



創価大学

ISSN 0387-6209

# 創大平和研究

SOKA UNIVERSITY

# PEACE RESEARCH

第 32/33 号

2017/2018

創価大学平和問題研究所



# 創 大 平 和 研 究

〔第32 / 33号〕

2017 / 18年

創価大学平和問題研究所



# 創大平和研究

第32 / 33号 (2017 / 18年)

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## 巻頭言

# 人間の安全保障の追求と SDGs

創価大学平和問題研究所 所長 玉井 秀樹

創価大学平和問題研究所は研究活動の軸として人間の安全保障を据えて取り組んできた。今日では、人間の安全保障的な価値が、国連システムなど国際社会における規範として定着してきているといえよう。そして、人間の安全保障的価値を実現する行動目標として結実したものがSDGsではないかと思う。

今や日本も含めた世界各国政府、企業、大学、市民運動など様々なアクターが、SDGs達成を目指す実践に取り組む時代となった。本学創立者が示される人間主義の思想と「価値創造」という本学の理念は、SDGsの目的と強く共鳴するものである。創価大学としては創立50周年をめぐってSDGsへの取り組みをさらに強化している。

平和問題研究所は2016年に設立40周年を迎え、記念シンポジウム「アジアにおける人間の安全保障」を開催したが、これは本学におけるSGU（スーパーグローバル大学創成事業）の中核であるグローバル・コア・センター開設を記念するイベントでもあった。

本学SGUでは「2023年までに創価大学を平和研究分野で世界的なコア・センターにする」ことをめざし、平和問題研究所の活動強化と平和学修士課程の開設をすすめてきたが、2018年に「国際平和学研究科（School of International Peace Studies: SIPS）を開設し、平和問題研究所は所員を刷新して新たに4つの研究プロジェクトを発足させた。

2018年より活動を開始した、「Human Security and SDGs」、「Global

Justice and Human Rights」、「Multilateralism in Asia」、「Peacebuilding in Africa」の各チームの取り組みについては、今号に掲載の活動報告を参照していただきたい。

また、韓国・慶南大学との交流から始まった「ピース・フォーラム」も、2017年に本学が主催して第1回会合を沖縄で開催することができた。（詳細は当研究所発行の議事録を参照いただきたい）そして、2018年には、台湾の中国文化大学が主催し、台北にて第2回会合が行われた。2019年には提唱者である慶南大学が主催し、済州島で開催される予定で、アジアにおける平和構築を追究するこの3大学の共同研究も順調に発展している。今後は、さらに多くの研究機関との共同研究の実施に取り組んでいく予定である。

一方、八王子のキャンパスでは、平和講座を中心として講演会、セミナーの開催も推進している。これも本学SGUの取り組みであるが、教養科目カリキュラムを改定して「世界市民教育科目」を開講した。これまで研究所としてコーディネートしてきた「平和学Ⅱ」をあらため「平和と人権」、「環境と開発」という新科目として運営することになった。本学にお招きする学外研究者や実務家にこの科目で講演（平和講座）をしていただくことも多い。

平和の創造、人権の擁護、そしてSDGs達成のために各界で活躍する専門家のお話を直接うかがうことは我々以上に、学生たちにとって最高の学びの機会となる。今号にはそうしたゲストスピーカーの講演抄録を掲載させていただいた。

特に、昨年逝去された大沼保昭先生の講義を掲載させていただけたことに深い感慨を禁じえない。本学草創期の大功労者である大熊信行先生が縁となり、大沼先生が、当研究所客員教授のお招きに応じてくださったことはたいへん嬉しく、光栄なことであった。大沼先生の本学における最後の講義の掲載をお許しくださった御遺族に感謝申し上げるとともに、大沼保昭先生の御冥福を衷心よりお祈りするものである。

大沼先生をはじめ、多くの方々のお力を得て、平和問題研究所も研究活動の更なる発展へと歩みを進めることができたことに深く感謝申し上げ、これまで以上に研究成果をあげていくことでお応えしていきたい。

## 追 悼

# 大沼保昭先生を偲んで

創価大学平和問題研究所 所長 玉 井 秀 樹

大沼保昭先生は世界に知られた国際法の泰斗であり、その学問上の功績はあまりにも大きいですが、先生はそうした学問的業績をあげられるに止まらず、戦争責任問題をめぐって対立する日韓・日中関係の改善に取り組むなど、実際に人権を擁護し、平和を構築することに尽くされた真の平和追求の人でありました。平和研究を志す学徒として、これほど偉大な研究者の逝去を惜しまずにはいられません。謹んで哀悼の誠をささげます。

東大法学部教授として教鞭をとられた後、2009年から明治大学特任教授に就かれていた大沼先生が、創価大学を訪問される縁となったのは、草創期の本学経済学部で教鞭を執られた大熊信行教授でした。大沼先生は、大熊教授の学風と人格に惹かれ、同郷（山形県）であったこともあり、若き日に大熊教授に私淑されていたとうかがいました。大熊教授が逝去され、その葬儀で創価大学での教育に情熱を傾けられていた大熊先生の言行を知って以来、大沼先生も本学に強い関心を持っておられたとのことでした。

そして、2014年12月、本学に隣接する公益財団法人・東洋哲学研究所が主催する研究会である「社会と宗教」セミナーでの「文明史の観点から見た21世紀の世界」の講演者として八王子にお出でになり、本学にも初めて訪問されました。大熊先生の事跡を知る大学首脳とも懇談の機会をもたれて、大熊先生が創価大学建設にかけられた思い、創立者・池田大作先生との関係を聞かれ、さらに本学への御理解を深めていただきました。

そして、大沼先生からは、「大熊先生が情熱を傾けた創価大学に私としてもできる限りの協力をしたい」とたいへんにありがたいお言葉をいただき、翌2015年から早速に平和問題研究所が開催する平和講座にて講演をしていただきました。

さらに2016年からは、創価大学平和問題研究所・客員教授の委嘱をお受けくださり、平和講座で学生に親しく講義され、さらに当研究所設立40周年記念シンポジウム開催にあたって様々に御助言をいただくなど、本学の研究・教育の発展に大きく貢献されたのです。大沼先生の御協力をさらにいただき、あらたな研究活動の進展とを考えておりましたところ、思いがけなく先生が病にて体調を崩されていることを知らされました。

私たちには推し量ることのできないたいへんな闘病生活があったことと思いますが、先生の旺盛な研究活動、執筆活動は衰えることはありませんでした。遠方にもかかわらず、平和講座のために本学までお越しくださいましたことを忘れることはできません。また、「誰にでもわかる『生きた国際法』の新書を最後に書きたい」とおっしゃられて、亡くなる前日まで筆を取られていたという遺作『国際法』は、人権の擁護と人類の平和の達成のために尽くされてきた先生の熱誠の結晶であると思います。

大沼保昭先生はこうして最後まで知的創造を続けながら、2018年10月16日、その尊き生涯を終えられました。大沼先生の御遺徳と御功績を偲び、衷心よりご冥福をお祈り申し上げます。

今回、研究所紀要『創大平和研究』に、御遺族の御理解を得て、大沼先生の本学での最後の講義内容を掲載させていただきました。大沼保昭先生が最後に教授をお勤めいただいた創価大学に奉職する者として、先生の御遺志をしっかり受け止め、平和創造に貢献する活動に取り組んでまいります。

## 講 演

# 戦争と平和 — 国際法、国際政治、歴史の視点から —

東京大学名誉教授 大 沼 保 昭

### 戦争と平和：国際法の目的

本日は、はじめに簡単に全体像をお話しした後に、戦争と法、戦争と国際法、現代国際社会の戦争への対応、21世紀の戦争と平和、不条理の世界と国際法という形でお話をします。

まず、「戦争と平和」ということを少し皆さん考えてみてください。なぜ「戦争と平和」であって、「平和と戦争」ではないのでしょうか。大事なのは平和であって、大事なものの順番からいえば「平和と戦争」です。トルストイの名著は『戦争と平和』ですし、国際法の父といわれるフーゴー・グロティウスというオランダの有名な学者の著書は『戦争と平和の法』という題名です。

このように、我々が平和について語るときは、つい「戦争と平和」というように語ります。なぜか。これは心理学者や歴史学者、思想史学者がいろいろな回答を与えてくれるかもしれません。

恐らく一つの理由は、これはグロティウス自身が言っていることですが、戦争という極めて悲惨であってはならないことが実際には起こってしまう、頻繁に起こる、それをいかに克服して平和にもっていくかということが、人類の課題であり続けていた、だから戦争があつて、それを克服するものとして平和を考える、そのような順序なのかと思います。

国際法も、まさにそこに存在理由があります。国際法は、近代のヨーロッパ

に生まれました。17世紀から18世紀にかけて、ヨーロッパでその法の形態が生まれてきて、19世紀にヨーロッパ世界が全世界にその勢力を拡大して、いわば世界中がヨーロッパ化しました。ヨーロッパ諸国が世界に植民地をひろげ、そしてヨーロッパ文明が世界文明となっていく。そのような中で、ヨーロッパで生まれた国際法は、ヨーロッパ国際法から世界の国際法へ変わりました。

ヨーロッパ国際法の最初の最も重要な課題は、いかに戦争を克服して平和を確保するかです。今日の国際法はいろいろな分野を持ち、様々な課題がありますが、戦争をいかに防止し、起こってしまった戦争の惨禍をいかに極小化して、そしてそれを終結に持っていか、その後確立した平和をいかに持続させるか、これが国際法の最も重要な一貫した課題です。

人間どうしが生きていく社会において、争いは常にあります。自分と他人がいて、自分と他人はそれぞれ違う存在で、欲望も違えば価値観も違います。仮に欲望や利益、価値観が同じだとしても、それを理解する能力が十分でなければ、共通の理解は認識できません。そこで解釈の違いが起こって争いが起きます。歴史上争いのない社会はないわけで、争いは人間にとって不可避のものです。その中で、国家間の武力紛争が戦争です。国家内でも武力紛争はあって、それが内戦というものです。

社会があるところに争いがあって、社会があるところに法があります。争いがあるから、争いを防ぐために法、規範があります。日本国にも当然さまざまな法律があります。人間と人間が共に生きていく、社会の中で共通の利益をできるだけ認識して、その共通の利益を大きくして、そして争いを最小化するために、法というものが最後の歯止めとしてあるわけです。

争いをなくす、争いを緩和するのは、もちろん法だけではありません。人に対する愛情、共感、同情の心、あるいはそのような共感や同情、寛容の心を育む宗教、あるいは学校教育があります。それから、人間は貧しくなって切羽詰まってくると盗みや詐欺をすることがしばしば起こりますから、経済的に豊かな環境をつくることも、争いを防ぐのに大事なことです。

このように、経済も宗教も教育も、全てが争いというものをできるだけ起こらないようにして、そして起こってしまった争いをできるだけ平穩に解決す

る、そのために人間が生み出した知恵であり、歴史的にわれわれが先祖代々受け継いできたものです。

人類は悠久の文明の中で、争いを最小化して人間の尊厳を守るため、さまざまな道具、思想、社会的な制度を発展させてきました。皮肉なことに、人間の努力というものは、しばしば常にそれが善をもたらすとは限りません。そのことがかえって悪をもたらすという逆説というものが人生の中には必ずあります。

人間がさまざまな努力を払って戦争を防止しよう、戦争の惨害をできるだけ少なくしようとしてきたことが、かえってマイナスになる、その一つの例がホブズの『リヴァイアサン』というものです。

近代国際法を生んだ一つのきっかけは、ヨーロッパの宗教戦争です。ヨーロッパの前近代から近代にかけて宗教改革が行われて、それをきっかけとして宗教戦争がさまざまなところで発生しました。宗教は人間のその生存と来世の救済に関するものですから、宗教戦争は非常に真剣な戦いになって、時として極めて残酷で悲惨なものになります。

ヨーロッパの宗教戦争はまさにそうです。特に1618年から48年の三十年戦争といわれる宗教戦争は、極めて悲惨な戦いでした。そのような中で、ホブズというイギリスの哲学者は、この非常に悲惨な状況をどう克服するかということを考え抜いて、国家に全権を与えて、そして人々の行動を制約して、その国家の下で平和を確保するという、そのような非常に素晴らしい理論を打ち立てました。これが『リヴァイアサン』という著作です。

内戦はある程度ヨーロッパで収まりました。国民国家ができて、内戦は克服されて、平和が国内的に確立しました。これは大変な善であり、一つの到達点です。しかし、ここにマイナスが生じました。ホブズの社会契約論は、国内の対立、争いをいかに克服して平和を国内的に確立するかということに全身全霊を注いで構築した理論です。しかし、国家は一つだけではありません。複数の国があると、国家対国家の争いは残ります。逆に、国内が平和になって、国家が非常に強大な力を持つようになったため、国家間戦争が非常に悲惨なものになりました。

もう一つ、ヨーロッパの近代は非常に優れた科学技術文明の時代でもあります。ヨーロッパの生んだ科学技術の発展は、人類へさまざまな福をもたらしました。ところが、核弾頭やミサイル、潜水艦をつくるのも科学技術です。戦争になれば、以前は、槍と刀で戦っていた人たちが、鉄砲を撃つようになり、機関銃を撃つようになり、大砲を撃ちあいます。戦車が出てくる、飛行機が爆撃をするというようになり、第2次世界大戦では核兵器がつくられ、科学技術の進歩が逆に戦争の悲惨さを増すわけです。このように、科学技術の発展と共に戦争が大規模化して、かえって残虐なものになっていったという面があります。

戦争は人間のさまざまな、争いの中の最悪の形態です。国家間が戦うようになると、その殺し合いは何千万人のレベルになります。戦争は、歴史的に、争いの極端な形態であると同時に、争いに決着をつけるためのものでもありました。国家間で、外交交渉で決着がつかないときは戦争で決着をつけようという、そのような時代でした。

かつて、ドイツにクラウゼヴィッツという有名な軍事思想家がいました。彼の戦争の定義は非常に有名です。「戦争とは他の手段をもってする政治の継続である」というものです。戦争は政治である、政治の延長である、というのが彼の考え方で、戦争は一方で紛争の極限形態でありながら、他方で紛争を解決する手段でもある、それが19世紀から20世紀初頭のヨーロッパの考え方でした。

## 戦争と国際法

国際法の父といわれるフーゴー・グロティウスは、宗教戦争の真ただ中で『戦争と平和の法』を書きました。当時、ヨーロッパ人はキリスト教の解釈で争っていたとはいえ、ほとんどのヨーロッパ人は敬虔なキリスト教信者であり、キリスト教の道德、キリスト教の倫理が、ヨーロッパ人の共通の規範でした。その時代の中で、グロティウスの『戦争と平和の法』の具体的な内容は、非常にキリスト教の道德と一致します。だから、グロティウスが説いた自然法



論は、ヨーロッパ人にとってとても受け入れやすいもの、キリスト教倫理に非常に深く根ざしていた法でした。

ところが、宗教戦争が進み、ホッブスの『リヴァイアサン』などが出てきて、いわば政教分離、宗教と世俗を分離する、ヨーロッパ社会がだんだん世俗化していく、キリスト教の影響力が衰えていくということになります。

そして、グロティウスが説いたキリスト教倫理を根底に持つ自然法論は、だんだん衰退していくことになります。自然法的な正戦論が19世紀になるとだんだん衰退してきて、19世紀から20世紀初頭には正戦論から無差別戦争観へという時代になってきます。

この時代のヨーロッパは、国家が主権国家として非常に強大な力を持って、ナショナリズムというものが人々の心を捉えていました。同時に、思想だけではなく、実際の政治の場面でも、ドイツの国民国家統一、イタリアの国民国家統一が起これ、さらに20世紀初頭にかけては、それが東ヨーロッパにも及んで、植民地のアジア、アフリカにもそのようなナショナリズムの影響が及び、どんどん国家が強まってきて、国家の意味、国家の存在理由が強調されてきました。

この時代は、国家政策の手段として国家は外交と戦争という二つの道具を持っている、外交でうまくいかないときは、政策の一環として、エリートがコントロールして戦争をして、少し戦ってある程度のところでエリート同士が話し合いをつけて戦争をやめていけばいいだろうと、そのような考え方がヨーロッパでは支配的でした。当時のヨーロッパは非常に強大であって、日本やアジア、アフリカ、ラテンアメリカ、全ての国に影響を及ぼしていましたから、日本や他の国々もそのような思想を受け入れたわけです。

1914年、サラエボ事件をきっかけとして第1次世界大戦が起きました。これは史上初の世界戦争でした。この第1次世界大戦が始まったときのヨーロッパの政治指導者の意識は今までの伝統的な戦争観で、国家政策の一環として、外交でうまくいかなかったら戦争をやって、それである程度コントロールしながら適当なところでやめて、また平和に回復すればいいという意識が一般的でした。

ところが、時代が変わってしまいました。まず、当時の科学技術の発達によって、戦争で死ぬ、あるいは負傷する人たちの数が桁違いに増えました。それから、科学技術の発展が、この時代にマスメディアの飛躍的な増大を生みました。新聞やラジオなどで、戦場の様子が一般民衆のところに届きます。何万人死んだ、何十万人死んだ、相手方はわれわれの兵隊を虐殺したというような話が、ありとあらゆる民衆レベルに届いていきます。これによって、相手方に対する大変な憎悪が全国民レベルで広まっていきます。

そうすると、エリートの政治指導者が、潮どきだからこの辺で講和をして休戦協定を結んで、政策のレベルで手打ちをしようと思っても、自分の夫や息子が殺された憎き敵に対して、お互いに妥協して休戦協定を結ぶなどということは国民が許しません。そのような強度の対敵憎悪観に凝り固まった大衆レベルの力で、戦争はどんどん長引いていきます。長引けば長引くほど犠牲は増えません。最初は数カ月で終わると政治指導者が思っていた第1次世界大戦は、何と4年以上もかかってしまいました。膨大な犠牲者を出して、第1次世界大戦はアメリカ合衆国が参戦することでようやく終結を迎えました。

ここで、さすがのヨーロッパの政治指導者たちも、もう戦争は政策の手段ではない、自分たちのコントロールをもう越えてしまっている、というような思いを深くしたわけです。

アメリカ合衆国は比較的参戦した時期も遅く、被害は少なかったのですが、アメリカ合衆国はそもそもヨーロッパの戦争には立ち入らない、関与しないというのに、無理やり参加させられたという思いがあり、アメリカの若者がヨーロッパ戦線という本国と関係ないところで殺されたという思いもあって、第1次世界大戦後に戦争の違法化運動が非常に広範囲にアメリカで起こりました。

戦争はもはや違法である、法上の制度ではなく、法の保護を与えてはならない、そのようなアウトローリー・オブ・ウォー・ムーブメント (the Outlawry of War Movement) が非常に大規模に展開されて、これが1928年不戦条約に結実しました。

「締約国は国際紛争解決のため、戦争に訴えることを非とし、かつその相互関係において国家の政策の手段としての戦争を放棄することを、その各自の人

民の名において厳粛に宣言する」これが不戦条約第1条です。つまり、国家の政策の手段として、外交と同じレベルで戦争が行われて紛争を解決する、そのような考え方を不戦条約は正面から否定しました。戦争というものを一般的に非とし、戦争に訴えることを非とする、これは違法とする、ということをはっきりとしました。

憲法第9条は、この不戦条約を明らかに意識してつくられています。さらに国連憲章は第2条4項で、「全ての加盟国は、その国際関係において、武力による威嚇または武力の行使を、いかなる国の領土保全または政治的独立に対するもの、また国連の目的と両立しない他のいかなる方法によるものもつつまなければならない」としています。

不戦条約にもかかわらず第2次世界大戦が起こってしまったわけですが、第1次世界大戦よりもさらに悲惨だった第2次世界大戦を踏まえて、国連憲章は1945年この第2条4項で、戦争放棄をより徹底して、武力による威嚇または武力の行使、つまり戦争よりもさらに広い概念で、国家間の武力行使を認めないという体制をつくりました。法は制裁によってその実効性を担保します。法はあくまで規範であり、事実ではありませんから、法を守る人もいれば守らない人もいます。戦争、武力行使を禁ずる国際法も、さまざまな制裁によってこれを担保しようとしています。それが国際連合の集団安全保障、集団的強制措置のメカニズムといわれるものです。

非軍事的な措置、つまり経済制裁や外交関係、運輸、輸出入関係の断絶、スポーツや文化交流などを禁止します。経済制裁は、貧しい人も含め国民全体に対して物資が不足しますから、むしろ指導者に対して刑事責任を追及する国際刑事裁判所などを設置して、戦争あるいは残虐行為をした者に対して刑事責任を追及します。

最終的には軍事的措置を取ります。残念ながら、本来の軍事的措置は、国連設立以来、一度も実施されたことはありません。安全保障理事会の、常任理事国の5大国の利害が対立して、国連の本来の国連軍ができないからです。これまで行われた軍事的な制裁措置に近いものは、多くの場合、本来の国連憲章の規定ではない多国籍軍で、国連の安全保障理事会が軍事行動を認めて、それに

対して軍隊を出す国々が共に戦うという形を取っています。あるいは、国連の平和維持活動＝PKOです。そのような形の国連憲章上認められてはいるけれども、本来の常設的に考えられた国連軍ではない形で、これまで対応されてきました。

第2次世界大戦後の国連体制の下で、武力行使は一般的に禁止され、違法とされています。違法な戦争を行った国、武力行使をした国には制裁が課せられるという建前が成立しました。そこで、唯一、残されている国家にとっての、武力行使の正当化根拠が自衛権の行使です。国連が違法行為を認定して、それに対して制裁をするのは、国連の安保理で審議をした上となり、ある程度、時間がかかります。ですから、そこまでのつなぎの間に国家の自衛権が認められていて、国家はその自衛権に基づいて一定の武力による反撃が許されます。「この憲章のいかなる規定も、国連加盟国に対して武力攻撃が発生した場合には、安保理が国際の平和と安全の維持に必要な措置を取るまでの間、個別的または集団的自衛の固有の権利を害するものではない」という規定があります。

他国が自国に対して攻撃してきたら、自国が武力をもってこれに反撃する、これはずっと古くから国家に認められていた固有の権利です。では、集団的自衛権とは一体どのような権利でしょうか。これは変な権利でして、他国への武力攻撃を自国への攻撃と見なして、被攻撃国を防衛する権利であるということです。

日本の安保法制の議論で問題になったのはどのようなことかということ、日本とアメリカは日米安全保障条約を結んでいます。日本が攻撃された場合、日本は専守防衛で他国を攻撃することはできないから、日本はもっぱら守る、他国への反撃はアメリカがやってくれる、それが日米安全保障条約の規定です。基本的にそのような形で日本はアメリカの圧倒的な軍事力の下に、日本の平和と安全を一定程度アメリカに委ねています。

アメリカにとっては、日本の軍事基地を使うということで、それはアメリカの非常に大きな利益ですから、そのアメリカの利益と日本が守ってもらうという利益のバランスがとれることで、日本とアメリカは相互に利益を共有しているという形で日米安全保障条約が成り立っています。

しかし、アメリカが攻撃されたときに日本の自衛隊はアメリカを守らないということであると、アメリカにとってこれは不公平ではないか、そのような国を守るという気は起こらないと言われても仕方ないのではないかという議論は、昔から日本とアメリカの関係者の間でありました。そのようなことから、日本の自公政権が、集団的自衛権を日本憲法9条は容認しているという形で安保法制をつくりました。他衛であって自衛ではないけれども、見なすという法的な工夫をすることで、これは自衛権であると言ってしまったわけです。

法というのはとても大事なものです。でも、法はフィクションだから、やはり変だと思えるところはあります。集団的自衛権はまさにそのようなものです。他国が攻撃されているのに、自衛というのは無理があります。でも、それを認めないと、確かにアメリカは不公平だと思うかもしれないというのも納得はできるという部分もある、そのようなことがあります。

## 21世紀の戦争と平和

次は、21世紀の戦争と平和、不条理の世界と国際法というところです。

まず、国連体制の意義と限界です。戦後国際社会は、第2次世界大戦という甚大な犠牲を踏まえて、集団安全保障体制をつくりましたが、これまで本来の国連軍というものはできなくて、なかなかうまく機能してきませんでした。その理由として、安全保障理事会で常任理事国である5大国の全会一致がなかなかできないということだけではなく、集団安全保障というものが持っている本来的な限界があると私は思っています。

自国が攻撃されたわけでもないのに、第三国が攻撃された場合、例えばインドネシアが韓国を攻撃したら、それに対して日本や中国がインドネシアはけしからんと言って韓国を守るために軍事制裁に参加するでしょうか。あるいは、エジプトに対して南アフリカが攻撃したら、それに対して日本の自衛隊を出してエジプトを守ろうという気になれるでしょうか、ということです。

まず99パーセントの人は、なぜそのような遠くのところまで、日本と関係ない国に軍隊を出して守らなければならないのかと言います。理念からいえば、

南アフリカがエジプトを攻撃する、インドネシアが韓国を攻撃するというのは明らかに違法であり、阻止すべきことで、集団安全保障体制の理念は正しいものです。

しかし、現実のわれわれの意識がついていかなければ、いくら理念は正しくても、それは法として機能しません。だから、集団安全保障体制というのは、地球社会の一員であるという我々の意識が、現代とは比較にならないほど高まって、エジプトが南アフリカから攻撃されることは、日本が南アフリカから攻撃されることとほとんど同じだという意識になるくらいまで世界市民としての人類の一体性が高まらないと、恐らく法として全面的に機能することはないでしょう。それは恐らく今から何十年後、何百年後の話です。そこに至るまでの過程は、やはりなかなか遠く厳しいものがあります。

平和というものを単に戦争のない状態として考えるのではなく、人権や人間の尊厳、生命を守る、構造的暴力から我々の生存と尊厳を確保する、そのような積極的平和としての考え方が起こってきています。虐殺などが起こった場合には、国家が保護することができなければ、国際社会全体、つまり各国がこれを保護する責任があるという考え方です。

これは日本における平和の考え方とどのような関係を持つのか、日本において積極的平和というものをどう考えるべきか、この問題は皆さんに考えていただきたいことです。これまで日本は、日本の平和を守るために、憲法第9条を大事にすると言ってきました。日本の平和は、ある意味でいえば非常に利己的な平和主義です。

ワシントンにホロコースト記念博物館 (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum) があります。ここでは、ナチスドイツが行ったホロコースト、ユダヤ人虐殺の全貌を描き出しています。基本的なコンセプトは何かというと、我々はこの600万人の被害者を見殺しにしたのではないかと非常に痛切な問いです。

これにはアメリカの歴史があって、アメリカは1941年12月8日に日本によって真珠湾を攻撃されるまでは中立の立場にいました。アメリカでは非常に平和主義運動が強く、アメリカの平和を守るために、1939年から始まっている、

ヨーロッパへのナチスドイツの侵略には参戦すべきでないという意識が非常に強かったのです。

その間、ナチスはホロコーストで次々にユダヤ人を殺していました。アメリカは戦後、あの間、アメリカの平和を守るために参戦しなかったのが正しいことだったのか、そのことを痛切に反省しました。もちろんそれは正しいことだったと言う人もいます。しかし、2年前に参戦していたら、もっと早く第二次世界大戦が終わり、犠牲はもっと少なかったかもしれないわけで、そこは非常に議論があるところです。いずれにせよ、ワシントンのホロコースト記念博物館は、我々がホロコーストを見殺しにした、それは果たして正しい政策だったのか、そのようなコンセプトでできています。

私は、日本の憲法第9条は素晴らしい条文であり、平和憲法は戦後日本の誇るべきものだと思います。しかし、一方で、日本の国民の生命が守られれば良いという利己主義を抱えているという矛盾を皆さんには考えてほしいと思っています。

## 【質疑応答】

(質問1) ホブズの『リヴァイアサン』に関して、国家主権というと、政府の権力強化はいわゆる恐怖政治へとつながるような悪いイメージがありますが、どうとらえるべきでしょうか。

**大沼** 国家に主権を集中させることは、いわば国民を無権利状態にしてしまうということに近いわけで、それは恐怖政治、独裁政治につながるような国家絶対の恐れをもたらします。しかし、ホブズはあえて、内戦の悲惨さよりは、抑圧的な政府であっても平和を維持する政府のほうがよいという思いを定めました。その判断が正しいかどうか、これはなかなか難しい問題ですが、少なくとも彼はそれを意図していました。

さらに言うと、立憲主義が今大はやりですが、強大な国家で無権利状態になりかねない国民を守る憲法の基本的人権をしっかりと尊重しなければならない、



それが憲法の任務である、これが近代憲法です。国内平和を確立するために国家に主権を集中する、その結果、裸の状態にされてしまった個人を守るために、立憲主義によって基本的人権を憲法で保障しなければならない、これは近代国家にとって非常に重要な制度です。

(質問2) 憲法9条についての質問です。私が履修している科目の中で、憲法改正に対しての反対意見と賛成意見を分析しており、自分自身もどちらに賛成するのかということは今模索しているところです。博士ご自身の憲法改正に対するご意見をお聞かせいただければありがたいです。

(質問3) 憲法9条についての解釈を変えていく議論をする必要はあると思います。しかし、理念に基づいて解釈を変えてしまうと、今の日本の現状を見ると、何か怪しいことが出てきてしまうのではないということも感じます。この種の議論をするにあたって、どのようなことを注意しなければいけないでしょうか。

**大沼** 二つの質問は共通しているので、一度にお答えしたいと思います。

私は基本的には、憲法は一定の期間が来たら、それは時代の現実との乖離が生ずるのは当然だから、改正はするべきだという考えを持っています。今の憲法は、もう70年以上前につくられており、それが皆さんを拘束しています。私は25年を一世代として、各世代で国家の基本法である憲法を見直して、自分たちの現実の社会に適應しているかどうかをチェックして、適合していない部分があれば変える、変える必要がなければ変えないという、一世代ごとに憲法を見直す機会を持つべきだと思います。憲法改正を議論もしないというような態度はおかしいと思います。

もう一つ大事なことは、今の憲法9条を含む日本国憲法は、日本が第2次世界大戦で侵略国家になって、それへの反省で世界に対して日本は平和国家として出発するというこのマニフェストであることです。日本国憲法だから日本国民が変える権利、自由はありますが、周りの国々、日本の被害を受けた国々が注目している憲法ですから、そのような国際環境も十分に意識して、周りの



国の目を大事にしなければいけないと思います。あの戦争は間違いだったということをはっきり言う内閣の下で、そのような姿勢で憲法を改正するということは非常に大事であり、日本の信用を高める、国際的な地位を高めるという上で重要だと思います。

(平和講座 2017年12月8日 創価大学)

## 大沼保昭先生 略歴・業績

1946年3月8日山形県山形市生まれ。1970年東京大学法学部卒業。

### 〈研究分野〉

主に国際法。この他、国際政治学、思想史、比較文明研究なども研究。  
特に国際法・国際関係思想史、国際法の基礎理論、国際法と国際政治、人権、安全保障、日本の戦争責任と戦後責任、文化・文明と国際法、社会における法・政治・文化などが主要研究分野である。

### 〈職歴〉

東京大学法学部助手	1970年4月～1973年10月
東京大学法学部助教授	1973年11月～1984年6月
東京大学法学部教授	1984年7月～1991年3月
東京大学大学院法学政治学研究科教授	1991年4月～2009年3月
明治大学法学部特任教授	2009年4月～2016年3月

### 〈在外客員教授・講師・研究員歴〉

ハーバード大学・プリンストン大学・マックスプランク国際刑法研究所・シドニー大学・ミシガン大学・オーストラリア国立大学・エディンバラ大学・イェール大学・コロンビア大学・国際高等研究学院（ジュネーヴ）・パリ第一大学・ケンブリッジ大学・北京大学・清華大学・ジャワハラル・ネルー大学・ジョージタウン大学

### 〈学会・社会活動（市民運動）〉

1970年代 日本戦争責任・戦後責任に関して研究を進めながら、サハリン残留朝鮮人の韓国への帰還運動、在日韓国・朝鮮人の法的・社会的地位の改善運動、「慰安婦」問題の解決のための運動（アジア女性基金の設立とその一員としての活動など）に携わる

- 1983年 田中宏、内海愛子氏などと「アジアに対する戦後責任を考える会」を設立し、代表を務めた
- 1990年 日本国憲法に関する論議について護憲的改憲論を提唱
- 1991年 安藤忠雄、緒方貞子、司馬遼太郎氏などととも朝日新聞の21世紀委員会 のメンバーに
- 2007年 アジア国際法学会の設立・運営にかかわり、同副理事長、同日本協会の理事長を歴任
- 2017年 橋本五郎・読売新聞特別編集委員とともに学者とジャーナリストがともに学び合う場「知の共同体」設立

#### 〈受賞歴〉

- 1975年 第8回安達峰一郎記念賞
- 1987年 第8回石橋湛山賞
- 1999年 韓国政府より修交勲章興仁章
- 2002年 カリフォルニア大学（バークレー校）ロースクールより第2回リーゼンフェルト賞
- 2017年 第6回日本平和学会平和賞

#### 〈ご著作・論文〉

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15. 『人権、国家、文明』 (筑摩書房、1998年；中国語版2003年)
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19. 『在日韓国・朝鮮人の国籍と人権』 (東信堂、2004年)
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## Prospects of Cross-strait Relations and East Asian Developments

October 7, 2018

Organizer: Peace Research Center, the College of Social Sciences,  
Chinese Culture University

Venue: VIP Room, Howard Civil Service International House

### Agenda

#### Opening Session

Shu-Yin Wang, Acting President, Chinese Culture University

Ryohei Tanaka, Executive Vice President, Soka University

Jung Kim, Professor, University of North Korean Studies, Kyungnam  
University

Wei-Jen Hu, Chair Professor, Chung Yuan Christian University;  
former Secretary-General, National Security Council

#### Keynote Speech

*“Taiwan in the New Balance of Power in East Asia”*

Chi Su, Chairman, Taipei Forum; former Secretary-General, National  
Security Council

#### Panel I: Issues in the Taiwan Strait

Moderator: Andrew Hsia, Chair Professor, Graduate Institute of  
National Development and Mainland China Studies,  
Chinese Culture University; former Minister, Mainland  
China Council

Presenter: *“Impacts of US-China Rivalry in the Taiwan Strait and the Korean Peninsula”*

Yong-Il Moon, Professor, Institute for Far Eastern Studies,  
Kyungnam University

Discussant: Edward I-Hsin Chen, Chair Professor, Department of  
Political Science, Chinese Culture University

Presenter: *“Averting War across the Taiwan Straits: Lessons from the  
“Thucydides Trap”*

Hsuan-Hsiang Lin, Associate Professor, Department of  
Political Science, Chinese Culture University

Discussant: Hsiao-Yun Yu, Director, Department of Public  
Administration and Management, Chinese Culture  
University

Presenter: *“A Study of Cross-strait Relations with the Perspectives of  
Network Analysis”*

Chien-kuo Pang, Professor, Graduate Institute of National  
Development and Mainland China Studies, Chinese  
Culture University

Discussant: Kenji Nakayama, Associate Professor, Soka University

## Panel II: East Asia's Developments

Moderator: Chien-min Chao, Dean, College of Social Sciences,  
Chinese Culture University

Presenter: *“The Political Logic of Globalizing and De-industrializing East  
Asian Democracies”*

Jung Kim, Professor, University of North Korean Studies,  
Kyungnam University

Discussant: Philip Hsu, Professor, Department of Political Science,  
National Taiwan University

Presenter: *“East Asia’s Developments and Localized Economic Zones: A “Sub-Regionalism” Perspective”*

Kenji Nakayama, Associate Professor, Soka University

Discussant: Yunchang Jeffrey Bor, Professor, Department of Economics, Chinese Culture University

Presenter: *“Mutual Understanding Between Peoples Through ‘Border Tourism’ ”*

Hideki Tamai, Professor, Soka University

Discussant: Yong-Il Moon, Professor, Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University

### Panel III: Regional Security in East Asia

Moderator: Wei-Jen Hu, Chair Professor, Chung Yuan Christian University; former Secretary-General, National Security Council

Presenter: *“Elites’ Cooperation as a Means of Regional Cooperation”*

Youngsoo Yu, Professor, University of North Korean Studies, Kyungnam University

Discussant: Kwei-Bo Huang, Vice Dean, College of International Affairs, National Chengchi University

Presenter: *“Abe’s Security Policy towards Asia”*

Minoru Koide, Professor, Soka University

Discussant: Jung Kim, Professor, University of North Korean Studies, Kyungnam University

Presenter: *“New Trends in East Asian Security”*

Kaocheng Wang, Vice President for International Affairs and Dean of College of International affairs, Tamkang University

Discussant: Gregory Coutaz, Adjunct Assistant Professor, Graduate

Institute of National Development and Mainland China  
Studies, Chinese Culture University

Closing Session

# East Asia's Development and Sub-regional Economic Zones: A Focus on Multilateral Cross-border Cooperation between Local Governments<sup>1</sup>

Kenji Nakayama

Associate Professor  
Faculty of Law, Soka University

## Introduction

Since the 1960s, countries in East Asia have realized strong economic growth, praised as the “East Asian miracle” (World Bank 1993). With Japan as the forerunner, the Asian newly industrialized economies (NIEs, i.e., South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 4 countries (ASEAN-4, i.e., Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand), China, and Vietnam have shown a pattern of catch-up development (in that order) known as “the flying-geese pattern” (Kojima 2004). However, since the second half of the 1980s, a number of sub-regional

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<sup>1</sup> This paper is prepared for an annual conference of the Taiwan/Japan/Korea Peace Forum, October 7 2018, in Taipei, Republic of China.

economic zones (SREZs) have emerged in different areas that span the national borders of East Asia's coastal regions (see Figure 1). Preceded by institutionalized regional economic zones such as the EU and NAFTA, these *de facto* SREZs have been formed in conjunction with global markets.<sup>2</sup> Such zones exemplify the characteristic development pattern of East Asia, which varies widely in terms of developmental stages and political systems (Watanabe 1992, Chen and Kwan 1997).

