mandate resolution. Paragraph 10 of the text of the resolution (L. 41) by the First Committee of the UN General Assembly is as follows:

10. Decides that the conference shall convene in New York under the rules of procedure of the General Assembly unless otherwise agreed by the conference, from 27 to 31 March and from 15 June to 7 July 2017, with the participation and contribution of international organizations and civil society representatives.

Accordingly, unless decided otherwise, it is stated that the UN General Assembly Rules of Procedure shall apply and that proposals that do not fall under any of the important matters such as the approval of new member countries will be decided by “a majority of the members present and voting.” (N.B. The organizational session of the Conference, which was held on 16 February 2017, adopted its Rules of procedure.) We also see the view that it has become customary to practice a consensus approach with regard to nuclear disarmament as was insisted by Japan in the meeting of the working group.

However, the rules of procedure used for the NPT conference also stipulate rules that allow decision-making by voting (even though these have not been applied so far). As I recall, there was a case about ten years ago in which voting was suddenly used for the adoption of a Middle East resolution, which had traditionally

been adopted by consensus at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) General Conference. Nevertheless, where normally permitted by the rules of procedure, the possibility of voting cannot be excluded. Thus, the adoption by vote of the report adopted at the recent meeting of the working group falls within the scope conceived by the UN General Assembly's Rules of Procedure.

Another possibility is that disagreements between the NWS and NNWS will become more pointed in the future. If this were to become the case, the pursuit of consensus under such conditions could come to pose a psychological barrier for negotiators attempting to achieve certain conclusions. Accordingly, even at Review conferences of the NPT, we can understand the reason for not excluding the possibility of a resolution ultimately becoming subject to voting as permitted by the rules of procedure.

Even so, since the consensus decision making is explicitly stipulated in the rules of procedure for the Conference on disarmament and is, moreover, indirectly prescribed by reference to Article 8 of the Rules of Procedure for the Review Conference on the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), it is necessary for the question of whether to hold a meeting of government experts on lethal autonomous weapons systems (so-called LAWS) in 2017 to be decided by the consensus method at the meeting of the CCW Review Conference held in Geneva in December 2016..

Moreover, while conditions for the participation of NGOs are often a principal issue when negotiating rules of procedure, we may note that these are also written in a form such that their participation is explicitly permitted under the UN General Assembly's Rules of Procedure.

4. Assumed Basic Obligations and Demands for Incorporation in Municipal Law

The treaties adopted by the UN vary widely, from voluminous conventions such as the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which consists of 320 articles, to concise documents such as the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which features less than 30 articles. Further, as I mentioned at the outset in reference to the definition of “treaty” in the VCLT, they can appear under various names and sometimes comprise multiple documents. In terms of the NWC, while there have been various proposals, including a model convention proposed by Costa Rica on the basis of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and a preemptive ban type NWC considering a treaty along the lines of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, which is advocated by the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), in view of treaty negotiations, it seems at the very least, necessary to conceive what kind of prohibition should be stipulated in the NWC about when or cut-off date for prohibition clause (i.e., temporal jurisdiction), where or place where to be prohibited for use of nuclear weapons (i.e., territorial jurisdiction), and how to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons and also about whom to prohibit.

However, as in the approach shown for written answers to official questions, the position of not entering into discussions by virtue of opposing treaty negotiations from the outset may be theoretically possible. However, what I want to emphasize is that even though the U.S. opposed the NWC and did not attend the working group meeting, when we look at the document issued calling on NATO member states to oppose this resolution, we can find a *prima facie*

evidence that careful consideration was given, including with regard to the kind of legal measures required by municipal law in case of an imposed obligation to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons, as well as the problem of their enactment.

In general Japan is, of course, a country that firmly incorporates the treaties into its municipal law for its national application at the time of conclusion. After negotiations of the NWC will be finished, then given Japan's status as the only country to have suffered from atomic bombing, we should avoid the situation where Japan will not be able to obtain the Diet's approval to conclude the treaty due to the fact that it will was not sufficiently reflected during the treaty negotiations, although the treaty is expected to contribute to nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation .

When an NWC will be concluded after future treaty negotiations, it would be thus necessary to secure the prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons by incorporating this within municipal legislation. Even if, as also described in the written answer to the official question that I presented earlier, "obviously [the Constitution] does not mandate their possession or use" given that the use of nuclear weapons is not possible on the premise of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, it may be that prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons is not actually subject to penalty under current Japanese law.

For example, to implement the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at the municipal law level, the revised Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors impose a penalty to secure the prohibition on nuclear explosions in Article 76.3, which stipulates that "Individuals who conducted a nuclear explosion shall be punished by imprisonment with work for not more than seven years. (2) Attempts to carry out the crime set forth

in the preceding paragraph shall be punished.” In this kind of text, whether this is a dual-liability formula intended to punish not only natural persons but also juridical persons that perform the same kind of action and whether this includes crimes subject to extraterritorial criminal provisions of the criminal code from the perspective of how this might apply to Japanese nationals who have used nuclear weapons overseas are questions that require further examination.

That said, the purpose of this law, as set out in Article 1 of the Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors is as follows:

This Act, in accordance with the spirit of the Atomic Energy Basic Act (Act No. 186 of 1955), is enacted for the purpose of providing necessary regulations on refining activities, fabricating and enrichment activities, interim storage activities, reprocessing activities and waste disposal activities, as well as on the installation and operation, etc. of reactors, while taking into consideration the possibility of large scale natural disasters, terror attacks, or other criminal acts, and also for the purpose of providing necessary regulations on the uses of international controlled material to execute treaties or other international agreements concerning the research, development and use of nuclear energy, in order to ensure that the uses of nuclear source material, nuclear fuel material and reactors are limited to peaceful ones, and at the same time, to ensure public safety by preventing hazards due to the event that a severe accident at a nuclear facility causes a discharge of an abnormal level of radioactive materials outside the factory or place of activity where said nuclear facility is installed, or otherwise resulting

from nuclear source material, nuclear fuel material, and reactors, and protecting nuclear fuel material, thereby contributing to protecting people's lives, health, and property, preserving the environment, and assuring national security.

Accordingly, where a prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons is not consistent with the objective of peaceful uses of nuclear energy as set out in Article 1 of the Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors, it is necessary for the prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons to be stipulated under municipal law by a separate independent piece of legislation.

Further, with regard to the case of self-defense within the scope allowed by Article 9 of the Constitution, it is much more difficult to understand a school of thought that considers that "since Japan has an inherent right to self-defense, retaining the necessary minimum level of self-defense capability is not necessarily prohibited by Article 9.2 of the Constitution. Accordingly, even if this were the case of nuclear weapons, so long as this remained within the bounds of such a limit, possession of such arms would not necessarily be prohibited by the Constitution."

This is akin to the conclusion of the dispositive E2 of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) advisory opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, in which the ICJ states that "it cannot reach a definitive conclusion as to the legality or illegality of the use of nuclear weapons by a State in an extreme circumstance of self-defense, in which its very survival would be at stake." This way, if a prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons falls within the scope of self-defense, it could be interpreted as being not a legal question but merely a policy choice. Since we are all familiar

with the terrible consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, after conducting sufficient comparative balancing vis-à-vis security considerations, it is necessary to minimize the range of any exception to such prohibition as much as possible.

Most multilateral treaties are devised to promote their universalization after adjustments to the interests of the countries concerned even though the methods by which this is accomplished are more often than not denigrated as “loopholes.” Nevertheless, to the extent that we can tolerate the range of reservations and exemption clause I mentioned at the beginning, it is necessary to create treaties in a way such that as many countries as possible can become party to them, ensuring the effectiveness of the prohibition and regulation.

As a practical problem, it is actually difficult to secure the implementation of treaties concluded by Japan in areas on Japanese territory that are not under the jurisdiction or control of the Japanese government, in particular, places such as overseas diplomatic establishments or U.S. military bases stationed in Japan. For example, it is not easy to respond to violations of basic obligations occurring in facilities or areas belonging to U.S. forces stationed in Japan, which are not controlled by a country that is not even a State Signatory of the Anti-Personnel Land Mines Convention or the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM). This is because, strictly speaking, non-State party that have not expressed consent to these treaties are not subject to any legal obligation, and this does not therefore constitute a violation thereof.

