

2024年度大学院博士前期課程一般入学試験（第I期）問題

研究科名	科目名
文学研究科 人文学専攻	英語

次の二つの英文をすべて和訳しなさい。（下線部については文末注を参照のこと）

Aristotle thought it obvious that all of us seek eudaimonia, which translates as “happiness,” or “flourishing.” A life of eudaimonia is an excellent life for the person living it. The happiness Aristotle speaks of is not mere enjoyment. It isn’t only a state of mind, but rather a combination of activity and pleasure. Aristotle thought that the good life is an active one filled with wise choices and worthy pursuits. No matter how much pleasures you get from sitting in front of the TV and watching *The Simpsons* (a lot, in my case), a life devoted to that fails to qualify as a good life. Aristotle was no hedonist.

Aristotle argued that virtue is an essential element in a good life. In this he agreed with his teacher Plato. Unlike Plato, however, Aristotle did not think that we could be happy on the rack. Virtue does not guarantee a good life; it is necessary, but not sufficient, for our flourishing. Most contemporary virtue ethicists side with Aristotle on this one – enough misfortune can damage a life so greatly as to make it, on the whole, an unenviable one. If a virtuous person loses her beloved family to war or disease, or falls prey to nasty rumors, crushing debt, and crippling disability, then no matter how virtuous, she can fail to gain true happiness.

(Russ Shaffer-Landau, *The Fundamentals of Ethics*)

‘Good,’ then, if we mean by it that quality which we assert to belong to a thing, when we say that the thing is good, is incapable of any definition, in the most important sense of that word. The most important sense of ‘definition’ is that in which a definition states what are the parts which invariably compose a certain whole: and in this sense ‘good’ has no definition because it is simple and has no parts. It is one of those innumerable objects of thought which are themselves incapable of definition, because they are the ultimate terms by reference to which whatever is capable of definition must be defined. That there must be an indefinite number of such terms is obvious, on reflection; since we cannot define anything except by an analysis, which, when carried as far as it will go, refers us to something, which is simply different from anything else, and which by that ultimate difference explains the peculiarity of the whole which we are defining: for every whole contains some parts which are common to other wholes also. There is, therefore, no intrinsic difficulty in the contention that ‘good’ denotes a simple and indefinable quality.

(G. E. Moore, *Principia Ethica*)

(注)

The Simpsons: 『シンプソン一家』（コメディ漫画の題名）

on the rack: 苦痛に満ちて、苦しんで

unenviable: うらやむに足らない、望ましくない

refers A to B: A の注意を B に向ける