SREZs exist in a variety of circumstances and are not defined by uniform economic conditions or formation mechanisms. SREZs in the planning stages can also be seen in economies that have not begun to take off as of yet. In examining the prospects for the institutionalized regional economic zones of the future, the economic liftoff of SREZs and the expansion of regional zones that are linked with the global economy should be recognized as trending, thereby deepening the functional cooperation in East Asia. Simultaneously, within the interdependence of SREZs and the East Asian economy, multilateral cross-border cooperation between local governments is also deepening and broadening. In concretely planning for the formation of institutionalized regional economic zones at the inter-governmental level, it seems that a more accurate grasp of the actual situation facing regional zones, premised on the existence of these local governments, is essential.


Therefore, this paper, along with organizing the actual economic situations and characteristics of both the East Asian region as a

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<sup>2</sup> According to Watanabe (1992: 21), SREZs are "economic zones that span national borders, that contain dormant complementary economic relationships between different regions, and that are being actualized with the dissolution of Cold War frameworks."



Figure 1. Sub-regional economic zones (SREZs) in East Asia



Note: There are also no clear boundaries with regard to the geographic extent of SREZs.

Source: Author's creation. Blank map from <http://www.freemap.jp/item/asia/kouiki2.html> (accessed February 8, 2019).

whole and the sub-regional zones, discusses the real conditions of the driving force behind cross-border cooperation between local governments. In particular, the case of the Pan-Yellow Sea Region (PYSR), which extends between the areas of Kyushu and Yamaguchi in Japan and the coastal areas of the Yellow Sea bordering China and Korea, will be considered through a comparison with the Pan-Japan Sea Region (PJSR), which extends along the Japanese coast

of the Sea of Japan, Northeastern China, South Korea, North Korea, the Far Eastern area of Russia, and Mongolia.<sup>3</sup> Based on these results, I will attempt to examine the significance and potential of SREZs distributed throughout East Asia.

## 1. Analytical Perspective

The most famous example of SREZs in East Asia is the South China Economic Zone (SCEZ), which extends from centers in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Guangdong, Fujian, and Hainan. Beginning in the 1990s, attention became focused on the Singapore/Johor Bahru/Riau Islands Growth Triangle (SIJORI), composed of Singapore, the state of Johor in southern Malaysia, and the Riau Islands Province of Indonesia, including the island of Batam. In recent years, great interest has been drawn to the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS), which includes Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Myanmar, the Chinese Province of Yunnan, and the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region of China, among others. Additionally, other SREZs in East Asia include the PYSR and PJSR.

There is a strong tendency to understand these SREZs as economic forms in which labor is divided between processes in a production and distribution network based on the principle of comparative advantage (Ohmae 1993, Kakazu 1995, Peng 2002-03, Sasuga 2004, OECD 2009, Kim et al. 2011). This viewpoint focuses on the optimization of economic interests based on the complementarity of production

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<sup>3</sup> As a debate exists concerning the term Pan-Japan Sea (in South and North Korea, “East Sea” is preferred), recently, the terms “Northeast Asia” and “Northeastern Asia” have been used instead. However, in this paper, “Pan-Japan Sea” is used throughout for convenience.

factors and geographical proximity. In comparison with these primary approaches, there is also a viewpoint that expects a correcting effect for local economic distortions produced under national economic cycles (e.g., disparities between regions) through cross-border mutual exchanges with other local economies (Ogawa 1995: 15-19, 200-201). In other words, economic sub-regions are expected to resolve center-periphery dependent structures that occur at the national level. Moreover, in contrast to these approaches, which are limited to a consideration of economic fields, a sociopolitical approach also exists that expects sub-regions to function as buffer zones in easing strained relationships between nations, thus contributing to the realization of proactive peace at the local level (Igarashi 2016). In addition, there is an approach that focuses on the local dimensions of international behavior and discourse and that views events in light of regional formation, such as the sharing and differentiation of identities between social groups (Hook 1999, Perkmann and Sum 2002).

In each of these cases, SREZs are social phenomena that produce cross-border regions in which smaller units within each nation are of core concern (Scott 2001, Chen 2005). Within the two differing movements of economic globalization and regionalization, in which national economies and national borders are erased, SREZs can be likened to a new dynamism that appears to be a synthetic vector. Accordingly, to what extent the development of open regionalism prepares for global integration in the limited region of East Asia and whether it will deepen East Asian regional integration seem to be focal points. Thus, to begin with, I will describe the characteristics of the actual economic situation in East Asia as a whole.


## 2. Economic Interdependence in East Asia

### *(1) Deepening of Economic Interdependence*

Figure 2 contrasts changes in trade volume in East Asia with similar changes for the EU and NAFTA. Changes over the 35-year period from 1980 to 2015 are shown in five-year increments. In contrast to increases in export volumes in the EU and NAFTA of 6.9 and 7.5 times, respectively, East Asia has experienced a dramatic increase by a factor of 17.7. Regarding imports, in contrast to increases of 6.8 and 9.7 times for the EU and NAFTA, respectively, East Asia experienced a striking increase by a factor of 14.9. Looking at the changes in the share of world trade within each region (see Figure 3), the EU has seen exports and imports decrease by about 10 points over these 35 years. The NAFTA has also experienced a decrease in exports of approximately three points and an increase in imports of only one point. In comparison, both exports and imports for East Asia have dramatically increased its share. Exports have almost doubled from 15.1% to 29.7%, and imports have increased by approximately 10 points, from 14% to 23.2%.


With such expansion in the share of world trade occurring in East Asia, there has been an increase in the degree of intra-regional interdependence regarding trade. Figure 4 compares changes in the proportion of intra-regional trade that occurred in East Asia for the EU and NAFTA. The NAFTA's proportion of intra-regional exports increased by 15 points, but the proportion of imports increased by only about five points. For the EU, both exports and imports initially involved high proportions of intra-regional trade (exceeding 60%), and the region has continued to grow on this basis. In comparison, both exports and imports in East Asia have had dramatic increases in

Figure 2. Changes in trade volume for the EU, East Asia, and NAFTA




Note: East Asia includes Japan, China, South Korea, Taiwan, and the ASEAN.  
 Source: Author's creation based on the JETRO "World Trade Matrix" <<https://www.jetro.go.jp/world/statistics/>> (accessed February 8, 2019). However, the original source is the IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, Taiwan Trade Statistics.

Figure 3. Changes in the share of world trade accounted for by the EU, East Asia, and NAFTA



Source: Author's creation based on the JETRO 'World Trade Matrix.' However, the original source is the IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, Taiwan Trade Statistics.

Figure 4. Changes in proportions of intra-regional trade for the EU, East Asia, and NAFTA



Source: Author's creation based on the JETRO 'World Trade Matrix.' However, the original source is the IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, Taiwan Trade Statistics.

the relative proportion of intra-regional trade. Intra-regional exports increased by 15 points (from 35.7% in 1980 to 50.6% in 2010), and the intra-regional imports increased by more than 20 points (from 38.4% to 58.8%). By 2010, East Asia showed an intra-regional export ratio on par with NAFTA's, and its intra-regional import ratio was close to that of the EU.

The context for such changes is the synergistic effect of the flow of direct investments from Japan to Asia, spurred by the sudden increase in the value of the yen following the 1985 Plaza Agreement and the export-driven industrial policies of East Asian countries. An international network for the division of labor based on a comparative advantage has been driven by the market, and intra-regional interdependence has been expanded through trade and direct investment. A triangle structure composed of capital and intermediate goods imported from Japan (and later from South Korea, Taiwan, and others), followed by the manufacture and export of finished goods to the U.S., has been established. Although the East Asian economy experienced a serious blow after the currency crisis of the late 1990s, it has returned to a course of growth, including overcoming a temporary bout of stagnation after the bursting of the IT bubble in 2001. While lacking an institutionalized framework such as that of the EU and NAFTA, East Asia has strengthened its market-driven economic interdependence.

## *(2) Emergence of the Chinese Economy*


Regarding the expansion of the East Asian economy after the currency crisis, the emergence of the Chinese economy after the implementation of economic reforms and the acceleration of capitalist market economization is particularly significant. Figure 5

shows the comparison of changes in the proportion of world trade accounted for by Japan, the ASEAN, and China. In comparison to decreases in shares of exports and imports for Japan, China's sudden increases are remarkable. While the share of exports for China was a mere 1.0% in 1980, it had increased by nearly a factor of 14 by 2015. Imports also increased by nearly nine times from a mere 1.0% to 8.6%. China had overtaken Japan in both exports and imports by 2005, reaching a share that was more than twice that of Japan by 2015. China's total trade surpassed that of the U.S. in 2013, making it the largest trading country in the world.

China joined the WTO in 2001, strengthening integration between the Chinese and world economies even more, with diversified trading partners. Actually, the proportion of Chinese trade conducted with partners in East Asia decreased after the 1990s. Figure 6 shows the comparison of changes in the proportion of trade with partners in East Asia for Japan, the ASEAN, and China. Japan saw an increase in the proportion of trade carried out with partners in East Asia from more than 20% to close to 50%, whereas the ASEAN maintained a high proportion of trade with East Asian partners (more than 50%). China experienced a dramatic decrease in the proportion of both exports and imports from or to East Asian partners. Exports fell from a peak of 65.7% in 1990 to 24.4% in 2015. Imports also decreased from a high of 67.2% in 1995 to 32.3% in 1980, which is lower than the 1980 level.


The sharp drop in the proportion of trade between China and East Asian partners was particularly significant between 2010 and 2015. With this decrease, the proportion of intra-regional trade for East Asia as a whole dropped sharply in 2015, decreasing to 1990 levels (see Figure 4). One of the factors behind this shift appears

Figure 5. Changes in the share of world trade accounted for by Japan, the ASEAN, and China



Source: Author's creation based on the JETRO 'World Trade Matrix.' However, the original source is the IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, Taiwan Trade Statistics.

Figure 6. Changes in the proportion of trade with other East Asian partners of Japan, the ASEAN, and China




Source: Author's creation based on the JETRO 'World Trade Matrix.' However, the original source is the IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics, Taiwan Trade Statistics.

to be Chinese President Xi Jinping's revelation of the plan for the 'One Belt, One Road' economic zone. The goal of this plan was to construct a Eurasian economic zone centered on China through the establishment of two lines of infrastructure: a northern Silk Road (One Belt) and a southern marine Silk Road (One Road) (see Figure 7). East Asian cohesion continues to increase through the strengthening of intra-regional interdependence on the economy, but, simultaneously, it is becoming more diffuse through plans for economic zones extending in a westward direction—rather than in the Asia-Pacific region.



Figure 7. Route map for “One Belt, One Road”



Source: Winter, Tim, “One Belt, One Road, One Heritage: Cultural Diplomacy and the Silk Road,” *The Diplomat*, March 29, 2016. <<https://thediplomat.com/2016/03/one-belt-one-road-one-heritage-cultural-diplomacy-and-the-silk-road/>> (accessed February 8, 2019).

### 3. A Comparative Consideration of SREZs

Meanwhile, one of the characteristics of the current East Asian economy is that, since the late 1980s, SREZs have expanded. SREZs exist in a diverse set of circumstances, and their respective economic conditions and formation mechanisms are by no means uniform in nature. Therefore, I will extract the issues and characteristics of each SREZs through a comparative consideration of the degree of development and participating actors.

#### *(1) Developmental Stages of SREZs*

Regarding the degree of development of an SREZ, attempts have

been made to model the definition into the following four stages: 1. cross-border trade, 2. contract manufacturing, 3. direct investment, and 4. localization.<sup>4</sup> The first stage, cross-border trade, is the initial level in which the use of production factors in adjoining regions by companies in the central region to bring down the costs of production does not occur. Rather, trade merely occurs across a national border. The second stage, contract manufacturing, is a form of production and trade in which companies in the central region export all parts and raw materials, and depending on the situation, equipment and machinery as well, to peripheral regions, provide instructions about production processes and conduct manufacturing and assembly in these regions, pay only manufacturing fees, and import all finished products. The third stage, direct investment, are situations in which companies from central regions acquire substantial management rights for companies in adjoining regions and conduct production, sales, etc., in these regions. The various methods include opening branch offices, establishing new subsidiaries, and acquiring existing companies, joint ventures, and so on. Finally, in the fourth stage of localization, companies from central regions shift all production and sales organizations, including the productions of parts and raw materials, to subsidiary companies in adjoining regions. Subsidiaries move outside of the direct control of the parent company in terms of

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4 According to this model (Nagai et al. 1993: 5-11), the degree of development of an SREZ is defined as “the extent to which the central region makes use of production factors in the adjoining regions.” Here, the “central region” refers to the “region of a country in which a production factor bottleneck occurs due to continued high levels of economic growth,” and “adjoining regions” is a term referring to “regions in which low cost production factors exist that also lag behind the central region in terms of economic development.”

production and sales (Nagai et al. 1993: 5-11).

Table 1 organizes the degree of development of East Asian SREZs according to this model. However, it is a simple comparison for grasping the characteristics of different SREZs and is not intended to be an empirical analysis using economic data.

Table 1. Developmental stages of SREZs in East Asia

Developmental Stage SREZs	Stage 1 (Cross-border trade)	Stage 2 (Contract processing)	Stage 3 (Direct investment)	Stage 4 (Localization)
SCEZ	██████████	██████████	██████████	██████████
SIJORI	██████████	██████████	██████████	██████████
GMS	██████████	██████████		
PYSR	██████████	██████████	██████████	
PJSR	██████████			

Source: Author's creation.

First, the earliest of the East Asian SREZs to emerge was the SCEZ. After the Chinese economy embarked on economic reforms in the first half of the 1980s, special economic zones (e.g., Shenzhen, Xiamen), 14 coastal cities (including Shanghai) and coastal deltas (including the Pearl River Delta), were designated as open economic areas. Making use of this opportunity, companies in Hong Kong rapidly advanced into the hinterlands of the Pearl River Delta for contract manufacturing and for the expansion of direct investment. With the normalization of relations with the U.S. providing a tailwind, Taiwanese companies—which needed to conduct entrepôt trade via Hong Kong—caused increasing activity in terms of direct trade and investment in Fujian (e.g., Xiamen) on the opposite shore of the Pearl River in Taiwan. In this way, the SCEZ deepened its interdependence with the global economy, and this seems to have created an integrated Chinese coastal economy. This zone, having developed

into a large production base in East Asia, has already reached the fourth stage of SREZ development and may be considered the prototypical model of an SREZ.

Next, we will consider SIJORI, the Southeast Asian SREZ that emerged in the 1990s. Singapore, which has an advanced industrial base, proposed a plan for SIJORI in 1989 to leverage a complementary relationship with the state of Johor in southern Malaysia and the Riau Islands Province of Indonesia, which includes the island of Batam. These are locations that have both labor and land that is cheap and plentiful. Subsequently, the development of the Batamindo Industrial Park on Batam Island proceeded, and investment in this area rapidly expanded as it grew into the next SREZ, following the SCEZ. By 2005, companies had gradually withdrawn because of the emergence of the Chinese economy. In recent years, however, with the advancement of the Iskandar Development Plan, which includes a portion of the state of Johor in southern Malaysia, investment in SIJORI has once again become active (JETRO 2015). Thus, SIJORI is also strengthening connectivity with the global economy and is considered to have reached the fourth stage of SREZ development.

Furthermore, the GMS is the focus of considerable expectation as an SREZ. The GMS originated in 1992 as a cooperative economic program under the leadership of the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Emphasis was placed on strengthening connectivity through improvements to transportation infrastructure over a wide area, and development has proceeded on the Kunming-Bangkok Expressway (which runs longitudinally through Indochina from Southern China to Thailand and Vietnam), the East-West Economic Corridor (which traverses the central portion of Indochina from Vietnam to Myanmar), and the Southern Economic Corridor (which runs along the southern

portion of Indochina from southern Vietnam to southern Thailand). On the intangible side, the Cross-border Transport Agreement (CBTA) has been concluded, and changes are proceeding for the rationalization and simplification of customs procedures, such as the mutual use of railroad cars (Sadotomo and Nakayama 2018). In particular, connectivity with Yunnan, China, and the Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region is deepening, and this SREZ is heading from stage 1 to stage 2 or 3. In the future, depending on the success or failure of development in the interior regions of China, there seems to be potential for the further fluidization of boundaries in the region.

In contrast to the SREZs described above, PYSR and PJSR are two SREZs that have been formed or proposed in Northeast Asia. Looking at the PYSR first, trade between China and South Korea increased rapidly starting in the latter half of the 1980s. With the normalization of relations between the two countries in the first half of the 1990s, the number of South Korean companies performing contract manufacturing and production in Shandong and Jilin began to increase. Moreover, since 1989, South Korean investments in China have increased. Accordingly, the PYSR moved through stages 1 and 2 in the second half of the 1980s, shifting to stage 3 and encompassing a wider economic zone after 1989 (Nagai et al. 1993: 10). After the 'southern tour' speeches of Deng Xiaoping in 1992, the PYSR began to integrate with the global economy just as the Chinese economy took steps to deepen its interdependence with the global economy.

At the end of the 1980s, using the opportunity of the *perestroika* policy of openness adopted by what was then the Soviet Union, plans for the PJSR emerged. This would encompass a new economic zone combining in a complementary manner the natural resources of the Soviet Union, the cheap labor forces of China and North Korea,

Table 2. A comparison of SREZs in East Asia

Main actors SREZs	Companies	Local governments	Central governments	International organizations
SCEZ	⊙ <sup>1</sup>	○ <sup>2</sup>	○	
SIJORI	○	○	⊙	
GMS	○	○	○	⊙
PYSR	○	⊙	○	
PJSR	○	⊙		○ <sup>3</sup>

1 ⊙ shows the leading actor and ○ shows participating actors.

2 The Chinese government views Taiwan as a local government.

3 The UNDP provides financial support for the Tumen River Area Development Plan.

and the capital and technological powers of South Korea and Japan. However, today, the PJSR has been limited to developmental stage 1. As described above, the conditions for a SREZ to take off are, first, the expansion of interdependence with the global economy and the economy of the larger region. Secondly, however, if we consider the essential nature of support for economic growth from a policy perspective, as long as a lack of diplomatic relations with the Russian Far East and North Korea continues, it will be difficult to achieve the creation of state-led intergovernmental cooperation and global economic penetration.

## (2) Actors Participating in SREZs

The process for forming an SREZ is typically thought of as a self-generated, corporate-led mechanism, premised on economical rationality. However, it actually involves various support systems and development policies, both formal and informal, implemented by national and international organizations, local governments, and other actors. Therefore, I will perform a comparative examination of the formation process for each SREZs from the perspective of the participating actors (see Table 2).

First, the SCEZ is a model of an SREZ generated by market leadership. As a background, difficulties existed in reaching formal, mutual agreements between the governments of China and Taiwan because of continuous and severe political antagonism. From the Chinese perspective, economic relations with Hong Kong and Taiwan were viewed as a singular policy for local economic stimulation. However, with the beginning of the Ma Ying-jeou administration in Taiwan in 2008, the three-links (trade, travel, and postal links) policy was actively promoted, and in 2010, the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA)—equivalent to a free trade agreement (FTA) between China and Taiwan—was officially concluded. Under the administration of the Democratic Progressive Party's Tsai Ing-wen, which began in 2016, the current situation is being maintained. The SCEZ, first launched through market leadership, is now reinforced by political support based on an official agreement between the respective governments.

Alternatively, one of the strongest components of SIJORI from its earliest stages has been its status as an official economic zone created from cooperative agreements at the central governmental level (Kanai 2017). Singapore's Goh Chok Tong, who was Deputy Prime Minister in 1990, concluded several agreements, including the Agreement on Economic Cooperation in the Framework of the Development of the Riau Province and the Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investment. In 1991, the leaders of Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia concluded cooperative agreements during their respective summit meetings, and in 1994, a memorandum on cooperation at the ministerial level was signed. The Iskandar Development Plan announced by Malaysia in 2006 is also a case of proactive participation in regional economic policy by a central government.

The GMS is also less of a market-driven economic zone than a wide-area development project promoted by the ADB, an international institution led by Japan. Approximately 10 billion dollars from 1992 to 2007, approximately 22 billion dollars from 2008 to 2012, and approximately 30 billion dollars from 2014 to 2018 have been invested. Furthermore, approximately 66 billion dollars of investment is planned from 2018 to 2022 (ADB 2018). Various international frameworks other than the GMS are gathering to be involved in development activities in the Mekong River basin, a situation referred to as ‘Mekong congestion.’ As the necessary capital for domestic development in the various countries of the Mekong River basin is insufficient, participation from countries outside of the region has become essential, and a conflict over leadership has occurred, primarily between Japan and China.

However, local governments in Japan have played a considerable role in the PYSR and PJSR. Since Chinese economic reforms were regularized in the 1990s and economic interdependence has deepened, local governments in Japan, expecting the international deployment of local companies, have become the standard-bearers for stages of development. Accordingly, they have promoted exchanges with regions on the opposite coast (for the PYSR, with local governments of northern Kyushu and Yamaguchi prefectures, and for the PJSR, with the local governments of the Hokuriku, Tohoku, and Sanin regions). With the political antagonism between countries caused by the vestiges of Cold War sentiments, support from central governments cannot be expected, and companies face difficulties in implementing self-generated economic activity. However, looking at later developments, although the expansion and deepening of interdependence with the global economy can be seen



in the PYSR, the economy of the PJSR has not yet taken off. While the reaction of the Japanese government has been slow regarding the PJSR, national institutions have set out to support the PYSR in concert with the efforts of local governments.

Examining the situation in this way, it seems that support systems generated by the efforts of national and international organizations and local governments, as well as coordination between such actors, are indispensable for SREZs to launch economically. Below, I will consider in more concrete detail the example of the PYSR, through a comparison with the PJSR.

#### 4. Case Studies of the PYSR

##### *(1) The Formation and Deepening of Local Government Cross-border Networks*<sup>5</sup>

A plan that called for the connection of the PYSR as a single economic zone was first proposed in the early 1990s by the International Centre for the Study of East Asian Development (ICSEAD), a think tank in Kitakyushu (now the Asian Growth Research Institute). In 1991, this center implemented a project stating that the PYSR had the potential to develop into an economic zone through future improvements in infrastructure and transportation systems and the use of such developments for interregional exchanges (Nishimura and Watanabe 1991). In light of this, the city of Kitakyushu encouraged mutual understanding with other major cities in the PYSR. To construct a system of cooperation between the cities, Kitakyushu organized the Pan-Yellow Sea City Conference (PYSCC) in 1991 in cooperation with the adjacent city of

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5 See the website of OEAED at <http://oeaed.org/>. Accessed February 8, 2019.

Shimonoseki by appealing to their sister cities. Participating cities included the Chinese cities of Dalian and Qingdao and the Korean cities of Incheon and Busan, as well as Kitakyushu and Shimonoseki, for a total of six cities from three countries. They began this effort by holding an intelligence council for academic experts and an economic council, primarily for individuals with ties to chambers of commerce and industry (Nishimura and Hayashi 1992). With the normalization of relations between China and South Korea in 1992, the momentum for increasing exchanges was heightened by top administration officials. Thus, in 1993, a mayoral conference was held. Through such efforts, development of an intercity network at the administrative level became a goal. The number of member cities expanded in 1994 with the addition of the Chinese cities of Tianjin and Yantai, in 1997 with the Korean city of Ulsan, and in 2000 with the Japanese city of Fukuoka, expanding to a total of 10 cities. During this period, the mayoral conference expanded to include exchange projects and jointly held environmental conservation seminars, youth sports exchanges, and economic exchanges, as well conferences held by research institutions. As the primary result of such efforts, cooperative projects were held in Kitakyushu to contribute to environmental conservation in Dalian (Osako 2005).

At the mayoral conference held in Incheon in 2002, it was agreed that the Organization for the East Asia Economic Development (OEAED) would be established to strengthen coordination between the mayoral conference and the economic council. Behind this decision were circumstances such as the rapid growth of the Chinese economy and China's entrance into the WTO, deregulation in South Korea, and movements for a Japan-South Korea FTA, resulting in the rapid development of coordination within the PYSR and the

expansion of its markets. In the 10 years since its inception, the biennial mayoral conference and the annual working conference produced a close-knit exchange, though the following must be acknowledged: 1. given the rarity of conferences, it was not possible to hold in-depth discussions or reach solutions for shared challenges; 2. the economic council had become isolated and was not facilitating active economic exchanges; and 3. a wall was being hit in terms of limitations at the governmental level for developing a leading intercity network for East Asia. The establishment of the OEAED was desired to provide a main body for promoting intercity exchanges. It would improve the functionality of the PYSCC in overcoming these types of problems, while also taking the international course of events into consideration, such as economic integration between Japan, China, and South Korea. With the ICSEAD as the core, research committees formed at research institutions in each member city were established as permanent institutions within the PYSCC; after a two-year examination period, in 2004, the establishment of the OEAED was agreed upon at the fifth mayoral conference in Kitakyushu.

The mayor and head of the chamber of commerce and industry in each city established an organizational conference as a decision-making body, and an executive committee was formed with officials from each city and executives from each chamber of commerce and industry. Additionally, four section meetings were established as operations departments for each type of important industry (international business, environment, logistics, and tourism). The Main Office for the Promotion of Section Operations was established as a supervisory department. Five important issues to be addressed in developing the PYSR were identified: 1. the creation and promotion of an East Asian FTA limited to the region, 2. the creation of a Pan-

Yellow Sea environmental model region, 3. the construction of a system for the generation of new business, 4. the development of a Pan-Yellow Sea tourism brand strategy, and 5. the formation of a platform for human resources development and technological exchanges. All of these goals were achieved and projects for each individual city to address in solving the associated challenges were undertaken. Moreover, signs of further expansion are being seen, such as the addition of the city of Kumamoto to the PYSR in 2015.

*(2) Toward a Support System by National Institutions*<sup>6</sup>

In concert with these movements led by local governments, national organizations began to get involved. For example, the Pan-Yellow Sea Economic and Technological Exchange Council was formed in 2001. This council, under commitments from governmental agencies of the three involved countries—such as the Japanese Kyushu Bureau of Economy, Trade, and Industry; the South Korean Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy; and the Chinese Ministry of Commerce and Ministry of Science and Technology—includes related municipal governments and economic groups, companies, researchers, and other actors as participating institutions. To improve economic and technological exchanges within the PYSR, this council aimed to establish multiple platforms for such exchanges by gathering related governmental institutions, municipal governments, economic groups, and so on, and to discuss policies in order to promote the expansion and facilitation of mutual exchanges and the mutual development of the PYSR.

The first meeting of the council was held in Fukuoka in 2001, and

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<sup>6</sup> See website of Kyushu Economy International (KEI) at <http://www.kyushu-kei.org/interactions/kankokai.html>. Accessed February 8, 2019.

it has convened in a different country each year on a rotating basis. In 2017, the 17<sup>th</sup> meeting will be held in Kagoshima City. This council holds business negotiation meetings to promote exchanges between companies, dispatch delegations, and encourage cooperative exchanges through the conclusion of the MOU between Japanese and South Korean clusters in the field of environmentalism, for example (the Kyushu Recycle and Environmental Industry Plaza and the ECO Executive Office of the Korean Industrial Complex Corporation). In addition, exchanges between universities are encouraged, as exemplified by the conclusion of a cooperative agreement between the Kyushu Institute of Technology and Changwon National University regarding the transfer of patents owned by universities to private enterprises.

### *(3) Comparisons with PJSR*

In the end of the 1980s, the Tumen River Area Development Programme (TRDAP), introduced under the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), gained attention as a plan for the economic development of the Tumen River area through multilateral cooperation (Ding 1996). This area straddles the three countries of China, Russia, and North Korea. However, as it was not possible to raise the capital necessary for establishing the infrastructure and other projects, the TRDAP was never able to get off the ground, and it remained at a deadlock (Hughes 2002). In 2005, the organization was shifted to the Greater Tumen Initiative (GTI), and the target development area was expanded to the three northeastern provinces of China, the North Korean Rason Special Economic Zone, the eastern portion of Mongolia, the eastern coastal region of South Korea, and a portion of the Russian Primorsky Krai. Accordingly,

joint funding was organized.<sup>7</sup> In 2009, China published Essential Points Regarding the Tumen River Area Cooperative Development Plan, and expectations were raised because of the Changchun-Jilin-Tumen Development Plan's position as a leading open development district (a national level project). However, along with North Korea withdrawing from the project in 2009, Japan remains as a mere observer, and it is difficult to confirm the formation of an economic zone in the PJSR at this time.

In contrast to the TRDAP, there have been movements to form a regional cooperative framework led by local governments. An example is the Association of North East Asia Regional Governments (NEAR), formed in 1996 in North Gyeongsang Province, South Korea, represent one of these attempts.<sup>8</sup> NEAR's framework is the widest in Northeast Asia; in 2018, 78 regional governments from six Northeast Asian countries, including Mongolia and North Korea, participated. Active participants included Japan, Toyama, Shimane, and Hyogo. At present, NEAR is nothing more than an interactive forum, but in the future, policies to offset the limits of intergovernmental cooperation may be produced as a result of this association (Nakayama 2015).

The characteristics of the support system for the PJSR, compared with those of the PYSR, are, first, differences in the actors that have taken leadership roles. In the case of the PYSR, concerned municipalities, such as Kitakyushu, make decisions about development, and national agencies from Japan, China, and South Korea are participating. Conversely, in the case of the PJSR, there

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7 See website of GTI at <http://www.tumenprogramme.org/>. Accessed February 8, 2019.

8 See website of NEAR at <http://www.neargov.org>. Accessed February 8, 2019.

is no active support from the Japanese government, and even the cooperative relationships between regional governments—such as those of Niigata, Toyama, and Shimane prefectures—are not carried out satisfactorily. Second, while support systems and development policies are succeeding to some degree in the PYSR, in the case of the PJSR—even if a network linking local governments exists—, it at best functions to facilitate cultural exchanges and exchange experiences. Thus, it does not do anything more than promote a mutual understanding between different places. In light of these facts, it seems that cooperative relationships between central and local governments are important factors for controlling whether SREZs succeed.