Thus, even more than the abstract conceptual level of extended deterrence, the extremely difficult challenges of ensuring consistency with the relevant provisions of the Japan—US Security Treaty and so

on wait at a more practical level.

A recent disarmament treaty, the CCM, Article 21 of the CCM to be precise, concerns countries that are not parties to the convention (particularly those such as the U.S.), works to resolve contradictions while encouraging participation in the form of a provision that “in accordance with international law, States Parties, their military personnel or nationals, may engage in military cooperation and operations with States not party to this Convention that might engage in activities prohibited to a State Party.” Of course, as to the extent to which exceptions are permitted by such an exemption provision, there might be the views that this may create loopholes, in other words, this is difficult to accept.

5. In Conclusion

In order to develop the discussion of the NWC found in *Naze kaku wa nakunaranai no ka II* [Why We Can't Eliminate Nuclear Weapons 2] (Hōritsu bunkasha, 2016), I have written that we need to clarify the legal interests that would be protected by a legal prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons. This is because, keeping in mind not only treaty negotiations but also the future conclusion of such a treaty by Japan, it will be necessary to secure such a treaty with legal penalties for its national implementation. Moreover, on the basis of the legal doctrine of *nulla poena sine lege* (“no penalty without a law”), it is also incumbent on us to clarify the definition and definite semantic scope, as well as the necessity, of what constitutes a “prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons.”

Regarding these protected legal interests, a precedent studies has attempted to present four forms of protected legal interest on the

basis of the concept of interest (infringement/compromise) in the terms, for example, of protective legitimacy and criminal law theory.

That is, as specific examples, it cites (1) that which constitutes the core of personality and protects the core essentials of life and body, (2) that which a person finds desirable even if this is also a personal interest, (3) interests (e.g., property rights) and things constituted as societal or public matters (e.g., environmental protection) that are only protected by law insofar as they belong to individuals, and (4) national protected interests.

Even though this is no more than a theory in the field other than criminal law in general as it relates to the negotiation of the NWC, it is also suggestive with reference to discussions of any prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons. We cannot simply begin and end by regarding a prohibition on their use as the natural consequence of the inherent inhumanity of nuclear weapons. Rather, I believe that we need to ensure a secure theoretical grounding that also includes such legal aspects.

I am afraid that I have set out the foregoing discussion rather roughly; however, the points to be discussed in the treaty negotiations are the issues of definition, basic obligations, relationships with other international conventions including the UN Charter, national implementation, decision-making bodies such as the Conference of the States Parties, a dispute resolution clause, and final provisions such as the requirement for entry into force, and it will be necessary to first consider how typical provisions should be provided for in such a treaty.

Furthermore, if Japan wishes to serve in an intermediary role, it will be necessary to steer the discussion after looking carefully at the respective trends of each country. In future, after examining such

details, since it is fine for Japan to contribute only in areas where its strengths lie and in ways that will not damage its national interests, its contribution may be expected in the form of the proposal of concrete wording for working documents.

In addition, the NWC is a treaty concept that concerns the entire field of international security, including disarmament. Therefore the Government of Japan as a whole should seek what is called for is a truly “realistic and practical” response. Since international law (the Law of Nations) is what basically regulates relationships between states, we need to ensure that the country, i.e., the government—does its best. However, in part because the resolution mandating treaty negotiation is premised on participation and contributions from international organizations and civil society, I believe that it is incumbent on university officials like us to participate, in a good way, by helping to produce knowledge while maintaining an appropriate wariness of, and distance from, the government as members of civil society. Thank you very much for your attention.

*This translated version was revised on June 1, 2017.

報 告

核廃絶に向けて、軍縮不拡散教育の重要性

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はじめに

冷戦が終結し、すでに四半世紀がたった今でも、世界中に現存する核弾頭の数は、いまだに15,000発以上である。冷戦の最盛期には70,000発以上存在していたことと比べると、数こそ一定の削減傾向にあるが、実際に数の減少が核兵器の危険性の減少と結びついているとは言いがたいのが現実である。

核兵器不拡散条約（NPT）の核兵器国（米国、ロシア（旧ソ連）英国、フランス、中国）のうち、世界中の核兵器の総数の90%以上を保有する、米露の核兵器の数は、二国間の軍備管理条約により、顕著に減少したが、中国、また、NPTに加盟せず、核兵器を所有しているインド、パキスタンは、核兵器の数及び能力ともに、上昇させていると考えられる。

また、北朝鮮は2016年に入り二度核実験を行いその核兵器の性能の向上が危惧される。更に、ここ数年再び緊張を高め、冷戦終結以降、最悪とまで言われている、米露関係や、近年、激化するテロリズム等の脅威による核兵器の使用が一層現実味を帯びていく現状を踏まえると、実際に、核兵器の脅威、核兵器が使用される危険性というのは、数の減少には、比例していないというのが正論ではないかと考えられる。

しかしながら、一般市民の間での核兵器の脅威に関する関心は冷戦期と比べ、驚くほど軽減している。核兵器に関する基本的な知識、また、実際の危険

性などに関して、大半の市民が無関心、また、十分な情報を把握していないとも言える。こういった現状を踏まえ、今日の安全保障を取り巻く国際状況を鑑みると、長期的展望で、核兵器のない平和で安全な世界を構築するためには、軍縮不拡散の分野における教育の進展のために努力することの必要性がいつそう増してきている。しかしながら、その具体的な進展は現存する核兵器の脅威に比べて、非常に限られていると言えるのではないだろうか。

この拙稿では、まず、軍縮不拡散教育の進展のために重要な役割をはたした、「軍縮不拡散教育に関する国連の研究：国連事務総長の報告」について触れ、なぜ軍縮不拡散教育が核廃絶のために重要であるかを検討し、筆者の所属するミドルベリー国際大学院モントレール校 ジェームズマーティン不拡散研究センター（以下モントレール不拡散研究センター）における、様々な軍縮不拡散教育の例を簡単に紹介する。特に、核兵器のない世界の実現に向けての青少年を対象とした軍縮不拡散教育の重要性について焦点を当てる。その上で、課題、今後の展望について述べる。

1. 軍縮不拡散教育に関する国連の研究、国連事務総長の報告に関して

歴史的背景

軍縮不拡散教育について論じるときに、国際連合の舞台でのこの分野の努力、歴史的背景を無視することはできない。国連の設立の目標が、戦火に泣いた人民の悲哀の歴史を平和で安全なものにすることであるなら、その国連の場で、軍縮不拡散教育が核兵器のない平和な世界へ向けて進展するために議論されてきたのは、必然であるといえる。それにもかかわらず、その進展は非常に限られており、最も重要な進展を見るには、2002年の国連総会での「軍縮不拡散教育に関する国連の研究 — 国連事務総長の報告」の採択まで待たねばならなかった。

1978年の第一回国連軍縮特別総会において、初めて軍縮教育の緊急性が宣言された折に、軍縮教育の進展のためには、その問題に関して、教授すること、

研究することの両方の大切さが、強調された。そして、この特別総会の最終文書は、ユネスコに対して、軍縮平和教育のプログラムを多様なレベルの教育において、開発するための段階的措置を採用していくことを勧告した。その勧告を受けて、1980年に行われたユネスコ軍縮教育世界会議の最終文書には、軍縮に関する研究と教育の数多くの推薦事項が含まれている。このユネスコの会議が今後の軍縮教育の発展に大きく貢献したという見方もある。

しかしながら、このユネスコ会議以降、2000年の国連総会で軍縮不拡散教育に関する報告書の提出を要求した決議が採択されるまでの約20年間、軍縮不拡散教育が真剣に国連の場で、討議されることはほとんどなかった。その理由に関しては様々な見方があるが、冷戦中における超大国間のイデオロギーの対立などから、軍縮教育に関して、実質的な討議がなされる余裕がなかったというのが、大きな1つの理由であると思われる。

その意味でも、2002年に国連総会で、「軍縮不拡散教育に関する国連の研究 ― 国連事務総長の報告」が採択されたことは、非常に大きな意義がある。この報告書は当時国連軍縮諮問委員会のメンバーであったモントレー不拡散研究センター所長のウィリアム・ポッター博士が軍縮不拡散に焦点を当てた教育の必要性を、当時の国連事務総長コフィ・アナンに提案したことに由来している。軍縮不拡散を進展させる上で、最大の問題のひとつは、核兵器の脅威に関する無関心や、認識の低さ、危機的現状から目をそらした安逸であると、鋭く警鐘を鳴らし、現状を打開するために軍縮不拡散教育実施の必要性を訴えたのである。