## 5. Cross-border Cooperation between Local Governments in the PJSR

Cross-border cooperation between local governments in the PJSR has managed to deepen and expand; in fact, a loose institutionalization is apparent. In realizing the formation of a regional economic zone at the intergovernmental level, it is essential to assume the existence of this kind of cooperation between local governments in order to obtain a more accurate grasp of the real situation facing regional zones. Below, the actual situation of multilateral cross-border cooperation between local governments in the PJSR is organized.

### *(1) Expansion*

The origins of a cross-border network of local governments in the PJSR were the Japan-Soviet (now Russia) Coastal Mayors' Association

(JRCMA), launched in 1970, and the Conference of Japan Sea Coastal Cities for Japan-North Korea Friendship and Trade Promotion, launched in 1972. Both of these were started through initiatives of Niigata City, Japan. The JRCMA includes participation from 17 cities in Japan and 18 cities in Russia and has continued youth exchange programs, the dispatch of workers, and the submission of requests to governments and relevant institutions for more than 45 years, with the goal of promoting intercity friendship and economic exchanges.<sup>9</sup> The Conference for Japan-North Korea Friendship has acted as one of the few contact points for exchanges with North Korea.<sup>10</sup>

After the Cold War at the beginning of the 1990s, a network of local governments was gradually formed in the PJSR. In 1992, the Permanent Joint Committee Regarding Economic Cooperation was formed between Hokkaido and the Far East region of Russia.<sup>11</sup> At the initiative of Shimane Prefecture, the Conference of North East Asia Regional Governments also commenced. In 1994, at the initiative of Tottori Prefecture, Mongolia was added to the list of participating countries (i.e., Japan, China, South Korea, and Russia) to form five Northeast Asian governments. Subsequently, a discussion framework for local governments, the Summit for International Exchange and Cooperation of Regional Governments around the Sea of Japan (now in Northeast Asia) (SIECRGNEA)<sup>12</sup> was launched. In addition, as a four-

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9 See website of JRCMA at <http://www.nichienkai.jp/index.html>. Accessed February 8, 2019.

10 However, at the Japan-North Korea summit in 2002, North Korea admitted to the abduction of Japanese citizens and was forced to suspend activities in 2003.

11 See website of Hokkaido government at <http://www.pref.hokkaido.lg.jp/ss/tsk/russia/russia/r-keizai/jousetugoudouinkai/index-ke.htm>. Accessed February 8, 2019.

12 Five participating regional governments from five countries include:



country network of cities, the Conference of Major Cities in the Japan (East) Sea Rim Region (CMCJSRR)<sup>13</sup> also began. In 1996, the Conference of North East Asia Regional Governments became NEAR.

Since the end of the 1990s, though new organizational efforts have slumped, the Japan-China-South Korea Three Country Symposium for Exchange between Regional Governments was held by international exchange organizations from each country (e.g., the Council of Local Authorities for International Relations (CLAIR), the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, and the Governors Association of Korea (GAOK)). It was an experiment aimed at providing support and economic stimulation from higher levels of government.<sup>14</sup> The Japan-South Korea Governors' Council, started in the same year, is a joint project by the National Governors' Association of Japan (NGAJ) and the GAOK. Further, the Japan-Russia Governors' Association, which began in 1968 but suspended activities in 1997, restarted in 2010, and in 2012, the Japan-China Forum for Governors and Provincial Leaders also began.<sup>15</sup> The Northeast Asian Mayors' Forum (NAMF) was launched in 2014 under

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Tottori Prefecture, Jilin Province of China, Gangwon Province of South Korea, Primorsky Krai of Russia, and the Töv Province of Mongolia. See the website of Tottori Prefecture at <http://www.pref.tottori.lg.jp/dd.aspx?menuid=37627>. Accessed February 8, 2019

13 Participating cities are Japan's Yonago, Sakaiminato, and Tottori; South Korea's Sokcho, Donghae, and Pohang; China's Hunchun, Yanji, and Tumen, Russia's Vladivostok, Nakhodka, and Khasansky District, and so on. See the website of the CMCJSRR at <http://www.city.tottori.lg.jp/kannihonkai/top.html>. Accessed February 8, 2019.

14 See website of CLAIR at <http://www.clair.or.jp/j/exchange/chiiki/index.html>. Accessed February 8, 2019.

15 See website of NGAJ at <http://www.nga.gr.jp/data/activity/international/index.html>. Accessed February 8, 2019.

the leadership of the Mongolian city of Ulaanbaatar.<sup>16</sup>

## *(2) Institutional Deepening*

The characteristics of the cross-border network of local governments in the PJSR are, first, that the member organizations extend over a variety of ranges. If they were to be classified according to country of affiliation, there would be those that bridge two countries (JRCMA, the Conference of Japan Sea Coastal Cities for Japan-North Korea Friendship and Trade Promotion, the Permanent Joint Committee Regarding Economic Cooperation between Hokkaido and the Far East region of the Russia Federation, the Japan-South Korea Governors' Association, the Japan-Russia Governors' Association, the Japan-China Forum for Governors and Provincial Leaders); those that bridge Japan, China, and Korea (Japan-China-South Korea Three Country Symposium for Exchange between Regional Governments); and those that bridge a wider area (SIECRGNEA, CMCJSRR, NEAR, NAMF). The various organizations have different scopes. If we focus on the initiative that led to an organization's founding, there are many cases in which each local government has led an organization as one method to encourage local economic activity, but in more recent times, cases in which organizations are deeply connected to national strategies have become more visible (e.g., the Japan-China-South Korea Regional Government Symposium, the Japan-South Korea Governors' Association, the Japan-Russia Governors' Association, and the Japan-China Forum for Governors and Provincial Leaders). These organizations can be used as platforms to construct cooperative

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<sup>16</sup> See website of NAMF at <http://neamf.ulaanbaatar.mn/>. Accessed February 8, 2019.

relationships between national and local governments.

Attention should also be paid to the fact that since the late 2000s, cross-border networks for local governments have achieved loose institutionalization (Lee 2010). After roughly 10 years of discussion, in 2005, a permanent office was established for NEAR in the city of Pohang in South Korea. The sub-committees for the promotion of individual projects have also expanded to 14 fields (see Table 3). The Logistics Sub-committee, International Personnel Exchange Sub-committee, and International E-Commerce Sub-committee, all newly established in 2017, were proposed by Chinese local governments. A proactive stance has been seen from China. Regarding financial systems, although a membership fee has been shelved, a system for the division of the costs of holding meetings has been instituted. Beginning in the mid-2000s, a network with other international institutions has also been initiated, and relationships have been built with the GTI and the UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), the Assembly of European Regions (AER), and the R20 Regions of Climate Action.<sup>17</sup>

The development of this kind of loose institutionalization is aimed at strengthening the functions of NEAR as a cross-border network for regional governments. It can be surmised that NEAR has loosely begun to form the basis for implementing cross-border political devices to solve real challenges—that is, cross-border governance—rather than simply hold international meetings. In the future, if policies to offset the limits of intergovernmental cooperation are created, an international actor with autonomy, permanence, and influence may be involved.

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<sup>17</sup> See website of NEAR (<http://www.neargov.org/jp/>). Accessed February 8, 2019.

Table 3. Sub-committees of NEAR

Sub-committee <sup>1</sup>	Coordinating region	Year formed
1. Economy and Humanities <sup>2</sup>	North Gyeongsang Province	1998
2. Environmental	Toyama Prefecture	1998
3. Education and Cultural Exchange <sup>3</sup>	Shimane Prefecture	1998
4. Disaster Prevention	Hyogo Prefecture	1998
5. Oceans and Fishery	Shandong Province	2008
6. Tourism	Henan Province	2008
7. Mineral Resources Development and Coordination	Magadan Oblast	2010
8. Energy and Climate Change	Shanxi Province	2010
9. Life and Medical Industry	North Chungcheong Province	2011
10. Agriculture	South Jeolla Province	2011
11. Sports	Sakha Republic	2013
12. Logistics and Transportation	Heilongjiang Province	2017
13. International Exchange of Human Resources	Jilin Province	2017
14. International E-Commerce	Henan Province	2017

1 The Border Region Cooperation Sub-committee (formed in 2004, coordinated by Irkutsk Oblast), the Science and Technology Sub-committee (formed in 2006, coordinated by Gyeonggi Province), and the Women and Children Sub-committee (formed in 2010, coordinated by Dornod Province) had no organizations accepting the status as coordinating regions. Therefore, they were abolished in 2017.

2 The Economy and Commerce Sub-committee formed in 1998 was renamed in 2013.

3 The Cultural Exchange Sub-committee and Normal Exchange Sub-committee formed in 1998 were merged in 2008.

Source: Website of NEAR at <http://www.neargov.org>. Accessed February 8, 2019.

## Conclusion

In examining the prospects for the future of an institutionalized East Asian economic zone, first, the economic liftoff of these SREZs and the expansion of economic zones linked with the global economy should be recognized as methods for deepening functional cooperation (i.e., a bottom-up strategy)<sup>18</sup>. Although these regions, which have historically complicated circumstances, have been planned as artificial (i.e., top-down) communities in which the nation is the organizational unit, there is a strong possibility that regions in

<sup>18</sup> SREZs are constructed from possible regions and fields that are gradually developed until eventually a full-scale regional economic zone is formed. This is a multistage and multilayered approach (Ogawa 2004).

which no actual shared cultures and consciousness exist will collapse at the slightest sign of resistance. Along such lines, exchanges between locals that have historically conducted exchanges with each other—which, as a result, have become active exchange partners (or are highly likely to become active)—may be considered effective for establishing a shared sense of community.

Additionally, if the East Asian economic zone actually develops at the national level, then specific industries, such as those dealing with agriculture, forestry, and fishing, will be unable to avoid having a negative impact on local economies. Thus, correspondence of some form will be needed to accompany compensation, either before or after such negative impacts have occurred. In this sense, sub-regional exchanges between locals can be thought of as having a mitigating effect from a new, non-national scale on the negative impact of expanding regional disparities that accompany the formation of FTA.<sup>19</sup> In such a case, support for such initiatives from cooperating national and local governments would lay the groundwork for an East Asian economic zone.

However, the circumstances, even for SREZs, are diverse, and developing actual exchanges requires a variety of different factors. As such, a more accurate analysis of the actual situation facing sub-regions may be essential. Above all, the role of a local government in SREZ, which is the most important factor in the development of the PYSR, is crucial. Further, the political willingness of top officials

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19 The PJSR, unlike other “actually occurring sub-regional economic zones” that have been naturally occurring, has a strong “strategic” aspect to it, in which local government-led attempts are made to develop peripheral areas that have been relatively slow to develop (Hirakawa 2003).

of local governments to focus on conditions necessary for expanding trade and direct investment is also urgently required. Considering that even in the PJSR, which faces many challenges, expanding and deepening cross-border cooperation between local governments appear to make it possible to implement policies to offset the limitations of intergovernmental cooperation, which provides encouragement for the future.

In this way, the SREZs distributed throughout the East Asia, having emerged in new, cross-border spaces along the coastal rim, are likely to develop into international actors. Whether this is market driven or based on national strategies, the transformation of such SREZs into international actors foretells the organization of a new international system with multilayered and multi-centric characteristics.

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# Abe's Diplomacy toward East Asia: Pursuit of Power Politics<sup>1</sup>

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## Introduction

The realist school in international relations emphasizes the continuity of power politics. According to the realist view, therefore, it is no surprise that Japan has been essentially facing the same strategic and security issues over the past fifty years. In his article published in 1963, Masataka Kosaka, a Kyoto University professor, summarized five major goals in the Japanese security policy as follows: (1) the cooperation with the US as the foundation for Japanese security, (2) the improvement of relations with China while maintaining the US alliance first, (3) the maintenance of peace and security on the Korean peninsula, (4) the development of Japan's defense abilities in the manner contributing to the stability of East

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1 This paper is prepared for an annual conference of the Taiwan/Japan/Korea Peace Forum, October 7 2018, in Taipei, Republic of China.

Asia, and (5) the promotion of multilateral security cooperation which are not contradicted with the US-Japanese alliance system.<sup>2</sup> These five issues are still major goals for Japanese security today. Based on the perspectives Kosaka proposed, this article tries to define the security issues facing Japan today, and to evaluate the security policies of the Abe administration since Abe took his second prime minister's office in December 2012.<sup>3</sup>

### Comparison with the Nakasone and the Koizumi administrations

As Abe won his third election of the Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) president in September 2018, the Abe administration will be the longest government in the modern political history of Japan if he completes his third (and last) term up to 2021. The comparison of Abe with Nakasone and Koizumi, the two former prime ministers who also succeeded in taking office for more than four years,<sup>4</sup> shows some similarities as a clue for its political longevity. The most

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2 Masataka Kosaka, "Genjitsushugisha no heiwaron (Peace Initiatives by a Realist)," *Chuo Koron*, Vol. 78, No. 1 (January 1963), pp. 38-49.

3 Abe took his first office from September 2006 to August 2007.

4 The postwar Japanese constitution adopts a parliamentary cabinet system, in which the lower house of the Japanese Diet has an authority to choose and disqualify a prime minister. As the term of the lower house is four years (although the prime minister has a power to dismiss the lower house even during the term), it usually requires the victory of at least two consecutive general elections to stay in the prime minister's office for more than four years. Among 34 prime ministers in postwar Japan before Abe, only five of them succeeded in going beyond four years in office. They are Shigeru Yoshida (October 1948-December 1954), Hayato Ikeda (July 1960-November 1964), Eisaku Sato (November 1964-July 1972), Yasuhiro Nakasone (November 1982-November 1987), and Junichiro Koizumi (April 2001-September 2006).

conspicuous characteristic among the three political leaders is their strongly nationalistic posture, which is symbolically expressed by their obstinate visits to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine. Another common characteristic among the three leaders is that they were respectively from a small faction in LDP when they took the prime minister's office so that they needed support from other LDP factions and LDP's coalition partners.<sup>5</sup> When Abe organized his second cabinet in December 2012, the upper house was under the control of the opposition parties. Even after the 2013 Upper House Election which resulted in LDP's landslide winning against the Democratic Party, LDP still needs seats of its coalition partner, Komeito, to control the Upper House.<sup>6</sup> Although LDP succeeded in establishing its single majority in the 2017 general election, Abe still needs Komeito, a coalition partner whose collaboration is essential in the small district election system and for Abe's ambitious goal of constitutional amendment. Just like Nakasone and Koizumi, therefore, Abe should carefully manage with his coalition partner and the opposition parties in his policy making efforts despite his seemingly strong and nationalistic posture.

From a viewpoint of their diplomacy style, another common feature among Nakasone, Koizumi, and Abe is a strong personal tie with US presidents. Nakasone established the so-called Ron-Yasu relations, in which Nakasone and Reagan called each other by their first name, to symbolically demonstrate his support of the Reagan's security policy

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5 Both Nakasone and Koizumi formed a coalition government. From December 1983 to July 1986, Nakasone's LDP allied with the New Liberal Party, which was separated from LDP in 1976 and subsequently joined LDP after the 1986 General Election. Koizumi, in his second cabinet, started the current two party coalition between LDP and Komeito.

6 Currently, as the result of the 2013 Upper House election, LDP occupies 115 seats out of 242 while Komeito keeps 20.

initiatives. Koizumi became the first Japanese prime minister who boarded with President George W. Bush on Air Force One, the special plane for the US president. Abe has also successfully demonstrated his personal ties with President Obama and Trump. When Obama visited Japan as a national guest in April 2014, Abe invited him to the cozy sushi bar in Ginza with only ten counter seats. Abe also became the first national leader who met Donald Trump when Trump was the president elect in November 2016. Since then, Abe has had a summit talk with Trump more than thirty times if online talks are included.

### **Japan when Abe took his second office in December 2012**

While the five diplomatic issues Kosaka raised indicate the Japanese enduring strategic goals, the concrete political agenda facing contemporary Japan need some more clarifications based on international and domestic political situation of Japan at a particular moment. When Abe took his second prime minister's office in December 2012, he faced the five agenda as follows:

As of December 2012, both US-Japanese and Sino-Japanese relations were at their respective nadirs. During the Democratic Party administrations in 2009-2012, the US-Japan alliance never recovered its damage inflicted by Prime Minister Hatoyama who initiated the moving of the Futenma military base out of Okinawa and the promotion of the East Asia Community. The Futenma alternative out of Okinawa was a clear violation of the 1996 US-Japan agreement on the Okinawa military base issue whereas the proposal of his East Asia Community was regarded as an attempt to exclude the US from Asian affairs, hence both were unacceptable for the Obama administration. The damage on the US-Japan alliance in turn resulted in the Chinese

maritime advancement into the East China Sea. When the Noda administration nationalized the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in September 2012, all the ministerial level meetings between Japan and China had been cancelled thereafter.

As for the Korean peninsula situation, Japanese-South Korean relations were increasingly severe in 2012 while North Korea had repeatedly conducted nuclear missile tests since 2009. When the then South Korean president, Lee Myung-bak, landed on the Takeshima/Dokdo island for the first time as the incumbent president of South Korea and required the apology of the Japanese emperor over the Japanese colonial rule of the Korean peninsula, the governmental talks between Japan and South Korea were almost completely cut.

Because of the intraparty disagreements specifically on defense policy, the Democratic Party administrations could not make integrated strategies. The FY 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) drafted and adopted by the Hatoyama administration emphasized the importance of both the US-Japan alliance and that of multilateral security network with no indication of which of the two is a primary goal. The Guidelines also expressed a confusing message about China, proposing constructive cooperation with China while criticizing the Chinese military buildup in recent years.

The initiative of the East Asian Community, which was included in the Democratic Party's election campaign agenda in 2009, had been proposed by the Koizumi administration. Therefore, the East Asian Community was originally not regarded as a contradicting initiative against the US-Japan alliance. Under the Hatoyama administration, however, the idea of the East Asian Community was increasingly connected with the Democratic Party's mismanagement

of the Futenma movement, giving the Japanese exploration of multilateralism a connotation of anti-American move. Overall the Democratic Party government in 2009-2012 failed to promote Japan's security interests according to the all five criteria Kosaka proposed.

### **Abe's Recovery and Rebuilding of the US-Japan alliance**

When the second Abe administration started in late 2012, the most urgent diplomatic issue for his government was to stabilize relations with the United States. In February 2013, Abe visited Washington to see President Obama. At that moment, the Obama administration had been requesting Japan's cooperation in three issue areas. They were; Japan's participation in TPP negotiations, the solution of the Futenma base issue by the original US-Japan agreement, and the promotion of US-Japanese security cooperation. Soon after his visit to Washington, Abe announced Japan's participation in the TPP negotiation process despite strong domestic resistance. The Abe government also managed with a compromise with the Okinawa prefecture on the Futenma relocation plan to Henoko. Although the Futenma relocation to Henoko has not been realized today due to the opposition of local communities, the Abe administration repeatedly demonstrated its determination to keep the 1996 agreement with the US government to realize the relocation to Henoko.

The recovery of US-Japanese relations required concrete Japanese commitments to the bilateral alliance. The fundamental mistake of the Democratic Party administrations was that they failed to introduce any concrete policy changes to strengthen the deterrent ability of the alliance. As of early 2013, the US-Japan alliance were facing three major threats to deal with; the Chinese maritime advancement into

the East and South China Sea, the development of North Korean nuclear missile technology, and the activity of international terrorist and criminal organizations. To demonstrate Japan's commitments to deal with these issues, Abe introduced a series of security-related legislations, i.e. State Secrets Law (December 2013), the Cabinet decision to admit the limited constitutionality of collective defense (July 2014), and Peace and Security Legislation (September 2015). Abe also agreed to the new security cooperation guidelines with the US in April 2015 to improve the threat management ability of the US-Japan alliance. Abe's security policy initiative stimulated anti-war sentiments of the Japanese public so that the Abe administration suffered from a sharp decline of support upon the introduction of each new security related legislation. In order to restore and maintain the domestic support to his government, Abe dismissed the lower house of the Diet in December 2014 that led to another LDP victory.

The restoration and improvement of the US-Japan alliance system during the Obama administration gave diplomatic assets for the Abe administration to deal with the Trump administration which has no hesitation in making a severe trade request even toward US allies. Having a summit talk with Trump more than thirty times, Abe has kept the US-Japan alliance system effective against the Chinese maritime advancement in the East and South China Sea and the North Korean nuclear missile threats. As the Trump administration tends to regard diplomacy as a deal with another country rather than as a strategy for international order making, however, the future US-Japanese relations may be destabilized specifically over bilateral trade issues. The primary security policy goal of the Abe administration continues to keep broad strategic cooperation with the Trump administration.

## Sino-Japanese relations under the Abe administration

While Abe engaged in consistent efforts to improve and maintain US-Japanese relations, Sino-Japanese relations continued to be cold, if not colder, specifically after Abe visited the Yasukuni Shrine in December 2013 despite the much prewarning from China. As Xi Jinping became a new Chinese leader almost simultaneously with the advent of the second Abe administration, Xi was also in the process of consolidating his power and authority in China. Regarding a history issue with Japan that can test his leadership, therefore, Xi had no room to be conciliatory toward Abe's Yasukuni visit. On the other hand, Abe's Yasukuni visit was criticized domestically. Even some LDP leaders as well as Komeito, the coalition partner of LDP, requested more diplomatic attention to care for relations with China and South Korea. Moreover, the US government unprecedentedly expressed a formal disappointment at Abe's visit to Yasukuni as an action that would aggravate already tense relations with Japan's neighbors. After all, Abe has refrained from visiting the shrine himself since then. When his cabinet members visited Yasukuni right after Abe's visit to the Pearl Harbor in December 2016, the US government again requested the careful management of history. As a result, in 2017 and 2018, no ministerial members of the Abe cabinet visited Yasukuni on August 15.

Although Abe's refrainment of Yasukuni visit is a result of the consideration of US relations, it also removed the biggest obstacle in Sino-Japanese relations. As Xi Jinping entered the second term in October 2017 by consolidating his domestic power base, he also began to explore better relations with Japan specifically because the Trump administration increasingly put pressure on China in the trade



issue. Since April 2018 when the Sino-Japanese high level economic talks were held for the first time in the past eight years in Tokyo, a new momentum has been added to the improvement of the bilateral relations specifically in trade and finance areas. At the high level talk, the two foreign ministers, Kono and Wang Yi, agreed to accelerate free trade negotiations among China, Japan, and South Korea. They also decided to have a high level talk on a regular basis.

In May 2018, in order to participate in the Sino-Japanese-South Korean trilateral summit, Premier Li Keqiang visited Tokyo for the first time since he took office in 2013. Abe and Li agreed to many issues such as the promotion of Sino-Japanese free trade, the expansion of the renminbi denominated bonds, the new negotiation on currency swap agreement, the introduction of the maritime and aviation communication mechanism, the bilateral cooperation for the Chinese one-belt-one-road initiative, and the relaxation of Chinese import restriction on Japanese food products. The two leaders are said to have dealt with relatively easy-to-agree items while sensitive issues such as the territorial dispute in the East China Sea, the Chinese military buildup in the South China Sea, the history problem, and the Taiwan issue, are all carefully avoided. However, specifically in the context of the North Korean nuclear missile development, it was a significant diplomatic achievement for Abe to improve relations with China that can exert an influence on Pyongyang.

### **Abe's policy toward the Korean Peninsula**

While both US-Japanese and Sino-Japanese relations can be primarily managed through bilateral channels, the maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean peninsula is a strategic issue that

involves far more than Japan's relations with North and South Korea. Since the mid 1990s, the North Korean nuclear missile development has been the biggest security threat to Northeast Asia where three nuclear powers and Japan interact with the two Koreas. Although the denuclearization of North Korea is the common goal among all the major powers in Northeast Asia, their complex interests over the Korean peninsula as well as the legacy of the Japanese colonial rule of the peninsula often limit Japan's diplomatic role toward the Korean peninsula.

There are five policy choices available for Japan to promote the denuclearization of North Korea. They are (1) the deterrent ability buildup against North Korea by strengthening the alliance with the US; (2) the cooperation with China that has the ultimate influence on North Korean economy; (3) the security cooperation with South Korea; (4) the cooperation with Russia for the strict execution of the UN sanctions on North Korea; and (5) the exploration of a direct contact with North Korea. Among the five policy choices, the Abe administration primarily took the first choice. When North Korea increased the frequency of its nuclear missile tests in 2017, Abe gave a full support to the Trump administration that said "all the options are on the table, including the military one." At the UN Security Council, Japan also supported the US initiative against North Korea to adopt a series of four resolutions with increasingly strict sanctions. As the China-Japan and the South Korea-Japan relations were cooled down over the history issue, however, Abe failed to promote security cooperation with the two countries on the North Korean nuclear missile issue. Russo-Japanese relations always face the Northern Territory dispute whereas the abduction of Japanese citizens by North Korea makes it difficult for the Abe administration to explore

its own channel to talk to Pyongyang. As a result, toward the North Korean nuclear missile threat, the Abe administration relies on its alliance with the US and its own economic sanctions (with limited effectiveness because of its already limited economic transactions with North Korea) in addition to the UN sanctions.

### **Abe's defense policy posture**

According to Kosaka, the strategic goal of Japan's military buildup is to keep the overall power balance in East Asia. In the current regional context of East Asia, the Japanese strategic goal is to deter the rising power of China by increasing Japan's commitment to the US-Japan alliance system. During the Democratic Party administrations, the Japanese military budget decreased to 4,713 billion yen in 2012. Since Abe took his second office, the Japanese military budget has increased for six consecutive years. In FY 2018, the Japanese military budget is 5,191 billion yen, an overall 10% increase compared with the 2012 budget.

The primary reason for the defense budget expansion is the introduction of updated military technologies such as a land based aegis system, Aegis Ashore, to respond to North Korean ballistic missiles and Chinese military modernization. Another reason for the increasing military budget is the procurement of US military equipment and services based on the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS). The budget for FMS was more than doubled, from 187 billion yen in 2014 to 410 billion yen in 2018. For the defense of remote islands from potential Chinese threats, the Abe administration plans to purchase forty two F35 fighter jets and seventeen Osprey helicopters over the next five years. Defense Minister Onodera says, "it is indispensable for

Japan to improve both quality and quantity of its self defense ability due to the increasing severity of Japanese security environments.”

In order to prevent a vicious cycle of security dilemma games triggered by the increasing Japanese defense ability and to stabilize power balance in East Asia, Japan should simultaneously engage in confidence building with its neighboring countries. It is in this context that the Abe administration’s attitude toward the history issue is particularly questioned. In fact, the strong nationalist image of Abe, that has been fixed by his Yasukuni visit in December 2013 and his periodical nationalistic comments on the history issues, has damaged the stability of diplomatic and security environments for Japan.

During his first administration in 2006-07, Abe’s comments on the comfort women issue already stimulated South Korea and China. When Abe took his second prime minister’s office in late 2012, Abe expressed his intention for his government to succeed the 1995 Murayama statement that expressed “deep condolence” over Japan’s colonial rule and aggression in the past. Regarding the 1993 Kono statement which expressed “apology and condolence” over the comfort women issue, Abe avoided expressing his position, saying that “the history issue should be reviewed by intellectuals.” Regarding the Yasukuni issue, Abe stated that he deeply regretted not having paid a visit to the Yasukuni Shrine during his first administration. Then, one year after the inauguration of his second administration, Abe visited the Yasukuni Shrine in December 2013.

As stated above, Abe’s Yasukuni visit invited the US disappointment as well as Chinese and Korean resentments, damaging Japanese foreign relations much more than Abe had expected. In March 2014, in his statement at the budget committee of the Upper House, Abe expressed his government’s succession of the Kono statement,

saying that “the Abe administration has no intention” to review the statement. Moreover, in his statement to commemorate the 70<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the end of the Pacific War, Abe himself admitted “deep condolence” and “apology from the bottom of heart” over the “Japanese colonial rule” and “aggression” in Asia. The Abe statement included all the diplomatic keywords of the 1995 Murayama statement and the 2005 Koizumi statement to make it clear that the Abe administration finally succeed the positions of the past governments on the history issues.

The 2015 Abe statement was drafted by the 21<sup>st</sup> Century Design Discussion Group, Abe's private advisory organ, that included specialists in modern Japanese history and international politics. The statement based on academic studies restricted Abe's nationalistic posture and secured the general acceptance of the statement by the Japanese public. China and South Korea also refrained from criticizing the Abe statement. The Abe statement opened Japan-South Korea talks on the history issue, which subsequently led to the bilateral agreement on the comfort women issue in December 2015. Although his Yasukuni visit in December 2013 fixed a nationalist image of Abe, the Abe administration learned a lesson from the visit that Japan should avoid making the history issues a diplomatic problem with its Asian neighbors. As for the Yasukuni issue specifically, the Abe administration shows a restraining attitude as indicated by the fact that no ministerial members visited the shrine on August 15 in 2017 and 2018. However, Abe's periodical nationalistic comments on the history issues has kept Japan and South Korea from executing the bilateral 2015 agreement on the comfort women issue.

### **Abe's use of multilateral institutions for power politics**

One of the noticeable characteristics in Abe's diplomacy is the large number of countries he has visited as a Japanese prime minister. As Abe took his second prime minister's office in December 2012, he immediately engaged in a "globe-perspective" diplomacy, visiting more than 20 countries in 2013 alone. As of January 2018, the number of countries Abe had visited reached 70, slightly over Xi Jinping's visit to 68 countries since 2013 when Xi became the Chinese leader. Abe has also effectively used gatherings of multilateral institutions, such as ASEAN and other regional and global organizations, to make a contact with other national leaders.

Abe's multilateralism is not an attempt of community building, but a practice of balancing power in Asia and the world. The subject of his balancing policy is China as indicated by the fact that Abe has concentratedly chosen China's neighboring countries in Southeast and South Asia to visit. Not like the East Asia Community proposed by the Democratic Party administrations, therefore, Abe's initiative of multilateralism does not contradict with the US-Japan alliance system.

Abe's practice of balance of power through multilateralism is also demonstrated by the fact that he left China and South Korea out of the immediate target of his global-perspective diplomacy during the early years of his second administration. In 2014, for example, Abe visited Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, respectively the first Japanese Prime Minister's visit in the last fourteen years and the last twenty four years. Regarding China and South Korea, however, Abe showed no sign of compromise on any diplomatic issues, including the history issues, that were prerequisite for setting up a summit meeting

with the two countries. Abe only made brief contacts with the leaders of China and South Korea at an international forum such as APEC or G20 while saying that “the window for dialogue (with China and South Korea) is kept open.”

## Conclusion

Abe's diplomacy toward East Asia is overall successful in terms of the five strategic goals Kosaka set for Japan. Starting with the damaged US-Japan alliance during the Democratic Party administrations, Abe quickly recovered trust from the US by making concrete policy commitments, the biggest example of which is to admit the constitutionality of collective self-defense, to strengthen the US-Japan alliance system despite strong domestic resistance against his initiatives. Although his Yasukuni visit in December 2013 resulted in cold relations with China in the following few years, the Abe administration in 2018 began high level contacts with the Chinese government, exploring the possibility of holding an Abe-Xi summit meeting soon. As for the peace and stability of the Korean peninsula, and specifically for the North Korean nuclear missile issue, there are few policy options for Japan to take an initiative role. However, consistently supporting the US posture toward the North Korean missile issue, the Abe administration indirectly contributed to the US-North Korean talks. Japan's military buildup under the Abe administration strengthened Japan's deterrent ability against the North Korean nuclear threats through the US-Japan alliance. Although Abe's nationalist posture periodically caused criticism and concerns from China and South Korea, his 2015 statement, that expressed the Abe administration's succession of the

past Japanese government positions on the history issues, and the restraint of Yasukuni visit by Abe and his cabinet members, improved confidence in the intention of the Abe administration. Finally, Abe's use of multilateral institutions from a balance of power perspective is checking the rise of China while maintaining the US-Japan alliance system.



# Mutual Understanding between Peoples through “Border Tourism”<sup>1</sup>

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## Introduction: Globalization, Mobilities, Tourism

The phenomenon known as globalization has become part of the lives of people in Asia. There is sociological research taking place that sees our current era of ceaseless movement of people, things, capital, information, values, technologies, etc. as the "age of mobilities." In mobilities research, existing reality is seen as constantly generating a new reality because it is not allowed to solidify and consolidate due to this movement that keeps it in continual flux and transformation.<sup>2</sup>

How have these kinds of mobilities emerged within parts of Asia? Let us take Japan as one example with regard to the movement of people.

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1 This paper is prepared for an annual conference of the Taiwan/Japan/Korea Peace Forum, October 7 2018, in Taipei, Republic of China.

2 SUDOU & ENDOU, *Tourism Sociology*, 2018, pp.214-215

According to public statistics from the National Tourism Organization, 17.11 million Japanese people set foot outside Japan in 2016. For the majority of them, Asia was their destination: 2.58 million visited China, 2.29 million visited the Republic of Korea, 1.89 million visited Taiwan, and 1.43 million visited Thailand. However, the single most visited country was the U.S., with 3.57 million Japanese travelers (1.48 million of whom visited Hawaii).<sup>3</sup>

At the same time, the vast majority of inbound tourists to Japan came from Asia. In 2016, total visitors came to 24 million, 6.37 million of whom were from China, 5.09 million from Korea, 4.16 million from Taiwan, and 1.83 million from Hong Kong.<sup>4</sup>

The breakdown of 2017 statistics for Japanese traveler destinations is not yet available, though the total number of outbound travelers was 17.88 million, an approximate increase of 700,000. Meanwhile, inbound visitors totaled 28.69 million (an approximate increase of 4.5 million), with growing numbers from Asian countries: 7.35 million from China (up 1.02 million), 7.14 million from Korea (up 2.05 million), 4.56 million from Taiwan (up 400,000), and 2.23 million from Hong Kong (up 400,000).<sup>5</sup>

In addition to this human movement, mobilities also cover the fields of technology, finance, and information (mass media, the internet). Considering that the movement of people is almost certainly

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3 Japan National Tourism Organization, Tourism Statistics 'Residents'/ Japanese Visits Abroad'

JTB Tourism Research & Consulting Japan, Tourism Statistics 'Residents'/ Japanese Visits Abroad'

4 Japan National Tourism Organization, Tourism Statistics 'Overseas Residents' Visits to Japan'

5 Japan National Tourism Organization, Tourism Statistics 'Overseas Residents' Visits to Japan'

accompanied by the movement of money, things, and information, it is arguable that there is more than a little significance in examining the dynamics of human interaction.

There are various reasons for the movement of people. These reasons can range from individuals with business, labor, academic, and research objectives to refugees who are forced to relocate. The vast majority of the aforementioned Asian visitors to Japan do so with the mindset that sightseeing = tourism. Within this context, this paper focuses on tourism and mobilities while considering social development in Asia.

## I. Tourism in Asia: Mobilities across national borders

Tourism, which warrants examination as one of the mobilities in Asia, basically means round-trip travel across national borders. In a narrow sense, tourism is understood as "sightseeing," while in a broader sense, it often refers to non-sightseeing activities including vacationing, convalescence, recreation, homecomings, as well as commerce.<sup>6</sup>

From the perspective of a tourist's intended purpose of travel, Cohen differentiates modes based on the effect of the tourist's travel experience: the diversion mode (simple recreation as an escape from conventional boredom), the recreation mode (recuperating and relieving mental and physical fatigue through a recreational/entertaining-style of tourism), and the experience mode (desiring contact with the lifestyle patterns and values of the people in the travel destination).<sup>7</sup>

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6 IWASHITA, *Border Tourism*, 2017, p.164

7 SUDOU & ENDOU, p.44

However, tourists are not the only ones experiencing change through tourism. The local residents in the travel destination incur a significant impact, while there are also those who help produce and coordinate this tourism. These three parties co-create tourism while also being impacted by it, which makes it important to consider the interrelationships of all three parties.<sup>8</sup>

Similarly, a crucial point is whether tourism engenders affinity, or whether it generates conflict, between the travelers and the local residents. For example, if tourism development undermines the daily customs and values of the local residents, the dissatisfaction and opposition from those locals may be directed towards tourism.<sup>9</sup>

The type of tourism that this paper seeks to examine is that which engenders encounters across national borders. The area of focus is Tsushima in Nagasaki Prefecture, which highlights the relationship with local residents affected by a rapid increase in tourism.


As an island sandwiched between the Korean Peninsula and Kyushu, Japan, Tsushima's history has included functioning as a point for negotiation between Japan and the nearby continent. From Japan's perspective, Tsushima is the frontline for mediation with the continent, though geographically, it is some 145 km removed from Fukuoka, Japan, while being approximately 50 km from Busan, Korea. Since a ferry ride to Tsushima from Busan takes about two hours (or even less than one hour by high-speed ferry), the destination offers the most accessible trip abroad and the influx of Korean travelers has continued to grow since the 1990s.

Despite a drop in visitors after the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake, there has been an increasing trend since 2012. *The Korea*

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8 SUDOU & ENDOU, pp.46-47

9 SUDOU & ENDOU, pp.46-47



(The Graph made by Nagasaki Prefecture’s Tourism Statistics)

*JoongAng Daily* has reported on the trend saying, "The greatest appeal of Tsushima is that it can offer an overseas trip for only about 50,000 won if you make the best use of specially priced options and (10,000 won) duty-free discounts."<sup>10</sup>

Tsushima has been marketed as a destination for Korean tours due to its famous sites with ties to Korea, such as those in centrally located Izuhara. These sites include the marriage memorial commemorating the turbulent life of Princess Deokhye, daughter of Emperor Gojong of Korea and the memorial at Shuzenji temple commemorating the martyrdom of Choi Ik-hyun, a patriot in the final days of the Joseon Dynasty.

Nearly all of the South Korean visitors to Tsushima take part in dining and shopping. The aforementioned *The Korea JoongAng Daily* has carried comments from repeat visitors saying, "I was able to distract myself from my daily life without spending too much time or money. I enjoyed a change of pace while experiencing the feel

<sup>10</sup> *The Korea JoongAng Daily* (Japanese), ‘290,000 Korean Tourists: Why is TSUSHIMA popular among Korean’, March 8, 2013

of a different country. You can save money on the boat fare, too, if you shop around." The article continued, "Despite being so nearby, it's an authentic trip abroad that requires you to show your passport and everything. The duty-free shops are a huge plus to visiting Tsushima. The ones in the Busan passenger terminal are great." Many travelers buy Japanese-made sundries, food, and beverages in bulk on Tsushima, with *The Korea JoongAng Daily* quoting one person saying, "The recent weakness in the Japanese yen makes local prices there feel cheaper."<sup>11</sup>

At the same time, other comments coming from the concerned representative of a travel company for Koreans crossing over to Tsushima addressed the boom in travelers who have an unabashed interest in shopping. The travel agent noted, "Many cases of visitors just skimming the surface of Tsushima and walking right past the historical sites important to us Koreans." And also remarked, "It hurts the image of Korea when some travelers exhibit bad manners and behavior."<sup>12</sup>

Unfortunately, some tourists' manners and the lack of mutual understanding of values and customs has led to certain shops refusing to serve Koreans and certain local residents developing feelings of opposition. Some of those voicing outright opposition have begun to argue that "Tsushima's travel industry is becoming controlled by Korean capital through the surge in visitors from that country," and, "Local land purchases with Korean money continue to take place. Their intention is to eventually make Tsushima a territory of Korea."<sup>13</sup>

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11 *The Korea JoongAng Daily* (Japanese), op. cit.

12 Ibid.

13 MIYAMOTO, 'A Strange Report: TSUSHIMA: the Sakimori's Island' *Sankei*

Since the island's population of about 30,000 people is accommodating more than 300,000 Korean visitors, it is only natural for guests (tourists) and hosts (local residents) to develop mutual grievances when sufficient measures, such as ample infrastructure, are not in place. This is where the importance of additional actors — the producers or facilitators of tourism — comes into play.

The influx of Korean tourists to Tsushima topped 350,000 people in 2017. With infrastructure still insufficient to accommodate these numbers, policies by the Tsushima Tourism Association and the local government are addressing the issue, while efforts with local businesses and Japanese capital are underway to build tourist lodging facilities and the like.<sup>14</sup>

The amount of consumption by tourists to Tsushima in 2017 exceeded 18.6 billion yen, or 610,000 yen on a per resident basis. Considering that in the same year the amount of tourist consumption in Nagasaki Prefecture as a whole was approximately 393.1 billion yen (290,000 yen per capita), the importance of the tourism industry in Tsushima becomes apparent.


It is important to be cognizant that most of those who take an alarmist view of the booming Korean tourism to Tsushima, and who maintain that it is a menace to an island on the boundary of Japan, where the population is aging and grey, have neither visited Tsushima (and therefore do not know the needs of the people on the island) nor have they provided support to Tsushima's efforts toward

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*News*, October 29 and 30, 2017

14 *The Nishinihon Shimbun*, ‘The people of Hidakatsu port are embarrassed by 260,000 tourists from Korea’, April 20, 2018

*The Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, ‘A tourism development is booming in Tsushima’, July 21, 2018



(The Graph made by Nagasaki Prefecture's Tourism Statistics)

regional vitalization. To these voices, Tsushima's important function is as a defensive front on Japan's national boundary, while the future of those living on the island is secondary.

## II. Border Studies and Tourism

In the field of border studies, an area like Tsushima is positioned as a border land. The origin of border studies came with the growing importance of national boundaries arising from the spread of sovereign states in Western Europe in the 17th century. Research approaches to the field, however, developed in the 1980s in England and other countries.

Akihiro Iwashita explains current border studies as follows:

Border studies, which handles issues of boundaries and national borders, takes up phenomena surrounding boundaries that bring about differentiation (distinguishing self from other) derived from the spaces themselves where people exist, the spaces that people possess, and elements of collective awareness. In a globalizing



world, this academic field engages in multifaceted analysis of theories of various spaces and boundaries that are formed, transformed, and reorganized.

The field especially examines mechanisms for avoiding conflicts surrounding spaces, including all manner of incidents related to people's lives, ranging from authority, immigration, the flow of goods, and culture. Furthermore, considering that, in the actual spaces of modern society, there are diverse points of conflict, such as areas (borders) where countries come together and ethnic groups oppose or cooperate, border studies sheds light on the people living there, divided by borders or forced to straddle borders. The field also elucidates awareness of self and other in certain places, even as regions and residents are altered by circumstances, and, in varying levels of granularity, traces manifestations of conditions in other places. While embracing disconnects between realities and awarenesses of these boundaries from the very start, to the extent that reproduction continues in an historical context, border studies shares an awareness of the problem of how to decipher boundary phenomena, explores the existence of problems in specific regions, observes their circumstances, considers approaches to resolutions, and offers idea for how to achieve these resolutions.<sup>15</sup>

With regard to borders, Yoshihisa Mihara explains that they are dividing lines between countries and between different states; they generally demarcate territory between nations. He also explains that borders differ from boundaries, which refer to the limits created by the spatial jurisdiction of sovereign nations. Borders are specific

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15 IWASHITA, *Introduction to Border Studies*, 2016, pp.22-23

edges created by the controlling force of a country, such that other countries opposite the edge come to possess controlling force as well. Furthermore, he introduces Konrad & Nicol, researchers of the Canadian-American borderlands, noting that the concept of borderlands encompasses boundaries, borders, frontiers, and border regions.<sup>16</sup>

With regard to the efficacy of the borderlands concept, Iwashita explains that it, in some sense, is a relationship of opposition akin to the relationships of nucleus vs. periphery, centrality vs. regionality in countries, though it allows the operation of spatial border-ness (a peculiar space because it abuts the national border). In other words, by conceiving of the national border as an expanse rather than a line, it allows for identifying practical challenges to be addressed by the border region in the area of politics and economics.<sup>17</sup>

These practical challenges for borderlands change relative to the degree of permeability of the border. If the situation is one of a closed border with nearly no cross-border interaction (i.e., alienation, to use Oscar Martinez' classification), then military apparatuses are deployed and commanded. If round-trip, cross-border excursions are allowed, the result is more than simply travel taking place across a border. Challenges arise with regard to forming economic cooperation and hubs of interactions straddling the border.<sup>18</sup>

Tsushima's existence as a borderland is a resource and the island fulfills the role of being a gate opening onto and connecting two countries. By visiting the borderland of Tsushima, Koreans who have

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16 MIHARA, Yoshihisa, 'A Study of the Actual Circumstances on "Cross Border Tourism"' in *Bulletin of Osaka Meijo University*, Vol.3, 2003, p.71

17 IWASHITA 2016, p.51

18 IWASHITA 2017, pp.65-66

found value in crossing the border are able to receive goods and services, while the residents of Tsushima receive economic activity, in what can be a relationship of mutual benefit.

The problem is people who try to avoid cross-border visitors without understanding these possibilities for Tsushima. Border tourism is an attempt to make people like this notice the similarities and differences that they have with people and communities across the border.

Ryu Shimada offers the following explanation of the objective for promoting border tourism in Japan:

Border tourism is sightseeing with borders and national boundaries as the entryway; however, for Japan, which is surrounded on all sides by water without visible national border lines, this has not been pursued much to date. As many regions on the border, including outer islands near the border, struggle with shrinking populations and industrial activity, the objective is to generate appealing tourism in the local area, then connect that to a greater number of visitors.

By creating new travel-related appeal through experiences that leverage the qualities of the border region, and by boosting tourist numbers arriving with that target in mind, the goal of border tourism promotion is to have this contribute to local economic vitalization, mainly centered on the travel industry.<sup>19</sup>

In Japan, the Japan International Border Studies Network (JIBSN)

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19 SHIMADA, ‘Development of Border Tourism between Tsushima and Busan’, 2017, pp.11-12

is an organization of border-region municipalities and research bodies planning and implementing Tsushima-Busan tours, as well as preliminary border tourism activities between Wakkanai-Sakhalin, Taiwan-Yaeyama, and elsewhere.



(IWASHITA 2017, p.18)

Shimada divides border tourism into the three categories of viewing, crossing, and combining and viewing. For example, the quintessential case of border tourism that involves viewing is the experience of

standing at the Panmunjom Joint Security Area on the impassable, military border between North and South Korea.

If the border area is at peace, it becomes possible to take commemorative photographs straddling the two sides of the border. In the case of the Singapore-Malaysia border, travelers can cross the border in a standard bus from the border town of Johor Baharu. Border tourism that involves crossing the border is where travelers traverse into a border region and follow the same itinerary on either side of the border.

Shimada's third category, border tourism that involves combining and viewing, is particularly relevant in a place like Japan where there are no visible borders. Tours of this variety combine observations of the cultures on the opposite sides of the border, allowing for the study of commonalities, differences, transformations, etc. of cultural elements on either side of the border.<sup>20</sup>

One example is Tsushima-Busan tour participants from Japan who see the history of Edo-period Korean delegations to Japan, as observed through local historical materials in Tsushima, as a symbol of how friendly relationships were recovered and Japan-Korea affinity restored through the efforts of Tsushima residents after ties were lost following the Imjin War (1592-1597). In a challenge to this opinion, visitors to the Busan historical museum covering the Korean delegations to Japan see how the "same" historical event can have different interpretations on each side of the border, learning how the activity involved the introduction and propagation in Japan of the historically advanced culture of the Korean Peninsula during that day and age. Reported results include travelers being surprised when

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20 SHIMADA 2017, pp.11-12

gaining this awareness.<sup>21</sup>

The preliminary efforts at border tourism by the JIBSN only just got off the ground in 2013 and have not yet developed into full-fledged travel packages. Going forward, it will be necessary to continue expanding and enhancing their content so that it attracts repeat visits to Tsushima by Koreans, while increasing the number of Japanese tourists as well.

### III. The Possibilities for Border Tourism

The aforementioned border tourism that involves combining and viewing can be described as a type of study tour. On this point, Masatoshi Takeuchi indicates that peace studies, which, like border studies, is characterized by interdisciplinary and practical aspects, presents structural violence as a new analytical framework and adopts exposure visits as an approach to tours that foster an awareness of problems through actual experiences. He notes that, as tours and participants increase, the significance of border studies for tourism appears to have possibilities for educational benefits for travelers, in addition to communicating problem awareness and viewpoints that cannot be elicited by academic dialogue alone.<sup>22</sup>

Today, as a means of research and education on problems related to peace, human rights, and the environment, various study tours are being developed, such as eco-tours focusing on observing natural forests and mangroves, as well as so-called "dark tourism" expeditions visiting sites of past massacres and disaster-afflicted areas.

An important characteristic of these types of study tours is

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21 IWASHITA 2017, pp.35-60

22 TAKEUCHI, 'Book Review: Iwashita, Border Tourism', 2018, pp.159-160

the substantial educational benefit they have for participants; however, due to their nature, they are small scale tours for a limited number of participants. In other words, while such tours have a significant impact in terms of transforming and fostering the views of participants, their overall social impact is, in many cases, not particularly significant. One can say that border tourism in Japan at present, which is in a trial and error phase, is confronting similar issues.

It seems necessary to consider collaboration with mass tourism as a means of strengthening the social impact of this kind of border tourism. Let us look at the example of tourism from Taiwan and Hong Kong to Okinawa and Yaeyama.

In recent years, the number of tourists to Okinawa has continued to increase, with 9.39 million (surpassing the number for Hawaii) in 2017. The Yaeyama Islands are approximately 410 km from the southern edge of Okinawa's main island. Ishigaki, centrally located within Yaeyama, is some 280 km from Taipei, while the outer island of Yonaguni is only 110 km from Hualian, Taiwan.

There are an ample number of airline routes connecting Taiwan with Okinawa and Ishigaki, though a characteristic of visits is the increasing popularity of cruise ships due to the proximity to Ishigaki.

The number of visitors to the Yaeyama Islands in 2017 grew by more than 130,000 year on year, exceeding 1.38 million people. Foreign visitors from abroad also reached an historical high at 2.17 million (84,440 from Taiwan, 29,869 from Hong Kong, and 24,035 from China). Port visits by foreign cruise ships totaled 132 (with 0 visits from domestic cruise ships), carrying more than 350,000 passengers.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> *The Yaeyama Mainichi Shimbun*, ‘1.38 million tourist visited Yaeyama’, February 3, 2018

Reasons for tourists choosing to take part in cruises include the travel time and the price. In the case of Busan — Tsushima, the appeal lies in the speed and affordability of high-speed ferries, while the Taiwan — Yaeyama route requires a three-day trip. However, passengers can ride for only 50,000 yen and can spend the trip enjoying dining and entertainment on the ship.<sup>24</sup>

The Yaeyama Islands are still a popular destination for domestic tours in Japan. While foreign visitor numbers are increasing, Japanese visitor numbers still remain high. The current situation is one in which foreign travelers, mainly from Taiwan, receive a cross-border experience through the visit, while nearly all Japanese travelers stop at Yaeyama and lack this recognition of the place as a borderland.

It seems that Japanese people are visiting to seek out the atmosphere of the Yaeyama Islands, and Yonaguni (the westernmost part of Japan) in particular, as a destination on the edge of the map. However, there are really no "edge of the map" destinations on the planet — another part of the world always continues beyond. Border tourism is a type of tourism that brings about this realization.

Although we see the world as being demarcated by borders, such as national borders, this is a type of fiction; most borders are not accompanied by physical obstacles or marks such as walls or actual lines. This is particularly evident for maritime boundaries. On maps and charts, there are clear lines showing territories and exclusive economic zones, while in real life, we can cross back and forth over these lines without seeing any marks in the water.

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Okinawa Prefecture, Tourism Statistics 'Visitors to the Yaeyama area'

24 TAMURA, 'Taiwan in the Yaeyama, the Yaeyama in Taiwan: The journey seeking the exchange of cultures and peoples', 2016



Ocean tours can convey the concept that our world is not separated by water, but is instead connected by it. The reputation of the 15th century Ryukyu Dynasty, an island state, included the label of being a "Bridge of Nations." Following this concept, it is possible to have broad expectations for trips crossing oceans, encountering different communities and people, and forming connections.

The vessels calling at the port in Ishigaki are mainly large ships with 1,000 to 2,600-passenger capacities, which is an example of mass tourism. While the main target of the cruises appears to be amusement and recreation on the ship, sightseeing at the port of call is also an important aspect. If tours can engender awareness of the connections between the origin (Taiwan) and the port of call (Ishigaki), which, for example, could include Taiwanese people communicating that pineapple is the main product of Ishigaki today, then many participants can gain an opportunity to experience the process of developing mutual understanding through awareness of others and changes in outlooks.

However, in order to pair mass tourism and study tours, initiatives are needed to build up destination areas in a way that will allow them to accommodate large groups of observers and visitors. In doing so, it is important to pay sufficient attention to preserving the authenticity of the destination as it undergoes development.

## **Conclusion**

In considering tourism and mobilities in Asia, the proposed examples of Tsushima and Yaeyama may be special cases. Although both are borderlands that developed in peaceful ways, they share the feature of hosting exceedingly few Japanese visitors who use

the destination as a point for crossing the border. Hence, they are apt regions for a consideration of border tourism targeting Japanese people.

Border tourism is arguably able to provide effective study opportunities for deepening mutual understanding to help tourists exhibit behavior conducive toward a positive reception in the destinations they choose to visit, and in order for them to be able to appropriately welcome tourists into their communities.

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<http://www.pref.okinawa.jp/site/somu/yaeyama/shinko/documents/documents/documents/gaikyou201701-12-syuusei.pdf>

## 活動報告

# SUPRI Project Annual Report April 2018 - March 2019

## Group 1 “Human Security and SDGs”

Group Members:

Vesselin Popovski, Hideaki Ishii, Hideki Tamai, Masashi Nakayama

### Research Subject

“Achieving Sustainable Development Goals and Mitigating Climate Change through Humanitarian Competition”

The research group in SUPRI on Sustainable Development (Popovski, Tamai and Ishii) between May and October 2018 prepared and submitted Category B application for Kaken hi grant with the title “Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals and Mitigation of Climate Change through Humanitarian Competition”. The proposal investigates whether the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change (PACC) represent new type of international agreements that manifest a shift towards what T. Makiguchi in 1903 defined as ‘humanitarian competition’. It assesses attitudes towards the SDGs and the PACC in selected countries testing the hypothesis that because these agreements are based on voluntary commitments - transparent, reviewed over time, and facilitated by global mechanisms - states can utilize ‘humanitarian competition’ to

implement these agreements.

## Scientific Background

The prominent Japanese philosopher and educator T. Makiguchi, who defined the Value-Creating Education (SOKA), in his book *Geography of Human Life* (1903) examined various forms of competition—military, political, economic—and argued that these competitions exhaust human energy and do not produce peace and happiness. He introduced a new type of competition — humanitarian - accepting the need and reality of competition, but ensuring that it is conducted on the basis of human values, combining humanitarian concerns with competitive energies. Makiguchi regarded this shift as a qualitative transformation, moving from a winner-takes-all mode of competition, to a conscious co-operative win-win mode. ‘humanitarian competition’ effectively reconciles co-operation and competition. Makiguchi’s ideas did not materialize during the 20th century, as a result of being marred by devastating World Wars and a prolonged Cold War. This project investigates whether the SDGs and the PACC, based on ‘soft law’, may give rise to such hopes in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, substituting internationally imposed obligations and sanctions.

The SDGs are a perfect example of ‘soft law’ that states adopt without entering into classical ‘hard law’ international treaty-making process. They represent a different approach from previous agreements, transforming the global governance, as the co-operation does not stop when the goals are reached, on the opposite, the SDGs introduce new practices in a complex political process that can bring new actors, new ideas and new action for sustainability.

The PACC combines ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law, inviting states to co-

operate without establishing sanctioning mechanisms. In this book, *“Implementation of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change”* (Routledge 2018), Popovski argues that the traditional top-down approach, exemplified by 1997 Kyoto Protocol, was unfit for the future global climate change regime, as states were naturally reluctant to accept obligations decided by outside bodies, and to face sanctions in case of non-compliance. The PACC can be seen as a new type of international agreement, based on bottom-up commitments along with the facilitation of the implementation of these commitments. Gradually the ‘sanctions committees’ are transforming into ‘facilitation committees’.

### **Research Question and Hypothesis**

Can the SDGs and the PACC be implemented through the evolution of ‘humanitarian competition’? The hypothesis is that these agreements signal a shift towards humanitarian competition, because states voluntarily pledge nationally determined commitments (NDCs) that can be reviewed over time facilitated through transparency, technology transfer and global funds. As far as these agreements do not envisage sanctions for non-compliance, states are expected to comply driven by humanitarian reputational considerations. The implementation of these agreements aim to protect and improve not only the life of own citizens, but also the life of all people on the planet, which fits into Makiguchi’s ‘humanitarian competition’.

### **Significance and Originality**

The impact of the project will be significant in showing paths to

solutions to dangerous global challenges. The research is original and first-hand, as nobody has ever yet explored the SDGs and the PACC through the prism of ‘humanitarian competition’. The novelty is also that the new type of international agreements allow for non-state actors — companies, philanthropists, civil society, academia - to take important part together with state actors. The research includes successful experiences from municipal authorities often significantly outpacing national counterparts, operating through vehicles like C-40, a network of the world’ s megacities committed to addressing climate change. The SDGs and PACC are conducive to long-term normative agenda-setting: they provide states with individual freedom to interpret and enact self-determined goals, but within an articulated long-term collective agenda, facilitated by interaction, communication, and information sharing.

## **Research Plan**

The project assesses evolving attitudes towards the SDGs and the PACC both in developed and developing countries and shows how some states can plan for more ambitious, not only minimal, commitments, with the flexibility to adjust those commitments down, -if they find that their methods are not working, or to account for a change in government, change in domestic priorities, etc. Other states can make modest commitments first and then adjust those up, if they find their methods are working better than expected, or if domestic priorities shift in favor of policy enactment. The research will look not only at governments but also at how business and civil society are instrumental in implementing the agreements. No state, even the most powerful, is able to fix climate change, inequality or ecological



damage, without acting in the mode of ‘humanitarian competition’.

The project runs for four years 2019-2023 and collects successful examples of how states abide by the new agreements without pressure from monitoring or sanctions. In regular workshops top scholars bring latest knowledge on how the SDGs and the PACC can be implemented and how countries signal preference to less formal and more flexible international agreements, where instead of sanctions facilitation emerges, where transparency and accountability replace monitoring and verification. The research methodology includes documentary research, analysis of latest policy decisions, and travel to developing countries to assemble views and allow for a rigorous brainstorming. The project will result in articles in peer-reviewed academic journals and, op-eds in significant newspapers. Its website will constantly be updated, mapping the progress in implementing the SDGs and the PACC. The investigators will write annual reports on the progress and present papers at conferences to disseminate the project’s findings.

The investigators have a remarkable record in similar collaborative research projects. Popovski initiated, developed and completed over twenty such projects and published them in edited books or articles in journals. He is capable of intellectually leading the project, to organize its work, bring into it world-class scholars and confidently guide them on how to contribute to achieve the project’s objectives. His publications include *‘Emotions in International Politics: Beyond Mainstream International Relations’* (Cambridge University Press 2016); *‘Spoiler Groups and UN Peacekeeping’* (Routledge 2015); *‘Access to International Justice’* (Routledge 2015); *‘International Rule of Law and Professional Ethics’* (Ashgate 2014); *‘Legality and Legitimacy in Global Affairs’* (Oxford University Press 2012); *‘After Oppression: Transitional Justice in Latin*

*America and Eastern Europe*' (2012); '*Norms of Protection: Responsibility to Protect and Protection of Civilians*' (2012); '*Blood and Borders: Responsibility to Protect and the Problem of the Kin-State*' (2011); '*Human Rights Regimes in the Americas*' (2010); '*Democracy in the South: Participation, the State and the People*' (2010); '*Engaging Civil Society: Trends in Democratic Governance*' (2010); '*Building Trust in Government*' (2010). Popovski co-edited the book '*World Religions and Norms of War*' (2009) which became the UNU Press' all-time bestseller.

Apart from books, Popovski published 'Win-win Formula for Reforming the UN Security Council' (*Oxford Yearbook of International Law and Jurisprudence* 2016), a critical assessment of 25 years of fruitless negotiations to enlarge the Council's membership, proposing a Model '8+8+8' that gained global recognition and is often cited. He has also challenged well-established notions: his article 'De-Mythologizing Peacekeeping' (*Journal of International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 19, No. 1-2, 2015) questions two axiomatic perceptions about peacekeeping - that it is 'Chapter six and a half' and that it must become 'robust', offering alternatives to these conceptual confusions. Popovski published 'Raphael Lemkin: Inventing and Codifying Genocide' (*Jus Gentium* Vol. 3, Issue 1, 2018, pp. 181-215) criticizing the excessive glorification of Lemkin in the legal literature. His article 'Fighting the Colonel: Sanctions and the Use of Force' (*Jindal Journal of International Affairs* Vol. 1, Issue 1, 2011, pp.149-162) reveals how the sanctions on Libya produced the opposite effect and made Gaddafi even more dictatorial.

Co-investigator **Hideaki Ishii** brings into the project his expertise in Development Economics, and Economics of Peace and Disarmament. He has published extensively on extreme poverty, on widening gap between rich and poor, on environmental degradation, climate change, overpopulation, illicit arms trade, and

other such occurrences that endanger human dignity and hinder socio-economic development. He investigated the negative impacts of military expenditures on economic development and advocates that it is imperative to transfer resources away from military to developmental programs and to integrate development and security policies, previously planned and implemented separately. Ishii also explored a new type of human security and global governance which encourage all countries to confront common threats together with shared awareness, responsibility and action to realize the well-beings for all, combining economic development, social inclusion, and environmental sustainability. In recent years, Ishii, as a member of the board of Toda Peace Institute, engaged in various projects on climate change and conflict, human security and global governance, arms control and disarmament. This opportunity has enabled him to create and expand his network with leading scholars, policymakers and practitioners around the world. Among his publications are: ‘Thoughts on a Significance of Human Security with a focus on Disarmament, Development and Peace’ (*Soka University Peace Research*, vol.20, pp.1-43, 2014); ‘Realizing a Decarbonized Society through Japan-China Cooperation’ (Joint Research Policy Proposal with Masahiro Kawai, Japan National Press Club, June 2008). ‘Some Thoughts on the Economics of Peace and Disarmament’ (*Soka University Peace Research*, vol.18, pp.5-42, 1997). ‘The Pursuit of Real Security in a Changing World — New Concepts and Perspectives’ (*Soka Economic Studies Quarterly*, Vol.25, pp.133-161, 1996). ‘On the Economics of Disarmament and Peace — New Research Fields and Future Directions’ (*Soka Economic Studies Quarterly*, Vol.26, pp.137-148,1996). ‘New Vision of Security for the Next Century — from Disarmament, Development, Environment and Human Rights Perspectives’ (*Journal*

of *Soka Women's College*, vol.20. pp.17-62, 1996).

Co-investigator **Hideki Tamai** is an expert in International Relations and Peace Studies. His research examines and promotes Human Security in terms of norm entrepreneurship and in terms of policy making and implementation [‘Development of Japanese Government Strategy of Peacebuilding in Post-Cold War era’ (*Sociologica*, Vol.34, No.1-2, 2010); ‘Issues with Human Insecurity in Japan: the Case of US Military Bases in Okinawa’ (*Soka University Peace Research*, No.29, 2015)] He has also been studying Global Governance for Human Security, For example his analysis of the UN Trust Fund for Human Security (UNTFHS) presented it uniquely as a novel type of international regime from the perspective of constructivism [‘Forming of a Human Security Regime and International Organization’ (Yamamoto et.al. eds., *International Organizations and International Institutions*, Shigakusha, Inc. Tokyo, 2017)] Prof. Tamai will be highly instrumental for this project as he will be the best to examine how major actors in the international arena may or may not obey the SDGs and PACC from perspectives of Global Governance or Human Security Studies. Tamai is also very experienced in leading many international conferences, such as the International Symposium “Human Security in Asia”, “Global Governance for Human Security” [*Soka University Peace Research*, No.30-31, 2017], and “Building a Peace Community in Asia in 2017” [*Proceedings of Peace Forum in Okinawa 2017*]. He will play an important role in presentations of the research achievements in conferences and symposia.

We invited **Masashi Nakayama** to join us in drafting and executing this project, having in mind his international legal experience and solid academic achievements. Nakayama published extensively on the following questions: How can international law play a role for

peace and how does “rule of law” apply at international level? How can the realization of human dignity become a central contributor to international peace? Do we need to search for a new form of international law in order to enhance the UN’s role in global governance and serve the interests of humanity?

This project is conceived as a natural and smooth continuation from previous works undertaken by the investigators. The SDG slogan ‘Leave No One Behind’ is also a core postulate of human security. All investigators have done research that extensive in quantity, as well as significant in quality. Working at the same University - Soka - they can coherently work together in the next years to examine and reveal how ‘humanitarian competition’ can be a driving force towards the implementation of the new type of international agreements. All four investigators possess both individual strength and collective synergy, they have expert knowledge and ability built throughout their long and highly recognized academic careers. Also the facilities in Soka University will be the best possible research environment for this project, as no other University in the world carries out so committedly the legacy of Makiguchi invention and definition of ‘humanitarian competition’.

### **Other research activities of the cluster on Sustainable Development**

In July 2018 Popovski took part in the Annual Meeting of the ACUNS in Rome, Italy, and presented a paper ‘Soft Law’, seeking feedback from the ACUNS participants. With other Japanese academics (Shoji, Takeuchi) members of ACUNS, Popovski is planning to develop more knowledge on soft law agreements, such as

SDGs, PACC, R2P, Global Compact on Migration etc.

In September-October Popovski undertook a field visit to Delhi, India, to have meetings in universities and think tanks and had discussions with academics, researchers and policy makers, consulting with them how to enrich and contextualize the project proposal on the SDGs and the PACC to the needs of developing countries.

During the reporting period (April- December 2018) Popovski collaborated with Prof. Aigul Kulnazarova and completed the editing of the *“Palgrave Handbook on Global Approaches to Peace”* (Routledge 2019). He also published the chapter ‘Renovating the Principal Organs of the United Nations’ for the book ‘Just Security in an Ungoverned World’ edited by W. Durch, J. Larik and R. Ponzio (Oxford University Press 2018) and the chapter ‘The Future of Law and Ethics’ for the book *‘Future Courses of Human Societies: Critical Reflections from the Natural and Social Sciences’*, edited by G. Kleber (Routledge 2018).

In December 2018 Popovski presented the Keynote Speech at the Tsukuba Educational Model United Nations (TEMUN) on ‘Conflict Resolution and Sustainable Development’

In January 2019 Popovski participated in the World Economic Forum (WEF) in Davos, Switzerland, an annual gathering of top policy makers, economists, governance experts etc.

## 活動報告

# SUPRI Project Annual Report April 2018 - March 2019

## Group 2 “Global Justice and Human Rights”

Group Members:

Tracey Nicholls, Rob Sinclair, Hanna Zulueta

### Research Subject

“Understanding Sexual Violence: Epistemic Injustice, Law, and Social Awareness”

The Global Justice and Human Rights research team was constituted at the first meeting of academic year 2018, April 25, 2018. We were charged with developing a research plan that we would present at the next meeting of the Soka University Peace Research Institute (SUPRI) in July 2018, and would develop into a *Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research* (KAKENHI) application for research funding from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (submitted October 2018).

### 1. Research targets and plan (methodologies and schedule)

In our first team meeting (May 16, 2018), we met to discuss our respective research interests, with a view towards establishing the

overlap out of which we might develop a collaborative research project.