報告の概要

コフィ・アナン元国連事務総長は以前「教育とは、平和構築のための異名である」と明確に述べたことがあるが、この明言の意義は昨今の混沌とした国際情勢、安全保障の状況を鑑みたときに、ますます深まっているように思う。

この国連事務総長の報告では、軍縮と平和の分野において教育はきわめて重要であるが、十分に活用されていないとの懸念を表している。また、この研究では、軍縮不拡散教育は、かつてないほど重要になってきており、国際安全保

障、持続可能な経済、社会の発展のためには、軍縮不拡散教育の推進は緊急の課題であると確認している。

この報告書には、34項目に上る具体的な提案事項が含まれている。報告書の作成に携わった10カ国からの政府専門家グループの中心的役割を果たした当時の外務省軍備管理科学審議官、現在のIAEA事務局長の天野之弥氏は、これらの提案事項は処方箋というよりもメニューであると述べているように、それぞれの国や、地域、または、組織、教育機関の状況に合わせて、最も適切と思われる分野から実行に移していくのが実際的ではないかと理解している関係者が多いようである。

2. 報告書採択以降の進展

2002年に報告書が採択されて以来、国連加盟国、国際機関、市民社会は2年に一度、軍縮不拡散教育の実施状況においての報告書を提出することになっている。残念ながら、加盟国の間での関心はいまだに低く、報告書を提出している国の数は、一桁と、非常に嘆かわしい状況である。また、提出している国のなかには、軍縮不拡散教育というよりも、抑止力、戦略研究や、そのための訓練や教育に力を入れている国が多く、その種の研究教育を軍縮不拡散教育の代用としている現実もある。

それと比べ、市民社会からの提出は、毎回、提出する団体の数も内容も増加し、充実している傾向がある。特に近年の核軍縮の非人道的側面からの議論が活発になるとともに、市民社会のネットワークの拡大と発展のために、軍縮教育に取り組む団体は、数を増し、その内容もますます充実しているように見受けられる。

特にこの非人道的側面からの議論には、核兵器を使用した場合の結果がどうなるか、環境や、人類に及ぼす影響などについて、科学的、道徳的に学ぶことが重要であり、そのための軍縮教育が更に必要になるのは言うまでもない。報告書採択以降、NPT再検討会議の最終文書などにも軍縮不拡散教育の重要性が盛り込まれるなど、一定の発展はあるが、実質的な発展は市民社会の側に大

きく見られる。

歴代事務総長の中でも、軍縮不拡散の推進に熱心なことで知られている潘基文前国連事務総長は、2013年に軍縮不拡散に関する重要なスピーチを発表する場として、最も先駆的な軍縮不拡散教育活動を行っているミドルベリー国際大学院モントレイ校を選らんだ。そのスピーチの中で、2002年の軍縮不拡散教育の国連事務総長の報告書に付いて言及し、軍縮教育に費やされている予算が限りなく少なく、あるいは、ほとんど存在していない国もあると指摘した。

国家は喫緊の課題に短期的に解決方法を見出すことを要求されており、教育という、いわば長期的な展望にたった軍縮不拡散問題の解決方法への優先順位は低いのかかもしれない。また、批判的能力の育成を報告書が推進しているにもかかわらず、若い世代が核抑止論の是非を問うことなく、核兵器の永久的存続の状態をあきらめて認めているような状況について懸念を表明し、軍縮教育こそが、新たな、創造的な思考を更に発展させ、核廃絶への確かな道のりであると強調した。

3. 軍縮不拡散教育のモントレイでの具体例

不拡散の修士課程

ここで、簡単に、筆者が勤務するモントレイ不拡散研究センターで行っているいくつかの軍縮不拡散教育の実例を紹介したい。1989年にウィリアム・ポッター博士により設立され、それ以来、大量破壊兵器の軍縮不拡散に関する研究、教育の活動を幅広く国際的に実施している。国際機関、米国政府からの信頼も厚く、委託研究や共同研究、教育活動を頻繁に推進している。ミドルベリー国際大学院モントレイ校では世界初、唯一の不拡散とテロリズム研究での修士号を修得できる制度があるため、世界中から優秀な学生が集っている。

このプログラムでは、大量破壊兵器全般（核、生物、化学兵器）そして、それらの運搬システム、つまり長距離ミサイルの軍縮不拡散に関わる、政策、技術的側面を包括的そして、系統的に研究する。さらに、軍縮不拡散のための国際条約、地域条約、二国間条約についても研究する。また地域における大量破

壊兵器拡散の脅威や、非国家主体への大量破壊兵器の拡散事項についても研究を行う。

多種多様な授業の中でも、ひときわユニークで学生にも大変人気が高いのが、軍縮交渉シミュレーションである。国連事務総長の報告書にも取り上げられ促進されている参加型方式の教授法を用いた授業である。この方式では、従来の講義型授業方法よりも、更に、学生が主体的に、討議される内容について、様々な資料を用い、シミュレーションを通し、批判的能力を発展させる。

モントレーでの軍縮交渉シミュレーションでは、学生が多国間または、二国間の軍縮交渉で、他国の代表の役割を演じることにより、軍縮問題を客観的に見る力を養い、交渉の方法、技術を習得することを目標としている。実世界で行われている軍縮交渉の、シミュレーションを行うに当たり、それぞれの学生は自分が担当する国の軍縮不拡散政策について、徹底的にリサーチを行うことを要求される。軍縮問題を他の立場の観点から見ることにより、より客観的、また、包括的にその問題を検討できることができ、本来の自分の立場に戻ったときに、より効果的な判断ができるということもありうる。

客員研究員プログラム

モントレー不拡散研究センターでは、各国からの外交官、物理学者などを対象に、過去20年以上にわたり、客員研究員のプログラムを毎学期実施している。客員研究員として、モントレー不拡散研究センターの専門家による軍縮不拡散に関する講義に参加するとともに、各自の研究課題を定め、学期の終わりには、論文の提出と研究発表をすることが要求されている。

このプログラムに参加した外交官のほとんどが、各国政府に戻り、それぞれ軍縮不拡散の分野で、重要な役割を担っている。また、この客員研究員のプログラムを通し培った信頼関係、友情は非常に厚い。軍縮不拡散関連の国際会議でも、国益のために対立している、米露、また、米中の使節団にも、同じ客員研究員のプログラムを経験した友人がいるために、その幅広い人間関係は様々な意味で有益な影響を与えている。

人間関係が非常に重要な要素を占める軍縮交渉にとって、このように、教育

プログラムを通し、国益に縛られることはあったとしても、国際的にも、軍縮不拡散の進展という目標という志を同じくした外交官、研究者のネットワークを広げていくことは、国際安全保障のためにも大変に意義あることと思われる。

これは、当研究センターで行われている全ての教育プロジェクトを通じて共通していることであり、モンレーの大学院の卒業生の多くが世界各国で軍縮不拡散に関する様々な組織で活躍している。そのネットワークは国際連合や、国際原子力機関、各国政府の外務省やエネルギー省、また、学術機関やNGOなどに広がり、軍縮不拡散を推進する大きな力となっていると自負している。

当センターでは、もちろん、軍縮不拡散に関する、専門的知識技術の向上のための教育、訓練に主眼を置いているが、このように、専門家同士の信頼関係、つながりを深め、ネットワークの拡大と軍縮不拡散教育を通し、国際平和と安定に大きく貢献していくことを重要な使命の1つとしている。

高校生対象の軍縮不拡散教育プログラム

軍縮不拡散の分野での次世代を担うリーダーの育成に力を注いでいる当研究センターでは、高校生対象の教育プロジェクトも実施している。モンレー不拡散研究センターの主要なプロジェクトのなかで、最も若い世代を対象としている、このクリティカル・イシューズ・フォーラム（CIF）は、世界中の高校教員と高校生に、軍縮不拡散教育と、異文化理解を促進している。このプログラムは高校生の批判的思考能力育て、国や文化の異なる参加者に、大量破壊兵器の軍縮不拡散という複雑かつ難題で重要な、国際安全保障問題への理解を深めさせることを目的としている。

毎年プロジェクト担当者を中心に軍縮・不拡散関連のタイムリーなトピックを選択し、参加校の高校生が教員の指導のもと年間を通してプロジェクトを実施する。まず教員対象のオンライン研修会でその年のトピックについての包括的な講義を実施し、研修会では世界トップレベルの当センターの専門家が講義を担当する。2015年は「核軍縮を目指して：人道的アプローチ」のトピックのもと、広島、長崎への原爆投下70周年の節目にあたり、初めて広島で春季国際

会議を岸田外務大臣、湯崎県知事などを来賓に迎え大成功に収めることができた。

例年はモンレーで行う生徒の国際会議を、その年は広島県、広島市、広島女学院高等学校との共催で行った。近年、核軍縮をめぐる議論の中で、核兵器の非人道性に焦点をあてる動きが新たな潮流を作り出し参加者は核兵器をめぐる基本的な知識を身につけるために、世界の核保有国の状況、国家が核兵器を保有する動機、核抑止について、核軍縮、不拡散の国際条約の概要などを学び、また、核兵器に関する基本的な科学と技術の面や、核兵器が実際に使用された場合の長期にわたる、人的、環境的影響なども研究した。

2016年は、ビル・クリントン政権下で国防長官を務め実際に核兵器政策に携わってきたウィリアム・ペリー博士を迎え、次世代を担う CIF 参加者と、核兵器の危険性を軽減し、更に、核兵器のない世界へ向けて具体的に何ができるかを、熱心に議論した。来る2017年の会議は初めて長崎市で開催する予定にしておりトピックは核廃絶のために重要な包括的核実験禁止条約について、研究し、条約が署名されて以降20年以上経た今も発効していない状況について、考慮し、条約発効のためには、何が必要なのか検討し、また、この条約が、核兵器のない平和で安全な世界の構築のために、どのように、役立つか高校生は、真剣に議論することになっている。最終的には、学習、研究したことをもとに、解決策を提案するような課題も含まれている。

CIF は20年前に開始して以来、2012年までは米国とロシアの核閉鎖都市の高校を主な対象とし数多くの米露の高校生たちに、軍縮不拡散教育を推進してきた。核閉鎖都市は核施設と雇用者の家族のために建設されたため、市の活動と人々の生活は核施設を中心に営まれた。そのため、核閉鎖都市の若者の軍縮・核不拡散教育は、核兵器のない世界へ向けた幅広い取り組みの、重要な象徴的かつ実際的な一歩である。CIF は3年前に画期的な進展を迎えた。被爆地広島と長崎から日本の高校生が初めて参加したのだ。それ以降、日本からの参加校は広島長崎以外からの高校も参加し、米国からはカリフォルニア、コネティカット、ウィスコンシン州など全米各地から、参加校が集い、そしてロシアの核閉鎖都市からの参加も続いている。

広島・長崎から参加した高校生らの報告は、核の惨状についての直接的な経験に基づいたもので、核兵器の使用が人間にもたらす実際の影響と、核兵器が人間や環境に与える長期的な影響を理解することこそ、核兵器が二度と使われないためのカギだ、という重要なメッセージが発せられ、新しい視点をもたらした。広島・長崎における核兵器の悲惨な記憶は、忘れ去られてはならない。教育はその記憶を留める手だてとなりうる。

先に述べた2002年の国連の報告書は、「何を考えるかではなく、どのように考えるかを教える」というアプローチを支持しており、CIFもそのために批判的能力を育成できるようなプログラムになっている。軍縮不拡散に関する事項を学習研究するためには、様々な視点からの知識の統合と、学際的アプローチが必要だ。そのためにも CIF は科学、社会文化、経済、地政学の各領域を横断的に適用する。これらの領域は、CIF のカリキュラムを様々なコースに組み込むことを可能にし、幅広い関心と才能を有する生徒を引き寄せ、チームワークを促進する。

会議の終了後は、参加した生徒が、会議には直接参加できなかったクラスメイトや同じ学校の生徒全体に対し、また、可能な限り学校の地元のコミュニティに対しても、発表を行うように推進している。このことにより、プロジェクトへの参加者からの情報の発信、啓蒙活動が広がり、また、プロジェクト参加者は、このプロジェクトへの参加をきっかけに、国際問題、安全保障、軍縮不拡散に関する問題への関心を高め、将来的には、この分野で活躍していける人材に成長してゆくことが期待できる。

高校生の段階で明確なキャリアパスを決定するのは難しいかもしれないが、軍縮不拡散問題に関する、意識を持ち続けてもらうことを目標に、また、国際平和のために活躍するという大目的を持った人材に成長してもらうことを念頭において、担当者一同教員と協力して、取り組んでいる。

モントレー不拡散研究センターはこのプロジェクトを通し、世界の平和を担う若い世代が核不拡散、核軍縮、核廃絶という平和の問題について真剣に考える機会を提供することにより、国際平和に貢献することを目指している。世界的に見ても一般的に、軍縮不拡散教育はいまだ発展途上にあるといわざるを得

ない。ましてや、高校生対象のプロジェクトはほとんど存在しないといっても過言ではないと思う。若い世代から、平和について考え、理念だけでなくそれを実現するための実践的な思考を身に着けることの重要性を強調したい。

4. 課題と今後の展望

青少年を対象とした軍縮不拡散教育に携わってきて、常に感じることは、教育に本来備わった力と可能性が、核兵器のない平和で安全な世界を構築するという目標達成のための鍵であるということをやより多くの世界の指導者に、更に認識を深めてほしいということである。

オバマ大統領が任期終了に近づいた2016年5月27日に現役の米国大統領として初めて広島を訪問した際のスピーチの中に、「私の国のように核を保有する国々は、恐怖の論理にとらわれず、核兵器なき世界を追求する勇気を持たなければなりません。私の生きている間に、この目標は実現できないかもしれません。しかし、たゆまぬ努力によって、悲劇が起きる可能性は減らすことができます。私たちは核の根絶につながる道筋を示すことができます。」とある。

また、大統領就任直後の2009年4月には、歴史に残るプラハ演説で、平和で安全な核兵器のない世界の必要性を訴えつつも、「私が生きている間にはおそらく難しいだろう。忍耐と粘り強さが必要」と明言した。

確かに、核兵器のない世界を実現するためには、次の世代が現在の努力を受け継ぎ、さらに、革新的、創造的に、また、批判的能力を発揮し、後継者としてのその勢いを加速化させていくことが必須である。核軍縮の流れを作るためには、その継続性が、なければならない。そのためにも、軍縮不拡散教育こそが、最も重要な手段である。

昨今の核軍縮に向けての停滞した状況、また、核兵器国と非核兵器国との深い対立を鑑みると果たしてオバマ大統領の任期中は、核軍縮へ向けて、前進したのか、後退したのか、また、停滞したままなのか、その評価は、様々である。だが、核軍縮、核廃絶のための議論を政策論争の主流に押し上げて行き、特に市民社会の間に、力強い希望をあたえたこと自体は立派な成果であると思

う。

オバマ大統領のプラハ演説は、核兵器禁止条約に向けての交渉開始の期待感を強め、オバマ大統領自身の米国を含む核兵器国が反対しつづけているその条約の交渉開始の実現への後押しとなったことは、大変興味深い。その意味でもオバマ大統領には、青少年対象の軍縮不拡散教育の重要性を残りの任期で、できる限り強調してもらいたいと同時に、大統領職の後も、ライフワークの一つにしてほしいと願っている。

モンレーで行われた2016年のCIF春季国際会議に特別ゲストとして、参加したウィリアム・ペリー博士は、講演の冒頭に、「核兵器の脅威を削減するためには、教育をとおして、青少年たちが、核兵器が与える実際の脅威を理解しなければ、核廃絶に向けての前進は不可能だ」と言われた。また、国連事務総長の潘基文が2013年にモンレーで核軍縮についての重要なスピーチを行った時に、軍縮教育の重要性について、次のように強調した。

「学生にとって、核抑止の理論を勉強し、理解する方が、現存する核兵器を保持し続けることが、安全保障に資するという、「神話」を論破することを学ぶよりも、ずっと優しいのだ。。。しかし、教育は、核廃絶は夢物語であるという主張を間違っていると論破することに役立つ。」