Dr. Nicholls is part of a four-person international team of scholars hired as faculty in Soka University's newly-created Graduate School of International Peace Studies (SIPS). This school and the M.A. degree it offers were created at the request of the Japanese Ministry of Education (MEXT), as part of their identification, and development, of Soka University as one of the Top Global Universities of Japan. She was appointed in April 2018 to teach in the areas of peace studies and gender studies. Her doctoral research considered the question of how ethical and political norms present in improvised jazz could help build more democratic political communities and more robust systems of protection for human rights. Her first faculty position was in the United States, teaching philosophy of law, ethics, and political philosophy, and co-directing a Women's Studies Program. As the university began to respond pro-actively to the general academic climate of concern regarding campus sexual assault, she began to work in the areas of gender justice and eradication of sexual violence, creating and directing a student group—much like the Believe Campaign currently working to introduce sexual consent education at Soka University. There she staged education and awareness events and helped train students in bystander-intervention techniques, which are a sociologically-recognized way to reduce sexual assault. Since arriving at Soka, motivated by the education and reform power of the “me too” social movement, she has begun researching and writing a book that brings her interest in improvisation together with a commitment to gender justice and equality, a book about improvisatory strategies (“culture-jamming”) to end the cultural conditioning (“rape culture”) which allows sexual



violence to be ignored or minimized.

Dr. Sinclair is a philosopher appointed in the undergraduate Faculty of International Liberal Arts (FILA), and is also appointed to teach graduate courses in the SIPS program. He taught in Canada and the United States before he came to Soka University. His area of expertise is pragmatist philosophy, specifically, American Pragmatism, a scholarly approach that stresses the practical relevance of philosophy to society. Currently, he is expanding his research interests to include exciting new work being done at the intersection of ethics and epistemology: theorizing epistemic injustice, a concept introduced by English philosopher Miranda Fricker, and its implications in gender relations. Fricker’s work on epistemic injustice gives us the resources to theorize the persistent derogation of women, the systematic campaigns against women’s credibility, and the corresponding assumption routinely furnished to men in public life: that they are competent professionals who can accurately grasp and describe reality. All of these harms—demeaning, disbelieving, dominating—are epistemic ones, and they are defining characteristics of the phenomenon of “rape culture,” a pervasive environment not just of explicit sexual violence, but of varied manifestations of disrespect for women’s personhood. When we look around the world at the many countries that are having, in their own distinct ways, #metoo moments and #metoo movements, we can see that we all have something to learn about justice and human rights from the ways these moments and movements are being voiced and being responded to. In both his teaching and his research, Dr. Sinclair examines these concepts and institutions from a socially-engaged critical standpoint.

Dr. Zulueta is a sociologist whose research specializations are

in gender and global migration. She has research and teaching expertise in issues of human trafficking and the role of gender in rights violations. Like Dr. Sinclair, she is appointed in FILA and cross-appointed in the SIPS graduate program. Dr. Zulueta was part of the inaugural faculty of FILA, appointed to teach in sociology and Japan Studies. As a researcher in Japan Studies and in the causes and effects of global migration, she brings an extraordinary cultural literacy to our discourses about justice and rights. Her research and teaching into the life chances of women who experience the added vulnerabilities of statelessness, dislocation, and poverty brings a set of skills in comparative analysis to our collaborative project. She too is interested in researching the cross-cultural discourse on gendered abuse and exploitation that is taking place under the label of the recently-emerged and rapidly globalizing “me too” movement, and is paying particular to developments in the Philippines and in campaigns of solidarity with stateless victims of sexual violence and other gendered harms, like the Rohingya.

In that first meeting of our three-member research team, it quickly became clear that our respective research interests all overlapped on the matter of gender equality as a basic principle of justice. As members of Soka University’s Peace Research Institute (SUPRI) and researchers in areas that overlap on questions of global justice and human rights, we agree that gender equality is a fundamental aspect of justice, and of human rights. In particular we see the importance, in our current global human rights context, of exploring the theorizing that noted scholars and activists from Japan and around the world have been doing, from a gendered perspective, on the topics of justice and human rights. As two of us are trained as philosophers, our dominant approach to methodology emphasizes

theoretical analysis of concepts and research problems. This is reflected in the project we have designed, but the addition to the team of a sociologist means we will also be doing data-driven comparative analysis.

Trends in our respective disciplines support our overlapping research interests and justify our consensus decision to explore the gendered aspects of global justice and human rights. These trends include philosophy’s recent growing interest in the intersection of epistemology (theories of knowledge) and ethics: a commitment to socially responsible philosophy epitomized by Miranda Fricker’s groundbreaking work on the concept of epistemic injustice.<sup>1</sup> This type of injustice occurs either when the harm that is experienced by a person is something for which their social world lacks the concepts required to make sense of their experience (a harm the person does not know how to name) or the person is not recognized as a believable holder of knowledge (a harm to one’s testimonial credibility). Another current and influential discourse, in peace studies, focuses on the concept of “structural violence” as an innovative way to understand social injustices such as poverty, racism, and sexism as forms of violence.<sup>2</sup> It furnishes us with a way of speaking about violence and injustice that does not depend on identifying individual acts of malevolence or harm; a social structure can bring violence into a person’s life by denying him or her the opportunity to meet basic needs, social needs, or self-actualization

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1 Miranda Fricker, *Epistemic Injustice: Power & the Ethics of Knowing* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

2 Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research,” *Journal of Peace Research*, volume 6.3 (1969): 167-191; Galtung, “Cultural Violence”, *Journal of Peace Research*, volume 27.3 (1990): 291-305.

needs. Both “epistemic injustice” and “structural violence” offer robust explanatory schemas for the empirical observation that the “average woman” has fewer and more constrained opportunities for a stable and successful life than her male counterpart in the same society. Additionally, global best practices in gender studies and sociology of gender have intensified feminist analysis and activism in the area of rape culture and sexual violence, and have contributed to the worldwide education movement about women’s experiences that many of us know as #metoo. Much of this analysis, activism, and education has been responsible for the legal reforms we see globally in areas such as updated legal definitions of rape, for example.

In the course of our discussions of these trends, we developed a three-year research project that has formed the basis of our 2018 application for a Grant-in-aid for scientific research (a KAKENHI application).

## **2. KAKENHI proposal**

title: “Understanding Sexual Violence: Epistemic Injustice, Law, and Social Awareness” (Grant-in Aid for Scientific Research (C) (General), submitted October 2018)

We have proposed a comparative theoretical project that looks at philosophical and sociological thinking about global justice and human rights through a gendered lens: social action to reduce (ideally, eliminate) sexual violence against women. While women are not, of course, the only victims of sexual violence, the larger social climate that normalizes and perpetuates sexual violence—the misogyny, objectification, and exploitation known as “rape culture”—is a set of

conditions that disadvantages women, in particular, as citizens and social agents. The focus of our project is:

- I. theorizing sexual violence as a form of structural violence—defined as any social organization in which “*human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic [physical] and mental realizations are below their potential realizations*” (Johan Galtung, “Violence, Peace and Peace Research” p.168) and
- II. examining the types of epistemic injustice—injustice done to people as knowers—that serve to promote, or work to reinforce, sexual violence within rape culture.

Our research project draws on different strands of academic thought—philosophy, for its theoretical precision; sociology, for its empirical and comparative focus; peace studies, for its analysis of violence; and gender studies, for its analysis of social equality—to examine sexual violence, in particular, as a human rights violation of concern to those who seek to build global justice. In proposing to analyze sexual violence as “structural violence,” we intend to highlight how social institutions can cause or enable harm and injustice, and in proposing to analyze sexual violence as “epistemic injustice,” we aim to highlight how both institutions and interpersonal relationships can hide or conceal its harms. The overarching purpose of our project—what makes it original—is that we will be producing an innovative and comprehensive interdisciplinary theoretical analysis that makes all of us, as social actors, more aware of the ways we need to restructure our social world so that we can reduce harm and end unnecessary suffering.

We plan to do this by bringing together experts in a range of relevant fields from around the world: to create a video library of

the expertise demonstrated in the public lectures they will give and the workshops they will participate in, and to invite them to contribute essays to a book we will edit—a collection of innovative theory on how to educate people and how to reform institutions so that sexual violence and harms are reduced. We are going to survey the best practices in academic theory on justice and human rights, and in social reform and activism, on the question of how to teach individuals and how to shape institutions so that we all take collective responsibility for reducing sexual violence. Our research project, through the events and publications we produce, will contribute to greater knowledge of the harms of sexual violence, greater ability to make social progress towards a more just and gender-equal world, and the greater peace and development that can be harnessed in a world where women are equal contributors of knowledge, instead of being victims of sexual coercion and unevenly distributed social privilege.

During what we hope will be the first year of funded research (academic year 2019), we plan to begin work on a journal article that presents our own theoretical analysis of innovations that offer a better understanding of the injustices of sexual violence, and we will also be working on extending invitations to the speaker series we are planning for academic year 2020 and the workshops we are planning for academic year 2021. Our co-written essay, to be produced and published in academic year 2019, will form a conceptual and discursive framework for our project, including the edited collection we will produce in the third year (academic year 2021). In the second year, we will host an interdisciplinary speaker series on gender justice and sexual autonomy, inviting a maximum of eight speakers to campus for public lectures (Spring term: April—July 2020, and

Fall term: September—December 2020) to share their expertise in analyzing legal reforms in the area of sexual violence, in comparing Japan’s legal and cultural climate with other jurisdictions, in demonstrating how advertising messages can enable sexual violence, in organizing responsible education and victim-support campaigns at the university level, and other questions relevant to understanding connections between sexual violence and gender inequality, or gender injustice. In the third year of funding (academic year 2021), we plan to host two day-long workshops that will call for both speakers on structural violence and speakers who can analyze epistemic injustice through a gendered lens, in order to establish links between the ideas produced in our speaker series, arguments developed in the separate research paper we co-write in academic year 2019, and the work currently being done by philosophers in epistemology and ethics on epistemic injustice, in particular as it pertains to gendered epistemic injustices. This would include questions such as why rape victims are disbelieved. All events, speaker series and workshops, will be recorded and transcribed, for permanent archiving—ideally, on the Soka University Peace Research Institute website—and selected speakers will be asked to contribute to the edited collection we produce. The edited collection will offer comparative and theoretical analyses of ways to correct and prevent the harms that sexual violence brings about: both to individual human beings, and to the concept of gender justice. When the manuscript is completed at the end of the research award period, it will be submitted to a university press for publication.

We anticipate inviting scholars whose research considers ways that universities and university students are working to reduce sexual assault and educate their communities about consent; ways that

advertising (of alcohol, in particular) normalizes lifestyles that lead to or are strongly correlated with sexual violence; and ways that we need to reconceptualize our understanding of justice in order to see the gender bias (or lack of sensitivity to the impact of gender) in our current grasp of what counts as justice or injustice. We also want to include activist voices who can offer the perspective of victims of this violence, and talk from a victim-advocacy standpoint about how they have learned to survive and heal from the harms they have suffered. By the end of the research period, there will be a permanent archive (the video library mentioned above) of the speaking and workshop events we organize around these researchers, and a collection of the best of this knowledge in a book we (Drs. Nicholls, Sinclair, and Zulueta) will be editing. The 2019 article we co-write, our theoretical analysis of the injustices of sexual violence, will be reworked to conceptually frame the other contributions to innovative thinking on eradicating sexual violence. We hope that the video library will be housed permanently on a stable Soka University website and, together with the book, will comprise a lasting resource for how the social problem of sexual violence needs to be theorized.

### **3. Activities of team members (articles, presentations, seminars, conferences)**

As we are a newly-formed team awaiting the results of our first application for funding for this project, an overview of our research activities relevant to this project is largely a report of present and prospective achievements.

In present achievements, Dr. Sinclair recently presented a paper called “Dewey’s Unmodern Philosophy and the Ideology of



Technicism” at the University of Helsinki, Finland, in June of 2018. The analysis of epistemic justice he offers in this paper represents the philosophical research base he brings to our project. Dr. Zulueta has obtained a book contract with Palgrave MacMillan, to publish her new book on migration and transnational identities in military bases in Okinawa.

Our goals for academic year 2019 include writing and submitting for publication two separate co-written articles, both in SCOPUS-indexed journals, and creating a partnership with Soka students to produce a #metoo-related art installation.

The first collaboration is the article the Drs. Nicholls and Zulueta are co-writing on how to understand “me too” as a globalized phenomenon. We will argue that the best way to understand #metoo is as an umbrella concept that links various national movements for gender justice and social equality. We will be making this argument through multiple theoretical lenses—mobility studies; peace studies; gender studies—that all have important insights for interpreting the significance of this most recent rupture of institutionalized gender roles. To achieve the widest audience for our argument, we will be looking at publishing in either *the Journal of Peace Research* or *Gender and Society*, both noted and widely-cited journals.

The second collaboration involves all three of us co-writing a theoretical analysis of the injustices of sexual violence. Here we will make our arguments for understanding sexual violence as “structural violence,” and the need to hold accountable social institutions can cause or enable harm and injustice, and as “epistemic (testimonial) injustice,” which, in its emphasis on interpersonal relationships and its identification of power inequities and abuses within those relationships, mirrors much of the “me too” discussion we are seeing

these days. This article, written to be publication in SCOPUS-indexed *Philosophy Compass*, will form the initial framework through which we announce and explain our project; we anticipate that a substantially reworked version will later form the conceptual-editorial framework for the edited collection we plan.

In addition to those interventions into academic discourse, we also want to harness the power of art to educate and to understand. We plan to involve students with interests in peace studies and gender justice in an on-campus presentation of samples of #metoo-related artwork as a way of educating the university community about sexual and gender-based violence. As #metoo-related movements take hold in countries around the world, we have begun to see a great deal of visual creativity in how these ideas are being presented, so we would like to have posters made of some of the most eye-catching of these images, and situate them around the Soka campus for a limited period of time. This would be an excellent way to involve students from the Believe Campaign: they could lead walking tours of the installation pieces and educate people about their student group, which promotes the importance of consent in respectful human relationships. And, should we find a suitable place on campus, this could perhaps be a permanent installation, paying tribute to Soka University's ongoing commitment to developing our students as creative agents of social justice and peacebuilding.

## 活動報告

# SUPRI Project Annual Report

## April 2018 - March 2019

### Group 3 “Multilateralism in Asia”

#### Group Members:

Jonathan Luckhurst, Minoru Koide, Hartmut Lenz, Kenji Nakayama

#### Research Subject

“Shaping 21st Century Multilateralism: Shifting Contexts of Global and Asian-Regional Economic Governance”

This research project analyzes how multilateralism in Asia is influenced by global and Asian-regional economic governance. The Principal Investigator and Co-Investigators examine this topic through distinct theoretical lenses, especially liberal, game theoretic, and constructivist approaches. This constitutes an analytically ‘eclectic’ study (Katzenstein and Sil 2011; Lake 2013), rather than privileging a narrow framework, integrating the trend in International Relations research to reduce theoretical silos. The Principal Investigator, Jonathan Luckhurst, will research how global governance networks influence Japan’s 2019 host presidency of the Group of Twenty (G20) and subsequent G20 rotating presidencies. Co-Investigator Hartmut Lenz analyzes the impact of domestic constraints and the formalization of institutions on the successes or

failures of intergovernmental treaty negotiations, developing a model to compare the ASEAN Plus Three and EU Treaty negotiations. Co-Investigator Kenji Nakayama will focus on local multilateralism and sub-regions in Asia. Co-Investigator Minoru Koide will conduct a comparative analysis of East Asia regionalism, analyzing the significance of competing trends in regional cooperation.

The core purpose of this research is to indicate how recent shifts in global and Asian-regional governance influenced multilateral economic cooperation, by examining linkages between these global and Asian-regional influences. This constitutes an innovative, multilevel-governance approach, indicating strengths and weaknesses, in addition to complementarities and conflicting aspects, of different layers of governance. The focus of the research is the connectivities, in particular, between key contexts and actors of global and Asian-regional governance and cooperation. This includes analysis of how diverse actors influence global and regional governance, across important institutional contexts and policy areas of economic governance, particularly trade, finance, and development issues. This analysis focuses on how global and regional governance networks influence these policy areas and organizational contexts, involving state and sub-state regional officials, international organizational actors, and the increasingly significant role of non-state actors.

The literature on multilateralism, global governance, and Asian-regional governance has increased substantially since the 1990s, when James Rosenau (1992) identified increasingly complex interactions that constituted new forms of global governance in the post-Cold War context. This reflects the growing importance of formal and informal aspects of multilateralism, including key developments such as the World Trade Organization in 1995; the start of the 'ASEAN

Plus Three’ process in 1997; and the Group of Twenty (G20) summits since 2008. The proposed project would contribute to the existing scholarly literature by focusing on the multilayered, multicontextual, and heterogeneous dimensions of twenty-first century multilateralism, in terms of the organization, policy areas, and actors involved. This would provide useful insights for scholars and policy practitioners into how new contexts, issues, and actors of global and Asian-regional governance influence contemporary multilateral relations and practices.

The G20 has become the leading global economic governance forum, as a ‘hub’ of coordination between these states, leading international financial institutions, and other ‘stakeholders’ in managing diverse policy areas. The Asia-regional members have been influential in this context, with the South Koreans, Chinese, and the Japanese hosting the G20 presidency and influencing the agenda in important ways. This indicates the importance of combining analysis of global and Asian-regional economic governance, as the two have become increasingly interconnected since the global financial crisis.

### **Purpose, scientific significance, and originality of the research**

There have been important new developments in global and Asian-regional economic governance since the global financial crisis of 2008-09. This research would help inform scholars, policymakers, international officials, and non-state actors in global and Asian-regional governance and multilateral cooperation about the effects of these developments on multilateral cooperation. The aim is to provide a coordinated and coherent analysis of key contexts of multilateral cooperation on economic governance since the global

financial crisis, to demonstrate the influence of global and regional governance networks on policy agendas and outcomes.

The four investigators will analyze different aspects of the core topic. Principal Investigator Jonathan Luckhurst examines how transnational governance networks influence G20 economic multilateralism, focusing on how state, non-state, and international institutional actors mutually constitute the G20 policy agenda. He analyzes the influence of these G20 governance networks on Asian-regional economic governance. Co-Investigator Hartmut Lenz will research how domestic constraints and the formalization of institutions influence successes or failures of intergovernmental treaty negotiations. This includes developing a model that incorporates the role of uncertainty, institutional constraints, and negotiations success. The model will compare the ASEAN Plus Three and EU Treaty negotiations. The results will help improve success rates in treaty negotiations. Co-Investigator Kenji Nakayama will focus on local multilateralism and sub-regions in Asia. He aims to examine the significance and potential of sub-regional economic zones throughout East Asia. His research, along with analyzing the actual economic situations and characteristics of both the East Asian region as a whole and the sub-regional zones, examines the driving force behind cross-border cooperation between local governments. Co-Investigator Minoru Koide will conduct a comparative analysis of East Asia regionalism, analyzing the significance of competing trends in regional cooperation, such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership.

The four contributors to the project therefore cover the different levels of analysis. This includes Luckhurst's focus on the global,

deploying a combined social constructivist, discourse analytic, and sociology of professions analytical framework; Koide’s focus on the global-regional context, with a liberal institutionalist analytical framework; Lenz’s analysis of intergovernmental negotiations between state actors utilizes a game theoretic approach to intergovernmental bargaining; and Nakayama’s analysis of sub-state regional interactions, with a political-sociological focus on local actor-networks. These four levels of analysis, deploying an inclusive, ‘eclectic’ analytical framework, indicates how these global and regional governance networks contribute to Asian-regional multilateral cooperation and economic governance. The research methodology is heterogeneous or eclectic, with the four contributors analyzing distinct aspects of the research question.

### **The anticipated research outcomes**

The four components of the research project will achieve insights that contribute to the broader conclusions of the project, about how shifting contexts of global and Asian-regional economic governance will shape twenty-first century multilateralism.

Luckhurst examines how global governance networks shape twenty-first century multilateralism, through interactions between organizations, actors, and policy issues in the global and Asian-regional contexts. This research analyzes how G20 governance networks shape contexts of global governance and Asian-regional multilateral cooperation. This includes an analysis of G20 governance networks on sustainable development governance, gender economic equity, and sustainable economic growth, to examine how discourse on ‘sustainability’ and ‘inclusivity’ has influenced G20 and Asian

policy debates. This analysis includes a particular focus on the G20's outreach engagement forums. The research for Luckhurst's contribution would include several interviews and participant observation, based on his participation in the Think20 forum and extensive contacts with actors involved in other G20 engagement processes, especially the Civil20 and Women20 forums.

This assesses how these global governance networks have influenced, and been influenced by, Asian-regional economic governance norms and practices. There is substantial evidence of a decentralizing effect in global governance authority since the 2008-09 global financial crisis, with Asian regional actors gaining influence in global economic governance, especially in sustainable development governance. This component of the project examines consequences of the increased role of Asian regional actors in global governance networks, especially G20 networks, on global development governance. It provides further insights on the consequences for Asian-regional multilateralism, especially relations between East and Southeast Asian G20 member states.

The aim of Lenz's research for the project is to understand the impact of domestic constraints and the formalization of institutions on the successes or failures of intergovernmental treaty negotiations. Lenz argues one common feature of treaty failure is that they can be reasonably called *involuntary* by the national governments, to the extent the behavior of the domestic actors who are involved in the ratification process is beyond the control of government representatives responsible for signing international agreements. This stands in sharp contrast to the fact that intergovernmental negotiations are often centered around the concept of states as unitary actors, with a single set of preferences. Nowadays it is



widely agreed that domestic politics and international relations are deeply entangled. Putnam (1988) interprets this situation as a “two-level game”. While this idea is intuitive, Iida (1993) criticizes that the model does not sufficiently describe the reasons and conditions for negotiation failure. This project’s aim is to close this gap and to explore the interconnections between governments’ negotiation strategies, formalization of institutions and domestic constraints. Therefore, it provides a detailed picture of the bargaining dynamics and increases our understanding under which conditions negotiations are more likely to succeed or fail. Specifically, Lenz answers two sets of questions:

- 1) If the unitary actor assumption is not applicable, do domestic constraints have an impact on the negotiation process and on governments’ negotiation strategies?
- 2) What is the impact of institutional settings on the negotiation process? Are these settings exogenously given or do they evolve as part of governments’ negotiation strategies?

On the basis of the highly formalized EU treaty negotiations and more informal ASEAN Plus Three negotiations, this research aims to specify under what conditions domestic actors constrain governments and how these conditions depend on institutional polity.

The contribution from Koide examines key trends in East Asia regionalism, analyzing the significance of competing influences in regional cooperation, especially the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. This comparative study of regionalism examines how forms of multilateral cooperation have been influenced by Asian-regional and global developments since the global financial crisis. This includes a focus on recent dynamics

in international relations, especially the rise of China, in global and regional contexts, and the consequences of the U.S. Trump Administration to Asian and global cooperation.

The comparative dimension also assesses the priorities and goals of the Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean governments in global and Asian-regional economic cooperation. This assesses key regional political and economic issues, and how state actors are adjusting to twenty-first century developments in multilateralism and economic governance. The anticipated results from this part of the project is to ascertain how global, Asian-regional, and state actors and issues shape Asian-regional economic cooperation in the post-2008 context.

Nakayama's study argues that if the East Asian economic zone actually develops at the international level, then specific industries, such as those dealing with agriculture, forestry, and fishing, will be unable to avoid having a negative impact on local economies. Thus, correspondence of some form will be needed to accompany compensation, either before or after such negative impacts have occurred. Sub-regional exchanges between locals can be thought of as having a mitigating effect on a new, non-national scale on the negative impact of expanding regional disparities that accompany the formation of free trade zones. Support for such initiatives from cooperating national and local governments would lay the groundwork for an East Asian economic zone.

However, circumstances for sub-regional economic zones are diverse, and to develop actual exchanges requires a variety of factors. As such, a more accurate analysis of the situation facing sub-regions is essential. The role of local governments in sub-regional economic zones, the most important factor in the development of the Pan-Yellow Sea Region, is crucial. Political willingness of top officials of

local governments to focus on conditions necessary for expanding trade and direct investment is also required. Even the Pan-Yellow Sea Region, which faces many challenges, is expanding and deepening cross-border cooperation between local governments, so policies to offset the limitations of intergovernmental cooperation may emerge in the future.

Sub-regional economic zones distributed throughout the East Asian region, having emerged in new, cross-border spaces along the coastal rim, are likely to develop into international actors. Whether market-driven or based on national strategies, the transformation of sub-regional economic zones into international actors foretells the organization of a new international system with multilayered and multicentric characteristics.

### **Project-related conference**

The project leader organized a one-day international conference, with the support and cooperation of the Soka University Peace Research Institute (SUPRI), on the theme, “Prospects and Possibilities for Japan’s 2019 G20 Osaka Summit.” This was hosted at Soka University on December 10, 2018. The theme is linked to the project theme of Asian influence in global and regional economic governance, since it focused on the influence of Japan as the host of the G20 this year. The event was held shortly after the inauguration of Japan’s G20 Presidency, with its Osaka Summit due to be held on June 28-29, 2019.

The conference was organized in collaboration with the G20 Research Group of the University of Toronto; Griffith Asia Institute at Griffith University; and the Russian Presidential Academy of

National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA). The event brought together international and Japanese scholars, representatives from the Think20 (T20) and Women20 (W20) official G20 engagement forums, and diplomats and officials from member states and international organizations.

The first panel session focused on the G20's role in global governance, especially since its inaugural summit in November 2008, during the global financial crisis (GFC). There were also thematic panels on the key issues of G20 economic governance, gender governance, and climate, energy, and sustainability governance. Two further sessions focused on the prospects and possibilities for Japan's G20 Presidency.

One conclusion from these discussions was that the G20's role has substantially shifted over the past decade, from crisis cooperation to an increasingly complex policy agenda. Some participants emphasized its importance as a global governance "hub," guiding interactions between diverse global actors and organizations on several policy areas. There was greater skepticism about whether the G20 constituted a multilateral, or plurilateral, 'club.' This was due to the perception, among some speakers, that normative divergence undermined the potential for a collective G20 sense of 'we-ness;' others also indicated the growing normative divergence among Group of Seven (G7) members since 2016.

Conference participants noted that the G20 agenda greatly expanded over the past decade, especially due to the influence of non-G7 member states. South Korea's G20 Presidency in 2010, which included sustainable development, was considered the key moment when the forum's agenda began to diversify beyond the initial priorities of its leading wealthy states, centered on financial

governance reform and an economic recovery strategy during the GFC. Policy areas such as food security, employment, climate change, and gender economic equity were subsequently incorporated in the agenda, especially through the host presidencies of Mexico, Russia, Turkey, China, and Argentina. A couple of speakers debated the potential for a greater focus on security at the G20, whether conceived in conventional military terms or linked more broadly to climate, food, energy, and other issues. This indicated how the forum influenced both narrower and broader dimensions of global security, though it remains significantly less of a focus than economic governance.

There was some debate about how the G20’s agenda expansion influenced its efficiency and legitimacy, in terms of its organizational capacity to progress on a range of policy issues, hence efficiency effects; but, also, legitimacy gains from the G20 prioritizing broader issues, many of them priorities for developing-state members. This issue has been a point of contention among G20 stakeholders and experts since the GFC; arguably, the expanded G20 agenda has become too established for any significant reduction to be feasible, absent another crisis, which could lead to a narrower focus in future. Another key legitimacy and efficiency issue was the restricted G20 membership, and trade-offs between size and coordination capacities.

Several participants stressed the importance of intensifying efforts to enhance summit commitment compliance, a growing topic of debate in recent years. There have been some notable G20 failures to comply with summit commitments, including the failure to implement the fossil-fuel subsidy phase-out, pledged at its Pittsburgh Summit of September 2009. Conference speakers noted the value of the compliance analysis and reports from the G20 Research Group at the

University of Toronto and RANEPa in Moscow. One speaker noted the data indicated that holding ministerial meetings tended to raise G20 compliance scores in related policy areas. This might encourage future host presidencies to continue to increase the number of G20 ministerials, a trend among recent host presidencies.

One important issue was the truncated time-frame for Japan's G20 Presidency, due to the Osaka Summit being held in June. Many participants at our conference, as well as at the T20's Inception Conference in Tokyo on December 4-5, argued that the effectively-shortened presidency meant there should be greater emphasis on implementing the existing policy agenda, rather than adding new topics. The G20, as well as the T20 and other engagement groups, would have little time to develop ambitious new proposals or conduct new research.

On the significance of the official G20 engagement forums and other forms of outreach, participants indicated the public diplomacy benefits from these activities. Some contextualized G20 outreach within the broader global governance trend since the 1990s of increasing engagement with non-state or civil society actors. One speaker perceived a new normative principle of growing inclusivity in global governance, though several noted that the role of engagement groups like the Civil20, T20, and W20 remains ambiguous, and their forms of engagement and composition rather arbitrary.

The conference included discussions of Japan's G20 policy agenda. It was noted that only half the scheduled ministerial meetings would occur before the Osaka Summit, which might diminish progress on issue areas where relevant ministerials were held afterwards. Japanese priorities for the summit would include, for the Sherpa Track, free trade, science and technological innovation, quality infrastructure

investment for development, global health, climate change, aging populations, and promoting the Sustainable Development Goals. The Finance Track would prioritize debt sustainability and transparency, plus focus on the effects of immigration and demographic shifts on the tax base. This would constitute a continuation of key aspects of the existing G20 agenda, with some new focus on demographic issues such as aging and migration. The Buenos Aires Summit leaders’ declaration emphasized World Trade Organization reform, so the Japanese agenda on promoting free trade would likely be influenced by this inherited issue.

One speaker said that the Argentine G20 Presidency had been “bottom-up” in its agenda deliberations, incorporating suggestions and policy priorities from G20 stakeholders. It was noted that the Japanese have been more “top-down” in constructing their agenda for the Osaka Summit. However, as experienced by the Australians in 2014, when trying to narrow the scope of the agenda to their core priorities for the Brisbane Summit, it is sometimes difficult to keep tight control of the G20 agenda. This might also be counter-productive, if it undermines cooperation or decreases constructive policy inputs from G20 stakeholders.

The conference left the impression that the G20 faces an uncertain future. There were strains in relations between key G20 members during the Argentine host year, though a couple of speakers noted the relative success of the Buenos Aires Summit. Despite prior concerns about tensions between the American and Chinese governments, especially on trade, fears that a leaders’ declaration would not be agreed were unfounded. The Japanese G20 Presidency comes at a time of growing doubts about the forum’s capacities to manage global economic uncertainties, security tensions, and global environmental

threats. The coming months provide an opportunity for the Japanese hosts presidency, and other G20 governments and stakeholders, to improve multilateral cooperation across the diverse policy agenda.

### **Research plans of the project members**

The main focus of the Principal Investigator's research over the next year will be to continue examining the role of the G20 in global economic governance, during the Japan G20 Presidency year. This includes his work as member of the T20 Task Force on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

These T20 activities will include participating in the T20 Tokyo Summit in May 2019, also contributing to the Task Force policy report that will be presented as part of the T20 report to the G20 Osaka Summit in June. The Principal Investigator has already participated in a number of T20 activities, including the T20 Buenos Aires Summit in September 2018; as well as the T20 Inception Conference held in Tokyo in December 2018. These activities included field research on how global governance networks influence the G20, including a series of semi-structured interviews conducted during the T20 Buenos Aires Summit. These interviews formed an important part of the research for a subsequent conference paper, presented at the German Development Institute's conference, "The G20 @ 10: Benefits, Limitations and the Future of Global Club Governance in Turbulent Times." This paper is the basis for the forthcoming article, by the same name, to be published by the South African Journal of International Relations.



Principal Investigator Jonathan Luckhurst’s contribution includes the following:-

*Publications*

(Forthcoming) “Governance Networks in Shaping the G20 Agenda,” *South African Journal of International Relations*.

(Forthcoming) “The G20 Hub of Decentralizing Authority in Post-Crisis Global Governance,” *International Organisations Research Journal*.

(Forthcoming) “A Constructivist Approach to the G20,” in Slaughter, S. ed. *The G20 & International Relations Theory: Perspectives in Global Summitry*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing.

*Guest presentations and conference papers*

Future:-

“Asian Influence on the G20’s Sustainable Development Consensus: How Decentralizing Authority is Shaping Global Governance.” International Studies Association Annual Convention, Toronto, 4-7 March 2019.

Already completed:-

“Women, Digitalization and the Future of Work: Challenges and Opportunities of Disruptive Technologies.” Invited to give keynote (on “G20 engagement groups”) at this Chatham House roundtable for Japan’s Women20 forum launch, at the British Embassy in Tokyo, 20 November 2018.

“Governance Networks in Shaping the G20 Agenda.” Invited to

present and give keynote at German Development Institute (GDI/DIE) conference on *The G20 @ 10: Benefits, Limitations and the Future of Global Club Governance in Turbulent Times*, Bonn, 23-24 October. 2018

“G20 at Ten: Navigating a Decade of Turbulence in Global Economic Governance.” Invited to present at Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration workshop *G20 and BRICS: Pursuing Multilateral Solutions to 21<sup>st</sup> Century Challenges?* Moscow, 10 October 2018.

“Gender Mainstreaming: A Strategic Approach for G20.” Invited to contribute to a Think20 Gender Economic Equity Task Force panel at the Buenos Aires Think20 Summit, 17-18 September 2018.

“No Going Back: Making Gender Equality Happen”. Invited to be a speaker at the Chatham House 2018 International Policy Forum, London, 9 July 2018.

(2018) “The Contextual Rationality of ADB—AIIB Cooperation: Shifting Practices of Global and Asian Development Governance.” International Studies Association Annual Convention, San Francisco, 4-7 April.