つまり、核軍縮をめぐる現状が、いかに厳しくとも、厳しい現実を真正面から見つめ、現実を変えていくという強い意志を持った次世代のリーダーが必要であり、そのためにも現状をそのまま、受け入れる教育ではなく、批判的能力を働かせ、創造力豊かに、考え、行動する後継者の育成が重要である。

また、核廃絶を実現することを目標とした、軍縮不拡散教育で欠かせないことは、核兵器の非道義性についても議論することであると考えられる。ただ、道義的なことになると、核抑止を信望する戦略研究家と、核兵器のない世界を目指す核廃絶論者の間には建設的な対話を成り立たせることは難しい。そのため、核問題を道徳的観点から、論じることを敬遠する核軍縮不拡散の専門家も多い。それでもやはり、核兵器廃絶を論じるときに、その非人道性、非道特性を無視しては、実際の核廃絶は無理ではないだろうか？

オバマ大統領自身も広島でのスピーチで、「広島と長崎が「核戦争の夜明け」

ではなく、私たちが道徳的に目覚めることの始まりとして知られるような未来なのです。」と述べている。また、プラハ演説でも、「核保有国として、核兵器を使用したことがあるただ一つの核保有国として、米国は行動する道義的な責任を持っています。」と発言した。これは、非常に重要な側面であり、今後の軍縮教育の中に、道徳的な要素も更に取り入れていくべきことでないかと思っている。

また、オバマ大統領がノーベル平和賞を受賞した際の演説では、ケネディ大統領の言葉を引用し、「人の本性の急激な変革ではなく、人の（作る）諸制度の漸進的進化に基づいた、より実際的かつ実現可能な平和に焦点を当てようではないか」とも語っている。また、広島でも、「私たちは、人間の悪をなす能力をなくすことはできないかもしれません。」と発言している。

確かに、人間の悪を根本的に無くすことは不可能かもしれない。また、軍縮不拡散の進展のためには軍縮不拡散の国際法を強化したり、それに関連した法整備などを各国政府で実施することは当然不可欠である。しかし、それと同時に重要なのは、社会正義、世界平和、核兵器のない平和で安全な世界を目指し、行動する善の連帯のネットワークを広げていくことが重要であり、そのためにも、特に青少年への軍縮不拡散教育が果たす役割は、限りない可能性がある」と強調したい。

Report

The importance of disarmament and nonproliferation education for the abolition of nuclear weapons

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Introduction

Even today, a quarter century after the end of the Cold War, the number of nuclear warheads extant in the world exceeds 15,000. While this shows evidence of a trend toward reduction when compared with the more-than-70,000 warheads in existence at the height of the Cold War, the fact is that it is difficult to determine whether this reduction in numbers is linked to any reduction in the risk posed by nuclear weapons.

Of the nuclear-weapons states of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (or Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT), i.e., the U.S., Russia (the former USSR), the UK, France, and China, the U.S. and Russia account for 90% of the total nuclear stockpiles in the world. While the number of nuclear weapons possessed by these two countries has been dramatically reduced under bilateral

arms control treaties, it appears that the stockpiles of China, as well as those of India and Pakistan, who are not party to the NPT, are increasing in terms of both number and capabilities.

In addition, there are concerns that North Korea, which conducted two nuclear tests in 2016, is improving the performance of its nuclear weapons. Furthermore, in light of the current volatile security environment, the possibility of use of nuclear weapons has become more realistic. This is due largely to threats such as the intensification in recent years of terrorism, as well as tensions in U.S.—Russian relations, now reputed to be at their lowest ebb since the end of the Cold War. Thus, it seems fair to argue that the threat posed by nuclear weapons and the danger of their being used is not at all proportional to their decrease in number.

Nevertheless, the level of the general public's interest in the threat of nuclear weapons is surprisingly much lower than it was during the Cold War. Most citizens are arguably indifferent to concerns such as basic knowledge of nuclear weapons and the actual dangers they represent, and it could also be said that they lack access to sufficient information. In light of these circumstances, when considering today's international security situation from a long-term perspective, building a safe and peaceful world that is free of nuclear weapons increasingly requires efforts to promote disarmament and nonproliferation education. However, it seems that concrete progress in this area has arguably been extremely limited when compared with the existing threat of nuclear weapons.

In this paper, after touching on the “United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education: Report of the Secretary-General,” which has played an important role in advancing disarmament and nonproliferation (DNP) education, I consider why

DNP education is important for the abolition of nuclear weapons and then briefly introduce various DNP education initiatives underway at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) in the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey (hereinafter CNS) of which I am a member. I focus particularly on the importance of DNP education for young people toward the realization of a world free of nuclear weapons. In addition, I describe some related challenges and future prospects.

1. Research Related to Disarmament and Nonproliferation Education and the Report of the UN Secretary-General

Historical Background

When discussing DNP education, we cannot ignore the historical background or efforts that have been made in this field on the stage of the United Nations. If the goal of establishing the UN was to bring peace and security into the sorrowful history of people ravaged by war, it was arguably inevitable that DNP education for making progress toward a peaceful world free of nuclear weapons should have been discussed at the UN. Nevertheless, such progress was very limited, and to see the most important developments, we had to wait for the adoption by the UN General Assembly in 2002 of the “United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education: Report of the Secretary-General.”

When the urgency of disarmament education was first declared at the first Special Session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament (SSOD-1), the importance of both teaching and studying the relevant issues for advancing disarmament education was emphasized. The final document emerging from SSOD-1

recommended that UNESCO adopt gradual measures to develop a program for disarmament and peace studies at various levels of education. In response to this recommendation, the final document coming out of the UNESCO World Congress on Disarmament Education held in 1980 included numerous recommendations for research and education related to disarmament. Some experts take the view that this UNESCO Congress contributed greatly to the subsequent development of disarmament education.

However, after the UNESCO Congress, very little serious discussion of DNP took place at the UN for the approximately two decades leading up to the UN General Assembly's adoption in 2000 of a resolution requesting for the submission of a report on DNP education. While views vary on why this should have been so, one major reason seems to have been the absence of room for substantive discussion regarding disarmament education largely consequential to the ideological conflict between the superpowers during the Cold War.

In that sense, the adoption of the "United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education: Report of the Secretary-General" at the UN General Assembly in 2002 is highly significant. The report derives from a proposal to the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan by Dr. William Potter, the director of the CNS as well as a serving member of the UN Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters. The report, sounding the warning that some of the biggest problems involved in promoting disarmament and nonproliferation are the indifference and lack of recognition to the threat of nuclear weapons and an idle disregard of the contemporary crisis, appealed for the need to implement DNP education in order to overcome the contemporary situation.

Outline of the Report

While Kofi Annan, the former UN Secretary-General, has said in the past that “Education is, quite simply, peace-building by another name,” I feel that this statement is taking on deeper significance in view of an international security situation that has grown increasingly chaotic.

While the “Report of the Secretary-General” regards education as being extremely important in the field of disarmament and peace, it expresses concern for such education not having been fully utilized. Moreover, the study also confirms that DNP education is becoming more important than ever and that its promotion constitutes an urgent challenge for international security and the sustainable development of society and the economy.

The report includes practical recommendations on 34 items. As stated by Yukiya Amano, who, at the time, played a central role in the group of governmental experts from the 10 countries involved in the preparation of the report and is now the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, these recommendations are more of a menu than they are a prescription, and it seems that many officials understand that it is most likely practical to move to on-the-ground implementation, which seems most appropriate according to the situations of their respective countries, regions, organizations, and educational institutions.

2. Progress Following the Adoption of the Report

Since the adoption of the report in 2002, UN member states, international organizations, and civil society have begun submitting biennial reports on the status of the implementation of DNP

education. Unfortunately, interest among member states remains low, and the number of countries submitting such reports remains very disappointing—in single digits. In addition, it is also a reality that many of the countries submitting such reports place greater emphasis on deterrence and strategic studies, as well as training and education for those purposes, thus substituting DNP education with this kind of research and education.

In comparison, submissions from the civil society sector have tended to increase and become more fully realized each time in terms of both the number of organizations submitting and the content of submissions. In particular, as a global discussion about the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons has intensified in recent years, organizations engaging in disarmament education so as to expand and develop civil society networks seem to be increasing in number as well, becoming more fully realized in terms of their substance.