**Co-Investigator Hartmut Lenz’s** contribution includes the following:-

Paper Presentation at the 2019 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association (MPSA), Chicago (1-4 April). Title: “The Impact of Public Opinion on Intergovernmental Treaty Negotiation”.

Abstract: This develops a game-theoretical model of the negotiation process that analyses the role of institutional constraints, public opinion and credible commitments. The derived hypothesis will be the basis for an empirical analysis of ASEAN Plus Three and EU treaty negotiations.

Political Economy Research Seminar Presentation: “Brexit the ultimate EU treaty negotiations” at Waseda University (March 2018).

Paper presented at the 2018 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association(MPSA), Chicago (March). Title: ‘Modelling iterate negotiation within the framework of European Negotiations’. Abstract: The aim of this research is to understand how iterate negotiations in the environment of the European Union lead to further cooperation.

PSPE Research Seminar Series Presentation: "Step by Step, Effects of Public Opinion on Intergovernmental Treaty Negotiations” London School of Economics, Department of Government, (January 2018).

“Achieving Effective International Cooperation: How Institutional Formalization Shapes Intergovernmental Negotiations” (2018) *World Affairs* 181 (2), Sage Publication.

Abstract:

This article explores how formalization of institutions and domestic constraints influence the outcomes of international cooperation and negotiation processes particularly in a regional setting like the European Union (EU) or the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Examining different forms of institutional setup along the formal-informal continuum, this

study evaluates their impact on the successes and failures of intergovernmental negotiation processes. While some scholars have been vocal about the importance of institutional setting on negotiation outcomes, there has not yet been any systematic analysis of the impact of institutional variations on the actual negotiation process. This project specifies under what conditions domestic actors constrain governments, and how these conditions depend on institutional structures. I analyze the impact of institutional variations, concentrating on negotiation failure and deadlock situations, to form a framework that can differentiate between various bargaining situations and to understand their impact on the possibility to facilitate successful negotiation outcomes. The central argument highlights the need for more nuanced connections between institutional design, domestic constraints, and the level of formalization to understand the likelihood of success or failure of intergovernmental negotiation processes.

**Co-Investigator Kenji Nakayama's** contribution includes the following:-

*Recent Activities*

Book (Chapter)

Nakayama, K. (with T. Sadotomo) (2018). "Mekong Region and Changing Borders: A Focus on the CBTA and BCPs," in H. Taga and S. Igarashi. eds. *The New International Relations of Sub-Regionalism: Asia and Europe*. London: Routledge, pp.160-179.

Article

Nakayama, K. (2019). “East Asia’s Development and Subregional Economic Zones: Toward Activating the Rim,” in Soka University Peace Research, Vol.33. (in printing)

*Presentations*

Nakayama, K. (2018). “East Asia’s Development and Subregional Economic Zones: Toward Activating the Rim,” at Taiwan/Japan/Korea Peace Forum, “Prospects of Cross-strait Relations and East Asian Developments,” in Taipei, October 7.

Nakayama, K. (2018). “A Dispute Concerning Possession of the Takeshima / Tok-do and Subregional Cooperation in Japan-Korea Relations,” at KAKENHI (B, 16H05700) Seminar, “A Multi-layered Subregion and the New Security Architecture in East Asia,” in Waseda University at Tokyo, October 13.

*International Seminars*

(Moderator) Nakayama, K. (2018). “Prospects for Peace on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia,” (Panelists: Yi Kiho (Hanshin University, South Korea), Ulv Hanssen (Soka University)), at Soka University, November 16.

(Moderator) Nakayama, K. (2018). “Improvement of Relations between Japan and China,” (Panelists: Lian Degui (Shanghai International Studies University, China), Yuji Morikawa (Nagasaki University), Nobumasa Kameyama (Keio Research Institute at SFC)), at Soka University, November 30.

(Moderator) Nakayama, K. (2018). "Inter-Korean Reconciliation under US-China Rivalry," (Panelists: Jung Kim (University of North Korean Studies, South Korea), Hideki Tamai (Soka University), Minoru Koide (Soka University)), at Soka University, December 21.

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## 活動報告

# SUPRI Project Annual Report April 2018 - March 2019

## Group 4 “Peacebuilding in Africa”

Group Members:

Nikolas Emmanuel, Satoshi Sasaki

### Research Subject

“The Promise of a Peace Dividend: Economic Aid and the Facilitation of a Sustainable Peace”

Since submitting the Kakenhi Grant (C) application in early November 2018, Professors Emmanuel and Sasaki have taken four steps to advance Group 4’s project on the relationship between foreign aid and peace processes in Africa and beyond.

First, we put together our thoughts on the patterns in the aid-peace relationship in the manuscript, “Patterns of Economic Aid and Peace Processes in Africa”. In doing so, one of the key efforts went into (1) gathering key literature on the topic and (2) looking for cases that could be used to illustrate the patterns that are clear in the aid-peace relationship. The two steps in outlining these patterns provide an excellent starting point for our project.

Second, Nikolas Emmanuel is in the process of using my personal research funds to purchase access to the online monthly journals *Africa Research Bulletin and Africa Confidential*. These journals and their archives are critical resources necessary to help outline the histories of the cases used in our study.

Third, in order to advance the book project, Nikolas Emmanuel contacted the editor for the African International Relations group at Routledge. Professor Emmanuel will travel to France this summer to talk with him. While in France, he will also undertake archival research at several university libraries that specialize on Africa.

Finally, Nikolas Emmanuel has submitted a paper proposal to participate in the International Studies Association (ISA) conference in Accra, Ghana that will take place from August 1-3, 2019. This conference will focus on African affairs and would be a perfect opportunity to get our first feedback on the project.

It is our hope that these four activities will serve to advance our project into the end of 2019.



# Patterns of Economic Aid and Peace Processes in Africa

Nikolas Emmanuel (SUPRI)  
Satoshi Sasaki (SUPRI)

## Introduction:

Donors can have a significant impact on the behavior of aid recipient countries, far beyond the projects they finance. Accordingly, external economic assistance represents a potentially strong incentive for peace after conflict has ended (Emmanuel and Rothchild, 2007; Emmanuel, 2015). This research advances the point put forward by Shepard Forman and Stewart Patrick (2000: 1), who argue that aid funds can “persuade formerly warring parties to resolve conflicts peacefully.” The end of warfare brings widespread hopes on the part of the exhausted rivals that the international community will support peace with increased economic aid. Some, such as Abu Bah (2013), have gone further and argued that this is in evidence as an emerging “new humanitarianism”, in which donors provide critical aid to help propel the recipients through the peace process and beyond. When aid providers back peace processes with financial resources, there appears to be a significantly higher likelihood that peace will last

longer than those that do not receive such funding. That is to say, one should expect periods of post-conflict peace to be longer when supported by donors with significant packages of economic aid.

Inversely, this research points to the conclusion that there is a higher likelihood that peace will breakdown and the conflict will recommence if donors do not provide significant post-conflict economic assistance. As Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (2002: 5) argue, after the achievement of peace “[t]here is a considerable risk that conflict will resume and *aid might directly reduce this risk*” (my emphasis). Susan Woodward et al. (2005: 331) also point out in a similar manner that there is a “widely accepted notion that an immediate “peace dividend,” rapid reconstruction, specific schemes such as financing reforms required in the peace agreement, and early, large-scale employment of demobilized soldiers are important to solidify the peace”. This study supports the assertion that economic aid can help solidify peace. This article proposes an empirical study that will examine the role of foreign assistance in seventy-one post-conflict peace processes across Africa between 1989 and 2006 (Harbom, Hogbladh, Wallensteen 2006; Hogbladh 2012). We examine these dates due to the dramatic increase in the use of peace agreements to settle intrastate wars during the period following the Cold War, as well as the increased availability of data on the subject. The end date of 2006 allows for five years of economic assistance data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in order to examine the trajectory of aid flows after a given peace settlement. We argue here that this aid pattern is critical in the success or failure of peace agreements. This is an important discussion since the literature has largely ignored the impact of the pattern of aid distribution provided to support peace processes in

Africa and beyond.

Peace incentives, defined here as an extensive post-conflict economic development assistance package aimed at enticing the various parties involved in the conflict to favor pursuing peaceful interactions, have deep implications for donors and recipients alike (Woodward 2002). Donors can have a positive impact using their aid to help bolster post-conflict peace, helping stabilize the international system, reducing negative externalities, alleviate human suffering, etc. For the recipients, economic assistance should provide an incentive for peace, allowing former warring parties to bargain (Rothchild and Emmanuel 2006: 28). In the wake of a devastating war, societies find themselves in desperate need of resources to rebuild. Part of the logic behind providing a peace incentive after the end of conflict is that by holding out the prospect of economic aid to meet these needs, the external actor or actors are attempting to promote peace by making the former warring parties stakeholders in the new and hopefully more prosperous post-conflict order (Emmanuel and Rothchild 2007). It seems apparent that offers of donor assistance should influence states and non-state rebel groups alike and encourage them to pursue more peaceful interactions. Furthermore, a post-conflict peace incentive can assist in alleviating the initial grievances that led to conflict in the first place. Former warring parties can convince their respective constituencies to pursue peace by touting the benefits of economic aid, including humanitarian assistance, reintegration of combatants, economic recovery, the rebuilding physical infrastructure, among other activities. As David Cortright (1997: 273) argues, aid should make the prospect of peaceful relations generally more attractive. The aim here is to establish the claim that aid matters in achieving lasting peace.

However, some identify a growing “peacebuilding malaise” in the international community and among academics (Duffield 2012). It is clear that what the literature refers to as the security-development nexus matters in this discussion. Aid is particularly problematic in this relationship. As Mark Duffield (2010: 54) points out, “rather than aid being a neutral institution, would-be recipients have come to see international assistance as an extension of Western foreign policy.” Although this understanding is nothing new in itself, the recent use of “development-based counter insurgency” strategies, with donor money at its center, in places such as Iraq and Afghanistan has undermined the idea of aid neutrality even further. While considering this critical view, the research presented in this study takes a slightly different approach. We examine whether economic aid can act as an incentive to convince former warring parties to stick to a peace process. Here, we ask about the strength of aid as an incentive in building peace.

In order to address this topic, the following paper is broken down in two sections. The first part frames economic aid as an incentive offered during peace processes. Second, we discuss the three central aid patterns provided by donors after civil conflicts.

### **Aid as an Incentive during Peace Processes in Africa.**

Peace processes are attempts to end violence between at least two opposing belligerents in a conflict and efforts to resolve the groups’ incompatibilities that led to the conflict. According to Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg (1997: 342), peace agreements, the potential end product, are fundamentally an understanding on how the parties will “explicitly regulate or resolve their basic

incompatibility." In addressing these problems, the resulting agreements spell out how the "warring parties contract to halt organized violence and redress outstanding political, social, and/or economic grievances" (Toft 2010, p.150). In the period following the Second World War, the vast majority of civil wars end in outright military victory of either the state or rebels (Pillar 1983; Stedman 1991). This changed as the global system shifted after the Cold War. Since then, many intrastate conflicts have ended through the achievement of peace agreements between the belligerents (Hartzell and Hoddie 2007: 10; Toft 2010: 7). Civil wars in Africa have specifically seen a dramatic increase in the use of bargaining and negotiated peace processes to end warfare since the fall of the Berlin Wall (Harbom et al 2006).

However, it is important to note that conflicts do not only end with negotiations and bargaining. Certainly, many conflicts in Africa and elsewhere do not simply end because of a negotiated settlement that emerges from the give and take of a peace process. Quite to the contrary, many civil conflicts end in outright military victories by one side or the other (Luttwak 1999). The example of the war between the Angolan government under the control of the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA) and the rebel movement União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) illustrates this point. In the long, vicious Angolan civil war, attempted negotiated settlements came and went with the conflict only ending when the MPLA government defeated UNITA on the battlefield (Emmanuel and Rothchild 2007: 182-184). Furthermore, a number of civil conflicts in Africa have ended in external military interventions, the recent French-led intervention in Mali comes to mind (Poirson and Tarrit 2013).

Peace is not easily achieved through bargaining. This is because the stakes are extremely high in war, especially in internal conflicts. As Roy Licklider (1995: 681) points out, a key assumption is that civil wars are “difficult to resolve by negotiation” because the rival parties have to share the same state institutions and resources, and live next to each other as neighbors once the fighting subsides. The civil wars in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) or the Cote d’Ivoire, among others, illustrate this point. This leads to an exceptionally high risk of reoccurring violence and the frequent failure of peace processes, in Africa, like elsewhere. Peace process can be perilous for the involved parties (Bah 2010; Stedman et al. 2002). Fundamentally, it is hard to judge if the other side’s commitment to peace is genuine. It is extremely difficult to obtain accurate and reliable information about an adversary’s intentions. Are they using the peace process to stall and rearm? After an agreement, will the other side abide by it in the future? These are among the many questions that plague peace processes. Some argue that this period is so difficult that most agreements never even last long enough to attain the implementation period (Stedman et al. 2002: 663). Licklider (1995: 685) adds empirical support for the fact that peace agreements break down into renewed fighting much more often than do out-right military victories by the state or rebel groups. Yet, what are the patterns in the relationship between economic aid and peace?

Foreign assistance after a devastating civil conflict can have deep implications for donors and recipients alike. Donors historically direct large amounts of foreign economic and humanitarian assistance to help facilitate peace and stabilize post-conflict situations after the achievement of an agreement. Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sudan all illustrate international efforts to use aid to ease peace processes and

increase their likelihood of the end of conflict. Donors clearly desire to have a positive impact in these instances. They gain from the resulting goodwill, a strengthening of the international state system, the enhancement of international norms, and the extension of a zone of peace in which they can engage in commerce and investment. For the war-ravaged recipients, donor assistance should provide a strong incentive for peace. Extensive economic aid packages promised after the conclusion of a civil war can increase the size of the pie available for division among former warring factions.

In an important example, the aid package offered by the international donor community to Burundi in the five years that followed the 2003 Pretoria Protocol represented a 118% increase in total aid flow from the five years before the negotiated settlement. Aid providers tried to use aid to facilitate the peace process. Countries such as Burundi find themselves in desperate demand of resources to rebuild out of the ashes of war. External donor assistance should clearly help to meet some of these needs. When donors inject aid into a peace process, it represents a clear incentive for peace. This should dramatically reduce the likelihood that civil conflict will reoccur.

Economic support is an important non-coercive incentive (Rothchild and Emmanel 2010). These types of incentives emerge when outside third parties (i.e., donors) offer material benefits to draw parties that are "sufficiently dissatisfied with their present costs... or future prospects" into a bargaining process (Zartman 2001: 301). When third parties offer incentives to raise the costs of continued war or to firm up existing agreements, they expand the benefits that follow from abiding by the new rules of relationship. The adversaries should desire to agree to peace in order to gain the benefits that follow from ending the uncertainty of protracted conflict and creating new

possibilities for economic development. In this context, incentives consist of distributive rewards that encourage the government and the insurgents to shift their priorities and agree to a compromise on the major issues in contention (Rothchild 1997). For all parties involved, the incentives provided by an externally provided peace incentive represent a significant investment in peace. Furthermore, and perhaps more centrally to the argument presented in this research, peace incentives encourage commitment to agreed political institutions and norms, and raise the costs of breaking the new social contract and returning to war.

Part of the logic behind providing a peace incentive during a peace process is that by holding out the prospect of aid, the external actor or actors are attempting to promote a successful settlement of the conflict by making the warring parties stakeholders in the new and hopefully more prosperous post-conflict order. Once a peace process has begun, packages of economic assistance should influence states and rebel groups alike. Centrally, a peace incentive can assist in alleviating the initial grievances that led to the conflict in the first place. Warring parties can convince their respective constituencies to pursue peace by touting the benefits of economic aid, including humanitarian assistance, reintegration of former warring parties, economic recovery, the rebuilding physical infrastructure such as schools and hospitals, among other activities.

### **Patterns in Post-Conflict Aid Distributions.**

Foreign assistance donors can have a significant impact on peace. However, as pointed out in this study, aid providers do not always



provide a peace incentive to post-conflict societies.<sup>1</sup> Out of the 71 negotiated settlements in Africa between 1989 and 2006, 35 (or 49.3%) received an increase in aid from the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) donors after they signed a peace agreement. We argue here that when donors do provide incentives to support peace, as with these 35 cases, it is more likely that peaceful relations will endure. That is to say, the provision of a peace incentive should lower the likelihood that civil conflict will reoccur. It appears that this is evident given this sample of recent African cases.

Three distinct patterns are present in the aid trajectories of post-conflict countries: 1) an aid increase, 2) no increase, and 3) a decline in economic assistance. In the Pattern 1 cases, donors frequently provide substantial reconstruction and development assistance following a peace agreement. This prolonged increase in development aid aims to rebuild the infrastructure and capacity of economies shattered by a civil war. I posit that this type of donor response can have enduring consequences and support the conditions for lasting peace. Pattern 2 cases experience no increase in post-conflict economic assistance. Pattern 3 sees a decline in foreign aid outlays. Patterns 2 and 3 do not help facilitate given peace processes. Nonetheless, each of these aid distributions has a distinct impact on the success of a given peace process.

*Pattern 1: Sustained Increase in Post-Conflict Economic Assistance.*

In Pattern 1 cases, donors provide substantial amounts of aid over an extended period of time (normally from five to ten years)

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1 This study uses total aid distributions from all OECD/DAC donors. These means that the aid flows used in the analysis presented here are actual deliveries, not aid promises from donors.

to facilitate reconstruction and development, helping push along the peace process and strengthening the likelihood that conflict will not re-occur. In the best of all worlds, economic assistance would “gradually rise during the first four years, and gradually taper back to normal levels by the end of the first post-conflict decade” (Collier and Hoeffler 2002: 16). This aid distribution pattern can be seen in the cases of Burundi, DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, and Sudan. OECD/DAC donors attempted to use aid as an incentive to encourage peace. These cases underline the central hypothesis of this research, which posits that this type of increased economic aid pattern can have enduring consequences, and should provide support for the conditions for a lasting peace. It appears logical that the provision of substantial amounts of economic reconstruction and development assistance over an extended period of time should have a positive impact on peace processes (Rothchild and Emmanuel 2006; Emmanuel and Rothchild 2007). However, this is not always the case. Donors do not always support peace agreements with increased aid, as seen with the decreases in aid deliveries to Algeria, Guinea-Bissau, or Somalia.

Understandably, rebuilding from the destruction of protracted warfare can prove extremely costly. Infrastructure lies in tatters and agricultural capacity is frequently devastated. A prolonged increase in aid can help rebuild the capacity of the economies in countries shattered by an internal conflict. Furthermore, under such conditions, donor contributions towards reconstruction and development can play a large part in keeping the warring parties on the path to reconciliation once the process of peace implementation begins. This offer of economic assistance should provide a significant incentive to bargaining parties to sign on to agreements and stick to them.

Centrally, donor aid presents them with resources for use in co-opting support from their various constituencies. The hope is that the offer is enticing enough to harden "the political resolve of internal actors to maintain the momentum of the peace process" (Boyce 1996: 130). In pattern 1 cases, we argue that aid donors can exert a considerable amount of influence on the behavior of the various actors negotiating peace accords.

*Pattern 2: No Increase in Post-Conflict Economic Aid*

Cases in Pattern 2 see no increase in their aid allocations during a peace process, leaving a flat aid distribution. Here donors have little faith in the peace process or the former warring parties and decide to maintain previous economic aid levels, but not to fund additional reconstruction and development projects. This aid distribution pattern does not have a positive impact on the ability of the former warring parties to reach a lasting peace. Since aid incentives are expected to help encourage bargaining and therefore facilitate peace, maintaining the size of the aid pie would not change the willingness of the combatting parties to continue the peace process. In these instances, there is no peace incentive and donors do not provide any significant increase in aid after the termination of the conflict. Cote d'Ivoire during the 2005 Pretoria Agreement is a clear example of this pattern.

*Pattern 3: A Decrease in Post-Conflict Economic Aid*

A surprisingly common pattern seen in this research is a significant decline in economic aid across the five years following a peace agreement (compared with the aid levels in the five years before a peace accord). In these cases, donors demonstrate a complete lack

of confidence in the given peace process and opt not to provide their support for it. One can distinguish a number of cases that follow this negative aid pattern, including Chad, Djibouti, Guinea-Bissau, and Somalia, among others. This type of aid distribution does not represent an incentive for actors involved in peace process, and does not appear to support their efforts to secure peace. However, Pattern 3 brings up an important general point concerning peace processes and aid incentives. Flows of international donor assistance are the result of donor choices, based on their perceived national interests and the desire to have their aid programs look successful. This means that donors may decide only to send their assistance to recipients that they believe are highly likely to achieve a lasting peace. Donors may select not to fund peace processes in which they have little confidence. For example, critical international aid providers such as France and Germany decided to reduce funding to Chad across most of its failed peace processes since 1989 (Emmanuel and Rothchild 2007). That is to say, donors actively send their economic aid to recipients that they believe will have successful peace processes, and denying it to those that they think will fail. This concentration of assistance to support cases that appear to be on the right track strengthens this study's claims that aid can be used to facilitate peace, but that there are also limits to the impact of donor aid. This needs to be explored in future research.

### **Conclusion:**

This study asks two critical questions. First, how does economic assistance influence the success or failure of peace processes in Africa? Second, can economic assistance act as an incentive to

facilitate an end to conflict? The literature on the subject largely ignores aid as a factor supporting peace processes. In addressing this topic, the current study tries to assess the impact of donor economic aid on recent African peace processes. This research points to the conclusion that international assistance can be a positive incentive for a lasting peace if provided as an incentive for peace.

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## 講 演

# UNDP と SDGs 持続可能な未来への取り組み

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みなさん、こんにちは。本日は UNDP の活動を通して、SDGs とは何かということについてお話していきたいと思いますので、宜しくお願いします。

SDGs のポイントは「人間の安全保障」—「ヒューマン・セキュリティ」が確保されることです。人間の安全保障という言葉には、欠乏からの自由、恐怖からの自由、尊厳ある人間生活という三つの主要素が確保されるという定義があります。SDGs の採択の文書には「ヒューマン・セキュリティ」という言葉は書かれていません。これは、セキュリティの語意を軍事行動だと考える国が世界の中でいまだに多いことがその理由です。当然、ヒューマン・セキュリティは軍事行動を伴わず、むしろ軍事行動や武力紛争や自然災害で困難に直面している人々に対して自ら立ち直っていける状況をつくることを目指しています。

ヒューマン・セキュリティという考え方を深掘りしてみましょう。人間の安全保障学会で、一昨年、世界的な国際政治学者である武者小路公秀先生がヒューマン・セキュリティについて講義されていました。彼は、『Security』という言葉が『Se』と『cure』の二つに分けて考えました。『Se』は、接頭語で、離していいという状態であり、『cure』は他者をケアすることを意味します。人間が軍隊や警察や医者のお世話にならなくても生きていける状態が『Secure』、『Security』です。武者小路先生は、「ヒューマン・セキュリティを確保することは、国連の目的であり、国家の目的である」とさ

れていました。

2000年にミレニアム開発目標である“MDGs”を採択した国連が、その8つの目標を追求してきたことを通して問題が見えてきました。達成できたこと、できないこともあり、人類にも得意分野と不得意分野があることが分かってきました。それを基に2016年から2030年までの目標として掲げたものが持続可能な開発目標であるSDGsになります。

私の所属するUNDPが、1994年に『人間開発報告書』を発表し、その中で、初めてヒューマン・セキュリティと持続可能な人間開発というテーマを設定しました。これを執筆したUNDPのエコノミストは日本の学識経験者で、さまざまな検討会をつくりました。この検討会には創価大学創立者の池田大作先生も参加されています。

1994年1月31日に、池田先生が中国の深圳（シンセン）で講演をされていますが、その中で、ソ連とアメリカの冷戦が終わった後の国際社会の構造について、人間中心になっていくというお考えを示された人間主義についてのお話がありました。これは「ヒューマン・セキュリティ」のアイデアを公表した『人間開発報告書1994』が発表される半年前です。

UNDPは1994年の報告書で、平和になれば、大国がお互いにミサイルを向け合っていた時期の膨大な軍事費用が必要なくなるので、そのお金を紛争や災害で困窮している人々に使ってはどうかと提案しました。この「平和の配当」というアイデアなど、人間の安全保障やSDGsの最も根幹の部分が、池田先生の深圳大学講演で問題提起をされているということを指摘しておきたいと思えます。

UNDPという組織についてもお話ししておきたいと思えます。私は2013年末に日本に帰ってくる前にはサハラ砂漠のチャドにおり、その前にも戦争をしていた国を中心にして仕事をしていました。戦争をしている国は立ち直っていない状態であり、人々が困窮しており、国連を最も必要とする場所でもあるので、そのような国へ行き仕事をするのが大半でした。

日本は戦争といった状態にはありませんが、昨今の気候変動による台風災害や極暑等の発生が懸念されています。本日お話することは、私たちがどの

ように未来を考えればいいのかということの基本的な枠組みであり、それが、SDGs に関するお話のテーマです。

国連は、第2次世界大戦が終わった1945年に設立され、原加盟国であるロシア、中国、イギリス、フランス、アメリカという5つの大きな国が、安全保障理事会の常任理事国となりました。当初、敗戦国である日本は4回も国連加盟を望みましたが、そのたびにどこかの常任理事国が拒否権を発動し、加盟ができませんでした。ようやく加盟となったのが、国連が設立されて11年目に当たる1956年でした。

その頃から世界が急速に変わりましたが、特筆すべきは、アフリカから新しい国が数多く出現してきたことでした。それまで植民地支配されてきた国が独立し、大統領が誕生します。新しい国々が自国をよい国にしなければいけないという思いを抱き、国連に集まってきたわけです。そして、1966年に国連開発計画（UNDP）が設立されました。

その新しい国々は、途上国から搾取してきたヨーロッパやアメリカや日本といった先進国からお金を出してもらい、自分たちでネットワークをつくり、いい国をつくるために、ガバナンス、貧困削減、防災、環境、自由、平等といった各目標に取り組んでいきました。1960年代の国連総会は、若い大統領たちがUNDPを利用して自分の国をいい国にすることを目指し、非常に熱気を帯び盛り上がっていたわけです。1960年は池田先生も創価学会の会長に就任された直後であったので、小説『人間革命』の中にもそのような国連総会の様子が書かれています。UNDPは、その後、世界の140の国と地域に展開し、現在では約7,400人の職員が世界で各国の国づくりの手伝いをしています。

UNDPは国連総会がつくった機関の一つですが、他にもさまざまな機関があり、「平和」、「人権」、「開発」の三つをポイントとして各国で活動をしています。「平和」については、PKO派遣等による紛争地域の調停、停戦監視の実施、戦争を起こさないように仲介することもあります。

「人権」を守れていない国には守ってもらえるように強く説得します。私は「開発」という言葉の意味を人々が持っている可能性を引き出すことなのだと考えています。外から新しいことを持ち込み、押し付けることや、何かをただ

単に与えること、施すことは“Develop”になりません。

UNDP は、その国の政府や、世界銀行等の政府機関、NGO、宗教団体を指す FBO 等の国連のさまざまな機関と協力してプロジェクトを進めています。また、ビジネスの世界とも深く関係を持ち、日本では経団連や経済同友会や個々の企業と協力しています。世界中の国で SDGs を目指し、国を再生し、成長戦略をすすめていこうと取り組んでいてもらえることが理想であり、UNDP は各国でそのためのネットワーキングをすることを主な仕事としています。

UNDP は具体的な貧困削減等のプロジェクトも実施します。地球の上には 73 億人の人口がありますが、73 億人が思い切り欲望を満たすだけの資源は地球上にはありません。同じくそれぞれの国が思い切り消費を楽しむと地球の環境はもちません。

現在、地球がサポートできる人口の 1.5 倍に当たる人々が地球上に存在します。その中で特に気を付けなければならないことが気候変動です。地球にはさまざまな種が生まれ、そして、気候変動によって絶滅してきました。今、問われているのは、果たして、私たちホモサピエンスはこの気候変動で生き残っていけるかです。

2015 年に国連で採択された SDGs は、「誰も置き去りにしない」という考えで、経済成長、社会的包摂、環境保護を調和させて進めていくという目標を掲げています。SDGs には 17 の目標、169 のターゲットがありますが、最低限それを実現しなければ、地球は 73 億人の面倒を見きれなくなります。何とかお願いしたいというのがこの SDGs なのです。皆さん自身やその家族が QOL (Quality of Life) の高い状態で人生を歩み、2030 年を迎えてもらいたいということが国連のメッセージなのです。そのために SDGs を深掘りして勉強し、ぜひ実現してもらいたいということが私たちの願いです。

SDGs の 17 の目標と聞くと非常に多く感じるかもしれませんが、UNDP が取り組んでいる 6 つの活動領域は、貧困、国の仕組み、レジリエンス、環境保全、エネルギー、ジェンダー平等です。この 6 つの分野において UNDP は 140 の国でプロジェクトを進めています。

SDGs の前に MDGs という 8 つの目標がありました。その追い込み時期であった頃の 2013 年に、私はアフリカのサハラ砂漠の真ん中にあるチャドにいました。2015 年のリミットまで残り 2 年であり、加速化する必要がありました。私は、軍事独裁で 25 年間君臨しているチャドの大統領へ協力をあおぐために MDGs の説明をしに行きましたが、非常に苦労した思い出があります。

SDGs は MDGs よりも数が多い 17 個の目標なので、さらに大変になると思います。しかし、心配は要りません。この 17 個の目標の一つ一つに 10 個程度の分野別の目標ターゲットが決められていますが、皆さんがどのような職に就いても必ずその仕事はこの SDGs のゴールターゲットを実現するための仕事になっています。自分が本当にしたいことをすれば、必ず皆さんも SDGs に貢献していけます。

SDGs の 17 の目標について大まかに説明すると、目標 1 から 6 は社会目標であり、いわば MDGs の積み残しになります。MDGs はかなりのレベルで達成できました。1990 年代に 19 億人いた 1 日 1 ドル 25 セント以下で暮らす最貧困層が、今では 6 億数千万人になり、3 分の 1 近くに削減されています。努力すれば結果を出せるということが分かったのが MDGs の経験でした。

目標 7 から 12 は新しい目標であり、産業、経済の目標です。働き方、エネルギー、まちづくり、プロダクト・ライアビリティ（製造物責任）、消費者のフェアトレード等です。目標 13 から 15 は環境関連です。目標 16 は皆さんの生活を守る国や行政が法の支配によって信頼できるものでなければいけないと述べており、それを守れば戦争が起きず、平和を実現できます。

先日、神奈川県民フォーラムに招かれましたが、黒岩知事から神奈川県は SDGs 自治体になるという決意が発表されました。神奈川県では SDGs を目指して事業運営するモデル企業に対して法人税を減免することを議会で議論しているそうです。

SDGs の達成には企業の役割が非常に重要となります。日本も ODA の拠出し、外務省や JICA が一生懸命活動して、UNDP もお金を出してきましたが、それだけでは全く足りない状況となっています。

SDGs を実現するためには、年間 5 - 7 兆円もお金がかかります。逆に言

えば、企業はそのようなマーケットでビジネスをすれば必ず収益を上げられるわけです。今までの企業の社会貢献は、CSR 活動が代表されるように寄付が主でありましたが、それだけでは足りない状況があります。

今は「共有価値創造」という考えの下、企業は本業に注力してSDGsに貢献する価値を提供してほしいという考え方にシフトしています。クリエイティング・シェアード・バリュー (Creating Shared Value)、略してCSVと呼ばれ、社会のために価値をつくり出すことが求められています。この言葉は創価の言葉としても認識されていることでしょう。結局はそこに戻ってくるのです。

日本企業は全員が持続可能な社会の実現に資するような価値を提供することを目指しています。経団連、経済同友会の参加企業のCEO、社長、会長にアンケートを採ると、98パーセントの方がSDGsを認識しています。皆さんが就職活動のときに絶対に欠かしてはいけないキーワードはSDGsです。

UNDPも日本がこれだけ進んでいるので、日本のような豊かで平和で安全な国になりたいと思うならばSDGsを達成するために努力してほしいと、それぞれの分野でSDGsを推進する活動を実施しています。その結果、300万人の雇用創出、1億7000万人が有権者登録して選挙に参加できる環境の実現、55カ国でエネルギーへのアクセスが改善されたこと、女性国会議員を増やしていくこと等、各分野で活動をして成果を残しています。

日本は先進国であるため、UNDPが先導する必要はありませんが、一つだけ、困っている問題があります。それは、SDGsの目標5のジェンダー平等、つまり、女性の不平等問題です。優秀な女性の要職や企業役員登用の少なさ、国会議員の数も十分とはいえない状況がこの問題を物語っていると考えられます。

ジェンダー平等について世界で比較すると、日本は世界で111番目という非常に低いところに位置しています。現在、女性が活躍できる社会を目指し尽力していく流れになっています。ぜひ、社会で活躍している女性を応援していきましょう。

UNDPの世界での取り組みについてお話しします。ルワンダではITを勉強

してもらい、スタートアップビジネスを若い方に取り組んでもらっています。NEC 等の IT 企業の生体認証技術は非常に低いコストで利用可能となっているため、マラウイではその技術を応用したプロジェクトが進められています。

チャドに駐在していた際、私のオフィスには200名ほどのスタッフがいました。私は所長として全員の人事情報を管理していましたが、スタッフの情報を見ると自分の誕生日を知らないがゆえに1月1日生まれと書いている方が大半であったことに驚きました。チャドには日本のような管理システムがありませんでした。これが世界の貧しい国における現実なのです。

そこで、UNDP が取り組んでいるのは、赤ん坊の指を生体認証で読み取り ID 登録ができるシステムです。このシステムにより、予防接種の記録、学校に入る際の学籍登録、選挙の際の有権者登録、病院での医療記録等でも全てその ID で管理が可能となります。その取り組みによって、ユニバーサル・ヘルス・カバレッジ (universal health coverage: UHC) への道が開けるわけです。日本のような国民皆保険制度の姿を目指す国が生体認証の技術等を導入しています。

カリブ諸国では台風による災害が多く起きますが、そのような国では、避難所をどこに造るのが適切かといったことを計画するために災害データを集めて分析しています。温室効果ガスである二酸化炭素等を減らすためには、モビリティをどのように確保するかをパッケージで考えなければなりません。それを検討しなければ、いくらガソリン車が温室効果ガス発生のためによくないものといっても、車がないと買い物にも行けないお年寄りや田舎でどのように暮らしていけばいいのでしょうか。このようなことに対する答えを出す必要があります。

SDGs のゴール 3 に、2030年までに交通事故の死者を半分へ減らすというターゲットがあります。世界では交通事故で亡くなる方が数多く存在する国もあり、そこでも UNDP はお手伝いをしています。他にも、中国での水素発電や、エジプトでの女性の起業支援等、さまざまな活動例があります。

SDGs と地方自治体の国際協力についてお話しします。コソボ共和国は、セルビア人がアルバニア人を追放しようとしている状況があり、ジェノサイド、



つまり、集団殺害が行われていました。国際法を犯しているこの行為に対して、北大西洋条約機構（NATO）の多国籍軍がセルビアを空爆した結果、3カ月で戦争は終わりましたが、迫害されたアルバニア人の中にはエスニック・クレンジング、つまり、民族浄化の名の下で、システマチックに女性がレイプされる悲劇が起きました。

そのような悲惨な戦争があると、何年たっても恨みが消えません。しかし、そのような国でも、次に生まれてくる子どもたちの学校を安全にする必要があり、適切な教育を行い、病院も造らなければいけません。そのため、民族和解をしてもらう必要があります。

そこで、日本の抛出による人間の安全保障プロジェクトの一環として、セルビア系、アルバニア系の住民代表が集まり、コソボ・ミトロビツァの市責任者たちと他民族融和フォーラムを立ち上げました。お互いの恨みは理解しつつも、自分たちの子どもに学校で適切な教育を受けさせ、親は働く環境を整えることが重要であることは間違いのないため、ここで一緒に相談し、国づくり、まちづくりを共に協力して実現するよう話し合っています。その結果、ドイツ、オランダの地方自治体からの協力を得て、コソボ南部のプリズレンと同西部のジャコバ間で大型バスの運行が始まり、職場へ公共輸送機関で通える環境を整えるプロジェクトも実現しました。

災害が非常に多い国である日本がどのようにして災害を乗り越えているのか、その知見や取り組みが世界からも注目されています。数多くの方が亡くなるような激甚災害が発生しても、日本はいつの間にか復興しています。そのような強靱な再現力をつけたいと世界の人たちは望んでいます。

東日本大震災の4年後に当たる2015年には、国連防災世界会議が開催されました。関連事業を含め世界中から15万人の人が集まり会議を行った結果、仙台防災枠組という防災のスタンダードができました。その中で話されたことを端的に言うと、今、1ドルの投資をしておけば災害が起きたときに7ドルの損害を防ぐことができるということでした。これは、災害について考えていない開発プランは全てアウトだとも表しています。

国連防災世界会議を通して協力してくれたのは東北大学と富士通でした。東




日本大震災の際に、陸前高田の気仙中学校では、4階建ての校舎が津波に浸かりましたが、地震があった直後に高台である山の上に逃げて、全員が無事に生きられました。しかし、石巻市の小学校では、生徒たちは流されて多くの犠牲者が出てしまいました。

東北大学の災害科学国際研究所の方たちは、この違いは何であったかを真剣に考えたわけです。そのようなデータがアジアの国々へ提供され、20カ国が同様のシミュレーションを行い、データを作成し、富士通のスーパーコンピューターを使い、そして、各国で共有されています。そのデータに基づいて、各国で避難計画等を作成して実際に避難訓練が行われています。日本政府からの援助も受けながら、1万人以上の方が訓練に参加し、現在のところ、8カ国、31校で実施されており(2018年3月現在)、今年は20カ国までに増やすことを目標としてUNDPがプロジェクトを推進しています。

災害に対する備えは非常に重要です。2030年まで生きるための最低条件は災害が発生しても生き延びることです。どれほど豊かに暮らしていても、災害で全てを失ってしまい、命まで失ってしまえば、2030年は来ません。そのことはSDGs自体がアウトになることを意味します。このことも強調しておきたい点です。

日本のSDGsの達成度スコアは78.5点であり、ますますのレベルに達していると思います。しかし、1から17の目標の中で円グラフを見ると分かりますが、でこぼこが目立ち、さらなる努力が必要な目標が存在することが分かります。特に目標5のジェンダー平等の他に、環境関係の目標である14や15が遅れており、真剣に取り組まなければならない状況です。

国連がこのSDGsについて企業経営者や政府関係者にお話しすることも仕事の一つです。日本政府では、内閣総理大臣が本部長を務めるSDGs推進本部を立ち上げて2年たちます。そこには有識者円卓会議があり、私も参加して助言を差し上げています。その円卓会議には、経団連の代表、年金積立金管理運用独立行政法人の理事長、NGOの方等、さまざまな方が参加しており、そのような各界の代表的な有識者との議論を通して、SDGsの課題を発見し、それに取り組んでいくというアプローチをしています。



皆さんも、自分の身の回りや、日本や世界にどのような課題があるか、日頃から考えていただきたいと思います。まちづくりの問題、少子高齢化等、さまざまな課題があると思います。2020年に予定されているオリンピック・パラリンピックはSDGs大会と言われており、地球に環境負荷をかけないように、人々が健康になるよう、オリンピック後の街が住みやすくなるように、全員が参加できて、誰も置き去りにしないことが目指されているため、数多くの課題を内包しています。

企業の方たちはビジネスにおいて、SDGsの課題を見つけて、いかに取り組むかに対して真剣に考えています。課題を解決するようなビジネスをつくり出さないと、企業は生き残っていきません。それをお手伝いする存在として、「SDGs Holistic Innovation Platform」、略して“SHIP”があります。現在、SHIPには80社の企業が参加されて、UNDPがお手伝いをしています。

国連職員は本日ご紹介したような仕事を各国で行っています。現在、UNDPには日本人職員が82名在籍しています。皆さんの中でも、将来の進路として国連職員も選択肢に入るという方は、本日を機会にどのようにしてその国連職員になるかを考えてもらえればと思います。

国連は、平和、開発、人権等、さまざまな分野で活動をしています。国連という立場で仕事をするものの一つのメリットは、中立であるという点です。企業、組織、宗教を問わず中立な立場でさまざまな方とコミュニケーションを取れる点は、私が働いている中でも非常に興味深いことだと感じています。国連の中で生き残っていくことは大変であり、苦労もあると思います。現在、日本政府は国連で働く日本人を増やすため、2025年までに現在の766人から1,000人にする目標を掲げてバックアップをしています。そのため、国連職員になりたい人は積極的に応募するように日本政府がアピールしています。

国連側も日本人に偏って採用するわけにはいきませんが、日本政府がこの人は優秀だと強くプッシュすれば、採用するケースも多くあり、私もその一人でした。国連職員をキャリアの選択肢の一つとして考えてもらうのもよいかと思います。国連職員に新卒で入ることは高い壁なので、何かの仕事で実績を積み、その道のプロになった方がプロフェッショナルの腕を国連で使いたいというときに職員となるというのが主な流れです。私も外務省に24年間在籍していましたが、最後の4年は国連へ出向していたので期間が重なっていました。その後、外務省を辞め、国連に入職し、17年がたちました。

現在、日本政府は国連で特に邦人幹部職員を増やしたいと考えています。国連では女性職員が多く、日本人女性も多数在籍しています。日本では、女性はさまざまな場面でガラスの壁があると言われていました。パワハラやセクハラに耐えている女性も多いのかもしれませんが、国連ではあってはならないことになっているので、そのようなことは起きないようにしています。

ぜひ、創価大学からSDGsのリーダーを輩出してもらいたいと思います。特に、皆さんの大学の創立者である池田先生はそうに思っておられると思います。皆さんの今後のご活躍を期待しています。



## 講 演

# ユネスコスクールと地球市民教育 — SDGs のめざす未来像との関係で —

玉川大学 教育学部 教授 小 林 亮

## ユネスコとユネスコスクール

こんにちは、玉川大学教育学部の小林亮です。本日は360名の参加と聞いて圧倒されていますが、皆さんとのスモールワークも行い、質疑応答の時間を設けたいと思っていますので、どうぞ積極的かつ主体的に参加してください。

まずはユネスコとユネスコスクールについてお話したいと思います。ユネスコは教育、科学、文化を通じて人類の恒久的な平和・福祉を実現することを目的としています。ユネスコ憲章の前文に、「戦争は人の心の中で生まれるものであるから、人の心の中に平和のとりでを築かなければならない」という、多くのスピーチや講演、書籍にも引用されている有名な言葉があります。第2次世界大戦終戦直後に設立された国連専門機関として、戦争はもう二度としたくないという当時の人たちの思いが強く反映された言葉であり、創価大学の教育理念とも合致しているいい言葉だと思います。

ユネスコ本部はパリにあります。皆さんが冬休みや夏休みでパリに行くことがあれば、ぜひユネスコ本部にお立ち寄りください。パリ市第7区にあるナポレオンが若い頃に学んでいた陸軍士官学校（エコール・ミリテール）の真向かいにあり、エッフェル塔の近くでもあります。ユネスコ事務局の窓からはエッフェル塔がよく見えます。ユネスコ本部の建物は、フランスの建築家ル・コルビュジエが設計した三矢型の面白い形をしています。上野にある国立西洋美術

館も同じル・コルビュジエが設計したものです。ということで、ユネスコは建物からして非常にユニークです。

地球の地図を月桂冠で飾った国連のロゴマークは有名なのでよくご存じだと思いますが、ユネスコのロゴマークについてはいかがでしょうか。ユネスコのロゴは、古代ギリシャ神話で学問と芸術の神であるアテナを祀ったパルテノン神殿のファサードを模しています。このように古代の文化遺産は現在の世界でもさまざまな文化的影響を及ぼしています。ギリシャの首都アテネにあるパルテノン神殿はユネスコの世界遺産にも登録されていますので、皆さんもギリシャに行かれたらぜひ一度ご覧になってみてください。壮大な神殿で、大変感動的です。

このユネスコ（国際連合教育科学文化機関）がつくった世界的な学校間ネットワークがユネスコスクール（ASPnet）です。1953年（昭和28年）に設立されました。1953年というと第二次世界大戦終戦から8年しかたっていません。ユネスコの掲げた理念を、政府や国連機関が指し示すだけではなく、小学校、中学校、高校といった教育の現場で児童・生徒たちに伝えていかなければいけない、学ぶ人たちの心（マインドセット）をより平和志向的なものに変えていかなければいけない、という趣旨のもとに、価値教育のための拠点としてユネスコスクールが設立されたわけです。

設立当時、わずか15学部、33校で発足しましたが、現在、ユネスコスクールがある国は182カ国、学校数は約1万1500校です。加盟校は世界中で刻々と増えているので、正確な数は言えませんが、とにかくすごい数です。うれしいことに、日本はユネスコスクール発足当時の1953年から加盟している創設期のメンバーなのです。また、意外に思われるかもしれませんが、北朝鮮も日本と同じくユネスコの加盟国であり、ユネスコスクールがあるそうです。今や北朝鮮も加盟しているほど、世界中ほとんどの国が加盟している学校間ネットワークがユネスコスクールなのです。

ユネスコ発足当時は、親を亡くした、子どもを亡くした、友人を亡くした、家を焼かれた等さまざまな戦争被害を受けた人々の間で平和への思いが強く、日本でも平和教育への取り組みとしてユネスコとスクールは非常な盛り上がり

を見せました。しかし、1960年代に入ると学生運動等さまざまな政治的イデオロギーによって国内が揺れる時代となり、ユネスコスクールも政治的な影響を受けることになりました。そして1970年代、ちょうど創価大学が創立されたぐらいから2000年ぐらいまでの30年間は、日本の経済成長が著しかった時代でもあり、生活が豊かになり、「平和」があまり切実な意味を持たなくなったのか、ユネスコスクールは停滞の時代でした。それが21世紀に入って大きく情勢が変化しました。

国連は2000年に「ミレニアム開発目標 (MDGs)」を採択しました。本日のテーマでもある「持続可能な開発目標 (SDGs)」の前身です。そして、2002年、ヨハネスブルグで開催された国連サミットでは、持続可能な社会をつくっていく人材育成が大事だということで、「持続可能な開発のための教育 (ESD)」が採択されました。このESDの誕生により、急速に状況が変化したのです。具体的には日本では、当時の政府 (小泉内閣) が、ユネスコスクールを「持続可能な開発のための教育 (ESD)」の推進拠点として再活性化しようと考えたのです。その結果、停滞していたユネスコスクールはめざましい発展を遂げ、2018年の現時点で、日本国内のユネスコスクールは1,149校に上っています。

国内ユネスコスクール1,149校の内訳として一番多いのは小学校です。次に中学校、高校と続き、大学の加盟校は5校です。ユネスコスクール自体に加盟している大学は、宮城教育大学、奈良教育大学、愛知教育大学、三重大学、そして私が在籍している玉川大学です。玉川大学は唯一の私学ですが、それ以外は全て国立の教育大学です。

その他、発達障害等さまざまな障害に直面している児童・生徒を支援する特別支援学校もユネスコスクールに加盟しています。また、幼稚園も日本国内だけで26園がユネスコスクールに参加しているのです。この事実から、ユネスコの追求する価値教育は、じつは幼児期からの教育課題だということが皆さんにお分かり頂けると思います。

私が奉職している玉川大学教育学部では、卒業後、小学校もしくは幼稚園の教員、あるいは保育士になる学生が大多数です。幼稚園の先生や保育士を志望

している学生にユネスコスクールのお話をすると、「自分たちとはあまり関係がない」という学生もいます。しかし、幼稚園でもユネスコスクールの教育を進めているのだということを、是非、認識して頂きたいと思います。他にもシユタイナー学校や外国の児童生徒を教育するインターナショナルスクールにもユネスコスクール加盟校があります。

ユネスコスクールのロゴマークはいわゆる多重図形です。地球を現す丸い図の上に学校での学びを表象する本と子供の成長を示す若葉の二重の意味を持たせた図案で構成されています。ユネスコスクールのロゴは、必ずユネスコのロゴとあわせ



て表示するようにユネスコ本部が指示しています。日本では三菱UFJ銀行が社会貢献事業として、日本ユネスコ協会連盟と連携して作成したロゴマークの金属プレートを、ユネスコスクールに加盟した全ての学校に寄贈しています。

ユネスコスクールには、ユネスコが進めている平和を中心とする価値教育の推進拠点という役割があります。ユネスコはこれまで戦後70余年にわたり、様々な価値教育のイニシアティブを展開してきました。最初は1953年に「国際理解教育」を立ち上げ、1998年には「平和の文化」を提唱しました。さらには2000年には、「文明間の対話」プログラムを提唱しました。また、「文化の多様性」や「持続可能な開発のための教育 (ESD)」、「地球市民教育 (GCED)」、「文化の和解」といった教育課題に取り組んできました。グローバル社会のさまざまな問題を解決していくためのユネスコの教育イニシアティブはもちろん全ての人に向けられているわけですが、それらの価値教育をとくに重点的に進めていく一番の推進拠点がユネスコスクールなのだとということをご理解頂ければと思います。

ユネスコスクールには重点的な学習テーマが定められています。忘れていけないのは、ユネスコスクールといっても、ふつうの公立学校あるいは私立学校であり、国語・算数・理科・社会・英語といった教科学習が行われているということです。それらと別の教科を立てるということではなく、通常の教科教育の中で、児童・生徒たちに重点的に伝えていってほしいという意味での学習



テーマです。

さまざまな教科学習の時間、今度教科化された道徳も含めた授業時間、あるいは総合学習の時間、ホームルーム、特活、クラブ活動（課外活動）等で、「持続可能な開発のための教育」、「地球市民教育」、「異文化間学習」と関連した学習を特に重点的に進めていってほしいという指針を、パリのユネスコ本部がユネスコスクールのネットワークで全世界に向けて発信しています。

ユネスコ本部のホームページを見ると、ユネスコスクールには、「平和のナビゲーター（“Navigators of Peace”）としての役割が期待されている」と記述されています。つまり、さまざまな課題を抱える世界で平和を構築していくために、特に教育がどういう方向で児童・生徒たちを導いていけばいいのか、その指針を決める上で主導的役割が求められているのがユネスコスクールの役割だということです。

現在、日本国内にあるユネスコスクールは文部科学省や日本ユネスコ国内委員会の支援を受けながら、平和と持続可能性を追求する教育活動を精力的に進めています。「ユネスコスクール全国大会」や研修会等で、ユネスコスクール加盟校の教員間で情報交換し、学び合い、お互いに支援やアドバイスをすると、この活動が保障されているところにユネスコスクールというネットワークの大きな強みがあります。

そして日本には、ユネスコスクールの取り組みを支援する「ユネスコスクール支援大学間ネットワーク（ASPUnivNet）」という大学のネットワークがあります。ASPnetとは“UNESCO Associated Schools (Project) Network”の略号で、ユネスコスクールのことです。それを高等教育の立場から支援する大学間ネットワークが日本にあるのです。2008年の11月に発足しました。

大学は教育機関であるとともに研究機関です。ユネスコスクールはどちらかというと小学校や中学校が中心になっていますが、それを高等教育機関である大学と一緒に支援をしていこうという仕組みがこのASPUnivNetで、ユネスコスクールを舞台にした学校と大学のこうしたコラボは、世界で初めての取り組みです。ユネスコスクールを応援する大学のネットワークが日本にできたこ

とは、パリのユネスコ本部はじめ、海外でも非常に注目されています。

ユネスコスクールの活動をさまざまな意味で支援するのが ASPUnivNet の役割です。例えば、ある学校がユネスコスクールに加盟したい場合には申請書の提出が必要ですが、平和教育や持続可能な社会づくりのための教育実践をしていること等、パリの本部に提出するためには加盟申請書を英語もしくはフランス語で作成しなければいけません。普段現場で忙しく授業をされている先生方にとって、こうした外国語による申請書作成の業務は大変です。そこで、ASPUnivNet の加盟大学が、単に翻訳だけではなく、教育活動の内容に関する支援やアドバイスを行っています。ESD の視点から見るともう少しこの活動を強調しておいた方がよいのではないか、あるいは教科間のつながりについてこのようなビジョンを提示すれば説得力を持つのではないか等、ASPUnivNet 加盟大学の教員は、加盟申請校のためにさまざまなアドバイスを提供し、また教員研修などの支援を行っています。

ユネスコスクールは世界的な学校間ネットワークなので、海外のユネスコスクールとの交流に向けた支援も ASPUnivNet の役割の一つです。今は SNS やインターネットが発達しているので、時差や言語の違いはあっても、たとえばテレビ会議や Skype、メール等を使って、さまざまな形での学校間国際交流ができる時代です。

例えば、アフリカ諸国のユネスコスクールと交流したいが、どこに連絡したらいいのか、交流のきっかけが見つからないといった場合に、大学自体もそうですし大学の教員も世界のさまざまな国との交流網を持っている場合が多いので、そうした国際ネットワークを生かして、「そうしたテーマでしたら、この国のこの学校と連絡を取ってみてはいかがでしょうか」といった形の支援をします。

2018年現在、全国22大学が ASPUnivNet に加盟しています。創価大学も ASPUnivNet に加盟して下さいました。東京都における ASPUnivNet の加盟大学は、現時点では創価大学と玉川大学の2大学だけです。ASPUnivNet には、それぞれの加盟大学がユネスコスクールを支援する地域分担が決められています。東京について言えば、東京西部地域は創価大学、23区を含む東部は

玉川大学が担当する取り決めができています。

こうした事情から考えれば、創価大学生の皆さんはユネスコスクールを応援する任務を帯びた当事者であるといえるでしょう。特に学校教員を目指そうとされる方は、創価大学がユネスコスクールを支援する拠点大学だということを認識し、できれば実際の支援活動にさまざまな形で参加して頂くといいのではないかと思います。

## 持続可能な開発のための教育（ESD）

次に話題を ESD に移しましょう。ここであらためて確認しておきたいことは、20世紀に起きた第一次世界大戦、第二次世界大戦のような全人類を巻き込んだ悲惨な戦争は二度とやってはいけないという強い決意を持って設立された、恒久平和を実現するための国際機関が国際連合であり、教育、科学、文化、コミュニケーションを通じた平和構築をめざす国連専門機関がユネスコであるということです。

そもそも、平和とは何でしょうか、そして、平和を実現するためにはどうすればよいのでしょうか。例えば、トルストイの有名な小説に『戦争と平和』がありますが、ここでは平和はどのように描かれているのでしょうか。平和とは戦争のない状態だと言う人も多いと思います。では、戦争がなければ平和なのでしょうか。

私は玉川大学教育学部の教員であり、また臨床心理士としてスクールカウンセラーも務めているので、特に目につくのが学校現場におけるいじめや親の虐待といった児童生徒を苦しめる問題です。他の子からの身体的な暴力や嫌がらせ、いじめを受けているだけではなく、今はネットを使った、精神的にじわじわと追い詰めていく陰湿ないじめもあります。戦争をしていない「平和な」日本に暮らしているからといって、いじめや虐待を受けている子どもの生活が平和といえるのでしょうか。絶対に平和ではありません。彼らにとっては毎日が地獄なのです。そういうことから、「平和とは何か」という問題を今一度原点に立ち返って考えてみることは、ユネスコスクールを支援する任務を帯びた創

価値大学の皆さんにとって非常に意味のあることだと思います。

そこで、皆さんに配布した資料『わたしの平和宣言』(Manifesto 2000)を読んで頂きたいと思います。ノーベル平和賞受賞者など世界を代表する識者が、新世紀開幕前の2000年に集まり、世界中で国家の対立、民族紛争やテロが起きているが、国連・ユネスコの理念である平和を実現するためにはいったいどうすればいいのかについて討議しました。その結果を非常にシンプルな六つの項目に集約して宣言したものが『わたしの平和宣言』です。

続いて、ショートワークをやってみましょう。4-6人でグループを作ってもらいます。各グループで、「平和宣言」の6つの項目の中で一番心に響いた宣言、これは私たちにとって特に大事だと思ったものを一つだけ選んでください。そして、その項目の内容を実現するために、自分自身が日常生活の中で具体的にどのようなことをすべきか、できるかを話し合ってください。それでは3分間で討議に取り組んでください。

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それでは時間になりましたのでお話をやめてください。全てのグループに討議の結果をお聞きしたいところですが、時間の制約もありますので、何人かにうかがってみましょう。

グループ1 私たちのグループでは4番の宣言、「相手の立場になって考えます」を大切にしたいという意見になりました。本当は、全体的に考えれば1番を大切にしたいのですが、少し抽象的な感じがしましたので、4番をとりあげました。相手の立場に立つということは、自分に分からないことがあったり、その人のバックグラウンドが分からなかったとしても、まず生命を大切にすることにつながるのではないかと思ったからです。

小林 ありがとうございます。素晴らしい答えです。相手の立場に立って考える、相手を尊重することが実は生命を大事にすることにつながりますよね。ですから、実は「わたしの平和宣言」の1番と4番はつながっているという指摘は鋭い分析です。非常に良い意見だと思います。ありがとうございました。

グループ2 私たちは、3番の「思いやりの心を持ち、助け合います」を選択しました。理由としては思いやりの心があれば、6つの項目どれにも対応できると考えたからです。助け合いがあれば全ての生命を大切にすることにもつながるので3番が一番重要だと思いました。

小林 そのために、あなたたちグループは何ができると思いますか。

グループ2 創価大学の学生としては、やはり普段から対話をし、相手のことを知ることだと思います。

小林 なるほど。ありがとうございます。非常にいい答えです。みなさんはそれを実践されていると思います。実は今年の10月に私は創価大学で講演したことがあります。その際、教育学部の校舎の場所が分からずに迷っていたときに、学生の方が「どこかお探しですか」と場所を教えてくださいました。とても助け合いの精神が満ちているキャンパスだと思って感動しました。まさにその通りです、ありがとうございます。

グループ3 私たちは、5番の「かけがえのない地球を守ります」を選択しました。まずは地球を大切にすることが私たちにとって具体的なことができると思ったからです。これから自分たちがよりよい環境で生きていくということを考えて5番を選びました。

小林 では、そのために私たちができる行動は何でしょうか。

グループ3 地球環境ということであれば、プラスチック減少のためにエコバッグを使うとか、節電をするといったことが考えられるので、そのための行動を取っていけばいいと思いました。

小林 皆さんありがとうございました。お答えいただいた3グループの方はそ

れぞれ違ったものを選択され、きちんと当事者意識を持って考えてくれた意見でどれも胸に響くいい答えだったと思います。今後も、自分が平和を実現するためには何ができるのか、成績評価ということとは別に自分の宿題として、人間としての課題として考えてもらえればと思います。この他にもよい答えがたくさんありそうですが、時間の制約上、次の話題に移りたいと思います。

日本のユネスコスクールは、『わたしの平和宣言』が出された2000年の時点では全国でわずか24校でしたが、今では1,149校まで急成長しています。これほどの急成長が達成できた要因としては、文部科学省が強く後押ししてユネスコスクール推進事業を進めていることがあります。文部科学省はユネスコスクール推進にあたって、ESDの推進拠点を作っていく取り組みとしてこれを取り上げたのです。つまり、ESD実践を先頭に立って進めていくのがユネスコスクールだという定義です。

ESDとはEducation for Sustainable Development、つまり「持続可能な開発のための教育」の略で、ユネスコがすすめている価値教育の一つです。皆さんは教育学部だけではなく法学部や経済学部等の方もいると思いますが、「持続可能性」という言葉は今日さまざまな所で使われています。今回、文部科学省が学校教育の基本指針として学習指導要領を新しく改訂した中にも、持続可能という言葉が入っています。つまり新しい学習指導要領には、持続可能な社会の担い手をつくる教育が大事だと明記されていますので、ある意味でESDは日本の教育政策における国是だと言ってもかまわないと思います。

ESDについては比較的長い歴史があり、この歴史は地球環境の悪化と連動しています。特に2002年、皆さんはまだ生まれて間もない頃だと思いますが、当時の日本政府（小泉内閣）が南アフリカのヨハネスブルグで行われた世界首脳会議でESDを提唱しました。これからは持続可能な社会をつくっていく人材育成をしていかなければ人類社会はもたないというメッセージです。

そして、ESDがめざす目標を人類全体の考えとして明文化したもの、可視的に分かりやすい形で示したものが国連の「持続可能な開発目標（SDGs）」であるといえるでしょう。SDGsでは、2030年に向け、人類社会として持続可能

な未来をつくるための17の目標が掲げられています。この目標は、途上国や一部の人たちが取り組めばいい課題ではなく、私たち人類全員が取り組まなければいけない開発目標です。ちなみに、SDGsについては、現在日本政府もESDとの関係でその普及と実践を重視しており、またさまざまなメディアでも広く取り上げられるようになっていきます。

例えば、ピコ太郎さんがSDGsの広報動画“PPAP”をつくっています。PPAPは世界的にヒットした元々のPPAPではなくて、同じメロディーに乗せて“Public & Private Action for Partnership”と踊っている動画がYouTubeで見ることができます。他にも、吉本興業の芸人の方が関西弁で面白おかしく「SDGs 数え歌」をつくっていて、これもYouTubeで見ることができます。

ESDが提唱されるに至った大きな契機は環境問題でしたが、環境教育だけではなく、現在ではESDの教育課題は非常に学際的に捉えられており、国際理解教育や学力問題、さらには、これは私の専門になりますが心の問題、社会問題といったもの全部に関わっています。ESDは非常に多角的で学際的な教育イニシアティブなのだということも、皆さんに知っておいて頂きたい点です。

人類の存続を難しいものにする「持続不可能な現実」という点では、地球環境問題だけでなく、社会文化的な問題も非常に重要なわけです。さまざまな問題を解決して人類の持続可能な発展を実現していくためには、私たちの生き方自体を改革していかなければいけない、新しい価値を創造していかなければならないということです。

文部科学省は、学校現場で児童生徒たちに親しみやすい形でESDを学んでもらいたいということで独自の教材も開発しています。「今日よりいいアースへの学び」という副題をつけ、『ESDクエスト』というタイトルの冊子を作り、ユネスコスクールをはじめ、さまざまな教育関連機関に配布しています。この『ESDクエスト』の中では、このままでいくと2050年までには地球の温度は平均1度上昇してしまう等、地球が直面している諸問題についてイラストも交えて分かりやすく解説しています。

ユネスコの中心的な課題として学びがありますが、ユネスコ21世紀教育国際委員会のジャック・ドロール委員長が1996年に『学習：秘められた宝』と題した報告書を発表しました。同報告書に「21世紀は人類にとって四つの学びが一番大事になる時代」だと書かれています。その四つの学習の柱とは何かというと、一つ目は『知ることを学ぶ』(learning to know)、二つ目に『実践することを学ぶ』(learning to do)、三つ目は『人間として生きることを学ぶ』(learning to be)、四つ目が『共に生きることを学ぶ』(learning to live together) です。

知る・実践・生きるはどちらかという古典的な哲学における三領域、つまり認識論、倫理学、存在論(形而上学)に対応するわけですが、共生することの学びが大きな学習の柱だと言ったのは実はこの報告書が初めてであろうと思います。ここからも見て取れるように、私たちの時代の大きなキーワードとして「共生」があるのです。

「共生」を説くことは簡単ですが、実際に身近なこととして自分の行動を含めて考えるのは意外と難しいことではないでしょうか。一番身近なところで言うと、たとえば男性と女性では、考え方や感じ方が違い、お互いの気持ちがわかりにくい、理解が難しいということが多いのではないのでしょうか。また、世代間の相違、学生の視点と教員の視点の相違ということはどうでしょうか。「なぜ先生はこういうことを言うのだろうか」、逆に教員は、「なぜ最近の学生はこうなのか」といったように世代間の相互理解も難しいものです。

関東人と関西人の違いということもよく言われますが、立場や文化的背景を異にする人との相互理解は意外と難しいものです。創価大学では仏教の信仰をお持ちの方が多いと思いますが、世界には仏教以外の宗教もたくさんあります。皆さんは、キリスト教信仰を持っている人との対話を上手にできますか。また、創価大学への外国人留学生にはたとえばインドネシアなどイスラム教国からの学生も多くいらっしゃると聞きましたが、その人たちとの相互理解はうまくできているのでしょうか。

価値観、行動様式、文化的背景などが自分と違う人たちとどのようにうまくやっていけるかが、21世紀の私たちに課せられた大きな宿題だと思います。異



質な人たちとの共生こそ、現代社会における最大の教育課題だと言えるでしょう。またこれと関連して、未来の世代と私たちの世代との共生、自然環境と人間社会との共生、日本と諸外国との共生といったさまざまな共生の側面を見ていく必要があります。

日本のユネスコスクールでは、それぞれ特色あるカリキュラムや学習活動を実践しているのですが、例えば、奈良県の東大寺の近くにある興東館桐生中学校では、伝統文化をテーマとし、地域特性を生かしたユニークなESD学習（世界遺産教育）を推進しています。

この中学校では奈良時代の先祖たちと自分たちとが実は深くつながっていることを体験するために、平城宮の仕事体験や宮中で使われていた四字熟語を書くといった学習活動を行い、平城宮で演奏されていた雅楽の鑑賞などを行っています。また、給食として古代米や飛鳥汁を提供するなど「ESD給食」という取り組みもあります。いずれも非常にユニークな学習活動で、奈良の地域特性をうまく生かしているESD実践だと思います。

## 地球市民教育

最後に地球市民教育についてお話したいと思います。実は持続可能な開発のための教育（ESD）と地球市民教育（GCED: Global Citizenship Education）は同じ目標をめざしています。この二つのプログラムは、平和で持続可能な社会を創っていくためにユネスコがすすめている未来教育プロジェクト、未来志向の価値教育なのです。世界的に見れば、ユネスコスクールはこの二つの教育プロジェクトの推進拠点と位置づけられています。

地球市民教育とは、要するに地球市民としての資質を育む教育ということです。前国連事務総長のパン・ギムン氏はグローバル教育の第一人者でもあり、2012年に「グローバル教育第一イニシアティブ」（Global Education First Initiative）を発表し、人類が直面している課題解決のためには三つの教育課題が最重要だと提唱しました。

一つは世界全ての子どもを就学させることを掲げています。世界には学校に

行けない子どもはまだ何億人もいて、日本の人口よりも多いのです。全ての子どもにまずは教育を与えなければ、児童の権利を守っていることにはならないということです。

ただ、こういう話をすると恐らく皆さんの中には、でもそれは日本の課題ではない、途上国の課題と思う人もいるのではないのでしょうか。本当にそうなのかと私は聞きたいと思います。日本では一応全児童が就学していることになっていますが、現実問題として学校に行けていない児童・生徒が多くいます。現在、日本全国で不登校児童生徒数は13万人を超えていることをご存知でしたか。私は心理臨床にかかわるスクールカウンセラーとして、学校に行けない子どもが日本にもたくさんいるのだという事実注意到喚起しておきたいと思います。

学校はあるし、行く権利はもちろんありますが、学校で疎外され、いじめられている、また、勉強についていけない、あるいは家庭の貧困の問題等のさまざまな原因で学校に行けないのです。不登校児童生徒数が13万人を超えているという現実、就学は途上国の問題だけではなく日本の問題でもあることを如実に示していると思います。

「グローバル教育第一イニシアティブ」は、教育の最優先課題の二つ目に、質の高い教育の実現を掲げています。何が質の高い教育か、これも重要な検討課題です。三つ目は地球市民性の育成を掲げています。パン・ギムン国連事務総長が提唱したこの三つの優先課題に基づいて、持続可能な開発目標(SDGs)の4に『質の高い教育を全ての人に』がうたわれており、その達成指標7には、持続可能な開発のための教育、持続可能なライフスタイル、人権、男女の公平、平和の文化、非暴力の推進、地球市民性、さらには文化的多様性の尊重、持続可能な開発に向けた文化の貢献、等が掲げられています。地球市民性とは、まさにSDGsの大事な目標の一つであるということです。