Particularly in discussions of the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, the environmental and human impacts are important considerations for moral and scientific study, and needless to say, disarmament education for this purpose is even more necessary. While some progress has been made since the adoption of the report, such as with the incorporation of the importance of DNP education in texts such as the final document of the NPT Review Conference, it is in the civil society sector that substantial developments are most widely evident.

Ban Ki-moon, who is known for his enthusiasm for promoting disarmament and nonproliferation even among those who have held the UN post of Secretary-General in the past, chose the Monterey campus of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, which

has been engaged in pioneering activities in the field of DNP education, to deliver an important speech on disarmament and nonproliferation in 2013. In his speech, making reference to the 2002 “United Nations study on disarmament and non-proliferation education: Report of the Secretary-General,” he pointed out that in some countries, the budget expended on disarmament education was exceedingly small, if at all it existed.

States are under pressure to find solutions to urgent challenges as quickly as possible, and consequently, the sober outlook, as it were, of education may be accorded low priority as a solution to the issues of disarmament and nonproliferation. Furthermore, although the report promotes the cultivation of critical thinking skills, the younger generation has resigned itself to accepting the permanent existence of nuclear weapons without questioning the pros and cons of nuclear deterrence. Ban ki-Moon expressed his concern over such a situation, emphasizing that disarmament education would itself contribute to the further development of a new and creative way of thinking as the sure path to the abolition of nuclear weapons.

3. Specific Examples of DNP Education at Monterey

MA in Nonproliferation Studies

Here, I would like to briefly introduce some examples of DNP education being conducted at the CNS where I work. Since its establishment in 1989 by Dr. William Potter, the center has conducted a wide range of international activities related to research and education on the disarmament and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Enjoying the strong faith placed in us by international agencies and the U.S. government, we frequently

promote our commissioned research, collaborative research, and educational activities. The Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey has the world's first and only Master of Arts in Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies, attracting excellent students from all over the world.

This program takes a comprehensive and systematic approach for studying policy and technical aspects related to the disarmament and nonproliferation of all manner of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons), as well as delivery systems, namely, long-range missiles. Further, students also study bilateral, regional, and international treaties oriented toward disarmament and nonproliferation, as well as the threats posed by the regional proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their spread to no state actors.

Within this broad variety of courses, our unique disarmament and arms control negotiation simulation course stands out as being very popular among students. This course makes use of a participatory learning method that is addressed and promoted in the Report of the UN Secretary-General. With this method, students proactively develop their critical thinking skills through simulations that make use of a variety of materials relevant to the topics under discussion instead of the conventional mode of receiving education in a lecture-based format.

The goal of Monterey's disarmament and arms control negotiation simulation is for students to cultivate the ability to consider the issue of disarmament objectively and learn methods and skills relevant to negotiation by acting out the roles of foreign delegates in multilateral and bilateral disarmament negotiations. When performing simulations of disarmament negotiations that take place in the real world, each

student is required to thoroughly research the disarmament and nonproliferation policies of their respectively assigned countries. By looking at the issue of disarmament from another standpoint, students are able to consider the problem comprehensively for them to make more effective judgements when they return to their original standpoint.

Visiting Fellow Program

Every semester, for more than 20 years, the CNS has conducted a Visiting Fellow Program for visiting diplomats and scientists from various countries. As well as participating in lectures on disarmament and nonproliferation by the experts at CNS, Visiting Fellows are required to establish their own research topic to serve as the subject of a paper that they submit when presenting their research at the end of the semester.

The alumni of this program include many diplomats who went on to play important roles in their respective fields of disarmament and nonproliferation after returning to their national governments. In addition, the relationships of trust and friendship that are cultivated through the Visiting Fellow Program are extremely close. Even at international conferences related to nonproliferation and disarmament, because there will be friends in the American and Russian or American and Chinese delegations, who, despite their conflicting national interests, share the experience of the Visiting Fellow Program, its wide-ranging network of human relationships can have various beneficial effects.

For disarmament negotiations, human relationships represent a very important factor. Thus, through our education program, although bound by national interests, the expansion of networks

among politicians and researchers who share a common aspiration toward the goal of internationally promoting disarmament and nonproliferation seems to be very meaningful for international security.

This is a common theme through all the educational projects being undertaken at our research center, and many alumni of the Monterey Institute are active in various organizations involved in disarmament and nonproliferation in many countries around the world. These networks include organizations such as the IAEA, foreign ministries and energy agencies of various countries, and academic institutions and NGOs, and we are proud to have become a key player in the promotion of disarmament and nonproliferation.

At the center, while we naturally focus on education and training to improve expert knowledge and skills related to disarmament and nonproliferation, we nonetheless regard the deepening of ties and relationships of trust between experts, expanding networks, and making a significant contribution to international peace and security to be important elements of our mission.

Disarmament and Nonproliferation Education Programs for High School Students

At our research center, where the focus is on training the next generation of leaders in the field of disarmament and nonproliferation, we also implement projects for high school students. The Critical Issues Forum (CIF)—one of the CNS's major projects, designed for the youngest generation—is a program that promotes cross-cultural understanding and DNP education to teachers and students in high schools around the world. This program, by working to cultivate high school students' critical thinking skills, aims to deepen the understanding of the complex and difficult yet important

international security issue of the disarmament and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction to participants from different countries and cultures.

Every year, a timely topic related to disarmament and nonproliferation is selected with reference to the project leaders, and high school students from the participating schools perform the projects throughout the year under teachers' guidance. First, comprehensive lectures are held on the year's topics in online teacher workshops, with top-level global experts from our center in charge of the workshop lectures. In 2015, to commemorate the 70 years of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the project was held on the topic of "Nuclear Disarmament: Humanitarian Approach," and our first Spring International Conference in Hiroshima enjoyed great success, with honored guests including Japan's Foreign Minister Kishida and Governor Yuzaki of Hiroshima Prefecture in attendance.

In 2015, our Annual International Student Conference, usually held in Monterey, was co-organized with Hiroshima Jogakuin High School in the city of Hiroshima. In recent years, in the context of debates over nuclear disarmament, moves to focus on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons have conjured up a new trend. Consequently, in order to acquire basic knowledge regarding nuclear weapons, participants study the current state of nuclear power in the world, states' motivations for possessing nuclear weapons, and an overview of international treaties on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation with reference to nuclear deterrence. Research has also been conducted into topics such as basic science and technology related to nuclear weapons, as well as the long-term human and environmental impacts in case of the actual use of nuclear weapons. In 2016, we welcomed Dr. William Perry, who was involved in actual

nuclear weapons policy when he served as defense secretary under President Bill Clinton. Dr. Perry engaged in enthusiastic discussions with the CIF participants who are to take the next generation forward, asking them to reflect on how to reduce the risk of nuclear weapons and moreover what they could do in particular to realize a world free of nuclear weapons. Our 2017 meeting is scheduled to be held in Nagasaki for the first time, where our topic will be to study the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, which is so crucial for the abolition of nuclear weapons. Participants are to consider the nature of the global conditions under which this treaty has still not come into force even 20 years after it was opened for signatures and examine what is required to be done for the treaty to come into force. Participating high school students would be devoting serious discussion to the question of how this treaty would be helpful for building a safe and peaceful world free of nuclear weapons. Ultimately, challenges such as having participants suggest solutions on the basis of what they have learned and studied are also to be included.

Since the CIF was launched more than 20 years ago, we have continued to promote DNP education for a great many Russian and American high school students, and until 2012, we targeted primarily high schools in the U.S. and Russia's closed nuclear cities. Since the closed nuclear cities were built to house nuclear facilities and employees' families, people's daily lives and urban activities were conducted primarily in the context of nuclear facilities. Hence, DNP education for young people in such—closed cities is an important symbolic and pragmatic step within the broader initiative to realize a world free of nuclear weapons. Three years ago, the CIF made landmark progress by welcoming for the first time the participation of

Japanese high school students from the bombed cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Since then, participating Japanese schools have included those from outside Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well, while from the U.S., participating schools have gathered from all over the country, including those from the states of California, Connecticut, and Wisconsin. Participation from Russia's closed nuclear cities also continues.