ユネスコの見解としては、ESDと地球市民教育は同じ課題状況に基づく教育プログラムであり、全ての人を巻き込んでいる地球的問題に関わっているので共通のニーズに応える教育イニシアティブだということになります。そして、グローバル社会の諸問題に当事者として積極的な貢献ができる人を育成す

ることが地球市民教育の大きな目標になります。市民性教育（公民教育）は昔からありますが、まずは皆さん自身が世界に対して当事者になれているかどうか、社会の一員としての責任感や積極的関与ができているか、ここが問われます。まずは皆さん自身に地球市民になってもらいたいと思います。また、将来教育に関わろうとしておられる方、学校教員になる方は、ぜひとも子どもたちを立派な地球市民に育てていってほしいと希望します。

ここで、よくある誤解を解いておきたいと思います。地球市民性の向上は、別に私たちの日本人性を否定することにはなりません。私たちのアイデンティティは多元的で複合的な構造をもったものだからです。これはまた、アイデンティティの多様性を受け入れる寛容さが大切であることを意味します。例えば皆さんの中で仏教徒の方がいれば、仏教徒以外の方たちを否定しないことが地球市民性の態度です。この授業の出席者の中には日本人以外の方もいると思いますが、その方たちの文化的特徴や民族性を否定しない、あるいは見下げたりしないことはとても大事です。自分と違う人を受け入れていく態度（多様性の尊重）が地球市民性のとても大事な発達課題になるだろうと思います。

ユネスコは地球市民性を育てていくための発達モデルを認知的領域、社会情動的領域、行動的領域と三つの領域に分けて提唱しています。地球市民性を育成するためにはどういった課題を達成していかなければならないかといった学習課題チャートも作成しています。今後、地球市民性の育成に向け、ユネスコが提唱するこうした学習モデルを学校現場で実際の教育活動にどう活かしていくか、どのように授業実践に落とし込んでいくかが大きな課題になってくると思います。

先日、ユネスコ本部で行われた専門家会議で、地球市民教育の教材作りに関わってきましたが、例えば葛藤解決や総合性とといった課題が地球市民教育では非常に大事になってくると思います。時間的に全部を扱うことはできないので、一つだけ皆さんに紹介したいと思います。

認知的領域、社会情動的領域、行動的領域の3領域のうち行動的領域について、ユネスコが特に重視しているのは対話です。先ほど、池田大作先生の名誉博士号や名誉教授号等数々の記録が展示されている池田大作研究センターを案

内して頂きました。例えば、20世紀を代表する偉大な歴史学者であるトインビー博士と池田大作先生が対話をされた記録が非常に印象的に展示をされているのを見て、創価大学は対話を建学の理念として重視されていることがよく分かりました。

ユネスコも対話を強調しています。先ほども申しましたように、自分と違う人と一緒にやっていく、共生するためには前提条件として対話がなければいけません。私もまだ対話が十分にできているとは言えない現状なので、あまり偉そうなことは言えませんが、みなさん自身がよき地球市民として成長していくために、いろいろな意味で自分と立場の違う人との対話を積極的に行うことを強くお勧めします。

具体的に言えば、日本人の方は日本人以外の方と対話をしたほうがいいし、仏教徒の方は仏教以外の信仰を持っている方とぜひ対話をすると思います。女性であれば男性と対話をしたほうがいいし、男性は女性と対話をしたほうがいいです。若い世代であれば年長の人や、あるいはもっと小さい、若い人たちと対話をするといったように、さまざまな形で自分とは異質な人たちと対話をしていくと思います。そのような「主体的、対話的で深い学び」を進めていくことが大事だと新しい学習指導要領にも書いてあります。つまり「対話」は、日本の学校教育の基本方針でもあるということです。その対話の場として、実はユネスコスクールが大きな可能性を秘めていることを指摘したいと思います。

現在私は、玉川大学で教師養成のための「ESD 実践学習プログラム」を進めています、そのためにさまざまなワークシートを作っています。

ひとつの事例として日韓関係について学ぶためのワークシートを御紹介したいと思います。日韓は隣国で民族的にも文化的にも実は結構近く、お互いの交流も今は非常に盛んです。皆さんの中に韓国籍の方がいらっしゃるかもしれませんね。私は何度か韓国に行ってさまざまな交流活動をしていますし、韓国の方もたくさん日本に来ていて、お互いにとても大事なパートナー、隣人です。その一方で、日本による植民地支配や第2次世界大戦といった深刻な負の歴史があり、そうした歴史的トラウマに起源をもつ難しい政治的な課題や葛藤問題

も日韓の間には多く存在します。

最近では、第2次大戦中の徴用工に対する賠償問題で、韓国の最高裁が判決を出したことに對して日本政府が反発をするという問題が起きています。しかしながら、皆さん、まさにこれこそ対話を通じて平和をつくっていくために、とても大事な課題、チャレンジングな学習課題だと思いませんか。まず隣国と仲良くできなければ、世界平和は実現できません。日韓の間に難しい問題がたくさんあるのは分かりますが、まさにそれだからこそ、対話の努力を諦めてはいけないと思います。

従軍慰安婦像の問題は徴用工の問題とも重なっていますが、皆さんの中にはソウルに行ったことがある方がたくさんいると思います。ソウルの日本大使館の前に行くと、大使館に向けて従軍慰安婦像が置かれています。日本人にとってはギョッとする光景ですが、もちろん韓国の方は撤去しません。その従軍慰安婦像の背後には、「独島（竹島）は明らかに韓国の土地だ」等、日韓問題に関わるさまざまな政治的メッセージが書いてあります。そこで、なぜそのような従軍慰安婦像が日本大使館の前に置いてあるのか、背景には一体何があるのかを実際にユネスコスクールの生徒に調べてもらいました。

この問題だけをみると、いかにも日本と韓国は仲が悪くて、互いにいがみ合っているように見えるかもしれません。しかしそれは事実の一面でしかありません。日韓の長い関係史を見ると、江戸時代の朝鮮通信使のようにとても友好的で深い文化交流の実績のあることもわかってきます。

日韓関係の歴史にはポジティブな面とネガティブな面の両方があるということを理解した上で、それでは本当の和解をするためには日本と韓国とはそれぞれ何をすればいいのか、そもそも和解とは何か、許すとはどういうことなのか、また、それに向けて日本人としてできることは何か、韓国人として知ってもらえることは何か。こうした諸問題を一緒に考えていきましょうというのが今回作成したワークシートの趣旨です。教師育成のための授業において、実際にこうしたワークシートを活用した学習活動をできればと思っています。

これは国同士の関係でも個人の関係でもそうですが、お互いに過去のさまざまな争いでトラブルがあったときに、どのようにわだかまりを解いて許し合っ

ていくのか、その課題に真正面から向き合うことが大事です。こうした和解の仕事がなければ、本当の平和は訪れません。一方が絶対に相手のことは許さないと思っていたら平和は訪れないわけです。それでは歴史的トラウマを克服するために、お互いにどのような対話をし、どのように学び合いをすすめていったらいいのかとについてお話すべきところですが、残念ながら時間がなくなってしまいました。ですので、私の話はここまでにさせて頂き、学生の皆さんからの質問、御意見をうかがいたいと思います。ありがとうございました。

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質問一 ユネスコスクールで様々な教育が行われていることをお伺いしましたが、それが先生たちから子どもたちに一方的にならないように、教師もまた児童・生徒から学ぶことができる関係性が大事だと思いました。そのような教育のために教師の方々が学習する場、環境はあるのでしょうか。

小林 先ほども申しましたが、ユネスコスクールの理念、あるいはユネスコの価値教育の理念は「全員野球」の精神です。もちろん、教師は学生や生徒を教える任務はありますが、学生から教わる謙虚さ、あるいは幅広さもとても大事です。ただ教える・教えられる関係ではなくて、全員が持続可能の問題、平和の問題、地球市民の問題に取り組んでいかなければいけません。ユネスコスクール加盟校では、そのために様々な教育プログラムを展開しています。ただ、学校一つでできることは限られていることもあり、例えば、文部科学省が、毎年1回、全国のユネスコスクール関係者を集めてユネスコスクール全国大会という全国規模の研修会を実施しています。ここでは教師も参加するし、教育委員会など行政関係者も参加するし、生徒も学生も参加します。

来月2018年12月8日土曜日に、文部科学省主催の「第10回ユネスコスクール全国大会」が横浜市立みなとみらい本町小学校で開催されます。パリの本部からもユネスコ職員が来賓として参加されます。共に学び合うことはとても大事な営みなので、さまざまな地域研究会や大学主催の教員研究会なども行われています。非常にタイムリーでいい質問でした、ありがとうございました。

## 講 演

# FAO と持続可能な開発目標 (SDGs)

国際連合食糧農業機関 (FAO) 駐日連絡事務所所長

チャールズ・ボリコ

みなさん、こんにちは。本日はFAOの活動を通して、SDGsとは何かということについてお話していきたいと思いますので、宜しくお願いします。

国連には食料・農業関連の3つの機関があります。農業・食料生産プロジェクトへの資金提供を行う銀行である国際農業開発基金 (The International Fund for Agricultural Development: IFAD)、緊急食料援助を行う国連世界食糧計画 (United Nations World Food Programme: WFP)、そして国連食糧農業機関 (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations: FAO) です。いずれもローマに本部があります。

FAOは、「活動的且つ健康な生活を人々がおくる為の十分な高品質の食料へ持続的にアクセス出来るために、知識を創出・共有する」ための活動に取り組んでいます。高品質の食料を持続的に十分に確保するためには、自らが食料を生産、確保していく必要があります。

そのためには可能な限り自分たちの力で、身近な所で生産できる土地が必要です。これは成功の可能性を非常に高め、コストも削減できます。この仕事を担当するのがFAOです。

また、持続可能性が高いことが重要であり、そのように取り組めば、全員が十分に高品質な食料を手に入れることが可能になります。その結果、活動的で健康的な生活が獲得できます。これがSDGsの掲げる持続可能な方法なので



す。

FAOは国連食糧農業機関なので、理系や農業学、食料学、栄養学に関する勉強をしなければ入職できないのではないかと思われるかもしれませんが、会議を管理する方、コンピューターのスペシャリスト、お金の管理をする方等、重要な仕事が多岐に存在するので、どのような勉強をしてもFAOに入職することは可能だと考えています。

その証拠に、私も人事職として入職しました。それほど幅の広いデマンドとミッションを持っている国連機関はFAOくらいです。日本人の方を数多く採用したいと考えているので、是非、みなさんもチャレンジしてください。

FAOの本部はローマにあり、地域事務所が5カ所、地域支所が10カ所あります。サモアのアピアの事務所長は日本人女性であり、インドの国事務所代表も日本人が務めています。連絡事務所としては、モスクワ、横浜、ブリュッセル、ジュネーブ、ニューヨーク、ワシントンの6カ所にオフィスがあります。

国事務所は途上国にあります。79カ所のオフィスを持っています。今年のデータを見ると、2,500以上の現場プロジェクトが世界中で実施されています。つまり、FAOに入職すればさまざまな国で仕事をすることが可能となります。創大生の皆さんも、このように働き甲斐のある機関で仕事をすることをめざして欲しいと思います。

FAOの任務と役割はSDGsが中心であり、食料安全保障の達成が目的です。SDGsの目標2に掲げる、「飢餓をゼロ」にするまで私どもは休めません。役割の一つ目として、「中立的討議の場の提供」が挙げられます。加盟国が集まり、問題が起きる前や多発する前に一緒に話し合い、方向性を決めます。

国同士の軍事衝突も解決すべき問題です。例えば、ある川が複数の国を流れている地域で上流側の国がその川を汚すと下流の国に悪影響を与え、争いの火種になります。しかし、FAOがあれば、各国で集まり、その問題について話し合いの上で解決することが可能になります。このFAOの役割は、世界平和の構築にも大きくつながっているといえます。

二つ目の役割である、「情報の収集・分析・提供」も非常に重要です。信頼度の高いデータを世界中から収集し、それを分析し、データベースを作り、い



ろいろな出版物を出して、それらを各国に提供します。いいデータがあれば、6カ月後、1年後といった将来に起こる災害等の問題の見通しやその対処法、復興方法がすぐに分かり、早期警戒、早期予防が可能となります。これが、研究データの素晴らしい点です。データ収集には衛星のデータやドローンという素晴らしい技術も活用しています。

三つ目の役割として、「政策支援」があります。蓄積したデータを利用して、さまざまな国に向けて、干ばつ等のさまざまな自然災害に対して、持続可能性を保つために自然資源の管理や利用方法の検討が必要だということを理解してもらいます。

四つ目の役割として、「開発援助を通じた知識・技術の普及」を行います。現場に行き、生産技術等を伝えます。食料問題は農業だけに限らず、林業、畜産業、水産業、気候変動も全て関係してきます。このような取り組みは人々の食料援助への依存を減らすことにつながり、どのように自然資源を利用し、管理すれば持続可能になるかについて教えることができます。

『世界の食料・農業事情』について考えてみます。実は、世界には全ての人が食べられる十分な量の食料があるにもかかわらず、現在、約8億2100万人の人々が栄養豊富な食料を満足に手に入れることができていません。

世界の飢餓人口のグラフを見ると、栄養不足人口とその蔓延率の割合は2005年から2015年までの間で徐々に減少していました。世界の人口が増加している中で栄養不足人口の割合がこれほど下がってきていたことは価値のあることだと思います。しかし、残念ながら過去3年間で再度上昇してきています。SDGsの目標では2030年までにこれをゼロにしなければいけません。

世界には9人に1人の割合で食料を満足に手に入れることができていない人が存在します。人数の面で見ると、この人々の3分の2がアジア人です。当然、中国やパキスタンやインドのような国の人口が影響していることもあるかと思えます。しかし、割合の面から見ると、アフリカは非常に過酷な状況であり、4人に1人が十分に食べることができていません。

ここで重要なのは、乳幼児死亡の約45パーセントは栄養不良に関連しているデータであり、食べ物さえあればこの子どもたちが救えるのです。しかし、現

実には多くの子どもが亡くなっており、どこかに存在する食べ物がその子どもたちに届いておらず、これは非常に大きな問題と捉えられます。もう一つ重要な点は、毎年の飢餓による死者の数は、マラリア、結核、エイズによる死者の合計を上回ります。そして、栄養不足による世界経済への損失は毎年3兆5000億ドル相当と推定されています。

食料安全保障を脅かす要因の一つ目は貧困です。食料を買いたくてもお金がありません。資料には、日本の4人家族1世帯とチャドの6人家族1世帯における1週間分の食料を載せていますが、非常に大きな差があることが分かります。(東京の家族の一週間の食費は約3万8千円、チャドの家族の一週間の食費は約100円)

十分に食べることができていない人がいる国がある一方、BRICsでは経済発展、社会発展により必要以上に食べるという現象が起きています。ここで多く食べられるものが肉となります。豚肉と牛肉の需要がBRICs諸国で急速に上がっていています。最近ではガーナのような国でも豊かになると肉を多く食べて、肥満率が上昇しています。

WHOのデータによると肥満率がどの地域でも上昇しています。ここでの問題は上昇が続いているという点です。1975年以来、肥満人口は3倍になってしまっています。日本は先進国の中で肥満率が4パーセント程度と最も低い国であり、食に対する教育やユネスコの無形文化遺産に登録もされた和食の影響が大きいと考えています。

食料安全保障を脅かすもう一つの要因が世界人口の増加です。今の傾向が続くと、2050年までは97億人にまで達します。現在の食料生産性を60パーセント程度増加させなければこの97億人の人々は食べることができなくなります。食料生産性を増加することは技術的には可能ですが、問題は、どの程度の水や農薬を使えば環境を壊さないで、皆さんの子どもたち、孫たちのために汚れていない地球を残せるかということです。

気候変動と自然災害も食料問題に大きく関わります。気候変動に対して脆弱な状況にある国では、気候変動が起これるとその国の栄養不足人口が上がります。気候変動はさまざまな問題をはらんでおり、食料生産の努力を台無しにし

てしまう可能性があります。

次の要因として挙げられるのは「紛争」です。先ほどの満足に食料を得ていない約8億2100万人がどこに住んでいるかという、その60パーセントが紛争の影響下にある国であり、40パーセントが紛争のない国となっています。紛争がある国では栄養不足蔓延率が高いことが明らかになっています。紛争があることによって栄養不足人口が増えることは事実ですが、決して一方通行ではなく、食べ物がないことが紛争の原因になる所も存在します。

食料価格は上下を繰り返しています。2004年から2005年辺りの食料価格の上昇でもブルンジ共和国のような国でも大きなデモ等のトラブルが起きます。さらに、2008年辺りまでの上昇があると、紛争がなく静かであった国でも14カ国で大きなトラブルが起きています。その後、少し下がりますが、2008年前後から2011年前後までの価格上昇があると、約20カ国で大きなトラブルが発生しました。つまり、食べられないこと自体がトラブルの原因となることを示しています。国連は、FAO のデータをよく検討した上で、2018年に国連安全保障理事会で初めて紛争と飢餓の関連性についての決議を採択しました。それほど世界的に大きな問題となっています。

十分な食料は生産されていますが、各国の競争のために大豆やトウモロコシ等がバイオ燃料の生産に使われており、現在でも残念ながらこの傾向が続いていることも大きな問題の一つとして挙げられます。

「食料ロス・廃棄」の話に移りますが、これは、皆さんも本日から取り組めることでもあります。日々、十分な量の食料は生産されていますが、その3分の1は誰にも食べられずに捨てられています。最も問題なのは、消費者の段階で捨てられる食べ物が多いことです。途上国では消費者の手に入ればほとんどが消費されますが、日本を含めた先進国では必要以上に食べ物を買ひ、電気や冷蔵庫があるにもかかわらず、一部を食べて一部を捨てるのが普通になっています。これは非常に残念なことです。根菜、果物、野菜は45パーセントが誰にも食べられずに捨てられています。捨てることは、当然、生産に使われた土地、水、エネルギー等が全て無駄になることを意味します。世界の食料ロスや廃棄による損失を金額にすると、毎年約2兆6000億ドルにも上ります。

この廃棄されている3分の1の食料を生産するためには中国の面積よりも広い土地が使われています。そこに多くのエネルギー、人力、水、農業を使用し、生産した結果、捨てられているのです。そして、世界では多くの人々が食べ物に困窮しています。現在、これが非常に大きな国際問題に発展しているのです。

食料廃棄の処分は、温室効果ガスの発生の問題も引き起こしており、中国、アメリカに次いで第3位の温室効果ガス発生原因となっています。つまり、食料廃棄は自分自身にも悪影響を及ぼす行為であり、地球を汚してしまっている行為でもあるのです。

日本でも多くの食料廃棄がなされています。日本人1人の1日当たりの食料廃棄量はご飯茶わん1杯分の食料に相当します。現在、日本の年間食料廃棄量は640万トンを超えており、一般的なプールの約1万7250杯以上の食料が捨てられています。

実は、廃棄されている食べ物の4分の1だけ利用されれば、先ほどの困窮している約8億2100万人が十分に食べることが可能となります。SDGsの目標12に、『つくる責任・つかう責任』が掲げられています。われわれ消費者には使う責任があります。そのためには、可能な限り1人当たりの食料廃棄を半減させることが必要です。2030年までに食料廃棄をゼロとして、何も捨てない世界の実現が目指されています。これは可能だと考えています。

皆さんも本日から意識してみてください。必要以上に買わず、必要以上に作らず、必要以上はお皿に載せないということが重要です。家での料理で余ったものは翌日のお弁当に入れることや、外食では食べ切れることを前提に注文し、残ったものは持ち帰るといった心掛けが大切です。賞味期限についてもいま一度考え直してみてください。賞味期限が切れているものだとしても、保存状態が適切ならば食べられるものも多いはずですよ。

このような話を、今日、初めて聞いたという方は数多くいると思います。皆さんもぜひご自分のご家族、友達同士でこのことについて話してください。食料廃棄をやめるべきだと感じて、自分たちのためにもよくないと思ってください。皆さんご自身のためにも、この地球を守っていく必要があるということを知ってください。

意識してみてください。

御清聴ありがとうございました。



## 研究所報

# 活動報告

1. 以下の通り、創価大学平和問題研究所運営委員会を開催した。

【開催日／会場】2018年4月6日 中央教育棟 第1会議室

※以下の事項について審議し、了承された。

1. 研究所運営委員会の構成について
2. 平和問題研究所所員委嘱の件
3. 研究活動計画について
4. 平和講座等について

【開催日／会場】2018年11月22日 中央教育棟 第1会議室

※以下の事項について審議し、了承された。

1. 2018年度活動状況について
2. 2019年度活動計画と予算について

2. 以下の通り、研究所員会を開催した。

【開催日／会場】2018年4月25日 平和問題研究所

※以下の事項について審議し、了承された。

1. 研究所の構成について
2. 研究プロジェクトの発足について

【開催日／会場】2018年7月11日 平和問題研究所

※以下の事項について審議し、了承された。

1. 研究プロジェクトの進捗状況について

【開催日／会場】2018年11月28日 AW1027

※以下の事項について審議し、了承された。

1. 科研費プロジェクトの紹介
  2. G20会議開催について
  3. 2019年度の活動について
3. 創価大学、韓国・慶南大学、台湾・中国文化大学の3大学による国際会議「ピース・フォーラム沖繩」を、2017年9月7日より9月10日まで沖縄県恩納村にて開催した。詳細については議事録を参照。(研究所ホームページにPDF版を掲載  
<https://www.soka.ac.jp/pri/resarch/proceeding2017/>)
4. 2018年9月8日、創価大学にて日中国交正常化提言50周年記念「日中新時代フォーラム」が開催され、玉井所長が基調講演を行った。詳細については『人民日報海外版日本月刊』特別増刊号〔日本東方出版社2018年10月1日〕も参照。
5. 2018年10月6日より10月9日まで、第2回ピースフォーラムが台北で開催され、田中副学長、玉井所長、小出稔教授、中山賢司准教授が参加した。玉井所長、小出教授、中山准教授の報告内容等、詳細については本誌別掲。
6. 研究プロジェクト「アジアにおけるマルチラテラリズム」の研究活動の一環として、「日本におけるG20サミット開催への展望」(“Prospects and Possibilities for Japan’s G20 Summit 2018”)をテーマとする会議を本学にて開催した。概要については本誌掲載のルックハースト報告を参照。また、ルックハースト教授の以下のレポートなども参照。  
 “Refocusing on the G20 Policy Agenda: Beyond the Summitry Show”



(<http://risingpowersproject.com/refocusing-on-the-g20-policy-agenda-beyond-the-summitry-show/>)

“Prospects and Possibilities for Japan’s 2019 G20 Osaka Summit”

(<https://blogs.die-gdi.de/2018/12/19/prospects-and-possibilities-for-japans-2019-g20-osaka-summit/>)

([https://www.soka.ac.jp/files/en/20181207\\_102056.pdf](https://www.soka.ac.jp/files/en/20181207_102056.pdf))

7. 2018年12月15日、ユニセフハウスに開催された『『日本の人間の安全保障』指標』発表記念シンポジウム（【主催】「人間の安全保障」フォーラム、日本ユニセフ協会 【後援】人間の安全保障学会、日本国際交流センター、SDGs 市民社会ネットワーク）に玉井所長、佐々木論教授が出席し、佐々木教授が報告を行った。
8. 平和講座、共通科目「平和と人権」、「環境と開発」を以下の通り開催した。また、創価高校との高大接続事業として同校「平和学入門」にて教員を派遣し、授業を行った。

#### 平和講座〔平和学Ⅱ〕（2017年度・前期）

金曜・4時限 AB103教室

No.	実施日	講師 / テーマ
1	4月7日	玉井秀樹教授（文学部）・平和問題研究所所長 ガイダンス（授業予定、平和学の概要、到達目標の検討）
2	4月14日	【第95回平和講座】 樹下智氏 聖教新聞外信部 「揺れる欧州統合」
3	4月21日	玉井秀樹教授（文学部）・平和問題研究所所長 【講義】 現代世界における平和の脅威とその克服
4	4月28日	【第96回平和講座】 マイケル・ノーベル博士 （平和問題研究所客員教授） 「現代世界における平和の脅威とその克服」

5	5月12日	高橋宗瑠講師（本学非常勤） 【講義】 難民問題
6	5月19日	佐々木論教授（看護学部） 【講義】 貧困と健康からみる人間の安全保障
7	5月26日	高木功教授（経済学部） 【講義】 グローバル経済の発展と私たちの生き方
8	6月2日	玉井秀樹教授（文学部）・平和問題研究所所長 【講義】 日本国憲法の平和主義と安全保障政策
9	6月9日	杉本一郎教授（国際教養学部） 【講義】 「アジアの世紀」を生きる
10	6月10日	玉井秀樹教授（文学部）・平和問題研究所所長 【講義】 現代世界における平和の脅威とその克服
11	6月16日	栗原淑江講師（東洋哲学研究所） 【講義】 女性と人権（1）
12	6月23日	栗原淑江講師（東洋哲学研究所） 【講義】 女性と人権（2）
13	6月30日	高橋宗瑠講師（本学非常勤） 【講義】 ビジネスと人権
14	7月7日	岩木秀樹講師（本学非常勤講師） 【講義】 イスラームと平和
15	7月14日	玉井秀樹教授（文学部）・平和問題研究所所長 リフレクション（到達度判定アンケート）

平和講座〔平和学Ⅱ〕（2017年度・後期）

金曜・4時限 AB103教室

No.	実施日	講師 / テーマ
1	9月15日	玉井秀樹教授（文学部）・平和問題研究所所長 ガイダンス（授業予定、平和学の概要、到達目標の検討）
2	9月22日	玉井秀樹教授（文学部）・平和問題研究所所長 【講義】 平和学への招待：戦争、暴力、平和

3	9月29日	中山賢司講師（法学部） 【講義】 北東アジアにおける平和の創造
4	10月13日	佐々木諭教授（看護学部） 【講義】 貧困と健康からみる人間の安全保障
5	10月20日	碓井健寛准教授（経済学部） 【講義】 日本の貧困問題について
6	10月27日	碓井健寛准教授（経済学部） 【講義】 夜間中学とは何か
7	11月3日	玉井秀樹教授（文学部）・平和問題研究所所長 【講義】 現代世界における平和の脅威とその克服
8	11月10日	【第97回平和講座】 マイケル・ノーベル博士 （平和問題研究所客員教授） 「現代世界における平和の脅威とその克服」
9	11月17日	石井秀明教授（平和問題研究所） 【講義】 軍縮・開発・平和
10	11月24日	高橋宗瑠（本学非常勤講師） 【講義】 難民問題
11	12月1日	高橋宗瑠（本学非常勤講師） 【講義】 ビジネスと人権
12	12月8日	【第98回平和講座】 大沼保昭教授 （東京大学名誉教授／平和問題研究所客員教授） 「戦争と平和」
13	12月15日	井手華奈子准教授（教育学部） 【講義】 平和教育（1）
14	12月22日	井手華奈子准教授（教育学部） 【講義】 平和教育（2）
15	1月12日	玉井秀樹教授（文学部）・平和問題研究所所長 リフレクション（到達度判定アンケート）

## 平和講座〔平和と人権〕(2018年度・春期)

金曜・4時限 M401教室

No.	実施日	講師 / テーマ
1	4月6日	玉井秀樹教授(文学部)・平和問題研究所所長 ガイダンス(授業予定、平和学の概要、到達目標の検討)
2	4月13日	玉井秀樹教授(文学部)・平和問題研究所所長 【講義】 平和学の課題としての人間の安全保障(1) — 現代の武力紛争
3	4月20日	玉井秀樹教授(文学部)・平和問題研究所所長 【講義】 平和学の課題としての人間の安全保障(2) — 日本の平和安全保障政策を考える
4	4月27日	【第99回平和講座】 Dr. Sung Yong Lee (オタゴ大学、国立平和・紛争研究センター) 「人道的介入と平和構築：ジレンマと課題」
5	5月11日	栗原淑江講師(東洋哲学研究所) 【講義】 女性と人権(1)
6	5月18日	栗原淑江講師(東洋哲学研究所) 【講義】 女性と人権(2)
7	5月25日	【第100回平和講座】 マイケル・ノーベル博士 (平和問題研究所客員教授) 「一人一人の生命の尊厳—創立者の平和提言に学ぶ」
8	6月1日	玉井秀樹教授(文学部)・平和問題研究所所長 【講義】 平和学の課題としての人間の安全保障(3) — SDGs への取り組み
9	6月8日	佐々木諭教授(看護学部) 【講義】 貧困と健康からみる人間の安全保障(1)
10	6月15日	佐々木諭教授(看護学部) 【講義】 貧困と健康からみる人間の安全保障(2)
11	6月22日	井手華奈子准教授(教育学部) 【講義】 平和教育(1)
12	6月29日	井手華奈子准教授(教育学部) 【講義】 平和教育(2)

13	7月6日	【第101回平和講座】 高須幸雄・国連事務総長特別顧問 「人間の安全保障のための取り組み — 誰も置き去りにしない社会への展望」
14	7月13日	中山賢司准教授 (法学部) 【講義】 北東アジアにおける平和の創造
15	7月20日	玉井秀樹教授 (文学部)・平和問題研究所所長 リフレクション (到達度判定テスト・アンケート)

## 平和講座〔環境と開発〕(2018年度・秋期)

金曜・4時限 S201教室

No.	実施日	講師 / テーマ
1	9月14日	玉井秀樹教授 (文学部)・平和問題研究所所長 ガイダンス (授業予定、平和学の概要、到達目標の検討)
2	9月21日	【第102回平和講座】 ガブリエル・ドゥケ・駐日コロンビア大使 「コロンビア環境 SDGs」
3	9月28日	【第103回平和講座】 近藤哲生・UNDP 駐日代表 「SDGs：UNDP の取り組み」
4	10月12日	有里典三教授 (通信教育部) 【講義】 地球環境問題の基本構造とは何か
5	10月19日	有里典三教授 (通信教育部) 【講義】 新しい環境倫理の確立にむけて：地球憲章の理念と特徴
6	10月26日	有里典三教授 (通信教育部) 【講義】 誰が環境問題を解決するのか ：「市民力」と国際環境 NGO
7	11月2日	石井秀明教授 (平和問題研究所) 【講義】 軍縮・開発・平和
8	11月9日	【第104回平和講座】 小林亮教授 (玉川大学) 「ユネスコスクールと地球市民教育 ～ SDGs のめざす未来像との関係で」
9	11月16日	【第105回平和講座】 アリフィン・タスリフ 駐日インドネシア大使 「インドネシアー日本との友好関係60年の歴史と未来」

10	11月23日	【第106回平和講座】 マイケル・ノーベル博士 (平和問題研究所客員教授) 「今求められる再生可能テクノロジー：どのように実現するのか」
11	11月30日	玉井秀樹教授 (文学部)・平和問題研究所所長 【講義】 平和学の課題としての人間の安全保障 — SDGs への取り組み
12	12月7日	碓井健寛教授 (経済学部) 【講義】 離島はどのような「ごみ問題」を抱えているのか？ — ミクロネシア連邦チューク州ウェノ島のごみ減量プロジェクト・ベースライン調査
13	12月14日	【第107回平和講座】 チャールズ・ボリコ FAO 駐日連絡事務所所長 「FAO と持続可能な開発目標 (SDGs)」
14	12月22日	佐藤秀雄 (本学客員教授) 【講義】 人間の安全保障と開発
15	1月12日	玉井秀樹教授 (文学部)・平和問題研究所所長 リフレクション (到達度判定アンケート)

### 創価高校「平和学入門」派遣教員一覧

#### 【2017年度】

No	実施日	担当者	テーマ等
1	4月21日	高木 功 教授	SDGs の意義と私たちの生き方
2	5月12日	佐々木 論 教授	World Health と人間の安全保障
3	5月26日	玉井 秀樹 教授	平和学入門 — 紛争解決の研究
4	6月2日	江口 満 教授	ロシア交流史
5	6月16日	中山 賢司 講師	アジアにおける多元的交流
6	9月15日	久米川宣一 講師	植物を活用した身近な環境改善法と世界的な環境問題との接点
7	9月22日	佐々木 論 教授	World Health と人間の安全保障
8	10月20日	朝賀 広伸 教授	環境保護への取り組み

9	11月10日	小出 稔 教授	グローバル化と文化的ナショナリズムの相克
10	1月12日	杉本 一郎 教授	「アジアの世紀」を生きる
11	1月26日	玉井 秀樹 教授	平和学入門 — 紛争解決の研究

## 【2018年度】

No	実施日	担当者	テーマ等
1	4月20日	高木 功 教授	SDGs の意義と私たちの生き方
2	5月11日	佐々木 論 教授	人間の安全保障と生命の格差
3	5月18日	玉井 秀樹 教授	平和学入門—紛争解決の研究
4	6月15日	小出 稔 教授	グローバル化と文化的ナショナリズムの相克
5	6月22日	杉本 一郎 教授	「アジアの世紀」を生きる
6	9月14日	久米川宣一 講師	植物を活用した身近な環境改善法と世界的な環境問題との接点
7	9月21日	佐々木 論 教授	World Health と人間の安全保障
8	10月26日	玉井 秀樹 教授	平和学入門—紛争解決の研究
9	11月9日	近貞美津子 准教授	食糧問題を考える
10	1月11日	朝賀 広伸 教授	環境保護への取り組み

創大平和研究

第32/33号

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2019年3月16日発行

発行者 創価大学平和問題研究所  
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東京都八王子市丹木町1-236  
TEL : 042-691-8179  
<https://www.soka.ac.jp/pri/>  
印刷所 株式会社 清水工房

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