With the presentations by high school students from Hiroshima and Nagasaki being based on their cities' direct experience of a nuclear tragedy, they have brought a new perspective to the project. They have done so by bringing home the important message that understanding the real human impact caused by the use of nuclear weapons, as well as the long-term impact of such weapons on people and the environment, is itself the key to preventing the future use of nuclear weapons. The tragic memory of nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki must never be forgotten. Education can be a means of keeping that memory alive.

The 2002 UN Report that I mentioned above supports an approach informed by the philosophy of "teaching how to think, rather than what to think," and the CIF also represents a program that can foster critical thinking skills to that end. The study and research of matters related to disarmament and nonproliferation call for an academic approach and the integration of knowledge from a variety of perspectives. For this reason as well, the CIF takes an interdisciplinary approach for applying the various areas of science, society and culture, economics, and geopolitics. These areas make it possible for the CIF curriculum to incorporate various courses, attract students with broad interests and talents, and promote teamwork.

Once the conference is over, participating students set about

making presentations for classmates who were unable to participate directly in the meeting or for the student bodies of their schools, as well as, to the extent possible, their school's local community. Through this, the information dissemination and awareness-raising activities of participants find a wider audience. Moreover, project participants, by dint of having participated in this project, become more keenly interested in international problems, security, and issues related to disarmament and nonproliferation, and in the future, they can be expected to mature as personnel who go on to play an active role in this field.

While it may be difficult to decide on a clear career path as high school students, we are working in cooperation with all the teaching staff in charge to ensure that students remain conscious of issues relating to disarmament and nonproliferation, bearing in mind as well the encouragement of their growth as personnel whose major objective is to contribute actively to the realization of international peace.

Through this project, the CNS aims to contribute to international peace and security by providing the younger generation, which is to assume the responsibilities of working for world peace, with an opportunity to seriously reflect on peace issues such as nuclear nonproliferation, disarmament, and abolition. Generally speaking, it must be said that DNP education worldwide is still at an early stage of its development. Furthermore, I do not think that it is an exaggeration to say that DNP projects for high-school students are almost nonexistent. I would like to emphasize the importance of thinking about peace at a young age. Furthermore, it is essential for young people to acquire a practical way of thinking in order to accomplish a peaceful world in addition to grasping the concept of peace.

4. Challenges and Future Prospects

Having been involved in DNP education for young people, I always feel the need for more world leaders to keenly recognize that the inherent power and potential of education is the key for achieving the goal of building a safe and peaceful world that is free of nuclear weapons.

Approaching the end of his term in office, on May 27, 2016, President Obama gave a speech as the first sitting American president to visit Hiroshima. In this speech, he stated that “among those nations like my own that hold nuclear stockpiles, we must have the courage to escape the logic of fear and pursue a world without them. We may not realize this goal in my lifetime, but persistent effort can roll back the possibility of catastrophe. We can chart a course that leads to the destruction of these stockpiles.”

In addition, in the historic speech he delivered in Prague in April 2009, shortly after his inauguration as president, while making an appeal for the necessity of a safe and peaceful world free of nuclear weapons, he declared that “this goal will not be reached quickly—perhaps not in my lifetime. It will take patience and persistence.”

Certainly, in order to realize a world free of nuclear weapons, it is essential for the next generation to carry on our present efforts, and moreover, as our successors, they must exercise their critical thinking skills in an innovative and creative manner so as to accelerate this momentum. Such continuity must exist for generating a momentum toward nuclear disarmament. DNP education is itself the most important means to that end.

Considering the recent stalemate in nuclear disarmament, as well as the growing schism between nuclear weapon states and non-

nuclear weapons states, it is perhaps no surprise that evaluations vary as to whether progress toward nuclear disarmament has moved forward, backward, or nowhere during President Obama's time in office. However, I believe that to have pushed the discussion of nuclear disarmament and abolition into the context of mainstream policy debates and inspired a strong sense of hope, in the civil society sector in particular, constitutes a magnificent achievement in itself.

President Obama's speech in Prague strengthened a sense of anticipation over the start of negotiations for a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons (or nuclear weapons convention, NWC), and it is very interesting that the world's nuclear powers, including President Obama's own U.S., were backing the start of negotiations with regard to a treaty that they continued to oppose. In this sense, as well, while I wanted President Obama, in the remainder of his term in office, to emphasize as much as possible the importance of DNP education for youth, it is my hope that he makes it a part of his life's work now that he has stepped down as president.

Dr. William Perry, who was our special guest at the 2016 CIF Spring International Conference held in Monterey, stated, at the outset of his lecture, that in order to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons, unless young people, through education, came to understand the actual threat posed by nuclear weapons, it would be impossible to make further progress toward the abolition of nuclear weapons. In addition, when he delivered an important speech on nuclear disarmament at Monterey in 2013, the then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stressed the importance of disarmament education as follows:

“It is easier for students to learn the logic of nuclear deterrence

than to learn to discard the myths that keep nuclear weapons in place. But education can help to refute the claim that nuclear disarmament is utopian.”

In other words, regardless of how difficult the current nuclear disarmament situation may seem, the next generation needs leaders who possess strong will to look this harsh reality squarely in the eye and work to change it. For this reason as well, rather than educating the future generation to accept the status quo, it is important to cultivate successors who exercise critical thinking skills and behaving in ways that are richly creative.

In addition, I believe that discussing the amoral character of nuclear weapons is also indispensable to DNP education that aims to realize the abolition of nuclear weapons. However, when it comes to morality, it is difficult to establish a constructive dialogue between strategic researchers who believe in nuclear deterrence and nuclear abolitionists who aim for a world without nuclear weapons. For that reason, many experts in nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation shy away from discussing nuclear issues from the perspective of morality. Nevertheless, when discussing the abolition of nuclear weapons, I worry that as long as we ignore their inherent inhumanity and amorality, achieving the actual abolition of nuclear weapons is impossible.

President Obama himself, in his Hiroshima speech, stated: “That is a future we can choose, a future in which Hiroshima and Nagasaki are known not as the dawn of atomic warfare but as the start of our own moral awakening.” In his Prague speech as well, he stated that “as a nuclear power, as the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon, the United States has a moral responsibility to act.” This is a very important aspect, and I feel strongly that moral elements should

be further incorporated into disarmament education in the future.

In addition, in an address delivered on being honored with the Nobel Peace Prize, President Obama invoked the words of President Kennedy, saying “Let us focus on a more practical, more attainable peace, based not on a sudden revolution in human nature but on a gradual evolution in human institutions.” At Hiroshima as well, he acknowledged that “We may not be able to eliminate man’s capacity to do evil.”

Certainly, it may be impossible to fundamentally eradicate the evil of humanity. However, the progress of nonproliferation and disarmament naturally calls for the necessary strengthening of international legislation governing these issues, as well as the implementation of the relevant domestic laws and regulations by national governments. Simultaneously, it is also important to expand networks of positive solidarity that aim and work toward social justice, world peace, and a safe and peaceful world free of nuclear weapons. For this purpose as well, I particularly emphasize the limitless potential of the role played by DNP education for youth.

*This translated version was revised on June 10, 2017.

研究所報

活動報告

■2015年度及び2016年度の平和講座・「平和学Ⅱ」を以下のように実施した。

平和学Ⅱ〔平和と人権 a〕(2015年度・前期)
金曜・4時限 AB102

No.	実施日	
1	4月10日	玉井秀樹教授(文学部)・平和問題研究所所長 ガイダンス(授業予定、平和学の概要)
2	4月17日	玉井秀樹教授(文学部)・平和問題研究所所長 【講義】平和学への招待：戦争、暴力、平和
3	4月24日	【第75回平和講座】大沼保昭博士(東京大学名誉教授) 「戦争と平和」
4	5月1日	玉井秀樹教授(文学部)・平和問題研究所所長 【講義】「人間の安全保障」問題を考える ― 3.11後の世界の課題
5	5月8日	【第76回平和講座】小菅信子教授(山梨学院大学) 「〈福島〉と〈フクシマ〉のあいだにあるもの ― 放射能とナショナリズム」
6	5月15日	玉井秀樹教授(文学部)・平和問題研究所所長 【講義】「人間の安全保障」問題を考える ― 核兵器とテクノロジーの課題
7	5月22日	【第77回平和講座】マイケル・ノーベル博士(ノーベル・ファミリー協会議長、平和問題研究所客員教授) 「アルフレッド・ノーベルとノーベル平和賞」

8	5月29日	【第78回平和講座】 リチャード・フォーク博士（プリンストン大学名誉教授） 「公正な世界秩序と人間の安全保障」
9	6月5日	栗原淑江講師（東洋哲学研究所） 【講義】 女性と人権（1）
10	6月12日	栗原淑江講師（東洋哲学研究所） 【講義】 女性と人権（2）
11	6月19日	玉井秀樹教授（文学部）・平和問題研究所所長 【講義】 核兵器問題を考える — 2015NPT 再検討会議の意味
12	6月26日	玉井秀樹教授（文学部）・平和問題研究所所長 【講義】 日本の「戦争責任」を考える — 国家間対立、国民間対立にどう向き合うべきか
13	7月3日	【第79回平和講座】 大沼保昭博士（東京大学名誉教授） 「『歴史認識』問題 — 中国、韓国との付き合い方を考える」
14	7月10日	岩木秀樹講師（本学非常勤） 【講義】 イスラームと平和
15	7月17日	【第80回平和講座】 スベレ・ルードガルド博士（戸田記念国際平和研究所上級研究員） 「人間の安全保障の今日的課題：変容する世界における日本の役割」

平和学Ⅱ〔平和と人権b〕（2015年度・後期）
金曜・4時限 AB102

No.	実施日	
1	9月11日	玉井秀樹教授（文学部）・平和問題研究所所長 ガイダンス（授業予定、平和学の概要）
2	9月18日	石井秀明教授（平和問題研究所） 【講義】 軍縮・開発・平和（1）
3	9月25日	石井秀明教授（平和問題研究所） 【講義】 軍縮・開発・平和（2）
4	10月2日	佐々木論准教授（看護学部） 【講義】 貧困と健康からみる人間の安全保障（1）

5	10月16日	佐々木論准教授 (看護学部) 【講義】 貧困と健康からみる人間の安全保障 (2)
★	10月22日 16:35 AW404	【第81回平和講座】 カルロス・アルマーグ大使 (メキシコ合衆国) 「メキシコ・日本外交関係論」 (Mexico-Japan Bilateral Relations)
6	10月23日	杉本一郎准教授 (国際教養学部) 【講義】 「アジアの世紀」を生きる
7	10月30日	【第82回平和講座】 マイケル・ノーベル博士 (ノーベル・ファミリー協会議長、平和問題研究所客員教授) 「暴力の代償」 (The Cost of Violence)
8	11月6日	高木功教授 (経済学部) 【講義】 グローバル経済の発展と私たちの生き方 (1)
9	11月13日	高木功教授 (経済学部) 【講義】 グローバル経済の発展と私たちの生き方 (2)
10	11月20日	碓井健寛准教授 (経済学部) 【講義】 環境と経済 (家庭ごみの有料化は有効か?)
11	11月27日	碓井健寛准教授 (経済学部) 【講義】 環境と経済 (『子どもたちとの七万三千日』)
12	12月4日	【第83回平和講座】 太田昌克氏 (共同通信社編集委員) 「なぜ核兵器廃絶をめざすべきなのか」
13	12月11日	【第84回平和講座】 西田充氏 (外務省 軍縮・不拡散専門官) 「核兵器廃絶への構想と行動」
14	12月18日	【第85回平和講座】 河合公明氏 (創価学会平和委員会事務局長) 「核兵器のない世界へ — SGI の挑戦」
15	1月15日	玉井秀樹教授 (文学部)・平和問題研究所所長 まとめ

平和学Ⅱ〔平和と人権 a〕(2016年度・前期)
金曜・4時限 AB102

No.	実施日	
1	4月8日	玉井秀樹教授 (文学部)・平和問題研究所所長 ガイダンス (授業予定、平和学の概要、到達目標の検討)

2	4月15日	玉井秀樹教授（文学部）・平和問題研究所所長 【講義】 平和学への招待：戦争、暴力、平和
3	4月22日	玉井秀樹教授（文学部）・平和問題研究所所長 【講義】 平和学への招待：戦争、暴力、平和
4	4月29日	佐々木諭教授（看護学部） 【講義】 貧困と健康からみる人間の安全保障
5	5月6日	岩木秀樹講師（本学非常勤） 【講義】 イスラームと平和
6	5月13日	岩木秀樹講師（本学非常勤） 【講義】 仏法と平和
7	5月20日	【第86回平和講座】 ケヴィン・クレメンツ教授（オタゴ大学、創価大学客員教授） The Politics of Compassion in a world of ruthless power
8	5月27日	【第87回平和講座】 マイケル・ノーベル博士（ノーベル・ファミリー協会議長、創価大学客員教授） “Peace Work by Dr. Ikeda”
9	6月3日	杉本一郎教授（国際教養学部） 【講義】 「アジアの世紀」を生きる
10	6月10日	【第89回平和講座】 ブルガリア共和国・ゲオルギ・ヴァシレフ大使 ブルガリアと日本 ― 両国の国民における平和および友好
11	6月17日	井手華奈子准教授（教育学部） 【講義】 平和教育（1）
12	6月24日	井手華奈子准教授（教育学部） 【講義】 平和教育（2）
13	7月1日	栗原淑江講師（東洋哲学研究所） 【講義】 女性と人権（1）
14	7月8日	栗原淑江講師（東洋哲学研究所） 【講義】 女性と人権（2）
15	7月15日	玉井秀樹教授（文学部）・平和問題研究所所長 リフレクション（到達度判定テスト・アンケート）

平和学Ⅱ〔平和と人権 b〕(2016年度・後期)
金曜・4時限 AB102

No.	実施日	
1	9月16日	玉井秀樹教授(文学部)・平和問題研究所所長 ガイダンス(授業予定、平和学の概要、到達目標の検討)
2	9月23日	玉井秀樹教授(文学部)・平和問題研究所所長 【講義】平和学への招待:戦争、暴力、平和
3	9月30日	中山賢司講師(法学部) 北東アジアにおける平和の創造①
4	10月14日	中山賢司講師(法学部) 北東アジアにおける平和の創造②
5	10月21日	碓井健寛准教授(経済学部) 【講義】日本の貧困問題について
6	10月28日	碓井健寛准教授(経済学部) 【講義】夜間中学とは何か
7	11月4日	高木功教授(経済学部) 【講義】グローバル経済の発展と私たちの生き方
8	11月11日	岩木秀樹講師(本学非常勤) 【講義】イスラーム世界と平和
9	11月18日	【第90回平和講座】マイケル・ノーベル博士(ノーベル・ファミリー協会議長、平和問題研究所客員教授) 「現代世界における平和の脅威とその克服」
10	11月25日	石井秀明教授(平和問題研究所) 【講義】軍縮・開発・平和
11	12月2日	【第91回平和講座】大沼保昭教授(東京大学名誉教授/平和問題研究所客員教授) 「平和と人権」
12	12月9日	【第92回平和講座】Ms. Mehrnaz Mostafavi, Chief of Human Security Unit, United Nations "Overview of Human Security and its Application to Global priorities in the UN system"

13	12月16日	【第93回平和講座】 ロハス・アラベナ国連平和大学総長 "THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN SECURITY and the increase of violence in Latin America"
14	12月23日	【第94回平和講座】 山下俊一教授 (長崎大学副学長／福島県立医科大学副学長) 「放射線の健康リスクとその対処」
15	1月13日	玉井秀樹教授 (文学部)・平和問題研究所所長 リフレクション (到達度判定アンケート)

■創価大学平和問題研究所設立40周年記念シンポジウムを以下のように開催した。

創価大学平和問題研究所設立40周年／
グローバル・コア・センター設立記念シンポジウム
アジアにおける人間の安全保障の促進
— 韓・朝鮮半島の平和と安全保障共同体の形成 —
Human Security in Asia: Peace in the Korean Peninsula
and Peacebuilding in Northeast Asia
【開催日】 2016年5月21日
【会場】 創価大学国際会議場

■「人間の安全保障学会」第6回研究大会を以下のように開催した。

Global Governance for Human Security
人間の安全保障のためのグローバル・ガバナンス
【開催日】 2016年12月10日 (土)、11日 (日)
【会場】 創価大学“グローバル・スクエア”(中央教育棟)

※その他の活動状況について研究所ホームページも御覧ください。

「創価大学平和問題研究所」 <http://www.supri.jp>

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